237  * @new: The proposed new credentials; alterations should be made here
239  * @effective: A pointer to the proposed new effective capabilities set
240  * @inheritable: A pointer to the proposed new inheritable capabilities set
241  * @permitted: A pointer to the proposed new permitted capabilities set
244  * process's capability sets.  The changes are made to the proposed new
247 int cap_capset(struct cred *new,  in cap_capset()  argument
263 		/* no new pI capabilities outside bounding set */  in cap_capset()
266 	/* verify restrictions on target's new Permitted set */  in cap_capset()
274 	new->cap_effective   = *effective;  in cap_capset()
275 	new->cap_inheritable = *inheritable;  in cap_capset()
276 	new->cap_permitted   = *permitted;  in cap_capset()
282 	new->cap_ambient = cap_intersect(new->cap_ambient,  in cap_capset()
285 	if (WARN_ON(!cap_ambient_invariant_ok(new)))  in cap_capset()
480  * If all is ok, we return the new size, on error return < 0.
531  * Calculate the new process capability sets from the capability sets attached
539 	struct cred *new = bprm->cred;  in bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps()  local
557 		new->cap_permitted.cap[i] =  in bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps()
558 			(new->cap_bset.cap[i] & permitted) |  in bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps()
559 			(new->cap_inheritable.cap[i] & inheritable);  in bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps()
561 		if (permitted & ~new->cap_permitted.cap[i])  in bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps()
724 	struct cred *new = bprm->cred;  in handle_privileged_root()  local
733 	if (has_fcap && __is_suid(root_uid, new)) {  in handle_privileged_root()
742 	if (__is_eff(root_uid, new) || __is_real(root_uid, new)) {  in handle_privileged_root()
744 		new->cap_permitted = cap_combine(old->cap_bset,  in handle_privileged_root()
750 	if (__is_eff(root_uid, new))  in handle_privileged_root()
761 static inline bool __is_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)  in __is_setuid()  argument
762 { return !uid_eq(new->euid, old->uid); }  in __is_setuid()
764 static inline bool __is_setgid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)  in __is_setgid()  argument
765 { return !gid_eq(new->egid, old->gid); }  in __is_setgid()
784 static inline bool nonroot_raised_pE(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,  in nonroot_raised_pE()  argument
789 	if ((__cap_grew(effective, ambient, new) &&  in nonroot_raised_pE()
790 	     !(__cap_full(effective, new) &&  in nonroot_raised_pE()
791 	       (__is_eff(root, new) || __is_real(root, new)) &&  in nonroot_raised_pE()
794 	     __is_suid(root, new) &&  in nonroot_raised_pE()
795 	     !__cap_full(effective, new)) ||  in nonroot_raised_pE()
796 	    (!__is_setuid(new, old) &&  in nonroot_raised_pE()
798 	       __cap_gained(permitted, new, old)) ||  in nonroot_raised_pE()
799 	      __cap_gained(ambient, new, old))))  in nonroot_raised_pE()
810  * Set up the proposed credentials for a new execution context being
817 	struct cred *new = bprm->cred;  in cap_bprm_set_creds()  local
822 	new->cap_ambient = old->cap_ambient;  in cap_bprm_set_creds()
830 	root_uid = make_kuid(new->user_ns, 0);  in cap_bprm_set_creds()
835 	if (__cap_gained(permitted, new, old))  in cap_bprm_set_creds()
841 	 * In addition, if NO_NEW_PRIVS, then ensure we get no new privs.  in cap_bprm_set_creds()
843 	is_setid = __is_setuid(new, old) || __is_setgid(new, old);  in cap_bprm_set_creds()
845 	if ((is_setid || __cap_gained(permitted, new, old)) &&  in cap_bprm_set_creds()
847 	     !ptracer_capable(current, new->user_ns))) {  in cap_bprm_set_creds()
849 		if (!ns_capable(new->user_ns, CAP_SETUID) ||  in cap_bprm_set_creds()
851 			new->euid = new->uid;  in cap_bprm_set_creds()
852 			new->egid = new->gid;  in cap_bprm_set_creds()
854 		new->cap_permitted = cap_intersect(new->cap_permitted,  in cap_bprm_set_creds()
858 	new->suid = new->fsuid = new->euid;  in cap_bprm_set_creds()
859 	new->sgid = new->fsgid = new->egid;  in cap_bprm_set_creds()
863 		cap_clear(new->cap_ambient);  in cap_bprm_set_creds()
869 	new->cap_permitted = cap_combine(new->cap_permitted, new->cap_ambient);  in cap_bprm_set_creds()
876 		new->cap_effective = new->cap_permitted;  in cap_bprm_set_creds()
878 		new->cap_effective = new->cap_ambient;  in cap_bprm_set_creds()
880 	if (WARN_ON(!cap_ambient_invariant_ok(new)))  in cap_bprm_set_creds()
883 	if (nonroot_raised_pE(new, old, root_uid, has_fcap)) {  in cap_bprm_set_creds()
884 		ret = audit_log_bprm_fcaps(bprm, new, old);  in cap_bprm_set_creds()
889 	new->securebits &= ~issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);  in cap_bprm_set_creds()
891 	if (WARN_ON(!cap_ambient_invariant_ok(new)))  in cap_bprm_set_creds()
897 	    (!__is_real(root_uid, new) &&  in cap_bprm_set_creds()
899 	      __cap_grew(permitted, ambient, new))))  in cap_bprm_set_creds()
995  * cevans - New behaviour, Oct '99
1005 static inline void cap_emulate_setxuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)  in cap_emulate_setxuid()  argument
1012 	    (!uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) &&  in cap_emulate_setxuid()
1013 	     !uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) &&  in cap_emulate_setxuid()
1014 	     !uid_eq(new->suid, root_uid))) {  in cap_emulate_setxuid()
1016 			cap_clear(new->cap_permitted);  in cap_emulate_setxuid()
1017 			cap_clear(new->cap_effective);  in cap_emulate_setxuid()
1025 		cap_clear(new->cap_ambient);  in cap_emulate_setxuid()
1027 	if (uid_eq(old->euid, root_uid) && !uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid))  in cap_emulate_setxuid()
1028 		cap_clear(new->cap_effective);  in cap_emulate_setxuid()
1029 	if (!uid_eq(old->euid, root_uid) && uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid))  in cap_emulate_setxuid()
1030 		new->cap_effective = new->cap_permitted;  in cap_emulate_setxuid()
1035  * @new: The proposed credentials
1042 int cap_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, int flags)  in cap_task_fix_setuid()  argument
1051 			cap_emulate_setxuid(new, old);  in cap_task_fix_setuid()
1063 			if (uid_eq(old->fsuid, root_uid) && !uid_eq(new->fsuid, root_uid))  in cap_task_fix_setuid()
1064 				new->cap_effective =  in cap_task_fix_setuid()
1065 					cap_drop_fs_set(new->cap_effective);  in cap_task_fix_setuid()
1067 			if (!uid_eq(old->fsuid, root_uid) && uid_eq(new->fsuid, root_uid))  in cap_task_fix_setuid()
1068 				new->cap_effective =  in cap_task_fix_setuid()
1069 					cap_raise_fs_set(new->cap_effective,  in cap_task_fix_setuid()
1070 							 new->cap_permitted);  in cap_task_fix_setuid()
1149 	struct cred *new;  in cap_prctl_drop()  local
1156 	new = prepare_creds();  in cap_prctl_drop()
1157 	if (!new)  in cap_prctl_drop()
1159 	cap_lower(new->cap_bset, cap);  in cap_prctl_drop()
1160 	return commit_creds(new);  in cap_prctl_drop()
1179 	struct cred *new;  in cap_task_prctl()  local
1229 		new = prepare_creds();  in cap_task_prctl()
1230 		if (!new)  in cap_task_prctl()
1232 		new->securebits = arg2;  in cap_task_prctl()
1233 		return commit_creds(new);  in cap_task_prctl()
1247 		new = prepare_creds();  in cap_task_prctl()
1248 		if (!new)  in cap_task_prctl()
1251 			new->securebits |= issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);  in cap_task_prctl()
1253 			new->securebits &= ~issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);  in cap_task_prctl()
1254 		return commit_creds(new);  in cap_task_prctl()
1261 			new = prepare_creds();  in cap_task_prctl()
1262 			if (!new)  in cap_task_prctl()
1264 			cap_clear(new->cap_ambient);  in cap_task_prctl()
1265 			return commit_creds(new);  in cap_task_prctl()
1284 			new = prepare_creds();  in cap_task_prctl()
1285 			if (!new)  in cap_task_prctl()
1288 				cap_raise(new->cap_ambient, arg3);  in cap_task_prctl()
1290 				cap_lower(new->cap_ambient, arg3);  in cap_task_prctl()
1291 			return commit_creds(new);  in cap_task_prctl()
1301  * cap_vm_enough_memory - Determine whether a new virtual mapping is permitted
1302  * @mm: The VM space in which the new mapping is to be made
1305  * Determine whether the allocation of a new virtual mapping by the current