/bionic/libc/bionic/ |
D | initgroups.c | 35 initgroups (const char *user, gid_t group) in initgroups() argument 42 if (getgrouplist(user, group, groups, &numgroups) < 0) { in initgroups() 46 if (getgrouplist(user,group,groups,&numgroups) < 0) { in initgroups()
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/bionic/libc/include/sys/ |
D | user.h | 86 struct user { struct 152 struct user { 203 struct user {
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/bionic/libc/kernel/uapi/linux/ |
D | atmsap.h | 72 unsigned char user; member 81 unsigned char user; member
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D | net_dropmon.h | 47 struct net_dm_config_msg user; member
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D | xfrm.h | 56 __kernel_uid32_t user; member
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/bionic/libc/kernel/uapi/linux/netfilter/ |
D | x_tables.h | 32 } user; member 47 } user; member 57 {.target.u.user = {.target_size = XT_ALIGN(__size),.name = __name, }, \
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/bionic/libc/kernel/tools/ |
D | kernel.py | 258 for user in fparser.getHeaderUsers(used): 259 needed[path].add(user) 267 for user in users: 268 self.needed[header].add(user)
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/bionic/tests/ |
D | sys_ptrace_test.cpp | 134 …ASSERT_EQ(0, ptrace(PTRACE_POKEUSER, child, offsetof(user, u_debugreg[0]), address)) << strerror(e… in set_watchpoint() 136 unsigned data = ptrace(PTRACE_PEEKUSER, child, offsetof(user, u_debugreg[7]), nullptr); in set_watchpoint() 147 …ASSERT_EQ(0, ptrace(PTRACE_POKEUSER, child, offsetof(user, u_debugreg[7]), data)) << strerror(errn… in set_watchpoint() 322 ASSERT_EQ(0, ptrace(PTRACE_POKEUSER, child, offsetof(user, u_debugreg[0]), address)) in set_breakpoint() 325 unsigned data = ptrace(PTRACE_PEEKUSER, child, offsetof(user, u_debugreg[7]), nullptr); in set_breakpoint() 336 ASSERT_EQ(0, ptrace(PTRACE_POKEUSER, child, offsetof(user, u_debugreg[7]), data)) in set_breakpoint()
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/bionic/docs/ |
D | fdtrack.md | 70 is critical to being useful for the initial user, system_server.
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D | 32-bit-abi.md | 48 flag that should never be set by user code but sometimes is (by zlib,
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D | fdsan.md | 42 …ity vulnerabilities are also possible (e.g. suppose thread two was saving user data to disk when a… 53 ### Enabling fdsan (as a user)
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D | libc_assembler.md | 118 NOTE: It is assumed that these commands are executed in adb as the shell user
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D | clang_fortify_anatomy.md | 35 increasingly strict versions of it. In general, FORTIFY doesn't require user 135 FORTIFY'ed function from Bionic. From the user's perspective, it supports a few
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D | elf-tls.md | 598 ** and should not be used/included by user-serviceable parts of
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/bionic/libc/kernel/ |
D | README.md | 27 made into uapi files, but some user space code expects that these
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/bionic/ |
D | README.md | 8 See the [user documentation](docs/). 334 a non-root user, so the unit tests must also pass when not run as root.
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D | android-changes-for-ndk-developers.md | 144 and reported to the user as space taken up by your app). Any .so file 175 In order to reduce the user impact of this transition, we've identified
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/bionic/libc/ |
D | SYSCALLS.TXT | 20 # been provided, allows the user to specify dispatch style syscalls.
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/bionic/libc/malloc_debug/ |
D | README.md | 608 Build fingerprint: 'google/taimen/taimen:8.1.0/OPM2.171026.006.C1/4769658:user/release-keys'
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