Lines Matching refs:attacker

128   *non-reversible* modification of the address to prevent an attacker from
129   reversing the check using attacker-controlled inputs.
257   // The stack has now been smashed, writing an attacker-controlled
261   // Control will speculate to the attacker-written address.
274 For variant #1.2, the attacker speculatively stores into the vtable or jump
638 registers that can potentially be any value, and may be attacker controlled,
647 gigabytes of address space. While these offsets are not attacker controlled,
648 the attacker could chose to attack a load which happens to have the desired
650 raises the burden on the attacker and limits the scope of attack but does not
696 `%index`. The only advantage we have is that the attacker also cannot modify
699 attacker can find a load which with this address happens to point to secret
852 the attacker could cause the initial address computation itself to stall and