Lines Matching refs:variant

11 This document covers Spectre variant 1 and Spectre variant 2.
45    CVE-2017-5753   Bounds check bypass      Spectre variant 1
46    CVE-2017-5715   Branch target injection  Spectre variant 2
47    CVE-2019-1125   Spectre v1 swapgs        Spectre variant 1 (swapgs)
60 Spectre variant 1 attacks take advantage of speculative execution of
61 conditional branches, while Spectre variant 2 attacks use speculative
66 Spectre variant 1 (Bounds Check Bypass)
78 There are some extensions of Spectre variant 1 attacks for reading data
82 Note that, despite "Bounds Check Bypass" name, Spectre variant 1 is not
89 Spectre variant 2 (Branch Target Injection)
102 In Spectre variant 2 attacks, the attacker can steer speculative indirect
118 One other variant 2 attack vector is for the attacker to poison the
134 Yet another variant 2 attack vector is for the attacker to poison the
156 Spectre variant 1
162    a pointer for a Spectre variant 1 attack.  The index or pointer
171 Spectre variant 1 (swapgs)
201 Spectre variant 2
204    A spectre variant 2 attacker can :ref:`poison <poison_btb>` the branch
222    mitigate Spectre variant 2 instead of retpoline. Enhanced IBRS is
226    Spectre variant 2 attack by a rogue user process. To mitigate such
238    Spectre variant 1 attacks generally require passing parameters
244    Spectre variant 2 attacks can be launched from a rogue process by
250    A user process can protect itself against Spectre variant 2 attacks
279    For Spectre variant 1 attacks, rogue guests can pass parameters
285    For Spectre variant 2 attacks, rogue guests can :ref:`poison
289    To mitigate variant 2, the host kernel can use return trampolines
304    Spectre variant 1 attacks are possible if parameters can be passed
310    Spectre variant 2 attacks can be launched from a rogue guest by
319    If SMT is used, Spectre variant 2 attacks from an untrusted guest
334 The sysfs file showing Spectre variant 1 mitigation status is:
355 variant 1 are covered.
372 The sysfs file showing Spectre variant 2 mitigation status is:
391     used to protect against Spectre variant 2 attacks when calling firmware (x86 only).
437 Turning on mitigation for Spectre variant 1 and Spectre variant 2
443 Spectre variant 1
446    For the Spectre variant 1, vulnerable kernel code (as determined
450    not cover all attack vectors for Spectre variant 1.
456    For the swapgs variant of Spectre variant 1, LFENCE barriers are
461 Spectre variant 2
464    For Spectre variant 2 mitigation, the compiler turns indirect calls or
482    On CPUs with hardware mitigation for Spectre variant 2 (e.g. Enhanced
491    before invoking any firmware code to prevent Spectre variant 2 exploits
501    User programs can mitigate Spectre variant 1 using LFENCE or "bounds
504    For Spectre variant 2 mitigation, individual user programs
515    also prevent the program from launching a variant 2 attack
531    Within the kernel, Spectre variant 1 attacks from rogue guests are
534    usable disclosure gadgets.  However, this may not cover all variant
537    For Spectre variant 2 attacks from rogue guests to the kernel, the
562 Spectre variant 2 mitigation can be disabled or force enabled at the
573 		[X86] Disable all mitigations for the Spectre variant 2
581 		[X86] Control mitigation of Spectre variant 2
625 		[X86] Control mitigation of Spectre variant 2
672 		disable Spectre variant 2 mitigations, boot with
673 		spectre_v2=off. Spectre variant 1 mitigations
690    keys), protection against Spectre variant 2 can be put in place by
709    All Spectre variant 2 mitigations can be forced on
717    against variant 2 attacks originating from programs running on