/* * Copyright 1995-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include "crypto/rand.h" #include "bn_local.h" #include #include #include typedef enum bnrand_flag_e { NORMAL, TESTING, PRIVATE } BNRAND_FLAG; static int bnrand(BNRAND_FLAG flag, BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom, unsigned int strength, BN_CTX *ctx) { unsigned char *buf = NULL; int b, ret = 0, bit, bytes, mask; OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx = ossl_bn_get_libctx(ctx); if (bits == 0) { if (top != BN_RAND_TOP_ANY || bottom != BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ANY) goto toosmall; BN_zero(rnd); return 1; } if (bits < 0 || (bits == 1 && top > 0)) goto toosmall; bytes = (bits + 7) / 8; bit = (bits - 1) % 8; mask = 0xff << (bit + 1); buf = OPENSSL_malloc(bytes); if (buf == NULL) { ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_BN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } /* make a random number and set the top and bottom bits */ b = flag == NORMAL ? RAND_bytes_ex(libctx, buf, bytes, strength) : RAND_priv_bytes_ex(libctx, buf, bytes, strength); if (b <= 0) goto err; if (flag == TESTING) { /* * generate patterns that are more likely to trigger BN library bugs */ int i; unsigned char c; for (i = 0; i < bytes; i++) { if (RAND_bytes_ex(libctx, &c, 1, strength) <= 0) goto err; if (c >= 128 && i > 0) buf[i] = buf[i - 1]; else if (c < 42) buf[i] = 0; else if (c < 84) buf[i] = 255; } } if (top >= 0) { if (top) { if (bit == 0) { buf[0] = 1; buf[1] |= 0x80; } else { buf[0] |= (3 << (bit - 1)); } } else { buf[0] |= (1 << bit); } } buf[0] &= ~mask; if (bottom) /* set bottom bit if requested */ buf[bytes - 1] |= 1; if (!BN_bin2bn(buf, bytes, rnd)) goto err; ret = 1; err: OPENSSL_clear_free(buf, bytes); bn_check_top(rnd); return ret; toosmall: ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_BN, BN_R_BITS_TOO_SMALL); return 0; } int BN_rand_ex(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom, unsigned int strength, BN_CTX *ctx) { return bnrand(NORMAL, rnd, bits, top, bottom, strength, ctx); } #ifndef FIPS_MODULE int BN_rand(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom) { return bnrand(NORMAL, rnd, bits, top, bottom, 0, NULL); } int BN_bntest_rand(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom) { return bnrand(TESTING, rnd, bits, top, bottom, 0, NULL); } #endif int BN_priv_rand_ex(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom, unsigned int strength, BN_CTX *ctx) { return bnrand(PRIVATE, rnd, bits, top, bottom, strength, ctx); } #ifndef FIPS_MODULE int BN_priv_rand(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom) { return bnrand(PRIVATE, rnd, bits, top, bottom, 0, NULL); } #endif /* random number r: 0 <= r < range */ static int bnrand_range(BNRAND_FLAG flag, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *range, unsigned int strength, BN_CTX *ctx) { int n; int count = 100; if (r == NULL) { ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_BN, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return 0; } if (range->neg || BN_is_zero(range)) { ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_BN, BN_R_INVALID_RANGE); return 0; } n = BN_num_bits(range); /* n > 0 */ /* BN_is_bit_set(range, n - 1) always holds */ if (n == 1) BN_zero(r); else if (!BN_is_bit_set(range, n - 2) && !BN_is_bit_set(range, n - 3)) { /* * range = 100..._2, so 3*range (= 11..._2) is exactly one bit longer * than range */ do { if (!bnrand(flag, r, n + 1, BN_RAND_TOP_ANY, BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ANY, strength, ctx)) return 0; /* * If r < 3*range, use r := r MOD range (which is either r, r - * range, or r - 2*range). Otherwise, iterate once more. Since * 3*range = 11..._2, each iteration succeeds with probability >= * .75. */ if (BN_cmp(r, range) >= 0) { if (!BN_sub(r, r, range)) return 0; if (BN_cmp(r, range) >= 0) if (!BN_sub(r, r, range)) return 0; } if (!--count) { ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_BN, BN_R_TOO_MANY_ITERATIONS); return 0; } } while (BN_cmp(r, range) >= 0); } else { do { /* range = 11..._2 or range = 101..._2 */ if (!bnrand(flag, r, n, BN_RAND_TOP_ANY, BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ANY, 0, ctx)) return 0; if (!--count) { ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_BN, BN_R_TOO_MANY_ITERATIONS); return 0; } } while (BN_cmp(r, range) >= 0); } bn_check_top(r); return 1; } int BN_rand_range_ex(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *range, unsigned int strength, BN_CTX *ctx) { return bnrand_range(NORMAL, r, range, strength, ctx); } #ifndef FIPS_MODULE int BN_rand_range(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *range) { return bnrand_range(NORMAL, r, range, 0, NULL); } #endif int BN_priv_rand_range_ex(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *range, unsigned int strength, BN_CTX *ctx) { return bnrand_range(PRIVATE, r, range, strength, ctx); } #ifndef FIPS_MODULE int BN_priv_rand_range(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *range) { return bnrand_range(PRIVATE, r, range, 0, NULL); } # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0 int BN_pseudo_rand(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom) { return BN_rand(rnd, bits, top, bottom); } int BN_pseudo_rand_range(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *range) { return BN_rand_range(r, range); } # endif #endif /* * BN_generate_dsa_nonce generates a random number 0 <= out < range. Unlike * BN_rand_range, it also includes the contents of |priv| and |message| in * the generation so that an RNG failure isn't fatal as long as |priv| * remains secret. This is intended for use in DSA and ECDSA where an RNG * weakness leads directly to private key exposure unless this function is * used. */ int BN_generate_dsa_nonce(BIGNUM *out, const BIGNUM *range, const BIGNUM *priv, const unsigned char *message, size_t message_len, BN_CTX *ctx) { EVP_MD_CTX *mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); /* * We use 512 bits of random data per iteration to ensure that we have at * least |range| bits of randomness. */ unsigned char random_bytes[64]; unsigned char digest[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH]; unsigned done, todo; /* We generate |range|+8 bytes of random output. */ const unsigned num_k_bytes = BN_num_bytes(range) + 8; unsigned char private_bytes[96]; unsigned char *k_bytes = NULL; int ret = 0; EVP_MD *md = NULL; OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx = ossl_bn_get_libctx(ctx); if (mdctx == NULL) goto err; k_bytes = OPENSSL_malloc(num_k_bytes); if (k_bytes == NULL) goto err; /* We copy |priv| into a local buffer to avoid exposing its length. */ if (BN_bn2binpad(priv, private_bytes, sizeof(private_bytes)) < 0) { /* * No reasonable DSA or ECDSA key should have a private key this * large and we don't handle this case in order to avoid leaking the * length of the private key. */ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_BN, BN_R_PRIVATE_KEY_TOO_LARGE); goto err; } md = EVP_MD_fetch(libctx, "SHA512", NULL); if (md == NULL) { ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_BN, BN_R_NO_SUITABLE_DIGEST); goto err; } for (done = 0; done < num_k_bytes;) { if (RAND_priv_bytes_ex(libctx, random_bytes, sizeof(random_bytes), 0) <= 0) goto err; if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(mdctx, md, NULL) || !EVP_DigestUpdate(mdctx, &done, sizeof(done)) || !EVP_DigestUpdate(mdctx, private_bytes, sizeof(private_bytes)) || !EVP_DigestUpdate(mdctx, message, message_len) || !EVP_DigestUpdate(mdctx, random_bytes, sizeof(random_bytes)) || !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(mdctx, digest, NULL)) goto err; todo = num_k_bytes - done; if (todo > SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH) todo = SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH; memcpy(k_bytes + done, digest, todo); done += todo; } if (!BN_bin2bn(k_bytes, num_k_bytes, out)) goto err; if (BN_mod(out, out, range, ctx) != 1) goto err; ret = 1; err: EVP_MD_CTX_free(mdctx); EVP_MD_free(md); OPENSSL_free(k_bytes); OPENSSL_cleanse(private_bytes, sizeof(private_bytes)); return ret; }