# applies all permissions to hal_omx NOT hal_omx_server
# since OMX must always be in its own process.

binder_call(hal_omx_server, binderservicedomain)
binder_call(hal_omx_server, { appdomain -isolated_app })

# Allow hal_omx_server access to composer sync fences
allow hal_omx_server hal_graphics_composer:fd use;

allow hal_omx_server ion_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
allow hal_omx_server hal_camera:fd use;

crash_dump_fallback(hal_omx_server)

# Recieve gralloc buffer FDs from bufferhubd. Note that hal_omx_server never
# directly connects to bufferhubd via PDX. Instead, a VR app acts as a bridge
# between those two: it talks to hal_omx_server via Binder and talks to bufferhubd
# via PDX. Thus, there is no need to use pdx_client macro.
allow hal_omx_server bufferhubd:fd use;

hal_attribute_hwservice(hal_omx, hal_omx_hwservice)

allow hal_omx_client hidl_token_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;

get_prop(hal_omx_client, media_variant_prop)
get_prop(hal_omx_server, media_variant_prop)

binder_call(hal_omx_client, hal_omx_server)
binder_call(hal_omx_server, hal_omx_client)

###
### neverallow rules
###

# hal_omx_server should never execute any executable without a
# domain transition
neverallow hal_omx_server { file_type fs_type }:file execute_no_trans;

# The goal of the mediaserver split is to place media processing code into
# restrictive sandboxes with limited responsibilities and thus limited
# permissions. Example: Audioserver is only responsible for controlling audio
# hardware and processing audio content. Cameraserver does the same for camera
# hardware/content. Etc.
#
# Media processing code is inherently risky and thus should have limited
# permissions and be isolated from the rest of the system and network.
# Lengthier explanation here:
# https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2016/05/hardening-media-stack.html
neverallow hal_omx_server domain:{ udp_socket rawip_socket } *;
neverallow hal_omx_server { domain userdebug_or_eng(`-su') }:tcp_socket *;