# Perfetto user-space tracing daemon (unprivileged) # type traced is defined under /public (because iorapd rules # under public/ need to refer to it). type traced_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type; # Allow init to exec the daemon. init_daemon_domain(traced) tmpfs_domain(traced) # Allow apps in other MLS contexts (for multi-user) to access # share memory buffers created by traced. typeattribute traced_tmpfs mlstrustedobject; # Allow traced to start with a lower scheduling class and change # class accordingly to what defined in the config provided by # the privileged process that controls it. allow traced self:global_capability_class_set { sys_nice }; # Allow to pass a file descriptor for the output trace from "perfetto" (the # cmdline client) and other shell binaries to traced and let traced write # directly into that (rather than returning the trace contents over the socket). allow traced perfetto:fd use; allow traced shell:fd use; allow traced shell:fifo_file { read write }; # Allow the service to create new files within /data/misc/perfetto-traces. allow traced perfetto_traces_data_file:file create_file_perms; allow traced perfetto_traces_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms; # ... and /data/misc/perfetto-traces/bugreport* allow traced perfetto_traces_bugreport_data_file:file create_file_perms; allow traced perfetto_traces_bugreport_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms; # Allow traceur to pass open file descriptors to traced, so traced can directly # write into the output file without doing roundtrips over IPC. allow traced traceur_app:fd use; allow traced trace_data_file:file { read write }; # Allow perfetto to access the proxy service for notifying Traceur. allow traced tracingproxy_service:service_manager find; binder_use(traced); binder_call(traced, system_server); # Allow iorapd to pass memfd descriptors to traced, so traced can directly # write into the shmem buffer file without doing roundtrips over IPC. allow traced iorapd:fd use; allow traced iorapd_tmpfs:file { read write }; # Allow traced to use shared memory supplied by producers. Typically, traced # (i.e. the tracing service) creates the shared memory used for data transfer # from the producer. This rule allows an alternative scheme, where the producer # creates the shared memory, that is then adopted by traced (after validating # that it is appropriately sealed). # This list has to replicate the tmpfs domains of all applicable domains that # have perfetto_producer() macro applied to them. # perfetto_tmpfs excluded as it should never need to use the producer-supplied # shared memory scheme. allow traced { appdomain_tmpfs heapprofd_tmpfs surfaceflinger_tmpfs traced_probes_tmpfs userdebug_or_eng(`system_server_tmpfs') }:file { getattr map read write }; # Allow traced to notify Traceur when a trace ends by setting the # sys.trace.trace_end_signal property. set_prop(traced, system_trace_prop) # Allow to lazily start producers. set_prop(traced, traced_lazy_prop) # Allow traced to talk to statsd for logging metrics. unix_socket_send(traced, statsdw, statsd) ### ### Neverallow rules ### ### traced should NEVER do any of this # Disallow mapping executable memory (execstack and exec are already disallowed # globally in domain.te). neverallow traced self:process execmem; # Block device access. neverallow traced dev_type:blk_file { read write }; # ptrace any other process neverallow traced domain:process ptrace; # Disallows access to /data files, still allowing to write to file descriptors # passed through the socket. neverallow traced { data_file_type -perfetto_traces_data_file -perfetto_traces_bugreport_data_file -system_data_file -system_data_root_file # TODO(b/72998741) Remove vendor_data_file exemption. Further restricted in a # subsequent neverallow. Currently only getattr and search are allowed. -vendor_data_file -zoneinfo_data_file with_native_coverage(`-method_trace_data_file') }:dir *; neverallow traced { system_data_file }:dir ~{ getattr search }; neverallow traced zoneinfo_data_file:dir ~r_dir_perms; neverallow traced { data_file_type -zoneinfo_data_file }:lnk_file *; neverallow traced { data_file_type -zoneinfo_data_file -perfetto_traces_data_file -perfetto_traces_bugreport_data_file -trace_data_file with_native_coverage(`-method_trace_data_file') }:file ~write; # Only init is allowed to enter the traced domain via exec() neverallow { domain -init } traced:process transition; neverallow * traced:process dyntransition; # Limit the processes that can access tracingproxy_service. neverallow { domain -traced -dumpstate -traceur_app -shell -system_server } tracingproxy_service:service_manager find;