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1 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
2 
3 #ifndef _ASM_X86_NOSPEC_BRANCH_H_
4 #define _ASM_X86_NOSPEC_BRANCH_H_
5 
6 #include <linux/static_key.h>
7 #include <linux/objtool.h>
8 #include <linux/linkage.h>
9 
10 #include <asm/alternative.h>
11 #include <asm/cpufeatures.h>
12 #include <asm/msr-index.h>
13 #include <asm/unwind_hints.h>
14 #include <asm/percpu.h>
15 
16 #define RETPOLINE_THUNK_SIZE	32
17 
18 /*
19  * Fill the CPU return stack buffer.
20  *
21  * Each entry in the RSB, if used for a speculative 'ret', contains an
22  * infinite 'pause; lfence; jmp' loop to capture speculative execution.
23  *
24  * This is required in various cases for retpoline and IBRS-based
25  * mitigations for the Spectre variant 2 vulnerability. Sometimes to
26  * eliminate potentially bogus entries from the RSB, and sometimes
27  * purely to ensure that it doesn't get empty, which on some CPUs would
28  * allow predictions from other (unwanted!) sources to be used.
29  *
30  * We define a CPP macro such that it can be used from both .S files and
31  * inline assembly. It's possible to do a .macro and then include that
32  * from C via asm(".include <asm/nospec-branch.h>") but let's not go there.
33  */
34 
35 #define RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS		32	/* To forcibly overwrite all entries */
36 
37 /*
38  * Google experimented with loop-unrolling and this turned out to be
39  * the optimal version — two calls, each with their own speculation
40  * trap should their return address end up getting used, in a loop.
41  */
42 #define __FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(reg, nr, sp)	\
43 	mov	$(nr/2), reg;			\
44 771:						\
45 	ANNOTATE_INTRA_FUNCTION_CALL;		\
46 	call	772f;				\
47 773:	/* speculation trap */			\
48 	UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY;			\
49 	pause;					\
50 	lfence;					\
51 	jmp	773b;				\
52 772:						\
53 	ANNOTATE_INTRA_FUNCTION_CALL;		\
54 	call	774f;				\
55 775:	/* speculation trap */			\
56 	UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY;			\
57 	pause;					\
58 	lfence;					\
59 	jmp	775b;				\
60 774:						\
61 	add	$(BITS_PER_LONG/8) * 2, sp;	\
62 	dec	reg;				\
63 	jnz	771b;				\
64 	/* barrier for jnz misprediction */	\
65 	lfence;
66 
67 #ifdef __ASSEMBLY__
68 
69 /*
70  * This should be used immediately before an indirect jump/call. It tells
71  * objtool the subsequent indirect jump/call is vouched safe for retpoline
72  * builds.
73  */
74 .macro ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE
75 	.Lannotate_\@:
76 	.pushsection .discard.retpoline_safe
77 	_ASM_PTR .Lannotate_\@
78 	.popsection
79 .endm
80 
81 /*
82  * (ab)use RETPOLINE_SAFE on RET to annotate away 'bare' RET instructions
83  * vs RETBleed validation.
84  */
85 #define ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE
86 
87 /*
88  * Abuse ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE on a NOP to indicate UNRET_END, should
89  * eventually turn into it's own annotation.
90  */
91 .macro ANNOTATE_UNRET_END
92 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_ENTRY
93 	ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE
94 	nop
95 #endif
96 .endm
97 
98 /*
99  * JMP_NOSPEC and CALL_NOSPEC macros can be used instead of a simple
100  * indirect jmp/call which may be susceptible to the Spectre variant 2
101  * attack.
102  */
103 .macro JMP_NOSPEC reg:req
104 #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
105 	ALTERNATIVE_2 __stringify(ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; jmp *%\reg), \
106 		      __stringify(jmp __x86_indirect_thunk_\reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE, \
107 		      __stringify(lfence; ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; jmp *%\reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE
108 #else
109 	jmp	*%\reg
110 #endif
111 .endm
112 
113 .macro CALL_NOSPEC reg:req
114 #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
115 	ALTERNATIVE_2 __stringify(ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; call *%\reg), \
116 		      __stringify(call __x86_indirect_thunk_\reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE, \
117 		      __stringify(lfence; ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; call *%\reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE
118 #else
119 	call	*%\reg
120 #endif
121 .endm
122 
123 .macro ISSUE_UNBALANCED_RET_GUARD
124 	ANNOTATE_INTRA_FUNCTION_CALL
125 	call .Lunbalanced_ret_guard_\@
126 	int3
127 .Lunbalanced_ret_guard_\@:
128 	add $(BITS_PER_LONG/8), %_ASM_SP
129 	lfence
130 .endm
131 
132  /*
133   * A simpler FILL_RETURN_BUFFER macro. Don't make people use the CPP
134   * monstrosity above, manually.
135   */
136 .macro FILL_RETURN_BUFFER reg:req nr:req ftr:req ftr2
137 .ifb \ftr2
138 	ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lskip_rsb_\@", "", \ftr
139 .else
140 	ALTERNATIVE_2 "jmp .Lskip_rsb_\@", "", \ftr, "jmp .Lunbalanced_\@", \ftr2
141 .endif
142 	__FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(\reg,\nr,%_ASM_SP)
143 .Lunbalanced_\@:
144 	ISSUE_UNBALANCED_RET_GUARD
145 .Lskip_rsb_\@:
146 .endm
147 
148 #ifdef CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY
149 #define CALL_ZEN_UNTRAIN_RET	"call zen_untrain_ret"
150 #else
151 #define CALL_ZEN_UNTRAIN_RET	""
152 #endif
153 
154 /*
155  * Mitigate RETBleed for AMD/Hygon Zen uarch. Requires KERNEL CR3 because the
156  * return thunk isn't mapped into the userspace tables (then again, AMD
157  * typically has NO_MELTDOWN).
158  *
159  * While zen_untrain_ret() doesn't clobber anything but requires stack,
160  * entry_ibpb() will clobber AX, CX, DX.
161  *
162  * As such, this must be placed after every *SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 at a point
163  * where we have a stack but before any RET instruction.
164  */
165 .macro UNTRAIN_RET
166 #if defined(CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY) || defined(CONFIG_CPU_IBPB_ENTRY)
167 	ANNOTATE_UNRET_END
168 	ALTERNATIVE_2 "",						\
169 	              CALL_ZEN_UNTRAIN_RET, X86_FEATURE_UNRET,		\
170 		      "call entry_ibpb", X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB
171 #endif
172 .endm
173 
174 #else /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
175 
176 #define ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE					\
177 	"999:\n\t"						\
178 	".pushsection .discard.retpoline_safe\n\t"		\
179 	_ASM_PTR " 999b\n\t"					\
180 	".popsection\n\t"
181 
182 extern void __x86_return_thunk(void);
183 extern void zen_untrain_ret(void);
184 extern void entry_ibpb(void);
185 
186 #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
187 
188 typedef u8 retpoline_thunk_t[RETPOLINE_THUNK_SIZE];
189 
190 #define GEN(reg) \
191 	extern retpoline_thunk_t __x86_indirect_thunk_ ## reg;
192 #include <asm/GEN-for-each-reg.h>
193 #undef GEN
194 
195 extern retpoline_thunk_t __x86_indirect_thunk_array[];
196 
197 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
198 
199 /*
200  * Inline asm uses the %V modifier which is only in newer GCC
201  * which is ensured when CONFIG_RETPOLINE is defined.
202  */
203 # define CALL_NOSPEC						\
204 	ALTERNATIVE_2(						\
205 	ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE					\
206 	"call *%[thunk_target]\n",				\
207 	"call __x86_indirect_thunk_%V[thunk_target]\n",		\
208 	X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE,					\
209 	"lfence;\n"						\
210 	ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE					\
211 	"call *%[thunk_target]\n",				\
212 	X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE)
213 
214 # define THUNK_TARGET(addr) [thunk_target] "r" (addr)
215 
216 #else /* CONFIG_X86_32 */
217 /*
218  * For i386 we use the original ret-equivalent retpoline, because
219  * otherwise we'll run out of registers. We don't care about CET
220  * here, anyway.
221  */
222 # define CALL_NOSPEC						\
223 	ALTERNATIVE_2(						\
224 	ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE					\
225 	"call *%[thunk_target]\n",				\
226 	"       jmp    904f;\n"					\
227 	"       .align 16\n"					\
228 	"901:	call   903f;\n"					\
229 	"902:	pause;\n"					\
230 	"    	lfence;\n"					\
231 	"       jmp    902b;\n"					\
232 	"       .align 16\n"					\
233 	"903:	lea    4(%%esp), %%esp;\n"			\
234 	"       pushl  %[thunk_target];\n"			\
235 	"       ret;\n"						\
236 	"       .align 16\n"					\
237 	"904:	call   901b;\n",				\
238 	X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE,					\
239 	"lfence;\n"						\
240 	ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE					\
241 	"call *%[thunk_target]\n",				\
242 	X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE)
243 
244 # define THUNK_TARGET(addr) [thunk_target] "rm" (addr)
245 #endif
246 #else /* No retpoline for C / inline asm */
247 # define CALL_NOSPEC "call *%[thunk_target]\n"
248 # define THUNK_TARGET(addr) [thunk_target] "rm" (addr)
249 #endif
250 
251 /* The Spectre V2 mitigation variants */
252 enum spectre_v2_mitigation {
253 	SPECTRE_V2_NONE,
254 	SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE,
255 	SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE,
256 	SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS,
257 	SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE,
258 	SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE,
259 	SPECTRE_V2_IBRS,
260 };
261 
262 /* The indirect branch speculation control variants */
263 enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation {
264 	SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE,
265 	SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT,
266 	SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED,
267 	SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL,
268 	SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP,
269 };
270 
271 /* The Speculative Store Bypass disable variants */
272 enum ssb_mitigation {
273 	SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_NONE,
274 	SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE,
275 	SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL,
276 	SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_SECCOMP,
277 };
278 
279 extern char __indirect_thunk_start[];
280 extern char __indirect_thunk_end[];
281 
282 static __always_inline
alternative_msr_write(unsigned int msr,u64 val,unsigned int feature)283 void alternative_msr_write(unsigned int msr, u64 val, unsigned int feature)
284 {
285 	asm volatile(ALTERNATIVE("", "wrmsr", %c[feature])
286 		: : "c" (msr),
287 		    "a" ((u32)val),
288 		    "d" ((u32)(val >> 32)),
289 		    [feature] "i" (feature)
290 		: "memory");
291 }
292 
indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(void)293 static inline void indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(void)
294 {
295 	u64 val = PRED_CMD_IBPB;
296 
297 	alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, val, X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB);
298 }
299 
300 /* The Intel SPEC CTRL MSR base value cache */
301 extern u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base;
302 DECLARE_PER_CPU(u64, x86_spec_ctrl_current);
303 extern void write_spec_ctrl_current(u64 val, bool force);
304 extern u64 spec_ctrl_current(void);
305 
306 /*
307  * With retpoline, we must use IBRS to restrict branch prediction
308  * before calling into firmware.
309  *
310  * (Implemented as CPP macros due to header hell.)
311  */
312 #define firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_start()			\
313 do {									\
314 	preempt_disable();						\
315 	alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL,			\
316 			      spec_ctrl_current() | SPEC_CTRL_IBRS,	\
317 			      X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW);			\
318 } while (0)
319 
320 #define firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_end()			\
321 do {									\
322 	alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL,			\
323 			      spec_ctrl_current(),			\
324 			      X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW);			\
325 	preempt_enable();						\
326 } while (0)
327 
328 DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_to_cond_stibp);
329 DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_cond_ibpb);
330 DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_always_ibpb);
331 
332 DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_user_clear);
333 DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_idle_clear);
334 
335 DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mmio_stale_data_clear);
336 
337 #include <asm/segment.h>
338 
339 /**
340  * mds_clear_cpu_buffers - Mitigation for MDS and TAA vulnerability
341  *
342  * This uses the otherwise unused and obsolete VERW instruction in
343  * combination with microcode which triggers a CPU buffer flush when the
344  * instruction is executed.
345  */
mds_clear_cpu_buffers(void)346 static __always_inline void mds_clear_cpu_buffers(void)
347 {
348 	static const u16 ds = __KERNEL_DS;
349 
350 	/*
351 	 * Has to be the memory-operand variant because only that
352 	 * guarantees the CPU buffer flush functionality according to
353 	 * documentation. The register-operand variant does not.
354 	 * Works with any segment selector, but a valid writable
355 	 * data segment is the fastest variant.
356 	 *
357 	 * "cc" clobber is required because VERW modifies ZF.
358 	 */
359 	asm volatile("verw %[ds]" : : [ds] "m" (ds) : "cc");
360 }
361 
362 /**
363  * mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers - Mitigation for MDS and TAA vulnerability
364  *
365  * Clear CPU buffers if the corresponding static key is enabled
366  */
mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers(void)367 static __always_inline void mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers(void)
368 {
369 	if (static_branch_likely(&mds_user_clear))
370 		mds_clear_cpu_buffers();
371 }
372 
373 /**
374  * mds_idle_clear_cpu_buffers - Mitigation for MDS vulnerability
375  *
376  * Clear CPU buffers if the corresponding static key is enabled
377  */
mds_idle_clear_cpu_buffers(void)378 static inline void mds_idle_clear_cpu_buffers(void)
379 {
380 	if (static_branch_likely(&mds_idle_clear))
381 		mds_clear_cpu_buffers();
382 }
383 
384 #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
385 
386 #endif /* _ASM_X86_NOSPEC_BRANCH_H_ */
387