/* * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project * 2004. */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright (c) 2004 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * licensing@OpenSSL.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "pcy_int.h" #include "../internal.h" /* * Enable this to print out the complete policy tree at various point during * evaluation. */ /* * #define OPENSSL_POLICY_DEBUG */ #ifdef OPENSSL_POLICY_DEBUG static void expected_print(BIO *err, X509_POLICY_LEVEL *lev, X509_POLICY_NODE *node, int indent) { if ((lev->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP) || !(node->data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_MAP_MASK)) BIO_puts(err, " Not Mapped\n"); else { int i; STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *pset = node->data->expected_policy_set; ASN1_OBJECT *oid; BIO_puts(err, " Expected: "); for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(pset); i++) { oid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(pset, i); if (i) BIO_puts(err, ", "); i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(err, oid); } BIO_puts(err, "\n"); } } static void tree_print(char *str, X509_POLICY_TREE *tree, X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr) { X509_POLICY_LEVEL *plev; X509_POLICY_NODE *node; int i; BIO *err; err = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE); if (!curr) curr = tree->levels + tree->nlevel; else curr++; BIO_printf(err, "Level print after %s\n", str); BIO_printf(err, "Printing Up to Level %ld\n", curr - tree->levels); for (plev = tree->levels; plev != curr; plev++) { BIO_printf(err, "Level %ld, flags = %x\n", plev - tree->levels, plev->flags); for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(plev->nodes); i++) { node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(plev->nodes, i); X509_POLICY_NODE_print(err, node, 2); expected_print(err, plev, node, 2); BIO_printf(err, " Flags: %x\n", node->data->flags); } if (plev->anyPolicy) X509_POLICY_NODE_print(err, plev->anyPolicy, 2); } BIO_free(err); } #else # define tree_print(a,b,c) /* */ #endif /*- * Initialize policy tree. Return values: * 0 Some internal error occurred. * -1 Inconsistent or invalid extensions in certificates. * 1 Tree initialized OK. * 2 Policy tree is empty. * 5 Tree OK and requireExplicitPolicy true. * 6 Tree empty and requireExplicitPolicy true. */ static int tree_init(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, unsigned int flags) { X509_POLICY_TREE *tree; X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level; const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache; X509_POLICY_DATA *data = NULL; X509 *x; int ret = 1; int i, n; int explicit_policy; int any_skip; int map_skip; *ptree = NULL; n = sk_X509_num(certs); #if 0 /* Disable policy mapping for now... */ flags |= X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP; #endif if (flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXPLICIT_POLICY) explicit_policy = 0; else explicit_policy = n + 1; if (flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY) any_skip = 0; else any_skip = n + 1; if (flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP) map_skip = 0; else map_skip = n + 1; /* Can't do anything with just a trust anchor */ if (n == 1) return 1; /* * First setup policy cache in all certificates apart from the trust * anchor. Note any bad cache results on the way. Also can calculate * explicit_policy value at this point. */ for (i = n - 2; i >= 0; i--) { x = sk_X509_value(certs, i); X509_check_purpose(x, -1, -1); cache = policy_cache_set(x); /* If cache NULL something bad happened: return immediately */ if (cache == NULL) return 0; /* * If inconsistent extensions keep a note of it but continue */ if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY) ret = -1; /* * Otherwise if we have no data (hence no CertificatePolicies) and * haven't already set an inconsistent code note it. */ else if ((ret == 1) && !cache->data) ret = 2; if (explicit_policy > 0) { if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) explicit_policy--; if ((cache->explicit_skip != -1) && (cache->explicit_skip < explicit_policy)) explicit_policy = cache->explicit_skip; } } if (ret != 1) { if (ret == 2 && !explicit_policy) return 6; return ret; } /* If we get this far initialize the tree */ tree = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_POLICY_TREE)); if (!tree) return 0; tree->flags = 0; tree->levels = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_POLICY_LEVEL) * n); tree->nlevel = 0; tree->extra_data = NULL; tree->auth_policies = NULL; tree->user_policies = NULL; if (!tree->levels) { OPENSSL_free(tree); return 0; } OPENSSL_memset(tree->levels, 0, n * sizeof(X509_POLICY_LEVEL)); tree->nlevel = n; level = tree->levels; /* Root data: initialize to anyPolicy */ data = policy_data_new(NULL, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_any_policy), 0); if (!data || !level_add_node(level, data, NULL, tree)) goto bad_tree; for (i = n - 2; i >= 0; i--) { level++; x = sk_X509_value(certs, i); cache = policy_cache_set(x); X509_up_ref(x); level->cert = x; if (!cache->anyPolicy) level->flags |= X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY; /* Determine inhibit any and inhibit map flags */ if (any_skip == 0) { /* * Any matching allowed if certificate is self issued and not the * last in the chain. */ if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) || (i == 0)) level->flags |= X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY; } else { if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) any_skip--; if ((cache->any_skip >= 0) && (cache->any_skip < any_skip)) any_skip = cache->any_skip; } if (map_skip == 0) level->flags |= X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP; else { if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) map_skip--; if ((cache->map_skip >= 0) && (cache->map_skip < map_skip)) map_skip = cache->map_skip; } } *ptree = tree; if (explicit_policy) return 1; else return 5; bad_tree: X509_policy_tree_free(tree); return 0; } static int tree_link_matching_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr, X509_POLICY_DATA *data) { X509_POLICY_LEVEL *last = curr - 1; X509_POLICY_NODE *node; int matched = 0; size_t i; /* Iterate through all in nodes linking matches */ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(last->nodes); i++) { node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(last->nodes, i); if (policy_node_match(last, node, data->valid_policy)) { if (!level_add_node(curr, data, node, NULL)) return 0; matched = 1; } } if (!matched && last->anyPolicy) { if (!level_add_node(curr, data, last->anyPolicy, NULL)) return 0; } return 1; } /* * This corresponds to RFC3280 6.1.3(d)(1): link any data from * CertificatePolicies onto matching parent or anyPolicy if no match. */ static int tree_link_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr, const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache) { size_t i; X509_POLICY_DATA *data; for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_num(cache->data); i++) { data = sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_value(cache->data, i); /* * If a node is mapped any it doesn't have a corresponding * CertificatePolicies entry. However such an identical node would * be created if anyPolicy matching is enabled because there would be * no match with the parent valid_policy_set. So we create link * because then it will have the mapping flags right and we can prune * it later. */ #if 0 if ((data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_MAPPED_ANY) && !(curr->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY)) continue; #endif /* Look for matching nodes in previous level */ if (!tree_link_matching_nodes(curr, data)) return 0; } return 1; } /* * This corresponds to RFC3280 6.1.3(d)(2): Create new data for any unmatched * policies in the parent and link to anyPolicy. */ static int tree_add_unmatched(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr, const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache, const ASN1_OBJECT *id, X509_POLICY_NODE *node, X509_POLICY_TREE *tree) { X509_POLICY_DATA *data; if (id == NULL) id = node->data->valid_policy; /* * Create a new node with qualifiers from anyPolicy and id from unmatched * node. */ data = policy_data_new(NULL, id, node_critical(node)); if (data == NULL) return 0; /* Curr may not have anyPolicy */ data->qualifier_set = cache->anyPolicy->qualifier_set; data->flags |= POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS; if (!level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree)) { policy_data_free(data); return 0; } return 1; } static int tree_link_unmatched(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr, const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache, X509_POLICY_NODE *node, X509_POLICY_TREE *tree) { const X509_POLICY_LEVEL *last = curr - 1; size_t i; if ((last->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP) || !(node->data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_MAPPED)) { /* If no policy mapping: matched if one child present */ if (node->nchild) return 1; if (!tree_add_unmatched(curr, cache, NULL, node, tree)) return 0; /* Add it */ } else { /* If mapping: matched if one child per expected policy set */ STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *expset = node->data->expected_policy_set; if ((size_t)node->nchild == sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(expset)) return 1; /* Locate unmatched nodes */ for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(expset); i++) { ASN1_OBJECT *oid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(expset, i); if (level_find_node(curr, node, oid)) continue; if (!tree_add_unmatched(curr, cache, oid, node, tree)) return 0; } } return 1; } static int tree_link_any(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr, const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache, X509_POLICY_TREE *tree) { size_t i; /* * X509_POLICY_DATA *data; */ X509_POLICY_NODE *node; X509_POLICY_LEVEL *last = curr - 1; for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(last->nodes); i++) { node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(last->nodes, i); if (!tree_link_unmatched(curr, cache, node, tree)) return 0; #if 0 /* * Skip any node with any children: we only want unmathced nodes. * Note: need something better for policy mapping because each node * may have multiple children */ if (node->nchild) continue; /* * Create a new node with qualifiers from anyPolicy and id from * unmatched node. */ data = policy_data_new(NULL, node->data->valid_policy, node_critical(node)); if (data == NULL) return 0; /* Curr may not have anyPolicy */ data->qualifier_set = cache->anyPolicy->qualifier_set; data->flags |= POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS; if (!level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree)) { policy_data_free(data); return 0; } #endif } /* Finally add link to anyPolicy */ if (last->anyPolicy) { if (!level_add_node(curr, cache->anyPolicy, last->anyPolicy, NULL)) return 0; } return 1; } /* * Prune the tree: delete any child mapped child data on the current level * then proceed up the tree deleting any data with no children. If we ever * have no data on a level we can halt because the tree will be empty. */ static int tree_prune(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree, X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr) { STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *nodes; X509_POLICY_NODE *node; int i; nodes = curr->nodes; if (curr->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP) { for (i = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(nodes) - 1; i >= 0; i--) { node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(nodes, i); /* Delete any mapped data: see RFC3280 XXXX */ if (node->data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_MAP_MASK) { node->parent->nchild--; OPENSSL_free(node); (void)sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_delete(nodes, i); } } } for (;;) { --curr; nodes = curr->nodes; for (i = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(nodes) - 1; i >= 0; i--) { node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(nodes, i); if (node->nchild == 0) { node->parent->nchild--; OPENSSL_free(node); (void)sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_delete(nodes, i); } } if (curr->anyPolicy && !curr->anyPolicy->nchild) { if (curr->anyPolicy->parent) curr->anyPolicy->parent->nchild--; OPENSSL_free(curr->anyPolicy); curr->anyPolicy = NULL; } if (curr == tree->levels) { /* If we zapped anyPolicy at top then tree is empty */ if (!curr->anyPolicy) return 2; return 1; } } } static int tree_add_auth_node(STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) **pnodes, X509_POLICY_NODE *pcy) { if (!*pnodes) { *pnodes = policy_node_cmp_new(); if (!*pnodes) return 0; } else { sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_sort(*pnodes); if (sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_find(*pnodes, NULL, pcy)) return 1; } if (!sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_push(*pnodes, pcy)) return 0; return 1; } /* * Calculate the authority set based on policy tree. The 'pnodes' parameter * is used as a store for the set of policy nodes used to calculate the user * set. If the authority set is not anyPolicy then pnodes will just point to * the authority set. If however the authority set is anyPolicy then the set * of valid policies (other than anyPolicy) is store in pnodes. The return * value of '2' is used in this case to indicate that pnodes should be freed. */ static int tree_calculate_authority_set(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree, STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) **pnodes) { X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr; X509_POLICY_NODE *node, *anyptr; STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) **addnodes; int i; size_t j; curr = tree->levels + tree->nlevel - 1; /* If last level contains anyPolicy set is anyPolicy */ if (curr->anyPolicy) { if (!tree_add_auth_node(&tree->auth_policies, curr->anyPolicy)) return 0; addnodes = pnodes; } else /* Add policies to authority set */ addnodes = &tree->auth_policies; curr = tree->levels; for (i = 1; i < tree->nlevel; i++) { /* * If no anyPolicy node on this this level it can't appear on lower * levels so end search. */ if (!(anyptr = curr->anyPolicy)) break; curr++; for (j = 0; j < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(curr->nodes); j++) { node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(curr->nodes, j); if ((node->parent == anyptr) && !tree_add_auth_node(addnodes, node)) return 0; } } if (addnodes == pnodes) return 2; *pnodes = tree->auth_policies; return 1; } static int tree_calculate_user_set(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree, STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *policy_oids, STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *auth_nodes) { size_t i; X509_POLICY_NODE *node; ASN1_OBJECT *oid; X509_POLICY_NODE *anyPolicy; X509_POLICY_DATA *extra; /* * Check if anyPolicy present in authority constrained policy set: this * will happen if it is a leaf node. */ if (sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(policy_oids) <= 0) return 1; anyPolicy = tree->levels[tree->nlevel - 1].anyPolicy; for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(policy_oids); i++) { oid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(policy_oids, i); if (OBJ_obj2nid(oid) == NID_any_policy) { tree->flags |= POLICY_FLAG_ANY_POLICY; return 1; } } for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(policy_oids); i++) { oid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(policy_oids, i); node = tree_find_sk(auth_nodes, oid); if (!node) { if (!anyPolicy) continue; /* * Create a new node with policy ID from user set and qualifiers * from anyPolicy. */ extra = policy_data_new(NULL, oid, node_critical(anyPolicy)); if (!extra) return 0; extra->qualifier_set = anyPolicy->data->qualifier_set; extra->flags = POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS | POLICY_DATA_FLAG_EXTRA_NODE; node = level_add_node(NULL, extra, anyPolicy->parent, tree); } if (!tree->user_policies) { tree->user_policies = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_new_null(); if (!tree->user_policies) return 1; } if (!sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_push(tree->user_policies, node)) return 0; } return 1; } static int tree_evaluate(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree) { int ret, i; X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr = tree->levels + 1; const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache; for (i = 1; i < tree->nlevel; i++, curr++) { cache = policy_cache_set(curr->cert); if (!tree_link_nodes(curr, cache)) return 0; if (!(curr->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY) && !tree_link_any(curr, cache, tree)) return 0; tree_print("before tree_prune()", tree, curr); ret = tree_prune(tree, curr); if (ret != 1) return ret; } return 1; } static void exnode_free(X509_POLICY_NODE *node) { if (node->data && (node->data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_EXTRA_NODE)) OPENSSL_free(node); } void X509_policy_tree_free(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree) { X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr; int i; if (!tree) return; sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_free(tree->auth_policies); sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_pop_free(tree->user_policies, exnode_free); for (i = 0, curr = tree->levels; i < tree->nlevel; i++, curr++) { if (curr->cert) X509_free(curr->cert); if (curr->nodes) sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_pop_free(curr->nodes, policy_node_free); if (curr->anyPolicy) policy_node_free(curr->anyPolicy); } if (tree->extra_data) sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_pop_free(tree->extra_data, policy_data_free); OPENSSL_free(tree->levels); OPENSSL_free(tree); } /*- * Application policy checking function. * Return codes: * 0 Internal Error. * 1 Successful. * -1 One or more certificates contain invalid or inconsistent extensions * -2 User constrained policy set empty and requireExplicit true. */ int X509_policy_check(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, int *pexplicit_policy, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *policy_oids, unsigned int flags) { int ret; int calc_ret; X509_POLICY_TREE *tree = NULL; STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *nodes, *auth_nodes = NULL; *ptree = NULL; *pexplicit_policy = 0; ret = tree_init(&tree, certs, flags); switch (ret) { /* Tree empty requireExplicit False: OK */ case 2: return 1; /* Some internal error */ case -1: return -1; /* Some internal error */ case 0: return 0; /* Tree empty requireExplicit True: Error */ case 6: *pexplicit_policy = 1; return -2; /* Tree OK requireExplicit True: OK and continue */ case 5: *pexplicit_policy = 1; break; /* Tree OK: continue */ case 1: if (!tree) /* * tree_init() returns success and a null tree * if it's just looking at a trust anchor. * I'm not sure that returning success here is * correct, but I'm sure that reporting this * as an internal error which our caller * interprets as a malloc failure is wrong. */ return 1; break; } if (!tree) goto error; ret = tree_evaluate(tree); tree_print("tree_evaluate()", tree, NULL); if (ret <= 0) goto error; /* Return value 2 means tree empty */ if (ret == 2) { X509_policy_tree_free(tree); if (*pexplicit_policy) return -2; else return 1; } /* Tree is not empty: continue */ calc_ret = tree_calculate_authority_set(tree, &auth_nodes); if (!calc_ret) goto error; ret = tree_calculate_user_set(tree, policy_oids, auth_nodes); if (calc_ret == 2) sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_free(auth_nodes); if (!ret) goto error; if (tree) *ptree = tree; if (*pexplicit_policy) { nodes = X509_policy_tree_get0_user_policies(tree); if (sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(nodes) <= 0) return -2; } return 1; error: X509_policy_tree_free(tree); return 0; }