| /kernel/linux/linux-6.6/drivers/gpu/drm/ci/ |
| D | gitlab-ci.yml | 86 - '/.gitlab-ci/farm-rules.yml'
126 .rules-anchors:
127 rules:
151 .scheduled_pipeline-rules:
152 rules:
158 .no_scheduled_pipelines-rules:
159 rules:
164 .build-rules:
165 rules:
166 - !reference [.no_scheduled_pipelines-rules, rules]
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| D | container.yml | 24 rules:
28 rules:
32 rules:
36 rules:
40 rules:
44 rules:
48 rules:
52 rules:
56 rules:
60 rules:
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| /kernel/linux/linux-6.6/tools/perf/util/ |
| D | strfilter.h | 23 * @rules: Filter rule, which is a combination of glob expressions.
24 * @err: Pointer which points an error detected on @rules
26 * Parse @rules and return new strfilter. Return NULL if an error detected.
30 struct strfilter *strfilter__new(const char *rules, const char **err);
35 * @rules: Filter rule to be appended at left of the root of
37 * @err: Pointer which points an error detected on @rules
39 * Parse @rules and join it to the @filter by using logical-or.
43 const char *rules, const char **err);
48 * @rules: Filter rule to be appended at left of the root of
50 * @err: Pointer which points an error detected on @rules
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| /kernel/linux/linux-5.10/tools/perf/util/ |
| D | strfilter.h | 23 * @rules: Filter rule, which is a combination of glob expressions.
24 * @err: Pointer which points an error detected on @rules
26 * Parse @rules and return new strfilter. Return NULL if an error detected.
30 struct strfilter *strfilter__new(const char *rules, const char **err);
35 * @rules: Filter rule to be appended at left of the root of
37 * @err: Pointer which points an error detected on @rules
39 * Parse @rules and join it to the @filter by using logical-or.
43 const char *rules, const char **err);
48 * @rules: Filter rule to be appended at left of the root of
50 * @err: Pointer which points an error detected on @rules
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| /kernel/linux/linux-6.6/security/apparmor/ |
| D | net.c | 113 struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules, in aa_profile_af_perm() local
114 typeof(*rules), list); in aa_profile_af_perm()
124 state = RULE_MEDIATES(rules, AA_CLASS_NET); in aa_profile_af_perm()
130 state = aa_dfa_match_len(rules->policy.dfa, state, (char *) &buffer, in aa_profile_af_perm()
132 perms = *aa_lookup_perms(&rules->policy, state); in aa_profile_af_perm()
226 struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules, in aa_secmark_perm() local
227 typeof(*rules), list); in aa_secmark_perm()
229 if (rules->secmark_count == 0) in aa_secmark_perm()
232 for (i = 0; i < rules->secmark_count; i++) { in aa_secmark_perm()
233 if (!rules->secmark[i].secid) { in aa_secmark_perm()
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| D | resource.c | 92 struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules, in profile_setrlimit() local
93 typeof(*rules), list); in profile_setrlimit()
96 if (rules->rlimits.mask & (1 << resource) && new_rlim->rlim_max > in profile_setrlimit()
97 rules->rlimits.limits[resource].rlim_max) in profile_setrlimit()
128 * profiles. AppArmor rules currently have the implicit assumption in aa_task_setrlimit()
168 struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&old->rules, in __aa_transition_rlimits() local
169 typeof(*rules), in __aa_transition_rlimits()
171 if (rules->rlimits.mask) { in __aa_transition_rlimits()
176 if (rules->rlimits.mask & mask) { in __aa_transition_rlimits()
188 struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&new->rules, in __aa_transition_rlimits() local
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| D | policy_unpack.c | 565 static bool unpack_secmark(struct aa_ext *e, struct aa_ruleset *rules) in unpack_secmark() argument
575 rules->secmark = kcalloc(size, sizeof(struct aa_secmark), in unpack_secmark()
577 if (!rules->secmark) in unpack_secmark()
580 rules->secmark_count = size; in unpack_secmark()
583 if (!unpack_u8(e, &rules->secmark[i].audit, NULL)) in unpack_secmark()
585 if (!unpack_u8(e, &rules->secmark[i].deny, NULL)) in unpack_secmark()
587 if (!aa_unpack_strdup(e, &rules->secmark[i].label, NULL)) in unpack_secmark()
599 if (rules->secmark) { in unpack_secmark()
601 kfree(rules->secmark[i].label); in unpack_secmark()
602 kfree(rules->secmark); in unpack_secmark()
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| D | capability.c | 67 struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules, in audit_caps() local
68 typeof(*rules), list); in audit_caps()
77 !cap_raised(rules->caps.audit, cap))) in audit_caps()
81 cap_raised(rules->caps.kill, cap)) { in audit_caps()
83 } else if (cap_raised(rules->caps.quiet, cap) && in audit_caps()
121 struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules, in profile_capable() local
122 typeof(*rules), list); in profile_capable()
125 if (cap_raised(rules->caps.allow, cap) && in profile_capable()
126 !cap_raised(rules->caps.denied, cap)) in profile_capable()
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| D | mount.c | 312 struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules, in match_mnt_path_str() local
313 typeof(*rules), list); in match_mnt_path_str()
320 if (!RULE_MEDIATES(rules, AA_CLASS_MOUNT)) in match_mnt_path_str()
335 pos = do_match_mnt(&rules->policy, in match_mnt_path_str()
336 rules->policy.start[AA_CLASS_MOUNT], in match_mnt_path_str()
372 struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules, in match_mnt() local
373 typeof(*rules), list); in match_mnt()
379 if (!RULE_MEDIATES(rules, AA_CLASS_MOUNT)) in match_mnt()
605 struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules, in profile_umount() local
606 typeof(*rules), list); in profile_umount()
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| D | ipc.c | 83 struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules, in profile_signal_perm() local
84 typeof(*rules), list); in profile_signal_perm()
89 !ANY_RULE_MEDIATES(&profile->rules, AA_CLASS_SIGNAL)) in profile_signal_perm()
95 state = aa_dfa_next(rules->policy.dfa, in profile_signal_perm()
96 rules->policy.start[AA_CLASS_SIGNAL], in profile_signal_perm()
98 aa_label_match(profile, rules, peer, state, false, request, &perms); in profile_signal_perm()
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| /kernel/linux/linux-6.6/drivers/net/dsa/qca/ |
| D | qca8k-leds.c | 53 * 3 control rules for phy0-3 that applies to all their leds in qca8k_get_control_led_reg()
54 * 3 control rules for phy4 in qca8k_get_control_led_reg()
65 qca8k_parse_netdev(unsigned long rules, u32 *offload_trigger) in qca8k_parse_netdev() argument
68 if (test_bit(TRIGGER_NETDEV_TX, &rules)) in qca8k_parse_netdev()
70 if (test_bit(TRIGGER_NETDEV_RX, &rules)) in qca8k_parse_netdev()
72 if (test_bit(TRIGGER_NETDEV_LINK_10, &rules)) in qca8k_parse_netdev()
74 if (test_bit(TRIGGER_NETDEV_LINK_100, &rules)) in qca8k_parse_netdev()
76 if (test_bit(TRIGGER_NETDEV_LINK_1000, &rules)) in qca8k_parse_netdev()
78 if (test_bit(TRIGGER_NETDEV_HALF_DUPLEX, &rules)) in qca8k_parse_netdev()
80 if (test_bit(TRIGGER_NETDEV_FULL_DUPLEX, &rules)) in qca8k_parse_netdev()
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| /kernel/linux/linux-5.10/Documentation/admin-guide/aoe/ |
| D | udev.txt | 1 # These rules tell udev what device nodes to create for aoe support.
11 # udev_rules="/etc/udev/rules.d/"
12 # bash# ls /etc/udev/rules.d/
13 # 10-wacom.rules 50-udev.rules
15 # /etc/udev/rules.d/60-aoe.rules
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| D | udev-install.sh | 1 # install the aoe-specific udev rules from udev.txt into
22 # find the directory where udev rules are stored, often
23 # /etc/udev/rules.d
27 rules_d=/etc/udev/rules.d
30 echo "$me Error: cannot find udev rules directory" 1>&2
33 sh -xc "cp `dirname $0`/udev.txt $rules_d/60-aoe.rules"
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| /kernel/linux/linux-6.6/Documentation/admin-guide/aoe/ |
| D | udev.txt | 1 # These rules tell udev what device nodes to create for aoe support.
11 # udev_rules="/etc/udev/rules.d/"
12 # bash# ls /etc/udev/rules.d/
13 # 10-wacom.rules 50-udev.rules
15 # /etc/udev/rules.d/60-aoe.rules
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| D | udev-install.sh | 1 # install the aoe-specific udev rules from udev.txt into
22 # find the directory where udev rules are stored, often
23 # /etc/udev/rules.d
27 rules_d=/etc/udev/rules.d
30 echo "$me Error: cannot find udev rules directory" 1>&2
33 sh -xc "cp `dirname $0`/udev.txt $rules_d/60-aoe.rules"
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| /kernel/linux/linux-5.10/net/netfilter/ |
| D | nft_set_pipapo.c | 56 * represented as one or more rules, depending on the number of composing
61 * Rules are mapped between fields through an array of x, n pairs, with each
62 * item mapping a matched rule to one or more rules. The position of the pair in
65 * next-field rules the current rule maps to.
108 * or multiple rules for ranges. Ranges are expanded to composing netmasks
116 * - insert references to the rules in the lookup table, selecting buckets
144 * rules from the lookup table to rules belonging to the same entry in
147 * Note that as rules map to contiguous ranges of rules, given how netmask
182 * we need to map rules for 10.0.0.5 in lookup table #0 (rule #0) to 1024
183 * in lookup table #1 (rule #0) and rules for 192.168.1.0-192.168.2.1
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| D | nft_set_pipapo.h | 52 /* Each n-bit range maps to up to n * 2 rules */
92 * @n: Number of rules (in next field) this rule maps to
114 * @rules: Number of inserted rules
123 unsigned long rules; member
187 int pipapo_refill(unsigned long *map, int len, int rules, unsigned long *dst,
245 * of rules (composing netmasks) the entries expand to. We compute the worst
262 unsigned long rules; in pipapo_estimate_size() local
268 * field can expand to up to n * 2 rules in each bucket, and in pipapo_estimate_size()
271 rules = ilog2(desc->field_len[i] * BITS_PER_BYTE) * 2; in pipapo_estimate_size()
272 entry_size += rules * in pipapo_estimate_size()
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| D | nf_tables_core.c | 173 struct nft_rule *const *rules; member
206 struct nft_rule *const *rules; in nft_do_chain() local
220 rules = rcu_dereference(chain->rules_gen_1); in nft_do_chain()
222 rules = rcu_dereference(chain->rules_gen_0); in nft_do_chain()
225 rule = *rules; in nft_do_chain()
227 for (; *rules ; rules++) { in nft_do_chain()
228 rule = *rules; in nft_do_chain()
271 jumpstack[stackptr].rules = rules + 1; in nft_do_chain()
287 rules = jumpstack[stackptr].rules; in nft_do_chain()
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| /kernel/linux/linux-6.6/net/netfilter/ |
| D | nft_set_pipapo.c | 56 * represented as one or more rules, depending on the number of composing
61 * Rules are mapped between fields through an array of x, n pairs, with each
62 * item mapping a matched rule to one or more rules. The position of the pair in
65 * next-field rules the current rule maps to.
108 * or multiple rules for ranges. Ranges are expanded to composing netmasks
116 * - insert references to the rules in the lookup table, selecting buckets
144 * rules from the lookup table to rules belonging to the same entry in
147 * Note that as rules map to contiguous ranges of rules, given how netmask
182 * we need to map rules for 10.0.0.5 in lookup table #0 (rule #0) to 1024
183 * in lookup table #1 (rule #0) and rules for 192.168.1.0-192.168.2.1
[all …]
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| D | nft_set_pipapo.h | 52 /* Each n-bit range maps to up to n * 2 rules */
92 * @n: Number of rules (in next field) this rule maps to
114 * @rules: Number of inserted rules
123 unsigned long rules; member
187 int pipapo_refill(unsigned long *map, int len, int rules, unsigned long *dst,
243 * of rules (composing netmasks) the entries expand to. We compute the worst
260 unsigned long rules; in pipapo_estimate_size() local
266 * field can expand to up to n * 2 rules in each bucket, and in pipapo_estimate_size()
269 rules = ilog2(desc->field_len[i] * BITS_PER_BYTE) * 2; in pipapo_estimate_size()
270 entry_size += rules * in pipapo_estimate_size()
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| /kernel/linux/linux-6.6/security/apparmor/include/ |
| D | policy.h | 68 APPARMOR_ENFORCE, /* enforce access rules */
126 /* struct aa_ruleset - data covering mediation rules
129 * @policy: general match rules governing policy
130 * @file: The set of rules governing basic file access and domain transitions
152 /* struct aa_attachment - data and rules for a profiles attachment
179 * @attach: attachment rules for the profile
180 * @rules: rules to be enforced
189 * attachments are determined by profile X transition rules.
211 struct list_head rules; member
275 static inline aa_state_t RULE_MEDIATES(struct aa_ruleset *rules, in RULE_MEDIATES() argument
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| /kernel/linux/linux-6.6/kernel/kcsan/ |
| D | permissive.h | 3 * Special rules for ignoring entire classes of data-racy memory accesses. None
4 * of the rules here imply that such data races are generally safe!
6 * All rules in this file can be configured via CONFIG_KCSAN_PERMISSIVE. Keep
20 * Access ignore rules based on address.
35 * Data race ignore rules based on access type and value change patterns.
44 * Rules here are only for plain read accesses, so that we still report in kcsan_ignore_data_race()
70 * The rules here will ignore the data races if we observe no more than in kcsan_ignore_data_race()
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| /kernel/linux/linux-6.6/drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/vcap/ |
| D | Kconfig | 13 A VCAP is essentially a TCAM with rules consisting of
24 The VCAP implementation provides switchcore independent handling of rules
27 - Creating and deleting rules
28 - Updating and getting rules
32 access rules via the API in a platform independent way, with the
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| /kernel/linux/linux-5.10/security/smack/ |
| D | Kconfig | 17 bool "Reporting on access granted by Smack rules"
21 Enable the bring-up ("b") access mode in Smack rules.
26 rules. The developer can use the information to
27 identify which rules are necessary and what accesses
54 delivering a signal in the Smack rules.
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| /kernel/linux/linux-6.6/security/smack/ |
| D | Kconfig | 17 bool "Reporting on access granted by Smack rules"
21 Enable the bring-up ("b") access mode in Smack rules.
26 rules. The developer can use the information to
27 identify which rules are necessary and what accesses
54 delivering a signal in the Smack rules.
|