/* * Copyright (C) 2017 The Android Open Source Project * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ package android.hardware.keymaster@4.0; import android.hardware.keymaster@3.0::ErrorCode; import android.hardware.keymaster@3.0::KeyFormat; /** * Keymaster device definition. * * == Features == * * An IKeymasterDevice provides cryptographic services, including the following categories of * operations: * * o Key generation * o Import and export (public only) of asymmetric keys * o Import of raw symmetric keys * o Asymmetric encryption and decryption with appropriate padding modes * o Asymmetric signing and verification with digesting and appropriate padding modes * o Symmetric encryption and decryption in appropriate modes, including an AEAD mode * o Generation and verification of symmetric message authentication codes * o Attestation to the presence and configuration of asymmetric keys. * * Protocol elements, such as purpose, mode and padding, as well as access control constraints, must * be specified by the caller when keys are generated or imported and must be permanently bound to * the key, ensuring that the key cannot be used in any other way. * * In addition to the list above, IKeymasterDevice implementations must provide one more service * which is not exposed as an API but used internally: Random number generation. The random number * generator must be high-quality and must be used for generation of keys, initialization vectors, * random padding and other elements of secure protocols that require randomness. * * == Types of IKeymasterDevices == * * All of the operations and storage of key material must occur in a secure environment. Secure * environments may be either: * * 1. Isolated execution environments, such as a separate virtual machine, hypervisor or * purpose-built trusted execution environment like ARM TrustZone. The isolated environment * must provide complete separation from the Android kernel and user space (collectively called * the "non-secure world", or NSW) so that nothing running in the NSW can observe or manipulate * the results of any computation in the isolated environment. Isolated execution environments * are identified by the SecurityLevel TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT. * * 2. Completely separate, purpose-built and certified secure CPUs, called "StrongBox" devices. * Examples of StrongBox devices are embedded Secure Elements (eSE) or on-SoC secure processing * units (SPU). StrongBox environments are identified by the SecurityLevel STRONGBOX. To * qualify as a StrongBox, a device must meet the requirements specified in CDD 9.11.2. * * == Necessary Primitives == * * All IKeymasterDevice implementations must provide support for the following: * * o RSA * * - TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT IKeymasterDevices must support 2048, 3072 and 4096-bit keys. * STRONGBOX IKeymasterDevices must support 2048-bit keys. * - Public exponent F4 (2^16+1) * - Unpadded, RSASSA-PSS and RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 padding modes for RSA signing * - TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT IKeymasterDevices must support MD5, SHA1, SHA-2 224, SHA-2 256, SHA-2 * 384 and SHA-2 512 digest modes for RSA signing. STRONGBOX IKeymasterDevices must support * SHA-2 256. * - Unpadded, RSAES-OAEP and RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 padding modes for RSA encryption. * * o ECDSA * * - TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT IKeymasterDevices must support NIST curves P-224, P-256, P-384 and * P-521. STRONGBOX IKeymasterDevices must support NIST curve P-256. * - TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT IKeymasterDevices must support SHA1, SHA-2 224, SHA-2 256, SHA-2 * 384 and SHA-2 512 digest modes. STRONGBOX IKeymasterDevices must support SHA-2 256. * * o AES * * - 128 and 256-bit keys * - CBC, CTR, ECB and GCM modes. The GCM mode must not allow the use of tags smaller than 96 * bits or nonce lengths other than 96 bits. * - CBC and ECB modes must support unpadded and PKCS7 padding modes. With no padding CBC and * ECB-mode operations must fail with ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH if the input isn't a * multiple of the AES block size. With PKCS7 padding, GCM and CTR operations must fail with * ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PADDING_MODE. * * o 3DES * * - 168-bit keys. * - CBC and ECB mode. * - CBC and ECB modes must support unpadded and PKCS7 padding modes. With no padding CBC and * ECB-mode operations must fail with ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH if the input isn't a * multiple of the DES block size. * * o HMAC * * - Any key size that is between 64 and 512 bits (inclusive) and a multiple of 8 must be * supported. STRONGBOX IKeymasterDevices must not support keys larger than 512 bits. * - TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT IKeymasterDevices must support MD-5, SHA1, SHA-2-224, SHA-2-256, * SHA-2-384 and SHA-2-512. STRONGBOX IKeymasterDevices must support SHA-2-256. * * == Key Access Control == * * Hardware-based keys that can never be extracted from the device don't provide much security if an * attacker can use them at will (though they're more secure than keys which can be * exfiltrated). Therefore, IKeymasterDevice must enforce access controls. * * Access controls are defined as an "authorization list" of tag/value pairs. Authorization tags * are 32-bit integers from the Tag enum, and the values are a variety of types, defined in the * TagType enum. Some tags may be repeated to specify multiple values. Whether a tag may be * repeated is specified in the documentation for the tag and in the TagType. When a key is created * or imported, the caller specifies an authorization list. The IKeymasterDevice must divide the * caller-provided authorizations into two lists, those it enforces in hardware and those it does * not. These two lists are returned as the "hardwareEnforced" and "softwareEnforced" elements of * the KeyCharacteristics struct. The IKeymasterDevice must also add the following authorizations * to the appropriate list: * * o Tag::OS_VERSION, must be hardware-enforced. * o Tag::OS_PATCHLEVEL, must be hardware-enforced. * o Tag::VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL, must be hardware-enforced. * o Tag::BOOT_PATCHLEVEL, must be hardware-enforced. * o Tag::CREATION_DATETIME, must be software-enforced, unless the IKeymasterDevice has access to * a secure time service. * o Tag::ORIGIN, must be hardware-enforced. * * The IKeymasterDevice must accept arbitrary, unknown tags and return them in the softwareEnforced * list. * * All authorization tags and their values, both hardwareEnforced and softwareEnforced, including * unknown tags, must be cryptographically bound to the private/secret key material such that any * modification of the portion of the key blob that contains the authorization list makes it * impossible for the secure environment to obtain the private/secret key material. The recommended * approach to meet this requirement is to use the full set of authorization tags associated with a * key as input to a secure key derivation function used to derive a key that is used to encrypt the * private/secret key material. * * IKeymasterDevice implementations must place any tags they cannot fully and completely enforce in * the softwareEnforced list. For example, Tag::ORIGINATION_EXPIRE_DATETIME provides the date and * time after which a key may not be used to encrypt or sign new messages. Unless the * IKeymasterDevice has access to a secure source of current date/time information, it is not * possible for the IKeymasterDevice to enforce this tag. An IKeymasterDevice implementation may * not rely on the non-secure world's notion of time, because it could be controlled by an attacker. * Similarly, it cannot rely on GPSr time, even if it has exclusive control of the GPSr, because * that might be spoofed by attacker RF signals. * * It is recommended that IKeymasterDevices not enforce any tags they place in the softwareEnforced * list. The IKeymasterDevice caller must enforce them, and it is unnecessary to enforce them * twice. * * Some tags must be enforced by the IKeymasterDevice. See the detailed documentation on each Tag * in types.hal. * * == Root of Trust Binding == * * IKeymasterDevice keys must be bound to a root of trust, which is a bitstring that must be * provided to the secure environment (by an unspecified, implementation-defined mechanism) during * startup, preferably by the bootloader. This bitstring must be cryptographically bound to every * key managed by the IKeymasterDevice. As above, the recommended mechanism for this cryptographic * binding is to include the Root of Trust data in the input to the key derivation function used to * derive a key that is used to encrypt the private/secret key material. * * The root of trust consists of a bitstring that must be derived from the public key used by * Verified Boot to verify the signature on the boot image and from the the lock state of the * device. If the public key is changed to allow a different system image to be used or if the lock * state is changed, then all of the IKeymasterDevice-protected keys created by the previous system * state must be unusable, unless the previous state is restored. The goal is to increase the value * of the software-enforced key access controls by making it impossible for an attacker-installed * operating system to use IKeymasterDevice keys. * * == Version Binding == * * All keys must also be bound to the operating system and patch level of the system image and the * patch levels of the vendor image and boot image. This ensures that an attacker who discovers a * weakness in an old version of the software cannot roll a device back to the vulnerable version * and use keys created with the newer version. In addition, when a key with a given version and * patch level is used on a device that has been upgraded to a newer version or patch level, the key * must be upgraded (See IKeymasterDevice::upgradeKey()) before it can be used, and the previous * version of the key must be invalidated. In this way, as the device is upgraded, the keys will * "ratchet" forward along with the device, but any reversion of the device to a previous release * will cause the keys to be unusable. * * This version information must be associated with every key as a set of tag/value pairs in the * hardwareEnforced authorization list. Tag::OS_VERSION, Tag::OS_PATCHLEVEL, * Tag::VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL, and Tag::BOOT_PATCHLEVEL must be cryptographically bound to every * IKeymasterDevice key, as described in the Key Access Control section above. */ interface IKeymasterDevice { /** * Returns information about the underlying IKeymasterDevice hardware. * * @return security level of the IKeymasterDevice implementation accessed through this HAL. * * @return keymasterName is the name of the IKeymasterDevice implementation. * * @return keymasterAuthorName is the name of the author of the IKeymasterDevice implementation * (organization name, not individual). */ getHardwareInfo() generates (SecurityLevel securityLevel, string keymasterName, string keymasterAuthorName); /** * Start the creation of an HMAC key, shared with another IKeymasterDevice implementation. Any * device with a StrongBox IKeymasterDevice has two IKeymasterDevice instances, because there * must be a TEE Keymaster as well. The HMAC key used to MAC and verify authentication tokens * (HardwareAuthToken, VerificationToken and ConfirmationToken all use this HMAC key) must be * shared between TEE and StrongBox so they can each validate tokens produced by the other. * This method is the first step in the process for agreeing on a shared key. It is called by * Android during startup. The system calls it on each of the HAL instances and collects the * results in preparation for the second step. * * @return error ErrorCode::OK on success, ErrorCode::UNIMPLEMENTED if HMAC agreement is not * implemented (note that all 4.0::IKeymasterDevice HALS must implement HMAC agreement, * regardless of whether or not the HAL will be used on a device with StrongBox), or * ErrorCode::UNKNOWN_ERROR if the parameters cannot be returned. * * @return params The HmacSharingParameters to use. As specified in the HmacSharingParameters * documentation in types.hal, the seed must contain the same value in every invocation * of the method on a given device, and the nonce must return the same value for every * invocation during a boot session. */ getHmacSharingParameters() generates (ErrorCode error, HmacSharingParameters params); /** * Complete the creation of an HMAC key, shared with another IKeymasterDevice implementation. * Any device with a StrongBox IKeymasterDevice has two IKeymasterDevice instances, because * there must be a TEE IKeymasterDevice as well. The HMAC key used to MAC and verify * authentication tokens must be shared between TEE and StrongBox so they can each validate * tokens produced by the other. This method is the second and final step in the process for * agreeing on a shared key. It is called by Android during startup. The system calls it on * each of the HAL instances, and sends to it all of the HmacSharingParameters returned by all * HALs. * * To ensure consistent ordering of the HmacSharingParameters, the caller must sort the * parameters lexicographically. See the support/keymaster_utils.cpp for an operator< that * defines the appropriate ordering. * * This method computes the shared 32-byte HMAC ``H'' as follows (all IKeymasterDevice instances * perform the same computation to arrive at the same result): * * H = CKDF(key = K, * context = P1 || P2 || ... || Pn, * label = "KeymasterSharedMac") * * where: * * ``CKDF'' is the standard AES-CMAC KDF from NIST SP 800-108 in counter mode (see Section * 5.1 of the referenced publication). ``key'', ``context'', and ``label'' are * defined in the standard. The counter is prefixed and length L appended, as shown * in the construction on page 12 of the standard. The label string is UTF-8 encoded. * * ``K'' is a pre-established shared secret, set up during factory reset. The mechanism for * establishing this shared secret is implementation-defined, but see below for a * recommended approach, which assumes that the TEE IKeymasterDevice does not have * storage available to it, but the StrongBox IKeymasterDevice does. * * CRITICAL SECURITY REQUIREMENT: All keys created by a IKeymasterDevice instance must * be cryptographically bound to the value of K, such that establishing a new K * permanently destroys them. * * ``||'' represents concatenation. * * ``Pi'' is the i'th HmacSharingParameters value in the params vector. Note that at * present only two IKeymasterDevice implementations are supported, but this mechanism * extends without modification to any number of implementations. Encoding of an * HmacSharingParameters is the concatenation of its two fields, i.e. seed || nonce. * * Note that the label "KeymasterSharedMac" is the 18-byte UTF-8 encoding of the string. * * Process for establishing K: * * Any method of securely establishing K that ensures that an attacker cannot obtain or * derive its value is acceptable. What follows is a recommended approach, to be executed * during each factory reset. It relies on use of the factory-installed attestation keys to * mitigate man-in-the-middle attacks. This protocol requires that one of the instances * have secure persistent storage. This model was chosen because StrongBox has secure * persistent storage (by definition), but the TEE may not. The instance without storage is * assumed to be able to derive a unique hardware-bound key (HBK) which is used only for * this purpose, and is not derivable outside the secure environment. * * In what follows, T is the IKeymasterDevice instance without storage, S is the * IKeymasterDevice instance with storage: * * 1. T generates an ephemeral EC P-256 key pair K1. * 2. T sends K1_pub to S, signed with T's attestation key. * 3. S validates the signature on K1_pub. * 4. S generates an ephemeral EC P-256 key pair K2. * 5. S sends {K1_pub, K2_pub}, to T, signed with S's attestation key. * 6. T validates the signature on {K1_pub, K2_pub}. * 7. T uses {K1_priv, K2_pub} with ECDH to compute session secret Q. * 8. T generates a random seed S. * 9. T computes K = KDF(HBK, S), where KDF is some secure key derivation function. * 10. T sends M = AES-GCM-ENCRYPT(Q, {S || K}) to S. * 10. S uses {K2_priv, K1_pub} with ECDH to compute session secret Q. * 11. S computes S || K = AES-GCM-DECRYPT(Q, M) and stores S and K. * * When S receives the getHmacSharingParameters call, it returns the stored S as the seed * and a nonce. When T receives the same call, it returns an empty seed and a nonce. When * T receives the computeSharedHmac call, it uses the seed provided by S to compute K. S, * of course, has K stored. * * @param params The HmacSharingParameters data returned by all IKeymasterDevice instances when * getHmacSharingParameters was called. * * @return error ErrorCode::OK in the event that there is no error. ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT * if one of the provided parameters is not the value returned by the prior call to * getHmacParameters(). * * @return sharingCheck A 32-byte value used to verify that all IKeymasterDevice instances have * computed the same shared HMAC key. The sharingCheck value is computed as follows: * * sharingCheck = HMAC(H, "Keymaster HMAC Verification") * * The string is UTF-8 encoded, 27 bytes in length. If the returned values of all * IKeymasterDevice instances don't match, clients must assume that HMAC agreement * failed. */ computeSharedHmac(vec params) generates (ErrorCode error, vec sharingCheck); /** * Verify authorizations for another IKeymasterDevice instance. * * On systems with both a StrongBox and a TEE IKeymasterDevice instance it is sometimes useful * to ask the TEE IKeymasterDevice to verify authorizations for a key hosted in StrongBox. * * For every StrongBox operation, Keystore is required to call this method on the TEE Keymaster, * passing in the StrongBox key's hardwareEnforced authorization list and the operation handle * returned by StrongBox begin(). The TEE IKeymasterDevice must validate all of the * authorizations it can and return those it validated in the VerificationToken. If it cannot * verify any, the parametersVerified field of the VerificationToken must be empty. Keystore * must then pass the VerificationToken to the subsequent invocations of StrongBox update() and * finish(). * * StrongBox implementations must return ErrorCode::UNIMPLEMENTED. * * @param operationHandle the operation handle returned by StrongBox Keymaster's begin(). * * @param parametersToVerify Set of authorizations to verify. The caller may provide an empty * vector if the only required information is the TEE timestamp. * * @param authToken A HardwareAuthToken if needed to authorize key usage. * * @return error ErrorCode::OK on success or ErrorCode::UNIMPLEMENTED if the IKeymasterDevice is * a StrongBox. If the IKeymasterDevice cannot verify one or more elements of * parametersToVerify it must not return an error code, but just omit the unverified * parameter from the VerificationToken. * * @return token the verification token. See VerificationToken in types.hal for details. */ verifyAuthorization(uint64_t operationHandle, vec parametersToVerify, HardwareAuthToken authToken) generates (ErrorCode error, VerificationToken token); /** * Adds entropy to the RNG used by Keymaster. Entropy added through this method must not be the * only source of entropy used, and a secure mixing function must be used to mix the entropy * provided by this method with internally-generated entropy. The mixing function must be * secure in the sense that if any one of the mixing function inputs is provided with any data * the attacker cannot predict (or control), then the output of the seeded CRNG is * indistinguishable from random. Thus, if the entropy from any source is good, the output must * be good. * * @param data Bytes to be mixed into the CRNG seed. The caller must not provide more than 2 * KiB of data per invocation. * * @return error ErrorCode::OK on success; ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH if the caller * provides more than 2 KiB of data. */ addRngEntropy(vec data) generates (ErrorCode error); /** * Generates a new cryptographic key, specifying associated parameters, which must be * cryptographically bound to the key. IKeymasterDevice implementations must disallow any use * of a key in any way inconsistent with the authorizations specified at generation time. With * respect to parameters that the secure environment cannot enforce, the secure environment's * obligation is limited to ensuring that the unenforceable parameters associated with the key * cannot be modified, so that every call to getKeyCharacteristics returns the original * values. In addition, the characteristics returned by generateKey places parameters correctly * in the hardware-enforced and software-enforced lists. See getKeyCharacteristics for more * details. * * In addition to the parameters provided, generateKey must add the following to the returned * characteristics. * * o Tag::ORIGIN with the value KeyOrigin::GENERATED. * * o Tag::BLOB_USAGE_REQUIREMENTS with the appropriate value (see KeyBlobUsageRequirements in * types.hal). * * o Tag::CREATION_DATETIME with the appropriate value. Note that it is expected that this will * generally be added by the HAL, not by the secure environment, and that it will be in the * software-enforced list. It must be cryptographically bound to the key, like all tags. * * o Tag::OS_VERSION, Tag::OS_PATCHLEVEL, Tag::VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL and Tag::BOOT_PATCHLEVEL with * appropriate values. * * The parameters provided to generateKey depend on the type of key being generated. This * section summarizes the necessary and optional tags for each type of key. Tag::ALGORITHM is * always necessary, to specify the type. * * == RSA Keys == * * The following parameters are required to generate an RSA key: * * o Tag::Key_SIZE specifies the size of the public modulus, in bits. If omitted, generateKey * must return ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE. Required values for TEE IKeymasterDevice * implementations are 1024, 2048, 3072 and 4096. StrongBox IKeymasterDevice implementations * must support 2048. * * o Tag::RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT specifies the RSA public exponent value. If omitted, generateKey * must return ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT. The values 3 and 65537 must be supported. It is * recommended to support all prime values up to 2^64. If provided with a non-prime value, * generateKey must return ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT. * * The following parameters are not necessary to generate a usable RSA key, but generateKey must * not return an error if they are omitted: * * o Tag::PURPOSE specifies allowed purposes. All KeyPurpose values (see types.hal) must be * supported for RSA keys. * * o Tag::DIGEST specifies digest algorithms that may be used with the new key. TEE * IKeymasterDevice implementations must support all Digest values (see types.hal) for RSA * keys. StrongBox IKeymasterDevice implementations must support SHA_2_256. * * o Tag::PADDING specifies the padding modes that may be used with the new * key. IKeymasterDevice implementations must support PaddingMode::NONE, * PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP, PaddingMode::RSA_PSS, PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_ENCRYPT and * PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN for RSA keys. * * == ECDSA Keys == * * Either Tag::KEY_SIZE or Tag::EC_CURVE must be provided to generate an ECDSA key. If neither * is provided, generateKey must return ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE. If Tag::KEY_SIZE is * provided, the possible values are 224, 256, 384 and 521, and must be mapped to Tag::EC_CURVE * values P_224, P_256, P_384 and P_521, respectively. TEE IKeymasterDevice implementations * must support all curves. StrongBox implementations must support P_256. * * == AES Keys == * * Only Tag::KEY_SIZE is required to generate an AES key. If omitted, generateKey must return * ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE. 128 and 256-bit key sizes must be supported. * * If Tag::BLOCK_MODE is specified with value BlockMode::GCM, then the caller must also provide * Tag::MIN_MAC_LENGTH. If omitted, generateKey must return ErrorCode::MISSING_MIN_MAC_LENGTH. * * * @param keyParams Key generation parameters are defined as IKeymasterDevice tag/value pairs, * provided in params. See above for detailed specifications of which tags are required * for which types of keys. * * @return keyBlob Opaque descriptor of the generated key. The recommended implementation * strategy is to include an encrypted copy of the key material, wrapped in a key * unavailable outside secure hardware. * * @return keyCharacteristics Description of the generated key. See the getKeyCharacteristics * method below. */ generateKey(vec keyParams) generates (ErrorCode error, vec keyBlob, KeyCharacteristics keyCharacteristics); /** * Imports key material into an IKeymasterDevice. Key definition parameters and return values * are the same as for generateKey, with the following exceptions: * * o Tag::KEY_SIZE is not necessary in the input parameters. If not provided, the * IKeymasterDevice must deduce the value from the provided key material and add the tag and * value to the key characteristics. If Tag::KEY_SIZE is provided, the IKeymasterDevice must * validate it against the key material. In the event of a mismatch, importKey must return * ErrorCode::IMPORT_PARAMETER_MISMATCH. * * o Tag::RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT (for RSA keys only) is not necessary in the input parameters. If * not provided, the IKeymasterDevice must deduce the value from the provided key material and * add the tag and value to the key characteristics. If Tag::RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT is provided, * the IKeymasterDevice must validate it against the key material. In the event of a * mismatch, importKey must return ErrorCode::IMPORT_PARAMETER_MISMATCH. * * o Tag::ORIGIN (returned in keyCharacteristics) must have the value KeyOrigin::IMPORTED. * * @param keyParams Key generation parameters are defined as IKeymasterDevice tag/value pairs, * provided in params. * * @param keyFormat The format of the key material to import. See KeyFormat in types.hal. * * @pram keyData The key material to import, in the format specified in keyFormat. * * @return keyBlob Opaque descriptor of the imported key. The recommended implementation * strategy is to include an encrypted copy of the key material, wrapped in a key * unavailable outside secure hardware. * * @return keyCharacteristics Description of the generated key. See the getKeyCharacteristics * method below. */ importKey(vec keyParams, KeyFormat keyFormat, vec keyData) generates (ErrorCode error, vec keyBlob, KeyCharacteristics keyCharacteristics); /** * Securely imports a key, or key pair, returning a key blob and a description of the imported * key. * * @param wrappedKeyData The wrapped key material to import. The wrapped key is in DER-encoded * ASN.1 format, specified by the following schema: * * KeyDescription ::= SEQUENCE( * keyFormat INTEGER, # Values from KeyFormat enum. * keyParams AuthorizationList, * ) * * SecureKeyWrapper ::= SEQUENCE( * version INTEGER, # Contains value 0 * encryptedTransportKey OCTET_STRING, * initializationVector OCTET_STRING, * keyDescription KeyDescription, * encryptedKey OCTET_STRING, * tag OCTET_STRING * ) * * Where: * * o keyFormat is an integer from the KeyFormat enum, defining the format of the plaintext * key material. * o keyParams is the characteristics of the key to be imported (as with generateKey or * importKey). If the secure import is successful, these characteristics must be * associated with the key exactly as if the key material had been insecurely imported * with the @3.0::IKeymasterDevice::importKey. See attestKey() for documentation of the * AuthorizationList schema. * o encryptedTransportKey is a 256-bit AES key, XORed with a masking key and then encrypted * with the wrapping key specified by wrappingKeyBlob. * o keyDescription is a KeyDescription, above. * o encryptedKey is the key material of the key to be imported, in format keyFormat, and * encrypted with encryptedEphemeralKey in AES-GCM mode, with the DER-encoded * representation of keyDescription provided as additional authenticated data. * o tag is the tag produced by the AES-GCM encryption of encryptedKey. * * So, importWrappedKey does the following: * * 1. Get the private key material for wrappingKeyBlob, verifying that the wrapping key has * purpose KEY_WRAP, padding mode RSA_OAEP, and digest SHA_2_256, returning the * appropriate error if any of those requirements fail. * 2. Extract the encryptedTransportKey field from the SecureKeyWrapper, and decrypt * it with the wrapping key. * 3. XOR the result of step 2 with maskingKey. * 4. Use the result of step 3 as an AES-GCM key to decrypt encryptedKey, using the encoded * value of keyDescription as the additional authenticated data. Call the result * "keyData" for the next step. * 5. Perform the equivalent of calling importKey(keyParams, keyFormat, keyData), except * that the origin tag should be set to SECURELY_IMPORTED. * * @param wrappingKeyBlob The opaque key descriptor returned by generateKey() or importKey(). * This key must have been created with Purpose::WRAP_KEY. * * @param maskingKey The 32-byte value XOR'd with the transport key in the SecureWrappedKey * structure. * * @param unwrappingParams must contain any parameters needed to perform the unwrapping * operation. For example, if the wrapping key is an AES key the block and padding modes * must be specified in this argument. * * @param passwordSid specifies the password secure ID (SID) of the user that owns the key being * installed. If the authorization list in wrappedKeyData contains a Tag::USER_SECURE_ID * with a value that has the HardwareAuthenticatorType::PASSWORD bit set, the constructed * key must be bound to the SID value provided by this argument. If the wrappedKeyData * does not contain such a tag and value, this argument must be ignored. * * @param biometricSid specifies the biometric secure ID (SID) of the user that owns the key * being installed. If the authorization list in wrappedKeyData contains a * Tag::USER_SECURE_ID with a value that has the HardwareAuthenticatorType::FINGERPRINT * bit set, the constructed key must be bound to the SID value provided by this argument. * If the wrappedKeyData does not contain such a tag and value, this argument must be * ignored. * * @return keyBlob Opaque descriptor of the imported key. It is recommended that the keyBlob * contain a copy of the key material, wrapped in a key unavailable outside secure * hardware. */ importWrappedKey(vec wrappedKeyData, vec wrappingKeyBlob, vec maskingKey, vec unwrappingParams, uint64_t passwordSid, uint64_t biometricSid) generates(ErrorCode error, vec keyBlob, KeyCharacteristics keyCharacteristics); /** * Returns parameters associated with the provided key, divided into two sets: hardware-enforced * and software-enforced. The description here applies equally to the key characteristics lists * returned by generateKey, importKey and importWrappedKey. The characteristics returned by * this method completely describe the type and usage of the specified key. * * The rule that IKeymasterDevice implementations must use for deciding whether a given tag * belongs in the hardware-enforced or software-enforced list is that if the meaning of the tag * is fully assured by secure hardware, it is hardware enforced. Otherwise, it's software * enforced. * * * @param keyBlob The opaque descriptor returned by generateKey, importKey or importWrappedKey. * * @param clientId An opaque byte string identifying the client. This value must match the * Tag::APPLICATION_ID data provided during key generation/import. Without the correct * value, it must be computationally infeasible for the secure hardware to obtain the key * material. * * @param appData An opaque byte string provided by the application. This value must match the * Tag::APPLICATION_DATA data provided during key generation/import. Without the correct * value, it must be computationally infeasible for the secure hardware to obtain the key * material. * * @return keyCharacteristics Description of the generated key. See KeyCharacteristics in * types.hal. */ getKeyCharacteristics(vec keyBlob, vec clientId, vec appData) generates (ErrorCode error, KeyCharacteristics keyCharacteristics); /** * Exports a public key, returning the key in the specified format. * * @parm keyFormat The format used for export. See KeyFormat in types.hal. * * @param keyBlob The opaque descriptor returned by generateKey() or importKey(). The * referenced key must be asymmetric. * * @param clientId An opaque byte string identifying the client. This value must match the * Tag::APPLICATION_ID data provided during key generation/import. Without the correct * value, it must be computationally infeasible for the secure hardware to obtain the key * material. * * @param appData An opaque byte string provided by the application. This value must match the * Tag::APPLICATION_DATA data provided during key generation/import. Without the correct * value, it must be computationally infeasible for the secure hardware to obtain the key * material. * * @return keyMaterial The public key material in PKCS#8 format. */ exportKey(KeyFormat keyFormat, vec keyBlob, vec clientId, vec appData) generates (ErrorCode error, vec keyMaterial); /** * Generates a signed X.509 certificate chain attesting to the presence of keyToAttest in * Keymaster. * * The certificates in the chain must be ordered such that each certificate is signed by the * subsequent one, up to the root which must be self-signed. The first certificate in the chain * signs the public key info of the attested key and must contain the following entries (see RFC * 5280 for details on each): * * o version -- with value 2 * * o serialNumber -- with value 1 (same value for all keys) * * o signature -- contains an the AlgorithmIdentifier of the algorithm used to sign, must be * ECDSA for EC keys, RSA for RSA keys. * * o issuer -- must contain the same value as the Subject field of the next certificate. * * o validity -- SEQUENCE of two dates, containing the values of Tag::ACTIVE_DATETIME and * Tag::USAGE_EXPIRE_DATETIME. The tag values are in milliseconds since Jan 1, 1970; see RFD * 5280 for the correct representation in certificates. If Tag::ACTIVE_DATETIME is not * present in the key, the IKeymasterDevice must use the value of Tag::CREATION_DATETIME. If * Tag::USAGE_EXPIRE_DATETIME is not present, the IKeymasterDevice must use the expiration * date of the batch attestation certificate (see below). * * o subject -- CN="Android Keystore Key" (same value for all keys) * * o subjectPublicKeyInfo -- X.509 SubjectPublicKeyInfo containing the attested public key. * * o Key Usage extension -- digitalSignature bit must be set iff the attested key has * KeyPurpose::SIGN. dataEncipherment bit must be set iff the attested key has * KeyPurpose::DECRYPT. keyEncipherment bit must be set iff the attested key has * KeyPurpose::KEY_WRAP. All other bits must be clear. * * In addition to the above, the attestation certificate must contain an extension with OID * 1.3.6.1.4.1.11129.2.1.17 and value according to the KeyDescription schema defined as: * * KeyDescription ::= SEQUENCE { * attestationVersion INTEGER, # Value 3 * attestationSecurityLevel SecurityLevel, # See below * keymasterVersion INTEGER, # Value 4 * keymasterSecurityLevel SecurityLevel, # See below * attestationChallenge OCTET_STRING, # Tag::ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE from attestParams * uniqueId OCTET_STRING, # Empty unless key has Tag::INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID * softwareEnforced AuthorizationList, # See below * hardwareEnforced AuthorizationList, # See below * } * * SecurityLevel ::= ENUMERATED { * Software (0), * TrustedEnvironment (1), * StrongBox (2), * } * * RootOfTrust ::= SEQUENCE { * verifiedBootKey OCTET_STRING, * deviceLocked BOOLEAN, * verifiedBootState VerifiedBootState, * # verifiedBootHash must contain 32-byte value that represents the state of all binaries * # or other components validated by verified boot. Updating any verified binary or * # component must cause this value to change. * verifiedBootHash OCTET_STRING, * } * * VerifiedBootState ::= ENUMERATED { * Verified (0), * SelfSigned (1), * Unverified (2), * Failed (3), * } * * AuthorizationList ::= SEQUENCE { * purpose [1] EXPLICIT SET OF INTEGER OPTIONAL, * algorithm [2] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL, * keySize [3] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL, * blockMode [4] EXPLICIT SET OF INTEGER OPTIONAL, * digest [5] EXPLICIT SET OF INTEGER OPTIONAL, * padding [6] EXPLICIT SET OF INTEGER OPTIONAL, * callerNonce [7] EXPLICIT NULL OPTIONAL, * minMacLength [8] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL, * ecCurve [10] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL, * rsaPublicExponent [200] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL, * rollbackResistance [303] EXPLICIT NULL OPTIONAL, * activeDateTime [400] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL, * originationExpireDateTime [401] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL, * usageExpireDateTime [402] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL, * userSecureId [502] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL, * noAuthRequired [503] EXPLICIT NULL OPTIONAL, * userAuthType [504] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL, * authTimeout [505] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL, * allowWhileOnBody [506] EXPLICIT NULL OPTIONAL, * trustedUserPresenceReq [507] EXPLICIT NULL OPTIONAL, * trustedConfirmationReq [508] EXPLICIT NULL OPTIONAL, * unlockedDeviceReq [509] EXPLICIT NULL OPTIONAL, * creationDateTime [701] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL, * origin [702] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL, * rootOfTrust [704] EXPLICIT RootOfTrust OPTIONAL, * osVersion [705] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL, * osPatchLevel [706] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL, * attestationApplicationId [709] EXPLICIT OCTET_STRING OPTIONAL, * attestationIdBrand [710] EXPLICIT OCTET_STRING OPTIONAL, * attestationIdDevice [711] EXPLICIT OCTET_STRING OPTIONAL, * attestationIdProduct [712] EXPLICIT OCTET_STRING OPTIONAL, * attestationIdSerial [713] EXPLICIT OCTET_STRING OPTIONAL, * attestationIdImei [714] EXPLICIT OCTET_STRING OPTIONAL, * attestationIdMeid [715] EXPLICIT OCTET_STRING OPTIONAL, * attestationIdManufacturer [716] EXPLICIT OCTET_STRING OPTIONAL, * attestationIdModel [717] EXPLICIT OCTET_STRING OPTIONAL, * vendorPatchLevel [718] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL, * bootPatchLevel [719] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL, * } * * The above schema is mostly a straightforward translation of the IKeymasterDevice tag/value * parameter lists to ASN.1: * * o TagType::ENUM, TagType::UINT, TagType::ULONG and TagType::DATE tags are represented as * ASN.1 INTEGER. * * o TagType::ENUM_REP, TagType::UINT_REP and TagType::ULONG_REP tags are represented as ASN.1 * SET of INTEGER. * * o TagType::BOOL tags are represented as ASN.1 NULL. All entries in AuthorizationList are * OPTIONAL, so the presence of the tag means "true", absence means "false". * * o TagType::BYTES tags are represented as ASN.1 OCTET_STRING. * * The numeric ASN.1 tag numbers are the same values as the IKeymasterDevice Tag enum values, * except with the TagType modifier stripped. * * The attestation certificate must be signed by a "batch" key, which must be securely * pre-installed into the device, generally in the factory, and securely stored to prevent * access or extraction. The batch key must be used only for signing attestation certificates. * The batch attestation certificate must be signed by a chain or zero or more intermediates * leading to a self-signed roots. The intermediate and root certificate signing keys must not * exist anywhere on the device. * * == ID Attestation == * * ID attestation is a special case of key attestation in which unique device ID values are * included in the signed attestation certificate. * * @param keyToAttest The opaque descriptor returned by generateKey() or importKey(). The * referenced key must be asymmetric. * * @param attestParams Parameters for the attestation. Must contain Tag::ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE, * the value of which must be put in the attestationChallenge field of the KeyDescription * ASN.1 structure defined above. * * @return certChain The attestation certificate, and additional certificates back to the root * attestation certificate, which clients will need to check against a known-good value. * The certificates must be DER-encoded. */ attestKey(vec keyToAttest, vec attestParams) generates (ErrorCode error, vec> certChain); /** * Upgrades an old key blob. Keys can become "old" in two ways: IKeymasterDevice can be * upgraded to a new version with an incompatible key blob format, or the system can be updated * to invalidate the OS version (OS_VERSION tag), system patch level (OS_PATCHLEVEL tag), vendor * patch level (VENDOR_PATCH_LEVEL tag), boot patch level (BOOT_PATCH_LEVEL tag) or other, * implementation-defined patch level (keymaster implementers are encouraged to extend this HAL * with a minor version extension to define validatable patch levels for other images; tags must * be defined in the implementer's namespace, starting at 10000). In either case, attempts to * use an old key blob with getKeyCharacteristics(), exportKey(), attestKey() or begin() must * result in IKeymasterDevice returning ErrorCode::KEY_REQUIRES_UPGRADE. The caller must use * this method to upgrade the key blob. * * The upgradeKey method must examine each version or patch level associated with the key. If * any one of them is higher than the corresponding current device value upgradeKey() must * return ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT. There is one exception: it is always permissible to * "downgrade" from any OS_VERSION number to OS_VERSION 0. For example, if the key has * OS_VERSION 080001, it is permissible to upgrade the key if the current system version is * 080100, because the new version is larger, or if the current system version is 0, because * upgrades to 0 are always allowed. If the system version were 080000, however, keymaster must * return ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT because that value is smaller than 080001. Values other * than OS_VERSION must never be downgraded. * * Note that Keymaster versions 2 and 3 required that the system and boot images have the same * patch level and OS version. This requirement is relaxed for 4.0::IKeymasterDevice, and the * OS version in the boot image footer is no longer used. * * @param keyBlobToUpgrade The opaque descriptor returned by generateKey() or importKey(); * * @param upgradeParams A parameter list containing any parameters needed to complete the * upgrade, including Tag::APPLICATION_ID and Tag::APPLICATION_DATA. * * @return upgradedKeyBlob A new key blob that references the same key as keyBlobToUpgrade, but * is in the new format, or has the new version data. */ upgradeKey(vec keyBlobToUpgrade, vec upgradeParams) generates (ErrorCode error, vec upgradedKeyBlob); /** * Deletes the key, or key pair, associated with the key blob. Calling this function on a key * with Tag::ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE in its hardware-enforced authorization list must render the key * permanently unusable. Keys without Tag::ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE may or may not be rendered * unusable. * * @param keyBlob The opaque descriptor returned by generateKey() or importKey(); */ deleteKey(vec keyBlob) generates (ErrorCode error); /** * Deletes all keys in the hardware keystore. Used when keystore is reset completely. After * this function is called all keys with Tag::ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE in their hardware-enforced * authorization lists must be rendered permanently unusable. Keys without * Tag::ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE may or may not be rendered unusable. * * @return error See the ErrorCode enum. */ deleteAllKeys() generates (ErrorCode error); /** * Destroys knowledge of the device's ids. This prevents all device id attestation in the * future. The destruction must be permanent so that not even a factory reset will restore the * device ids. * * Device id attestation may be provided only if this method is fully implemented, allowing the * user to permanently disable device id attestation. If this cannot be guaranteed, the device * must never attest any device ids. * * This is a NOP if device id attestation is not supported. */ destroyAttestationIds() generates (ErrorCode error); /** * Begins a cryptographic operation using the specified key. If all is well, begin() must * return ErrorCode::OK and create an operation handle which must be passed to subsequent calls * to update(), finish() or abort(). * * It is critical that each call to begin() be paired with a subsequent call to finish() or * abort(), to allow the IKeymasterDevice implementation to clean up any internal operation * state. The caller's failure to do this may leak internal state space or other internal * resources and may eventually cause begin() to return ErrorCode::TOO_MANY_OPERATIONS when it * runs out of space for operations. Any result other than ErrorCode::OK from begin(), update() * or finish() implicitly aborts the operation, in which case abort() need not be called (and * must return ErrorCode::INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE if called). IKeymasterDevice implementations * must support 16 concurrent operations. * * If Tag::APPLICATION_ID or Tag::APPLICATION_DATA were specified during key generation or * import, calls to begin must include those tags with the originally-specified values in the * inParams argument to this method. If not, begin() must return ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB. * * == Authorization Enforcement == * * The following key authorization parameters must be enforced by the IKeymasterDevice secure * environment if the tags were returned in the "hardwareEnforced" list in the * KeyCharacteristics. Public key operations, meaning KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT and * KeyPurpose::VERIFY must be allowed to succeed even if authorization requirements are not met. * * -- All Key Types -- * * The tags in this section apply to all key types. See below for additional key type-specific * tags. * * o Tag::PURPOSE: The purpose specified in the begin() call must match one of the purposes in * the key authorizations. If the specified purpose does not match, begin() must return * ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_PURPOSE. * * o Tag::ACTIVE_DATETIME can only be enforced if a trusted UTC time source is available. If * the current date and time is prior to the tag value, begin() must return * ErrorCode::KEY_NOT_YET_VALID. * * o Tag::ORIGINATION_EXPIRE_DATETIME can only be enforced if a trusted UTC time source is * available. If the current date and time is later than the tag value and the purpose is * KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT or KeyPurpose::SIGN, begin() must return ErrorCode::KEY_EXPIRED. * * o Tag::USAGE_EXPIRE_DATETIME can only be enforced if a trusted UTC time source is * available. If the current date and time is later than the tag value and the purpose is * KeyPurpose::DECRYPT or KeyPurpose::VERIFY, begin() must return ErrorCode::KEY_EXPIRED. * o Tag::MIN_SECONDS_BETWEEN_OPS must be compared with a trusted relative timer indicating the * last use of the key. If the last use time plus the tag value is less than the current * time, begin() must return ErrorCode::KEY_RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED. See the tag description for * important implementation details. * o Tag::MAX_USES_PER_BOOT must be compared against a secure counter that tracks the uses of * the key since boot time. If the count of previous uses exceeds the tag value, begin() must * return ErrorCode::KEY_MAX_OPS_EXCEEDED. * * o Tag::USER_SECURE_ID must be enforced by this method if and only if the key also has * Tag::AUTH_TIMEOUT (if it does not have Tag::AUTH_TIMEOUT, the Tag::USER_SECURE_ID * requirement must be enforced by update() and finish()). If the key has both, then this * method must receive a non-empty HardwareAuthToken in the authToken argument. For the auth * token to be valid, all of the following have to be true: * * o The HMAC field must validate correctly. * * o At least one of the Tag::USER_SECURE_ID values from the key must match at least one of * the secure ID values in the token. * * o The key must have a Tag::USER_AUTH_TYPE that matches the auth type in the token. * * o The timestamp in the auth token plus the value of the Tag::AUTH_TIMEOUT must be less than * the current secure timestamp (which is a monotonic timer counting milliseconds since * boot.) * * If any of these conditions are not met, begin() must return * ErrorCode::KEY_USER_NOT_AUTHENTICATED. * * o Tag::CALLER_NONCE allows the caller to specify a nonce or initialization vector (IV). If * the key doesn't have this tag, but the caller provided Tag::NONCE to this method, * ErrorCode::CALLER_NONCE_PROHIBITED must be returned. * * o Tag::BOOTLOADER_ONLY specifies that only the bootloader may use the key. If this method is * called with a bootloader-only key after the bootloader has finished executing, it must * return ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB. The mechanism for notifying the IKeymasterDevice that * the bootloader has finished executing is implementation-defined. * * -- RSA Keys -- * * All RSA key operations must specify exactly one padding mode in inParams. If unspecified or * specified more than once, the begin() must return ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE. * * RSA signing and verification operations need a digest, as do RSA encryption and decryption * operations with OAEP padding mode. For those cases, the caller must specify exactly one * digest in inParams. If unspecified or specified more than once, begin() must return * ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST. * * Private key operations (KeyPurpose::DECRYPT and KeyPurpose::SIGN) need authorization of * digest and padding, which means that the key authorizations need to contain the specified * values. If not, begin() must return ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST or * ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PADDING, as appropriate. Public key operations (KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT * and KeyPurpose::VERIFY) are permitted with unauthorized digest or padding modes. * * With the exception of PaddingMode::NONE, all RSA padding modes are applicable only to certain * purposes. Specifically, PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN and PaddingMode::RSA_PSS only * support signing and verification, while PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_ENCRYPT and * PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP only support encryption and decryption. begin() must return * ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE if the specified mode does not support the specified * purpose. * * There are some important interactions between padding modes and digests: * * o PaddingMode::NONE indicates that a "raw" RSA operation is performed. If signing or * verifying, Digest::NONE is specified for the digest. No digest is necessary for unpadded * encryption or decryption. * * o PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN padding requires a digest. The digest may be Digest::NONE, * in which case the Keymaster implementation cannot build a proper PKCS#1 v1.5 signature * structure, because it cannot add the DigestInfo structure. Instead, the IKeymasterDevice * must construct 0x00 || 0x01 || PS || 0x00 || M, where M is the provided message and PS is a * random padding string at least eight bytes in length. The size of the RSA key has to be at * least 11 bytes larger than the message, otherwise begin() must return * ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH. * * o PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_1_5_ENCRYPT padding does not require a digest. * * o PaddingMode::RSA_PSS padding requires a digest, which may not be Digest::NONE. If * Digest::NONE is specified, the begin() must return ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST. In * addition, the size of the RSA key must be at least 2 + D bytes larger than the output size * of the digest, where D is the size of the digest, in bytes. Otherwise begin() must * return ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST. The salt size must be D. * * o PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP padding requires a digest, which may not be Digest::NONE. If * Digest::NONE is specified, begin() must return ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST. The OAEP * mask generation function must be MGF1 and the MGF1 digest must be SHA1, regardless of the * OAEP digest specified. * * -- EC Keys -- * * EC key operations must specify exactly one padding mode in inParams. If unspecified or * specified more than once, begin() must return ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE. * * Private key operations (KeyPurpose::SIGN) need authorization of digest and padding, which * means that the key authorizations must contain the specified values. If not, begin() must * return ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST. Public key operations (KeyPurpose::VERIFY) are * permitted with unauthorized digest or padding. * * -- AES Keys -- * * AES key operations must specify exactly one block mode (Tag::BLOCK_MODE) and one padding mode * (Tag::PADDING) in inParams. If either value is unspecified or specified more than once, * begin() must return ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_BLOCK_MODE or * ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE. The specified modes must be authorized by the key, * otherwise begin() must return ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_BLOCK_MODE or * ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PADDING_MODE. * * If the block mode is BlockMode::GCM, inParams must specify Tag::MAC_LENGTH, and the specified * value must be a multiple of 8 that is not greater than 128 or less than the value of * Tag::MIN_MAC_LENGTH in the key authorizations. For MAC lengths greater than 128 or * non-multiples of 8, begin() must return ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_MAC_LENGTH. For values less * than the key's minimum length, begin() must return ErrorCode::INVALID_MAC_LENGTH. * * If the block mode is BlockMode::GCM or BlockMode::CTR, the specified padding mode must be * PaddingMode::NONE. For BlockMode::ECB or BlockMode::CBC, the mode may be PaddingMode::NONE * or PaddingMode::PKCS7. If the padding mode doesn't meet these conditions, begin() must * return ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PADDING_MODE. * * If the block mode is BlockMode::CBC, BlockMode::CTR, or BlockMode::GCM, an initialization * vector or nonce is required. In most cases, callers shouldn't provide an IV or nonce and the * IKeymasterDevice implementation must generate a random IV or nonce and return it via * Tag::NONCE in outParams. CBC and CTR IVs are 16 bytes. GCM nonces are 12 bytes. If the key * authorizations contain Tag::CALLER_NONCE, then the caller may provide an IV/nonce with * Tag::NONCE in inParams. If a nonce is provided when Tag::CALLER_NONCE is not authorized, * begin() must return ErrorCode::CALLER_NONCE_PROHIBITED. If a nonce is not provided when * Tag::CALLER_NONCE is authorized, IKeymasterDevice must generate a random IV/nonce. * * -- HMAC keys -- * * HMAC key operations must specify Tag::MAC_LENGTH in inParams. The specified value must be a * multiple of 8 that is not greater than the digest length or less than the value of * Tag::MIN_MAC_LENGTH in the key authorizations. For MAC lengths greater than the digest * length or non-multiples of 8, begin() must return ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_MAC_LENGTH. For * values less than the key's minimum length, begin() must return ErrorCode::INVALID_MAC_LENGTH. * * @param purpose The purpose of the operation, one of KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, * KeyPurpose::SIGN or KeyPurpose::VERIFY. Note that for AEAD modes, encryption and * decryption imply signing and verification, respectively, but must be specified as * KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT and KeyPurpose::DECRYPT. * * @param keyBlob The opaque key descriptor returned by generateKey() or importKey(). The key * must have a purpose compatible with purpose and all of its usage requirements must be * satisfied, or begin() must return an appropriate error code (see above). * * @param inParams Additional parameters for the operation. If Tag::APPLICATION_ID or * Tag::APPLICATION_DATA were provided during generation, they must be provided here, or * the operation must fail with ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB. For operations that require * a nonce or IV, on keys that were generated with Tag::CALLER_NONCE, inParams may * contain a tag Tag::NONCE. If Tag::NONCE is provided for a key without * Tag:CALLER_NONCE, ErrorCode::CALLER_NONCE_PROHIBITED must be returned. * * @param authToken Authentication token. Callers that provide no token must set all numeric * fields to zero and the MAC must be an empty vector. * * @return outParams Output parameters. Used to return additional data from the operation * initialization, notably to return the IV or nonce from operations that generate an IV * or nonce. * * @return operationHandle The newly-created operation handle which must be passed to update(), * finish() or abort(). */ begin(KeyPurpose purpose, vec keyBlob, vec inParams, HardwareAuthToken authToken) generates (ErrorCode error, vec outParams, OperationHandle operationHandle); /** * Provides data to, and possibly receives output from, an ongoing cryptographic operation begun * with begin(). The operation is specified by the operationHandle parameter. * * If operationHandle is invalid, update() must return ErrorCode::INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE. * * To provide more flexibility for buffer handling, implementations of this method have the * option of consuming less data than was provided. The caller is responsible for looping to * feed the rest of the data in subsequent calls. The amount of input consumed must be returned * in the inputConsumed parameter. Implementations must always consume at least one byte, unless * the operation cannot accept any more; if more than zero bytes are provided and zero bytes are * consumed, callers must consider this an error and abort the operation. * * Implementations may also choose how much data to return, as a result of the update. This is * only relevant for encryption and decryption operations, because signing and verification * return no data until finish. It is recommended to return data as early as possible, rather * than buffer it. * * If this method returns an error code other than ErrorCode::OK, the operation is aborted and * the operation handle must be invalidated. Any future use of the handle, with this method, * finish, or abort, must return ErrorCode::INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE. * * == Authorization Enforcement == * * Key authorization enforcement is performed primarily in begin(). The one exception is the * case where the key has: * o One or more Tag::USER_SECURE_IDs, and * * o Does not have a Tag::AUTH_TIMEOUT * * In this case, the key requires an authorization per operation, and the update method must * receive a non-empty and valid HardwareAuthToken. For the auth token to be valid, all of the * following has to be true: * * o The HMAC field must validate correctly. * * o At least one of the Tag::USER_SECURE_ID values from the key must match at least one of * the secure ID values in the token. * * o The key must have a Tag::USER_AUTH_TYPE that matches the auth type in the token. * * o The challenge field in the auth token must contain the operationHandle * * If any of these conditions are not met, update() must return * ErrorCode::KEY_USER_NOT_AUTHENTICATED. * * The caller must provide the auth token on every call to update() and finish(). * * -- RSA keys -- * * For signing and verification operations with Digest::NONE, this method must accept the entire * block to be signed or verified in a single update. It may not consume only a portion of the * block in these cases. However, the caller may choose to provide the data in multiple updates, * and update() must accept the data this way as well. If the caller provides more data to sign * than can be used (length of data exceeds RSA key size), update() must return * ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH. * * -- ECDSA keys -- * * For signing and verification operations with Digest::NONE, this method must accept the entire * block to be signed or verified in a single update. This method may not consume only a * portion of the block. However, the caller may choose to provide the data in multiple updates * and update() must accept the data this way as well. If the caller provides more data to sign * than can be used, the data is silently truncated. (This differs from the handling of excess * data provided in similar RSA operations. The reason for this is compatibility with legacy * clients.) * * -- AES keys -- * * AES GCM mode supports "associated authentication data," provided via the Tag::ASSOCIATED_DATA * tag in the inParams argument. The associated data may be provided in repeated calls * (important if the data is too large to send in a single block) but must always precede data * to be encrypted or decrypted. An update call may receive both associated data and data to * encrypt/decrypt, but subsequent updates must not include associated data. If the caller * provides associated data to an update call after a call that includes data to * encrypt/decrypt, update() must return ErrorCode::INVALID_TAG. * * For GCM encryption, the AEAD tag must be appended to the ciphertext by finish(). During * decryption, the last Tag::MAC_LENGTH bytes of the data provided to the last update call must * be the AEAD tag. Since a given invocation of update cannot know if it's the last invocation, * it must process all but the tag length and buffer the possible tag data for processing during * finish(). * * @param operationHandle The operation handle returned by begin(). * * @param inParams Additional parameters for the operation. For AEAD modes, this is used to * specify Tag::ADDITIONAL_DATA. Note that additional data may be provided in multiple * calls to update(), but only until input data has been provided. * * @param input Data to be processed. Note that update() may or may not consume all of the data * provided. See inputConsumed. * * @param authToken Authentication token. Callers that provide no token must set all numeric * fields to zero and the MAC must be an empty vector. * * @param verificationToken Verification token, used to prove that another IKeymasterDevice HAL * has verified some parameters, and to deliver the other HAL's current timestamp, if * needed. If not provided, all fields must be initialized to zero and vectors must be * empty. * * @return error See the ErrorCode enum in types.hal. * * @return inputConsumed Amount of data that was consumed by update(). If this is less than the * amount provided, the caller may provide the remainder in a subsequent call to * update() or finish(). Every call to update must consume at least one byte, unless * the input is empty, and implementations should consume as much data as reasonably * possible for each call. * * @return outParams Output parameters, used to return additional data from the operation. * * @return output The output data, if any. */ update(OperationHandle operationHandle, vec inParams, vec input, HardwareAuthToken authToken, VerificationToken verificationToken) generates (ErrorCode error, uint32_t inputConsumed, vec outParams, vec output); /** * Finalizes a cryptographic operation begun with begin() and invalidates operationHandle. * * This method is the last one called in an operation, so all processed data must be returned. * * Whether it completes successfully or returns an error, this method finalizes the operation * and therefore must invalidate the provided operation handle. Any future use of the handle, * with finish(), update(), or abort(), must return ErrorCode::INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE. * * Signing operations return the signature as the output. Verification operations accept the * signature in the signature parameter, and return no output. * * == Authorization enforcement == * * Key authorization enforcement is performed primarily in begin(). The exceptions are * authorization per operation keys and confirmation-required keys. * * Authorization per operation keys are the case where the key has one or more * Tag::USER_SECURE_IDs, and does not have a Tag::AUTH_TIMEOUT. In this case, the key requires * an authorization per operation, and the finish method must receive a non-empty and valid * authToken. For the auth token to be valid, all of the following has to be true: * * o The HMAC field must validate correctly. * * o At least one of the Tag::USER_SECURE_ID values from the key must match at least one of * the secure ID values in the token. * * o The key must have a Tag::USER_AUTH_TYPE that matches the auth type in the token. * * o The challenge field in the auth token must contain the operationHandle * * If any of these conditions are not met, update() must return * ErrorCode::KEY_USER_NOT_AUTHENTICATED. * * The caller must provide the auth token on every call to update() and finish(). * * Confirmation-required keys are keys that were generated with * Tag::TRUSTED_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED. For these keys, when doing a signing operation the * caller must pass a KeyParameter Tag::CONFIRMATION_TOKEN to finish(). Implementations must * check the confirmation token by computing the 32-byte HMAC-SHA256 over all of the * to-be-signed data, prefixed with the 18-byte UTF-8 encoded string "confirmation token". If * the computed value does not match the Tag::CONFIRMATION_TOKEN parameter, finish() must not * produce a signature and must return ErrorCode::NO_USER_CONFIRMATION. * * -- RSA keys -- * * Some additional requirements, depending on the padding mode: * * o PaddingMode::NONE. For unpadded signing and encryption operations, if the provided data is * shorter than the key, the data must be zero-padded on the left before * signing/encryption. If the data is the same length as the key, but numerically larger, * finish() must return ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT. For verification and decryption * operations, the data must be exactly as long as the key. Otherwise, return * ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH. * * o PaddingMode::RSA_PSS. For PSS-padded signature operations, the PSS salt length must match * the size of the PSS digest selected. The digest specified with Tag::DIGEST in inputParams * on begin() must be used as the PSS digest algorithm, MGF1 must be used as the mask * generation function and SHA1 must be used as the MGF1 digest algorithm. * * o PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP. The digest specified with Tag::DIGEST in inputParams on begin is * used as the OAEP digest algorithm, MGF1 must be used as the mask generation function and * and SHA1 must be used as the MGF1 digest algorithm. * * -- ECDSA keys -- * * If the data provided for unpadded signing or verification is too long, truncate it. * * -- AES keys -- * * Some additional conditions, depending on block mode: * * o BlockMode::ECB or BlockMode::CBC. If padding is PaddingMode::NONE and the data length is * not a multiple of the AES block size, finish() must return * ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH. If padding is PaddingMode::PKCS7, pad the data per the * PKCS#7 specification, including adding an additional padding block if the data is a multiple * of the block length. * * o BlockMode::GCM. During encryption, after processing all plaintext, compute the tag * (Tag::MAC_LENGTH bytes) and append it to the returned ciphertext. During decryption, * process the last Tag::MAC_LENGTH bytes as the tag. If tag verification fails, finish() * must return ErrorCode::VERIFICATION_FAILED. * * @param operationHandle The operation handle returned by begin(). This handle must be invalid * when finish() returns. * * @param inParams Additional parameters for the operation. For AEAD modes, this is used to * specify Tag::ADDITIONAL_DATA, but only if no input data was provided to update(). * * @param input Data to be processed, per the parameters established in the call to begin(). * finish() must consume all provided data or return ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH. * * @param signature The signature to be verified if the purpose specified in the begin() call * was KeyPurpose::VERIFY. * * @param authToken Authentication token. Callers that provide no token must set all numeric * fields to zero and the MAC must be an empty vector. * * @param verificationToken Verification token, used to prove that another IKeymasterDevice HAL * has verified some parameters, and to deliver the other HAL's current timestamp, if * needed. If not provided, all fields must be initialized to zero and vectors empty. * * @return outParams Any output parameters generated by finish(). * * @return output The output data, if any. */ finish(OperationHandle operationHandle, vec inParams, vec input, vec signature, HardwareAuthToken authToken, VerificationToken verificationToken) generates (ErrorCode error, vec outParams, vec output); /** * Aborts a cryptographic operation begun with begin(), freeing all internal resources and * invalidating operationHandle. * * @param operationHandle The operation handle returned by begin(). This handle must be * invalid when abort() returns. * * @return error See the ErrorCode enum in types.hal. */ abort(OperationHandle operationHandle) generates (ErrorCode error); };