Searched full:attack (Results 1 – 25 of 378) sorted by relevance
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| /kernel/linux/linux-5.10/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/ |
| D | spectre.rst | 69 The bounds check bypass attack :ref:`[2] <spec_ref2>` takes advantage
92 The branch target injection attack takes advantage of speculative
116 the attack revealing useful data.
118 One other variant 2 attack vector is for the attacker to poison the
123 return instructions. This attack can be mitigated by flushing the return
134 Yet another variant 2 attack vector is for the attacker to poison the
141 Currently the only known real-world BHB attack vector is via
147 Attack scenarios
150 The following list of attack scenarios have been anticipated, but may
151 not cover all possible attack vectors.
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| D | l1tf.rst | 56 similar to the Meltdown attack.
59 allows to attack any physical memory address in the system and the attack
60 works across all protection domains. It allows an attack of SGX and also
65 Attack scenarios
73 application to attack the physical memory to which these PTEs resolve.
78 The Linux kernel contains a mitigation for this attack vector, PTE
92 PTE inversion mitigation for L1TF, to attack physical host memory.
98 only to attack data which is present in L1D, a malicious guest running
99 on one Hyperthread can attack the data which is brought into the L1D by
103 If the processor does not support Extended Page Tables, the attack is
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| D | srso.rst | 56 address User->User and VM->VM attack
97 attack vectors, including the local User->Kernel one.
103 new attack vectors appear.
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| D | gather_data_sampling.rst | 17 attacks. GDS is a purely sampling-based attack.
27 Attack scenarios
44 attack, and re-enable it.
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| D | mds.rst | 55 allows in turn to infer the value via a cache side channel attack.
64 Attack scenarios
74 the TLBleed attack samples can be postprocessed successfully.
220 to use MWAIT in user space (Ring 3) which opens an potential attack vector
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| /kernel/linux/linux-6.6/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/ |
| D | spectre.rst | 69 The bounds check bypass attack :ref:`[2] <spec_ref2>` takes advantage
92 The branch target injection attack takes advantage of speculative
116 the attack revealing useful data.
118 One other variant 2 attack vector is for the attacker to poison the
123 return instructions. This attack can be mitigated by flushing the return
134 Yet another variant 2 attack vector is for the attacker to poison the
141 Previously the only known real-world BHB attack vector was via unprivileged
146 Attack scenarios
149 The following list of attack scenarios have been anticipated, but may
150 not cover all possible attack vectors.
[all …]
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| D | l1tf.rst | 56 similar to the Meltdown attack.
59 allows to attack any physical memory address in the system and the attack
60 works across all protection domains. It allows an attack of SGX and also
65 Attack scenarios
73 application to attack the physical memory to which these PTEs resolve.
78 The Linux kernel contains a mitigation for this attack vector, PTE
92 PTE inversion mitigation for L1TF, to attack physical host memory.
98 only to attack data which is present in L1D, a malicious guest running
99 on one Hyperthread can attack the data which is brought into the L1D by
103 If the processor does not support Extended Page Tables, the attack is
[all …]
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| D | gather_data_sampling.rst | 17 attacks. GDS is a purely sampling-based attack.
27 Attack scenarios
44 attack, and re-enable it.
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| D | srso.rst | 68 does address User->User and VM->VM attack vectors.
124 attack vectors, including the local User->Kernel one.
130 new attack vectors appear.
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| D | mds.rst | 55 allows in turn to infer the value via a cache side channel attack.
64 Attack scenarios
74 the TLBleed attack samples can be postprocessed successfully.
220 to use MWAIT in user space (Ring 3) which opens an potential attack vector
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| /kernel/linux/linux-6.6/Documentation/security/ |
| D | self-protection.rst | 9 and actively detecting attack attempts. Not all topics are explored in
20 attack surface. (Especially when they have the ability to load arbitrary
31 Attack Surface Reduction
114 bug to an attack.
127 unexpectedly extend the available attack surface. (The on-demand loading
146 to gain execution control during an attack, By far the most commonly
149 kind of attack exist, and protections exist to defend against them.
164 A less well understood attack is using a bug that triggers the
166 allocations. With this attack it is possible to write beyond the end of
200 defense, in that an attack must gather enough information about a
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| /kernel/linux/linux-5.10/Documentation/security/ |
| D | self-protection.rst | 9 and actively detecting attack attempts. Not all topics are explored in
20 attack surface. (Especially when they have the ability to load arbitrary
31 Attack Surface Reduction
115 bug to an attack.
128 unexpectedly extend the available attack surface. (The on-demand loading
147 to gain execution control during an attack, By far the most commonly
150 kind of attack exist, and protections exist to defend against them.
165 A less well understood attack is using a bug that triggers the
167 allocations. With this attack it is possible to write beyond the end of
201 defense, in that an attack must gather enough information about a
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| /kernel/linux/linux-5.10/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/sound/ |
| D | max98504.txt | 20 applied during the "attack hold" and "timed hold" phase, the value must be
22 - maxim,brownout-attack-hold-ms - the brownout attack hold phase time in ms,
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| /kernel/linux/linux-6.6/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/sound/ |
| D | maxim,max98504.yaml | 44 Brownout attenuation to the speaker gain applied during the "attack hold"
47 maxim,brownout-attack-hold-ms:
51 Brownout attack hold phase time in ms, VBATBROWN_ATTK_HOLD, register 0x0018.
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| /kernel/linux/linux-5.10/include/linux/mfd/ |
| D | ac100.h | 96 #define AC100_ADC_DAP_L_A_T 0x8b /* Left Attack Time */
98 #define AC100_ADC_DAP_R_A_T 0x8d /* Right Attack Time */
118 #define AC100_DAC_DAP_H_G_A_T_C 0xa9 /* High Gain Attack Time Coef */
119 #define AC100_DAC_DAP_L_G_A_T_C 0xaa /* Low Gain Attack Time Coef */
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| /kernel/linux/linux-6.6/include/linux/mfd/ |
| D | ac100.h | 96 #define AC100_ADC_DAP_L_A_T 0x8b /* Left Attack Time */
98 #define AC100_ADC_DAP_R_A_T 0x8d /* Right Attack Time */
118 #define AC100_DAC_DAP_H_G_A_T_C 0xa9 /* High Gain Attack Time Coef */
119 #define AC100_DAC_DAP_L_G_A_T_C 0xaa /* Low Gain Attack Time Coef */
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| /kernel/linux/linux-5.10/Documentation/input/devices/ |
| D | iforce-protocol.rst | 126 0a-0b Address of attack and fade parameters, or ffff if none.
139 Attack and fade
147 02-03 Duration of attack (little endian encoding, in ms)
148 04 Level at end of attack. Signed byte.
356 - attack and fade : 0e
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| /kernel/linux/linux-6.6/Documentation/input/devices/ |
| D | iforce-protocol.rst | 126 0a-0b Address of attack and fade parameters, or ffff if none.
139 Attack and fade
147 02-03 Duration of attack (little endian encoding, in ms)
148 04 Level at end of attack. Signed byte.
356 - attack and fade : 0e
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| /kernel/linux/linux-6.6/Documentation/staging/ |
| D | tee.rst | 227 There are additional attack vectors/mitigations for the kernel that should be
232 * Attack vector: Replace the OP-TEE OS image in the rootfs to gain control of
241 * Attack vector: Using an alternate boot mode (i.e. recovery mode), the
250 * Attack vector: Code that is executed prior to issuing the SMC call to load
253 * Mitigation: The OP-TEE driver must be loaded before any potential attack
260 * Attack vector: Prevent the driver from being probed, so the SMC call to
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| /kernel/linux/linux-5.10/sound/soc/codecs/ |
| D | cs42l73.h | 53 #define CS42L73_LIMARATEHL 0x26 /* Lmtr Attack Rate HP/Line. */
56 #define CS42L73_LIMARATESPK 0x29 /* Lmtr Attack Rate Spkphone [A]. */
59 #define CS42L73_LIMARATEESL 0x2C /* Lmtr Attack Rate */
62 #define CS42L73_ALCARATE 0x2F /* ALC Enable, Attack Rate AB. */
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| /kernel/linux/linux-6.6/sound/soc/codecs/ |
| D | cs42l73.h | 53 #define CS42L73_LIMARATEHL 0x26 /* Lmtr Attack Rate HP/Line. */
56 #define CS42L73_LIMARATESPK 0x29 /* Lmtr Attack Rate Spkphone [A]. */
59 #define CS42L73_LIMARATEESL 0x2C /* Lmtr Attack Rate */
62 #define CS42L73_ALCARATE 0x2F /* ALC Enable, Attack Rate AB. */
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| /kernel/linux/linux-5.10/arch/arm/mm/ |
| D | copypage-v6.c | 27 * attack the kernel's existing mapping of these pages.
43 * attack the kernel's existing mapping of this page.
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| /kernel/linux/linux-6.6/include/uapi/sound/ |
| D | asound_fm.h | 39 unsigned char attack; /* 4 bits: attack rate */ member
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| /kernel/linux/linux-6.6/arch/arm/mm/ |
| D | copypage-v6.c | 28 * attack the kernel's existing mapping of these pages.
44 * attack the kernel's existing mapping of this page.
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| /kernel/linux/linux-5.10/drivers/firmware/efi/ |
| D | Kconfig | 201 bool "Reset memory attack mitigation"
205 using the TCG Platform Reset Attack Mitigation specification. This
233 PCI devices from being able to attack the OS via DMA. However, since
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