# Domain for shell processes spawned by ADB or console service. type shell, domain, mlstrustedsubject; type shell_exec, exec_type, file_type; # Create and use network sockets. net_domain(shell) # logcat read_logd(shell) control_logd(shell) # logcat -L (directly, or via dumpstate) allow shell pstorefs:dir search; allow shell pstorefs:file r_file_perms; # Root fs. allow shell rootfs:dir r_dir_perms; # read files in /data/anr allow shell anr_data_file:dir r_dir_perms; allow shell anr_data_file:file r_file_perms; # Access /data/local/tmp. allow shell shell_data_file:dir create_dir_perms; allow shell shell_data_file:file create_file_perms; allow shell shell_data_file:file rx_file_perms; allow shell shell_data_file:lnk_file create_file_perms; # Read and delete from /data/local/traces. allow shell trace_data_file:file { r_file_perms unlink }; allow shell trace_data_file:dir { r_dir_perms remove_name write }; # Access /data/misc/profman. allow shell profman_dump_data_file:dir { write remove_name r_dir_perms }; allow shell profman_dump_data_file:file { unlink r_file_perms }; # Read/execute files in /data/nativetest userdebug_or_eng(` allow shell nativetest_data_file:dir r_dir_perms; allow shell nativetest_data_file:file rx_file_perms; ') # adb bugreport unix_socket_connect(shell, dumpstate, dumpstate) allow shell devpts:chr_file rw_file_perms; allow shell tty_device:chr_file rw_file_perms; allow shell console_device:chr_file rw_file_perms; allow shell input_device:dir r_dir_perms; allow shell input_device:chr_file rw_file_perms; r_dir_file(shell, system_file) allow shell system_file:file x_file_perms; allow shell toolbox_exec:file rx_file_perms; allow shell tzdatacheck_exec:file rx_file_perms; allow shell shell_exec:file rx_file_perms; allow shell zygote_exec:file rx_file_perms; r_dir_file(shell, apk_data_file) # Set properties. set_prop(shell, shell_prop) set_prop(shell, ctl_bugreport_prop) set_prop(shell, ctl_dumpstate_prop) set_prop(shell, dumpstate_prop) set_prop(shell, exported_dumpstate_prop) set_prop(shell, debug_prop) set_prop(shell, powerctl_prop) set_prop(shell, log_tag_prop) set_prop(shell, wifi_log_prop) # Allow shell to start/stop traced via the persist.traced.enable # property (which also takes care of /data/misc initialization). set_prop(shell, traced_enabled_prop) # adjust is_loggable properties userdebug_or_eng(`set_prop(shell, log_prop)') # logpersist script userdebug_or_eng(`set_prop(shell, logpersistd_logging_prop)') userdebug_or_eng(` # "systrace --boot" support - allow boottrace service to run allow shell boottrace_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms; allow shell boottrace_data_file:file create_file_perms; set_prop(shell, persist_debug_prop) ') # Read device's serial number from system properties get_prop(shell, serialno_prop) # Allow shell to read the vendor security patch level for CTS get_prop(shell, vendor_security_patch_level_prop) # Read state of logging-related properties get_prop(shell, device_logging_prop) # Read state of boot reason properties get_prop(shell, bootloader_boot_reason_prop) get_prop(shell, last_boot_reason_prop) get_prop(shell, system_boot_reason_prop) # allow shell access to services allow shell servicemanager:service_manager list; # don't allow shell to access GateKeeper service # TODO: why is this so broad? Tightening candidate? It needs at list: # - dumpstate_service (so it can receive dumpstate progress updates) allow shell { service_manager_type -gatekeeper_service -incident_service -installd_service -netd_service -virtual_touchpad_service -vold_service -vr_hwc_service }:service_manager find; allow shell dumpstate:binder call; # allow shell to get information from hwservicemanager # for instance, listing hardware services with lshal hwbinder_use(shell) allow shell hwservicemanager:hwservice_manager list; # allow shell to look through /proc/ for lsmod, ps, top, netstat. r_dir_file(shell, proc_net) allow shell { proc_asound proc_filesystems proc_interrupts proc_meminfo proc_modules proc_pid_max proc_stat proc_timer proc_uptime proc_version proc_zoneinfo }:file r_file_perms; # allow listing network interfaces under /sys/class/net. allow shell sysfs_net:dir r_dir_perms; r_dir_file(shell, cgroup) allow shell domain:dir { search open read getattr }; allow shell domain:{ file lnk_file } { open read getattr }; # statvfs() of /proc and other labeled filesystems # (yaffs2, jffs2, ext2, ext3, ext4, xfs, btrfs, f2fs, squashfs) allow shell { proc labeledfs }:filesystem getattr; # stat() of /dev allow shell device:dir getattr; # allow shell to read /proc/pid/attr/current for ps -Z allow shell domain:process getattr; # Allow pulling the SELinux policy for CTS purposes allow shell selinuxfs:dir r_dir_perms; allow shell selinuxfs:file r_file_perms; # enable shell domain to read/write files/dirs for bootchart data # User will creates the start and stop file via adb shell # and read other files created by init process under /data/bootchart allow shell bootchart_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms; allow shell bootchart_data_file:file create_file_perms; # Make sure strace works for the non-privileged shell user allow shell self:process ptrace; # allow shell to get battery info allow shell sysfs:dir r_dir_perms; allow shell sysfs_batteryinfo:dir r_dir_perms; allow shell sysfs_batteryinfo:file r_file_perms; # Allow access to ion memory allocation device. allow shell ion_device:chr_file rw_file_perms; # # filesystem test for insecure chr_file's is done # via a host side test # allow shell dev_type:dir r_dir_perms; allow shell dev_type:chr_file getattr; # /dev/fd is a symlink allow shell proc:lnk_file getattr; # # filesystem test for insucre blk_file's is done # via hostside test # allow shell dev_type:blk_file getattr; # read selinux policy files allow shell file_contexts_file:file r_file_perms; allow shell property_contexts_file:file r_file_perms; allow shell seapp_contexts_file:file r_file_perms; allow shell service_contexts_file:file r_file_perms; allow shell sepolicy_file:file r_file_perms; # Allow shell to start up vendor shell allow shell vendor_shell_exec:file rx_file_perms; ### ### Neverallow rules ### # Do not allow shell to hard link to any files. # In particular, if shell hard links to app data # files, installd will not be able to guarantee the deletion # of the linked to file. Hard links also contribute to security # bugs, so we want to ensure the shell user never has this # capability. neverallow shell file_type:file link; # Do not allow privileged socket ioctl commands neverallowxperm shell domain:{ rawip_socket tcp_socket udp_socket } ioctl priv_sock_ioctls; # limit shell access to sensitive char drivers to # only getattr required for host side test. neverallow shell { fuse_device hw_random_device kmem_device port_device }:chr_file ~getattr; # Limit shell to only getattr on blk devices for host side tests. neverallow shell dev_type:blk_file ~getattr;