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Searched refs:CAP_SETUID (Results 1 – 17 of 17) sorted by relevance

/kernel/linux/linux-5.10/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/
DSafeSetID.rst14 to switch to a different user must be spawned with CAP_SETUID privileges.
15 CAP_SETUID is granted to programs running as root or those running as a non-root
16 user that have been explicitly given the CAP_SETUID runtime capability. It is
25 since CAP_SETUID allows changing to any user on the system, including the root
35 other untrusted uids without full blown CAP_SETUID capabilities. The non-root
36 program would still need CAP_SETUID to do any kind of transition, but the
38 of CAP_SETUID since the non-root program cannot take advantage of CAP_SETUID to
41 services without having to give out CAP_SETUID all over the place just so that
45 basically-root-equivalent CAP_SETUID.
112 previously for CAP_SETUID. However, for compatibility with common sandboxing
/kernel/liteos_a/security/cap/
Dcapability_type.h43 #define CAP_SETUID 7 macro
/kernel/linux/linux-5.10/security/safesetid/
Dlsm.c96 if (cap != CAP_SETUID && cap != CAP_SETGID) in safesetid_security_capable()
114 case CAP_SETUID: in safesetid_security_capable()
/kernel/linux/patches/linux-4.19/prebuilts/usr/include/linux/
Dcapability.h66 #define CAP_SETUID 7 macro
/kernel/linux/patches/linux-5.10/prebuilts/usr/include/linux/
Dcapability.h77 #define CAP_SETUID 7 macro
/kernel/linux/linux-5.10/include/uapi/linux/
Dcapability.h157 #define CAP_SETUID 7 macro
/kernel/linux/linux-5.10/tools/testing/selftests/clone3/
Dclone3_cap_checkpoint_restore.c101 cap_value_t cap_values[] = { CAP_SETUID, CAP_SETGID }; in set_capability()
/kernel/linux/linux-5.10/security/keys/
Dpersistent.c149 !ns_capable(ns, CAP_SETUID)) in keyctl_get_persistent()
/kernel/liteos_a/testsuites/unittest/security/capability/smoke/
Dcap_test_001.cpp74 capdata[CAP_TO_INDEX(CAP_SYS_NICE)].effective |= CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SETUID); in TestChild()
/kernel/linux/linux-5.10/tools/testing/selftests/safesetid/
Dsafesetid-test.c272 cap_value_t cap_values[] = {CAP_SETUID, CAP_SETGID}; in drop_caps()
/kernel/linux/linux-5.10/kernel/
Duser_namespace.c1100 return map_write(file, buf, size, ppos, CAP_SETUID, in proc_uid_map_write()
1145 if (cap_setid == CAP_SETUID && !verify_root_map(file, ns, new_map)) in new_idmap_permitted()
1154 if (cap_setid == CAP_SETUID) { in new_idmap_permitted()
Dsys.c529 !ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) in __sys_setreuid()
538 !ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) in __sys_setreuid()
597 if (ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) { in __sys_setuid()
659 if (!ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) { in __sys_setresuid()
831 ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) { in __sys_setfsuid()
/kernel/linux/linux-5.10/net/core/
Dscm.c58 uid_eq(uid, cred->suid)) || ns_capable(cred->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) && in scm_check_creds()
/kernel/liteos_a/syscall/
Dprocess_syscall.c645 if (IsCapPermit(CAP_SETUID)) { in SysSetUserID()
687 if (IsCapPermit(CAP_SETUID)) { in SysSetUserID()
/kernel/liteos_a/fs/proc/os_adapt/
Dprocess_proc.c430 ret = OsUserContainerMapWrite(file, kbuf, size, CAP_SETUID, in ProcIDMapWrite()
/kernel/linux/linux-5.10/security/
Dcommoncap.c865 if (!ns_capable(new->user_ns, CAP_SETUID) || in cap_bprm_creds_from_file()
/kernel/linux/linux-5.10/security/integrity/ima/
Dima_policy.c531 if (has_capability_noaudit(current, CAP_SETUID)) { in ima_match_rules()