# android user-space log manager
type logd, domain, mlstrustedsubject;
type logd_exec, exec_type, file_type;

# Read access to pseudo filesystems.
r_dir_file(logd, cgroup)
r_dir_file(logd, proc)
r_dir_file(logd, proc_meminfo)
r_dir_file(logd, proc_net)

allow logd self:capability { setuid setgid setpcap sys_nice audit_control };
allow logd self:capability2 syslog;
allow logd self:netlink_audit_socket { create_socket_perms_no_ioctl nlmsg_write };
allow logd kernel:system syslog_read;
allow logd kmsg_device:chr_file w_file_perms;
allow logd system_data_file:{ file lnk_file } r_file_perms;
allow logd pstorefs:dir search;
allow logd pstorefs:file r_file_perms;
userdebug_or_eng(`
  # Access to /data/misc/logd/event-log-tags
  allow logd misc_logd_file:dir r_dir_perms;
  allow logd misc_logd_file:file rw_file_perms;
')
allow logd runtime_event_log_tags_file:file rw_file_perms;

# Access device logging gating property
get_prop(logd, device_logging_prop)

r_dir_file(logd, domain)

allow logd kernel:system syslog_mod;

control_logd(logd)
read_runtime_log_tags(logd)

allow runtime_event_log_tags_file tmpfs:filesystem associate;
# Typically harmlessly blindly trying to access via liblog
# event tag mapping while in the untrusted_app domain.
# Access for that domain is controlled and gated via the
# event log tag service (albeit at a performance penalty,
# expected to be locally cached).
dontaudit domain runtime_event_log_tags_file:file { open read };

###
### Neverallow rules
###
### logd should NEVER do any of this

# Block device access.
neverallow logd dev_type:blk_file { read write };

# ptrace any other app
neverallow logd domain:process ptrace;

# ... and nobody may ptrace me (except on userdebug or eng builds)
neverallow { domain userdebug_or_eng(`-crash_dump') } logd:process ptrace;

# Write to /system.
neverallow logd system_file:dir_file_class_set write;

# Write to files in /data/data or system files on /data
neverallow logd { app_data_file system_data_file }:dir_file_class_set write;

# Only init is allowed to enter the logd domain via exec()
neverallow { domain -init } logd:process transition;
neverallow * logd:process dyntransition;

# protect the event-log-tags file
neverallow {
  domain
  -init
  -logd
} runtime_event_log_tags_file:file no_w_file_perms;