1 /*
2 * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 *
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
8 */
9
10 #include <stdio.h>
11 #include <limits.h>
12 #include <errno.h>
13 #include "../ssl_local.h"
14 #include <openssl/evp.h>
15 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
16 #include <openssl/rand.h>
17 #include "record_local.h"
18 #include "../packet_local.h"
19
20 #if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) || \
21 !( defined(AESNI_ASM) && ( \
22 defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
23 defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) ) \
24 )
25 # undef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
26 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
27 #endif
28
RECORD_LAYER_init(RECORD_LAYER * rl,SSL * s)29 void RECORD_LAYER_init(RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL *s)
30 {
31 rl->s = s;
32 RECORD_LAYER_set_first_record(&s->rlayer);
33 SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
34 }
35
RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER * rl)36 void RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
37 {
38 rl->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
39
40 /*
41 * Do I need to clear read_ahead? As far as I can tell read_ahead did not
42 * previously get reset by SSL_clear...so I'll keep it that way..but is
43 * that right?
44 */
45
46 rl->packet = NULL;
47 rl->packet_length = 0;
48 rl->wnum = 0;
49 memset(rl->handshake_fragment, 0, sizeof(rl->handshake_fragment));
50 rl->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
51 rl->wpend_tot = 0;
52 rl->wpend_type = 0;
53 rl->wpend_ret = 0;
54 rl->wpend_buf = NULL;
55
56 SSL3_BUFFER_clear(&rl->rbuf);
57 ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl->s);
58 rl->numrpipes = 0;
59 SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
60
61 RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(rl);
62 RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(rl);
63
64 if (rl->d)
65 DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl);
66 }
67
RECORD_LAYER_release(RECORD_LAYER * rl)68 void RECORD_LAYER_release(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
69 {
70 if (SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl->rbuf))
71 ssl3_release_read_buffer(rl->s);
72 if (rl->numwpipes > 0)
73 ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl->s);
74 SSL3_RECORD_release(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
75 }
76
77 /* Checks if we have unprocessed read ahead data pending */
RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER * rl)78 int RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl)
79 {
80 return SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->rbuf) != 0;
81 }
82
83 /* Checks if we have decrypted unread record data pending */
RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER * rl)84 int RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl)
85 {
86 size_t curr_rec = 0, num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(rl);
87 const SSL3_RECORD *rr = rl->rrec;
88
89 while (curr_rec < num_recs && SSL3_RECORD_is_read(&rr[curr_rec]))
90 curr_rec++;
91
92 return curr_rec < num_recs;
93 }
94
RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(const RECORD_LAYER * rl)95 int RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl)
96 {
97 return (rl->numwpipes > 0)
98 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->wbuf[rl->numwpipes - 1]) != 0;
99 }
100
RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(RECORD_LAYER * rl)101 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
102 {
103 memset(rl->read_sequence, 0, sizeof(rl->read_sequence));
104 }
105
RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(RECORD_LAYER * rl)106 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
107 {
108 memset(rl->write_sequence, 0, sizeof(rl->write_sequence));
109 }
110
ssl3_pending(const SSL * s)111 size_t ssl3_pending(const SSL *s)
112 {
113 size_t i, num = 0;
114
115 if (s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)
116 return 0;
117
118 for (i = 0; i < RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer); i++) {
119 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(&s->rlayer.rrec[i])
120 != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
121 return 0;
122 num += SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&s->rlayer.rrec[i]);
123 }
124
125 return num;
126 }
127
SSL_CTX_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL_CTX * ctx,size_t len)128 void SSL_CTX_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL_CTX *ctx, size_t len)
129 {
130 ctx->default_read_buf_len = len;
131 }
132
SSL_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL * s,size_t len)133 void SSL_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL *s, size_t len)
134 {
135 SSL3_BUFFER_set_default_len(RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer), len);
136 }
137
SSL_rstate_string_long(const SSL * s)138 const char *SSL_rstate_string_long(const SSL *s)
139 {
140 switch (s->rlayer.rstate) {
141 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER:
142 return "read header";
143 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY:
144 return "read body";
145 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE:
146 return "read done";
147 default:
148 return "unknown";
149 }
150 }
151
SSL_rstate_string(const SSL * s)152 const char *SSL_rstate_string(const SSL *s)
153 {
154 switch (s->rlayer.rstate) {
155 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER:
156 return "RH";
157 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY:
158 return "RB";
159 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE:
160 return "RD";
161 default:
162 return "unknown";
163 }
164 }
165
166 /*
167 * Return values are as per SSL_read()
168 */
ssl3_read_n(SSL * s,size_t n,size_t max,int extend,int clearold,size_t * readbytes)169 int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, size_t n, size_t max, int extend, int clearold,
170 size_t *readbytes)
171 {
172 /*
173 * If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
174 * packet by another n bytes. The packet will be in the sub-array of
175 * s->rlayer.rbuf.buf specified by s->rlayer.packet and
176 * s->rlayer.packet_length. (If s->rlayer.read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may
177 * be stored in rbuf [plus s->rlayer.packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
178 * if clearold == 1, move the packet to the start of the buffer; if
179 * clearold == 0 then leave any old packets where they were
180 */
181 size_t len, left, align = 0;
182 unsigned char *pkt;
183 SSL3_BUFFER *rb;
184
185 if (n == 0)
186 return 0;
187
188 rb = &s->rlayer.rbuf;
189 if (rb->buf == NULL)
190 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s)) {
191 /* SSLfatal() already called */
192 return -1;
193 }
194
195 left = rb->left;
196 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
197 align = (size_t)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
198 align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
199 #endif
200
201 if (!extend) {
202 /* start with empty packet ... */
203 if (left == 0)
204 rb->offset = align;
205 else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
206 /*
207 * check if next packet length is large enough to justify payload
208 * alignment...
209 */
210 pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset;
211 if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
212 && (pkt[3] << 8 | pkt[4]) >= 128) {
213 /*
214 * Note that even if packet is corrupted and its length field
215 * is insane, we can only be led to wrong decision about
216 * whether memmove will occur or not. Header values has no
217 * effect on memmove arguments and therefore no buffer
218 * overrun can be triggered.
219 */
220 memmove(rb->buf + align, pkt, left);
221 rb->offset = align;
222 }
223 }
224 s->rlayer.packet = rb->buf + rb->offset;
225 s->rlayer.packet_length = 0;
226 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
227 }
228
229 len = s->rlayer.packet_length;
230 pkt = rb->buf + align;
231 /*
232 * Move any available bytes to front of buffer: 'len' bytes already
233 * pointed to by 'packet', 'left' extra ones at the end
234 */
235 if (s->rlayer.packet != pkt && clearold == 1) {
236 memmove(pkt, s->rlayer.packet, len + left);
237 s->rlayer.packet = pkt;
238 rb->offset = len + align;
239 }
240
241 /*
242 * For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets because the read
243 * operation returns the whole packet at once (as long as it fits into
244 * the buffer).
245 */
246 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
247 if (left == 0 && extend)
248 return 0;
249 if (left > 0 && n > left)
250 n = left;
251 }
252
253 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
254 if (left >= n) {
255 s->rlayer.packet_length += n;
256 rb->left = left - n;
257 rb->offset += n;
258 *readbytes = n;
259 return 1;
260 }
261
262 /* else we need to read more data */
263
264 if (n > rb->len - rb->offset) {
265 /* does not happen */
266 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,
267 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
268 return -1;
269 }
270
271 /* We always act like read_ahead is set for DTLS */
272 if (!s->rlayer.read_ahead && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
273 /* ignore max parameter */
274 max = n;
275 else {
276 if (max < n)
277 max = n;
278 if (max > rb->len - rb->offset)
279 max = rb->len - rb->offset;
280 }
281
282 while (left < n) {
283 size_t bioread = 0;
284 int ret;
285
286 /*
287 * Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and
288 * need to read in more until we have len+n (up to len+max if
289 * possible)
290 */
291
292 clear_sys_error();
293 if (s->rbio != NULL) {
294 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
295 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
296 ret = BIO_read(s->rbio, pkt + len + left, max - left);
297 if (ret >= 0)
298 bioread = ret;
299 } else {
300 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,
301 SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
302 ret = -1;
303 }
304
305 if (ret <= 0) {
306 rb->left = left;
307 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
308 if (len + left == 0)
309 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
310 return ret;
311 }
312 left += bioread;
313 /*
314 * reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because the
315 * underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed to
316 * byte oriented as in the TLS case.
317 */
318 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
319 if (n > left)
320 n = left; /* makes the while condition false */
321 }
322 }
323
324 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
325 rb->offset += n;
326 rb->left = left - n;
327 s->rlayer.packet_length += n;
328 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
329 *readbytes = n;
330 return 1;
331 }
332
333 /*
334 * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if
335 * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
336 */
ssl3_write_bytes(SSL * s,int type,const void * buf_,size_t len,size_t * written)337 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, size_t len,
338 size_t *written)
339 {
340 const unsigned char *buf = buf_;
341 size_t tot;
342 size_t n, max_send_fragment, split_send_fragment, maxpipes;
343 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
344 size_t nw;
345 #endif
346 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
347 int i;
348 size_t tmpwrit;
349
350 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
351 tot = s->rlayer.wnum;
352 /*
353 * ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out
354 * than the original len from a write which didn't complete for
355 * non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for
356 * this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be
357 * possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then
358 * promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and
359 * report the error in a way the user will notice
360 */
361 if ((len < s->rlayer.wnum)
362 || ((wb->left != 0) && (len < (s->rlayer.wnum + s->rlayer.wpend_tot)))) {
363 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,
364 SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
365 return -1;
366 }
367
368 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITING
369 && !early_data_count_ok(s, len, 0, 1)) {
370 /* SSLfatal() already called */
371 return -1;
372 }
373
374 s->rlayer.wnum = 0;
375
376 /*
377 * If we are supposed to be sending a KeyUpdate then go into init unless we
378 * have writes pending - in which case we should finish doing that first.
379 */
380 if (wb->left == 0 && s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE)
381 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1);
382
383 /*
384 * When writing early data on the server side we could be "in_init" in
385 * between receiving the EoED and the CF - but we don't want to handle those
386 * messages yet.
387 */
388 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)
389 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_UNAUTH_WRITING) {
390 i = s->handshake_func(s);
391 /* SSLfatal() already called */
392 if (i < 0)
393 return i;
394 if (i == 0) {
395 return -1;
396 }
397 }
398
399 /*
400 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
401 * will happen with non blocking IO
402 */
403 if (wb->left != 0) {
404 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
405 i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], s->rlayer.wpend_tot,
406 &tmpwrit);
407 if (i <= 0) {
408 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
409 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
410 return i;
411 }
412 tot += tmpwrit; /* this might be last fragment */
413 }
414 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
415 /*
416 * Depending on platform multi-block can deliver several *times*
417 * better performance. Downside is that it has to allocate
418 * jumbo buffer to accommodate up to 8 records, but the
419 * compromise is considered worthy.
420 */
421 if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
422 len >= 4 * (max_send_fragment = ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s)) &&
423 s->compress == NULL && s->msg_callback == NULL &&
424 !SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) &&
425 EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx)) &
426 EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK) {
427 unsigned char aad[13];
428 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param;
429 size_t packlen;
430 int packleni;
431
432 /* minimize address aliasing conflicts */
433 if ((max_send_fragment & 0xfff) == 0)
434 max_send_fragment -= 512;
435
436 if (tot == 0 || wb->buf == NULL) { /* allocate jumbo buffer */
437 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
438
439 packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
440 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE,
441 (int)max_send_fragment, NULL);
442
443 if (len >= 8 * max_send_fragment)
444 packlen *= 8;
445 else
446 packlen *= 4;
447
448 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s, 1, packlen)) {
449 /* SSLfatal() already called */
450 return -1;
451 }
452 } else if (tot == len) { /* done? */
453 /* free jumbo buffer */
454 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
455 *written = tot;
456 return 1;
457 }
458
459 n = (len - tot);
460 for (;;) {
461 if (n < 4 * max_send_fragment) {
462 /* free jumbo buffer */
463 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
464 break;
465 }
466
467 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
468 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
469 if (i <= 0) {
470 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
471 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
472 return i;
473 }
474 }
475
476 if (n >= 8 * max_send_fragment)
477 nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 8);
478 else
479 nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 4);
480
481 memcpy(aad, s->rlayer.write_sequence, 8);
482 aad[8] = type;
483 aad[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8);
484 aad[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version);
485 aad[11] = 0;
486 aad[12] = 0;
487 mb_param.out = NULL;
488 mb_param.inp = aad;
489 mb_param.len = nw;
490
491 packleni = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
492 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD,
493 sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param);
494 packlen = (size_t)packleni;
495 if (packleni <= 0 || packlen > wb->len) { /* never happens */
496 /* free jumbo buffer */
497 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
498 break;
499 }
500
501 mb_param.out = wb->buf;
502 mb_param.inp = &buf[tot];
503 mb_param.len = nw;
504
505 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
506 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT,
507 sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param) <= 0)
508 return -1;
509
510 s->rlayer.write_sequence[7] += mb_param.interleave;
511 if (s->rlayer.write_sequence[7] < mb_param.interleave) {
512 int j = 6;
513 while (j >= 0 && (++s->rlayer.write_sequence[j--]) == 0) ;
514 }
515
516 wb->offset = 0;
517 wb->left = packlen;
518
519 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = nw;
520 s->rlayer.wpend_buf = &buf[tot];
521 s->rlayer.wpend_type = type;
522 s->rlayer.wpend_ret = nw;
523
524 i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], nw, &tmpwrit);
525 if (i <= 0) {
526 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
527 if (i < 0 && (!s->wbio || !BIO_should_retry(s->wbio))) {
528 /* free jumbo buffer */
529 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
530 }
531 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
532 return i;
533 }
534 if (tmpwrit == n) {
535 /* free jumbo buffer */
536 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
537 *written = tot + tmpwrit;
538 return 1;
539 }
540 n -= tmpwrit;
541 tot += tmpwrit;
542 }
543 } else
544 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK */
545 if (tot == len) { /* done? */
546 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
547 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
548
549 *written = tot;
550 return 1;
551 }
552
553 n = (len - tot);
554
555 max_send_fragment = ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s);
556 split_send_fragment = ssl_get_split_send_fragment(s);
557 /*
558 * If max_pipelines is 0 then this means "undefined" and we default to
559 * 1 pipeline. Similarly if the cipher does not support pipelined
560 * processing then we also only use 1 pipeline, or if we're not using
561 * explicit IVs
562 */
563 maxpipes = s->max_pipelines;
564 if (maxpipes > SSL_MAX_PIPELINES) {
565 /*
566 * We should have prevented this when we set max_pipelines so we
567 * shouldn't get here
568 */
569 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,
570 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
571 return -1;
572 }
573 if (maxpipes == 0
574 || s->enc_write_ctx == NULL
575 || !(EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx))
576 & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE)
577 || !SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s))
578 maxpipes = 1;
579 if (max_send_fragment == 0 || split_send_fragment == 0
580 || split_send_fragment > max_send_fragment) {
581 /*
582 * We should have prevented this when we set/get the split and max send
583 * fragments so we shouldn't get here
584 */
585 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,
586 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
587 return -1;
588 }
589
590 for (;;) {
591 size_t pipelens[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES], tmppipelen, remain;
592 size_t numpipes, j;
593
594 if (n == 0)
595 numpipes = 1;
596 else
597 numpipes = ((n - 1) / split_send_fragment) + 1;
598 if (numpipes > maxpipes)
599 numpipes = maxpipes;
600
601 if (n / numpipes >= max_send_fragment) {
602 /*
603 * We have enough data to completely fill all available
604 * pipelines
605 */
606 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
607 pipelens[j] = max_send_fragment;
608 }
609 } else {
610 /* We can partially fill all available pipelines */
611 tmppipelen = n / numpipes;
612 remain = n % numpipes;
613 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
614 pipelens[j] = tmppipelen;
615 if (j < remain)
616 pipelens[j]++;
617 }
618 }
619
620 i = do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), pipelens, numpipes, 0,
621 &tmpwrit);
622 if (i <= 0) {
623 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
624 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
625 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
626 return i;
627 }
628
629 if (tmpwrit == n ||
630 (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
631 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) {
632 /*
633 * next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
634 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness:
635 */
636 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
637
638 if (tmpwrit == n
639 && (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS) != 0
640 && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
641 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
642
643 *written = tot + tmpwrit;
644 return 1;
645 }
646
647 n -= tmpwrit;
648 tot += tmpwrit;
649 }
650 }
651
do_ssl3_write(SSL * s,int type,const unsigned char * buf,size_t * pipelens,size_t numpipes,int create_empty_fragment,size_t * written)652 int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
653 size_t *pipelens, size_t numpipes,
654 int create_empty_fragment, size_t *written)
655 {
656 WPACKET pkt[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
657 SSL3_RECORD wr[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
658 WPACKET *thispkt;
659 SSL3_RECORD *thiswr;
660 unsigned char *recordstart;
661 int i, mac_size, clear = 0;
662 size_t prefix_len = 0;
663 int eivlen = 0;
664 size_t align = 0;
665 SSL3_BUFFER *wb;
666 SSL_SESSION *sess;
667 size_t totlen = 0, len, wpinited = 0;
668 size_t j;
669
670 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++)
671 totlen += pipelens[j];
672 /*
673 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
674 * will happen with non blocking IO
675 */
676 if (RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
677 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
678 return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, totlen, written);
679 }
680
681 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
682 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
683 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
684 if (i <= 0) {
685 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
686 return i;
687 }
688 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
689 }
690
691 if (s->rlayer.numwpipes < numpipes) {
692 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s, numpipes, 0)) {
693 /* SSLfatal() already called */
694 return -1;
695 }
696 }
697
698 if (totlen == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
699 return 0;
700
701 sess = s->session;
702
703 if ((sess == NULL) ||
704 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) || (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL)) {
705 clear = s->enc_write_ctx ? 0 : 1; /* must be AEAD cipher */
706 mac_size = 0;
707 } else {
708 /* TODO(siz_t): Convert me */
709 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
710 if (mac_size < 0) {
711 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
712 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
713 goto err;
714 }
715 }
716
717 /*
718 * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself
719 */
720 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done) {
721 /*
722 * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see
723 * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
724 */
725
726 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
727 /*
728 * recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this
729 * prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these
730 * 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual
731 * payload)
732 */
733 size_t tmppipelen = 0;
734 int ret;
735
736 ret = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, &tmppipelen, 1, 1, &prefix_len);
737 if (ret <= 0) {
738 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
739 goto err;
740 }
741
742 if (prefix_len >
743 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD)) {
744 /* insufficient space */
745 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
746 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
747 goto err;
748 }
749 }
750
751 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
752 }
753
754 if (create_empty_fragment) {
755 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
756 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
757 /*
758 * extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, which would be
759 * multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so if we want to align the real
760 * payload, then we can just pretend we simply have two headers.
761 */
762 align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
763 align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
764 #endif
765 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align);
766 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt[0], SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb),
767 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0)
768 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt[0], align, NULL)) {
769 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
770 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
771 goto err;
772 }
773 wpinited = 1;
774 } else if (prefix_len) {
775 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
776 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt[0],
777 SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb),
778 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0)
779 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt[0], SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(wb)
780 + prefix_len, NULL)) {
781 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
782 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
783 goto err;
784 }
785 wpinited = 1;
786 } else {
787 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
788 thispkt = &pkt[j];
789
790 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[j];
791 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD != 0
792 align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
793 align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
794 #endif
795 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align);
796 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(thispkt, SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb),
797 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0)
798 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, align, NULL)) {
799 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
800 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
801 goto err;
802 }
803 wpinited++;
804 }
805 }
806
807 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
808 if (s->enc_write_ctx && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) && !SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s)) {
809 int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx);
810 if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
811 /* TODO(size_t): Convert me */
812 eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx);
813 if (eivlen <= 1)
814 eivlen = 0;
815 } else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
816 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
817 eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
818 } else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {
819 eivlen = EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
820 }
821 }
822
823 totlen = 0;
824 /* Clear our SSL3_RECORD structures */
825 memset(wr, 0, sizeof(wr));
826 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
827 unsigned int version = (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION) ? TLS1_2_VERSION
828 : s->version;
829 unsigned char *compressdata = NULL;
830 size_t maxcomplen;
831 unsigned int rectype;
832
833 thispkt = &pkt[j];
834 thiswr = &wr[j];
835
836 /*
837 * In TLSv1.3, once encrypting, we always use application data for the
838 * record type
839 */
840 if (SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s)
841 && s->enc_write_ctx != NULL
842 && (s->statem.enc_write_state != ENC_WRITE_STATE_WRITE_PLAIN_ALERTS
843 || type != SSL3_RT_ALERT))
844 rectype = SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA;
845 else
846 rectype = type;
847 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(thiswr, rectype);
848
849 /*
850 * Some servers hang if initial client hello is larger than 256 bytes
851 * and record version number > TLS 1.0
852 */
853 if (SSL_get_state(s) == TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
854 && !s->renegotiate
855 && TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION
856 && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE)
857 version = TLS1_VERSION;
858 SSL3_RECORD_set_rec_version(thiswr, version);
859
860 maxcomplen = pipelens[j];
861 if (s->compress != NULL)
862 maxcomplen += SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD;
863
864 /* write the header */
865 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(thispkt, rectype)
866 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(thispkt, version)
867 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(thispkt)
868 || (eivlen > 0
869 && !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, eivlen, NULL))
870 || (maxcomplen > 0
871 && !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(thispkt, maxcomplen,
872 &compressdata))) {
873 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
874 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
875 goto err;
876 }
877
878 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
879 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(thiswr, compressdata);
880 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(thiswr, pipelens[j]);
881 SSL3_RECORD_set_input(thiswr, (unsigned char *)&buf[totlen]);
882 totlen += pipelens[j];
883
884 /*
885 * we now 'read' from thiswr->input, thiswr->length bytes into
886 * thiswr->data
887 */
888
889 /* first we compress */
890 if (s->compress != NULL) {
891 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s, thiswr)
892 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, thiswr->length, NULL)) {
893 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
894 SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
895 goto err;
896 }
897 } else {
898 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(thispkt, thiswr->input, thiswr->length)) {
899 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
900 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
901 goto err;
902 }
903 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr[j]);
904 }
905
906 if (SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s)
907 && s->enc_write_ctx != NULL
908 && (s->statem.enc_write_state != ENC_WRITE_STATE_WRITE_PLAIN_ALERTS
909 || type != SSL3_RT_ALERT)) {
910 size_t rlen, max_send_fragment;
911
912 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(thispkt, type)) {
913 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
914 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
915 goto err;
916 }
917 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, 1);
918
919 /* Add TLS1.3 padding */
920 max_send_fragment = ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s);
921 rlen = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr);
922 if (rlen < max_send_fragment) {
923 size_t padding = 0;
924 size_t max_padding = max_send_fragment - rlen;
925 if (s->record_padding_cb != NULL) {
926 padding = s->record_padding_cb(s, type, rlen, s->record_padding_arg);
927 } else if (s->block_padding > 0) {
928 size_t mask = s->block_padding - 1;
929 size_t remainder;
930
931 /* optimize for power of 2 */
932 if ((s->block_padding & mask) == 0)
933 remainder = rlen & mask;
934 else
935 remainder = rlen % s->block_padding;
936 /* don't want to add a block of padding if we don't have to */
937 if (remainder == 0)
938 padding = 0;
939 else
940 padding = s->block_padding - remainder;
941 }
942 if (padding > 0) {
943 /* do not allow the record to exceed max plaintext length */
944 if (padding > max_padding)
945 padding = max_padding;
946 if (!WPACKET_memset(thispkt, 0, padding)) {
947 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
948 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
949 goto err;
950 }
951 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, padding);
952 }
953 }
954 }
955
956 /*
957 * we should still have the output to thiswr->data and the input from
958 * wr->input. Length should be thiswr->length. thiswr->data still points
959 * in the wb->buf
960 */
961
962 if (!SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) {
963 unsigned char *mac;
964
965 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, mac_size, &mac)
966 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, thiswr, mac, 1)) {
967 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
968 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
969 goto err;
970 }
971 }
972
973 /*
974 * Reserve some bytes for any growth that may occur during encryption.
975 * This will be at most one cipher block or the tag length if using
976 * AEAD. SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE covers either case.
977 */
978 if (!WPACKET_reserve_bytes(thispkt, SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE,
979 NULL)
980 /*
981 * We also need next the amount of bytes written to this
982 * sub-packet
983 */
984 || !WPACKET_get_length(thispkt, &len)) {
985 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
986 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
987 goto err;
988 }
989
990 /* Get a pointer to the start of this record excluding header */
991 recordstart = WPACKET_get_curr(thispkt) - len;
992
993 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(thiswr, recordstart);
994 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(thiswr);
995 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(thiswr, len);
996 }
997
998 if (s->statem.enc_write_state == ENC_WRITE_STATE_WRITE_PLAIN_ALERTS) {
999 /*
1000 * We haven't actually negotiated the version yet, but we're trying to
1001 * send early data - so we need to use the tls13enc function.
1002 */
1003 if (tls13_enc(s, wr, numpipes, 1) < 1) {
1004 if (!ossl_statem_in_error(s)) {
1005 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
1006 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1007 }
1008 goto err;
1009 }
1010 } else {
1011 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, wr, numpipes, 1) < 1) {
1012 if (!ossl_statem_in_error(s)) {
1013 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
1014 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1015 }
1016 goto err;
1017 }
1018 }
1019
1020 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
1021 size_t origlen;
1022
1023 thispkt = &pkt[j];
1024 thiswr = &wr[j];
1025
1026 /* Allocate bytes for the encryption overhead */
1027 if (!WPACKET_get_length(thispkt, &origlen)
1028 /* Encryption should never shrink the data! */
1029 || origlen > thiswr->length
1030 || (thiswr->length > origlen
1031 && !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt,
1032 thiswr->length - origlen, NULL))) {
1033 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
1034 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1035 goto err;
1036 }
1037 if (SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) {
1038 unsigned char *mac;
1039
1040 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, mac_size, &mac)
1041 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, thiswr, mac, 1)) {
1042 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
1043 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1044 goto err;
1045 }
1046 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, mac_size);
1047 }
1048
1049 if (!WPACKET_get_length(thispkt, &len)
1050 || !WPACKET_close(thispkt)) {
1051 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
1052 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1053 goto err;
1054 }
1055
1056 if (s->msg_callback) {
1057 recordstart = WPACKET_get_curr(thispkt) - len
1058 - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
1059 s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, recordstart,
1060 SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
1061 s->msg_callback_arg);
1062
1063 if (SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s) && s->enc_write_ctx != NULL) {
1064 unsigned char ctype = type;
1065
1066 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_INNER_CONTENT_TYPE,
1067 &ctype, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1068 }
1069 }
1070
1071 if (!WPACKET_finish(thispkt)) {
1072 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
1073 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1074 goto err;
1075 }
1076
1077 /*
1078 * we should now have thiswr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which
1079 * is thiswr->length long
1080 */
1081 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(thiswr, type); /* not needed but helps for
1082 * debugging */
1083 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
1084
1085 if (create_empty_fragment) {
1086 /*
1087 * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write
1088 * out anything here
1089 */
1090 if (j > 0) {
1091 /* We should never be pipelining an empty fragment!! */
1092 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
1093 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1094 goto err;
1095 }
1096 *written = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr);
1097 return 1;
1098 }
1099
1100 /* now let's set up wb */
1101 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&s->rlayer.wbuf[j],
1102 prefix_len + SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr));
1103 }
1104
1105 /*
1106 * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write
1107 * retries later
1108 */
1109 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = totlen;
1110 s->rlayer.wpend_buf = buf;
1111 s->rlayer.wpend_type = type;
1112 s->rlayer.wpend_ret = totlen;
1113
1114 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
1115 return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, totlen, written);
1116 err:
1117 for (j = 0; j < wpinited; j++)
1118 WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt[j]);
1119 return -1;
1120 }
1121
1122 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this
1123 *
1124 * Return values are as per SSL_write()
1125 */
ssl3_write_pending(SSL * s,int type,const unsigned char * buf,size_t len,size_t * written)1126 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len,
1127 size_t *written)
1128 {
1129 int i;
1130 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = s->rlayer.wbuf;
1131 size_t currbuf = 0;
1132 size_t tmpwrit = 0;
1133
1134 if ((s->rlayer.wpend_tot > len)
1135 || (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER)
1136 && (s->rlayer.wpend_buf != buf))
1137 || (s->rlayer.wpend_type != type)) {
1138 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,
1139 SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
1140 return -1;
1141 }
1142
1143 for (;;) {
1144 /* Loop until we find a buffer we haven't written out yet */
1145 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf]) == 0
1146 && currbuf < s->rlayer.numwpipes - 1) {
1147 currbuf++;
1148 continue;
1149 }
1150 clear_sys_error();
1151 if (s->wbio != NULL) {
1152 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
1153 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */
1154 i = BIO_write(s->wbio, (char *)
1155 &(SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&wb[currbuf])
1156 [SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(&wb[currbuf])]),
1157 (unsigned int)SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf]));
1158 if (i >= 0)
1159 tmpwrit = i;
1160 } else {
1161 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,
1162 SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
1163 i = -1;
1164 }
1165 if (i > 0 && tmpwrit == SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf])) {
1166 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb[currbuf], 0);
1167 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit);
1168 if (currbuf + 1 < s->rlayer.numwpipes)
1169 continue;
1170 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1171 *written = s->rlayer.wpend_ret;
1172 return 1;
1173 } else if (i <= 0) {
1174 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1175 /*
1176 * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in
1177 * using a datagram service
1178 */
1179 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb[currbuf], 0);
1180 }
1181 return i;
1182 }
1183 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit);
1184 SSL3_BUFFER_sub_left(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit);
1185 }
1186 }
1187
1188 /*-
1189 * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
1190 * 'type' is one of the following:
1191 *
1192 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
1193 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
1194 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
1195 *
1196 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
1197 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
1198 *
1199 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
1200 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify) or renegotiation requests. ChangeCipherSpec
1201 * messages are treated as if they were handshake messages *if* the |recd_type|
1202 * argument is non NULL.
1203 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
1204 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
1205 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
1206 * Change cipher spec protocol
1207 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
1208 * Alert protocol
1209 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
1210 * Handshake protocol
1211 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
1212 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
1213 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
1214 * Application data protocol
1215 * none of our business
1216 */
ssl3_read_bytes(SSL * s,int type,int * recvd_type,unsigned char * buf,size_t len,int peek,size_t * readbytes)1217 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type, unsigned char *buf,
1218 size_t len, int peek, size_t *readbytes)
1219 {
1220 int i, j, ret;
1221 size_t n, curr_rec, num_recs, totalbytes;
1222 SSL3_RECORD *rr;
1223 SSL3_BUFFER *rbuf;
1224 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL;
1225 int is_tls13 = SSL_IS_TLS13(s);
1226
1227 rbuf = &s->rlayer.rbuf;
1228
1229 if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(rbuf)) {
1230 /* Not initialized yet */
1231 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s)) {
1232 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1233 return -1;
1234 }
1235 }
1236
1237 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
1238 && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) || (peek
1239 && (type !=
1240 SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) {
1241 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1242 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1243 return -1;
1244 }
1245
1246 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1247 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
1248 {
1249 unsigned char *src = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
1250 unsigned char *dst = buf;
1251 unsigned int k;
1252
1253 /* peek == 0 */
1254 n = 0;
1255 while ((len > 0) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0)) {
1256 *dst++ = *src++;
1257 len--;
1258 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len--;
1259 n++;
1260 }
1261 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1262 for (k = 0; k < s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len; k++)
1263 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
1264
1265 if (recvd_type != NULL)
1266 *recvd_type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1267
1268 *readbytes = n;
1269 return 1;
1270 }
1271
1272 /*
1273 * Now s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
1274 */
1275
1276 if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) && SSL_in_init(s)) {
1277 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
1278 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1279 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1280 if (i < 0)
1281 return i;
1282 if (i == 0)
1283 return -1;
1284 }
1285 start:
1286 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1287
1288 /*-
1289 * For each record 'i' up to |num_recs]
1290 * rr[i].type - is the type of record
1291 * rr[i].data, - data
1292 * rr[i].off, - offset into 'data' for next read
1293 * rr[i].length, - number of bytes.
1294 */
1295 rr = s->rlayer.rrec;
1296 num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer);
1297
1298 do {
1299 /* get new records if necessary */
1300 if (num_recs == 0) {
1301 ret = ssl3_get_record(s);
1302 if (ret <= 0) {
1303 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
1304 return ret;
1305 }
1306 num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer);
1307 if (num_recs == 0) {
1308 /* Shouldn't happen */
1309 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1310 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1311 return -1;
1312 }
1313 }
1314 /* Skip over any records we have already read */
1315 for (curr_rec = 0;
1316 curr_rec < num_recs && SSL3_RECORD_is_read(&rr[curr_rec]);
1317 curr_rec++) ;
1318 if (curr_rec == num_recs) {
1319 RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s->rlayer, 0);
1320 num_recs = 0;
1321 curr_rec = 0;
1322 }
1323 } while (num_recs == 0);
1324 rr = &rr[curr_rec];
1325
1326 if (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0
1327 && SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
1328 && SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1329 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1330 SSL_R_MIXED_HANDSHAKE_AND_NON_HANDSHAKE_DATA);
1331 return -1;
1332 }
1333
1334 /*
1335 * Reset the count of consecutive warning alerts if we've got a non-empty
1336 * record that isn't an alert.
1337 */
1338 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_ALERT
1339 && SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) != 0)
1340 s->rlayer.alert_count = 0;
1341
1342 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
1343
1344 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
1345 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
1346 && (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) {
1347 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1348 SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
1349 return -1;
1350 }
1351
1352 /*
1353 * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
1354 * 'peek' mode)
1355 */
1356 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
1357 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
1358 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1359 return 0;
1360 }
1361
1362 if (type == SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)
1363 || (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1364 && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && recvd_type != NULL
1365 && !is_tls13)) {
1366 /*
1367 * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
1368 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
1369 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1370 */
1371 /*
1372 * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
1373 * doing a handshake for the first time
1374 */
1375 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
1376 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) {
1377 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1378 SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
1379 return -1;
1380 }
1381
1382 if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
1383 && SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1384 && s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0) {
1385 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1386 SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1387 return -1;
1388 }
1389
1390 if (recvd_type != NULL)
1391 *recvd_type = SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr);
1392
1393 if (len == 0) {
1394 /*
1395 * Mark a zero length record as read. This ensures multiple calls to
1396 * SSL_read() with a zero length buffer will eventually cause
1397 * SSL_pending() to report data as being available.
1398 */
1399 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0)
1400 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1401 return 0;
1402 }
1403
1404 totalbytes = 0;
1405 do {
1406 if (len - totalbytes > SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))
1407 n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr);
1408 else
1409 n = len - totalbytes;
1410
1411 memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n);
1412 buf += n;
1413 if (peek) {
1414 /* Mark any zero length record as consumed CVE-2016-6305 */
1415 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0)
1416 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1417 } else {
1418 SSL3_RECORD_sub_length(rr, n);
1419 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, n);
1420 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) {
1421 s->rlayer.rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
1422 SSL3_RECORD_set_off(rr, 0);
1423 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1424 }
1425 }
1426 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0
1427 || (peek && n == SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))) {
1428 curr_rec++;
1429 rr++;
1430 }
1431 totalbytes += n;
1432 } while (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && curr_rec < num_recs
1433 && totalbytes < len);
1434 if (totalbytes == 0) {
1435 /* We must have read empty records. Get more data */
1436 goto start;
1437 }
1438 if (!peek && curr_rec == num_recs
1439 && (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS)
1440 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0)
1441 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
1442 *readbytes = totalbytes;
1443 return 1;
1444 }
1445
1446 /*
1447 * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
1448 * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello) or invalid (we
1449 * were actually expecting a CCS).
1450 */
1451
1452 /*
1453 * Lets just double check that we've not got an SSLv2 record
1454 */
1455 if (rr->rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) {
1456 /*
1457 * Should never happen. ssl3_get_record() should only give us an SSLv2
1458 * record back if this is the first packet and we are looking for an
1459 * initial ClientHello. Therefore |type| should always be equal to
1460 * |rr->type|. If not then something has gone horribly wrong
1461 */
1462 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1463 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1464 return -1;
1465 }
1466
1467 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION
1468 && (s->server || rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT)) {
1469 /*
1470 * If we've got this far and still haven't decided on what version
1471 * we're using then this must be a client side alert we're dealing with
1472 * (we don't allow heartbeats yet). We shouldn't be receiving anything
1473 * other than a ClientHello if we are a server.
1474 */
1475 s->version = rr->rec_version;
1476 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1477 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1478 return -1;
1479 }
1480
1481 /*-
1482 * s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1483 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
1484 */
1485
1486 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
1487 unsigned int alert_level, alert_descr;
1488 unsigned char *alert_bytes = SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr)
1489 + SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr);
1490 PACKET alert;
1491
1492 if (!PACKET_buf_init(&alert, alert_bytes, SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))
1493 || !PACKET_get_1(&alert, &alert_level)
1494 || !PACKET_get_1(&alert, &alert_descr)
1495 || PACKET_remaining(&alert) != 0) {
1496 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1497 SSL_R_INVALID_ALERT);
1498 return -1;
1499 }
1500
1501 if (s->msg_callback)
1502 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, alert_bytes, 2, s,
1503 s->msg_callback_arg);
1504
1505 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1506 cb = s->info_callback;
1507 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1508 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
1509
1510 if (cb != NULL) {
1511 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1512 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1513 }
1514
1515 if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING
1516 || (is_tls13 && alert_descr == SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED)) {
1517 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1518 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1519
1520 s->rlayer.alert_count++;
1521 if (s->rlayer.alert_count == MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT) {
1522 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1523 SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS);
1524 return -1;
1525 }
1526 }
1527
1528 /*
1529 * Apart from close_notify the only other warning alert in TLSv1.3
1530 * is user_cancelled - which we just ignore.
1531 */
1532 if (is_tls13 && alert_descr == SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED) {
1533 goto start;
1534 } else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY
1535 && (is_tls13 || alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING)) {
1536 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1537 return 0;
1538 } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL || is_tls13) {
1539 char tmp[16];
1540
1541 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1542 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1543 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1544 SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1545 BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%d", alert_descr);
1546 ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp);
1547 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1548 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1549 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
1550 return 0;
1551 } else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) {
1552 /*
1553 * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
1554 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal
1555 * alert because if application tried to renegotiate it
1556 * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In
1557 * future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if
1558 * the peer refused it where we carry on.
1559 */
1560 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1561 SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1562 return -1;
1563 } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) {
1564 /* We ignore any other warning alert in TLSv1.2 and below */
1565 goto start;
1566 }
1567
1568 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1569 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1570 return -1;
1571 }
1572
1573 if ((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0) {
1574 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
1575 BIO *rbio;
1576
1577 /*
1578 * We ignore any handshake messages sent to us unless they are
1579 * TLSv1.3 in which case we want to process them. For all other
1580 * handshake messages we can't do anything reasonable with them
1581 * because we are unable to write any response due to having already
1582 * sent close_notify.
1583 */
1584 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1585 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
1586 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1587
1588 if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY) != 0)
1589 goto start;
1590
1591 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1592 rbio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
1593 BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio);
1594 BIO_set_retry_read(rbio);
1595 return -1;
1596 }
1597 } else {
1598 /*
1599 * The peer is continuing to send application data, but we have
1600 * already sent close_notify. If this was expected we should have
1601 * been called via SSL_read() and this would have been handled
1602 * above.
1603 * No alert sent because we already sent close_notify
1604 */
1605 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
1606 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1607 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1608 SSL_R_APPLICATION_DATA_AFTER_CLOSE_NOTIFY);
1609 return -1;
1610 }
1611 }
1612
1613 /*
1614 * For handshake data we have 'fragment' storage, so fill that so that we
1615 * can process the header at a fixed place. This is done after the
1616 * "SHUTDOWN" code above to avoid filling the fragment storage with data
1617 * that we're just going to discard.
1618 */
1619 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
1620 size_t dest_maxlen = sizeof(s->rlayer.handshake_fragment);
1621 unsigned char *dest = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
1622 size_t *dest_len = &s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len;
1623
1624 n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
1625 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) < n)
1626 n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr); /* available bytes */
1627
1628 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1629 memcpy(dest + *dest_len,
1630 SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr) + SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr), n);
1631 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, n);
1632 SSL3_RECORD_sub_length(rr, n);
1633 *dest_len += n;
1634 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0)
1635 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1636
1637 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
1638 goto start; /* fragment was too small */
1639 }
1640
1641 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1642 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1643 SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1644 return -1;
1645 }
1646
1647 /*
1648 * Unexpected handshake message (ClientHello, NewSessionTicket (TLS1.3) or
1649 * protocol violation)
1650 */
1651 if ((s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4)
1652 && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) {
1653 int ined = (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING);
1654
1655 /* We found handshake data, so we're going back into init */
1656 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1);
1657
1658 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1659 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
1660 if (i < 0)
1661 return i;
1662 if (i == 0) {
1663 return -1;
1664 }
1665
1666 /*
1667 * If we were actually trying to read early data and we found a
1668 * handshake message, then we don't want to continue to try and read
1669 * the application data any more. It won't be "early" now.
1670 */
1671 if (ined)
1672 return -1;
1673
1674 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
1675 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0) {
1676 /* no read-ahead left? */
1677 BIO *bio;
1678 /*
1679 * In the case where we try to read application data, but we
1680 * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry
1681 * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty
1682 * problems in the blocking world
1683 */
1684 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1685 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
1686 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1687 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1688 return -1;
1689 }
1690 }
1691 goto start;
1692 }
1693
1694 switch (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)) {
1695 default:
1696 /*
1697 * TLS 1.0 and 1.1 say you SHOULD ignore unrecognised record types, but
1698 * TLS 1.2 says you MUST send an unexpected message alert. We use the
1699 * TLS 1.2 behaviour for all protocol versions to prevent issues where
1700 * no progress is being made and the peer continually sends unrecognised
1701 * record types, using up resources processing them.
1702 */
1703 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1704 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1705 return -1;
1706 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1707 case SSL3_RT_ALERT:
1708 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1709 /*
1710 * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
1711 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) is true, but
1712 * that should not happen when type != rr->type
1713 */
1714 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1715 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1716 return -1;
1717 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1718 /*
1719 * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
1720 * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read()
1721 * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read
1722 * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet
1723 * started), we will indulge it.
1724 */
1725 if (ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(s)) {
1726 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
1727 return -1;
1728 } else if (ossl_statem_skip_early_data(s)) {
1729 /*
1730 * This can happen after a client sends a CH followed by early_data,
1731 * but the server responds with a HelloRetryRequest. The server
1732 * reads the next record from the client expecting to find a
1733 * plaintext ClientHello but gets a record which appears to be
1734 * application data. The trial decrypt "works" because null
1735 * decryption was applied. We just skip it and move on to the next
1736 * record.
1737 */
1738 if (!early_data_count_ok(s, rr->length,
1739 EARLY_DATA_CIPHERTEXT_OVERHEAD, 0)) {
1740 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1741 return -1;
1742 }
1743 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1744 goto start;
1745 } else {
1746 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1747 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1748 return -1;
1749 }
1750 }
1751 }
1752
ssl3_record_sequence_update(unsigned char * seq)1753 void ssl3_record_sequence_update(unsigned char *seq)
1754 {
1755 int i;
1756
1757 for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) {
1758 ++seq[i];
1759 if (seq[i] != 0)
1760 break;
1761 }
1762 }
1763
1764 /*
1765 * Returns true if the current rrec was sent in SSLv2 backwards compatible
1766 * format and false otherwise.
1767 */
RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(RECORD_LAYER * rl)1768 int RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
1769 {
1770 return SSL3_RECORD_is_sslv2_record(&rl->rrec[0]);
1771 }
1772
1773 /*
1774 * Returns the length in bytes of the current rrec
1775 */
RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(RECORD_LAYER * rl)1776 size_t RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
1777 {
1778 return SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&rl->rrec[0]);
1779 }
1780