// Copyright 2013 The Chromium Authors // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be // found in the LICENSE file. #include "net/cert/multi_log_ct_verifier.h" #include #include #include "base/logging.h" #include "base/metrics/histogram_macros.h" #include "base/values.h" #include "net/base/net_errors.h" #include "net/cert/ct_log_verifier.h" #include "net/cert/ct_objects_extractor.h" #include "net/cert/ct_serialization.h" #include "net/cert/ct_signed_certificate_timestamp_log_param.h" #include "net/cert/sct_status_flags.h" #include "net/cert/signed_certificate_timestamp_and_status.h" #include "net/cert/x509_certificate.h" #include "net/log/net_log_event_type.h" #include "net/log/net_log_with_source.h" namespace net { namespace { // Record SCT verification status. This metric would help detecting presence // of unknown CT logs as well as bad deployments (invalid SCTs). void LogSCTStatusToUMA(ct::SCTVerifyStatus status) { // Note SCT_STATUS_MAX + 1 is passed to the UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION as that // macro requires the values to be strictly less than the boundary value, // and SCT_STATUS_MAX is the last valid value of the SCTVerifyStatus enum // (since that enum is used for IPC as well). UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Net.CertificateTransparency.SCTStatus", status, ct::SCT_STATUS_MAX + 1); } // Record SCT origin enum. This metric measure the popularity // of the various channels of providing SCTs for a certificate. void LogSCTOriginToUMA(ct::SignedCertificateTimestamp::Origin origin) { UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Net.CertificateTransparency.SCTOrigin", origin, ct::SignedCertificateTimestamp::SCT_ORIGIN_MAX); } void AddSCTAndLogStatus(scoped_refptr sct, ct::SCTVerifyStatus status, SignedCertificateTimestampAndStatusList* sct_list) { LogSCTStatusToUMA(status); sct_list->push_back(SignedCertificateTimestampAndStatus(sct, status)); } std::map> CreateLogsMap( const std::vector>& log_verifiers) { std::map> logs; for (const auto& log_verifier : log_verifiers) { logs[log_verifier->key_id()] = log_verifier; } return logs; } } // namespace MultiLogCTVerifier::MultiLogCTVerifier( const std::vector>& log_verifiers) : logs_(CreateLogsMap(log_verifiers)) {} MultiLogCTVerifier::~MultiLogCTVerifier() = default; void MultiLogCTVerifier::Verify( X509Certificate* cert, std::string_view stapled_ocsp_response, std::string_view sct_list_from_tls_extension, base::Time current_time, SignedCertificateTimestampAndStatusList* output_scts, const NetLogWithSource& net_log) const { DCHECK(cert); DCHECK(output_scts); output_scts->clear(); std::string embedded_scts; if (!cert->intermediate_buffers().empty() && ct::ExtractEmbeddedSCTList(cert->cert_buffer(), &embedded_scts)) { ct::SignedEntryData precert_entry; if (ct::GetPrecertSignedEntry(cert->cert_buffer(), cert->intermediate_buffers().front().get(), &precert_entry)) { VerifySCTs(embedded_scts, precert_entry, ct::SignedCertificateTimestamp::SCT_EMBEDDED, current_time, cert, output_scts); } } std::string sct_list_from_ocsp; if (!stapled_ocsp_response.empty() && !cert->intermediate_buffers().empty()) { ct::ExtractSCTListFromOCSPResponse( cert->intermediate_buffers().front().get(), cert->serial_number(), stapled_ocsp_response, &sct_list_from_ocsp); } // Log to Net Log, after extracting SCTs but before possibly failing on // X.509 entry creation. net_log.AddEvent( NetLogEventType::SIGNED_CERTIFICATE_TIMESTAMPS_RECEIVED, [&] { return NetLogRawSignedCertificateTimestampParams( embedded_scts, sct_list_from_ocsp, sct_list_from_tls_extension); }); ct::SignedEntryData x509_entry; if (ct::GetX509SignedEntry(cert->cert_buffer(), &x509_entry)) { VerifySCTs(sct_list_from_ocsp, x509_entry, ct::SignedCertificateTimestamp::SCT_FROM_OCSP_RESPONSE, current_time, cert, output_scts); VerifySCTs(sct_list_from_tls_extension, x509_entry, ct::SignedCertificateTimestamp::SCT_FROM_TLS_EXTENSION, current_time, cert, output_scts); } net_log.AddEvent(NetLogEventType::SIGNED_CERTIFICATE_TIMESTAMPS_CHECKED, [&] { return NetLogSignedCertificateTimestampParams(output_scts); }); } void MultiLogCTVerifier::VerifySCTs( std::string_view encoded_sct_list, const ct::SignedEntryData& expected_entry, ct::SignedCertificateTimestamp::Origin origin, base::Time current_time, X509Certificate* cert, SignedCertificateTimestampAndStatusList* output_scts) const { if (logs_.empty()) return; std::vector sct_list; if (!ct::DecodeSCTList(encoded_sct_list, &sct_list)) return; for (std::vector::const_iterator it = sct_list.begin(); it != sct_list.end(); ++it) { std::string_view encoded_sct(*it); LogSCTOriginToUMA(origin); scoped_refptr decoded_sct; if (!DecodeSignedCertificateTimestamp(&encoded_sct, &decoded_sct)) { LogSCTStatusToUMA(ct::SCT_STATUS_NONE); continue; } decoded_sct->origin = origin; VerifySingleSCT(decoded_sct, expected_entry, current_time, cert, output_scts); } } bool MultiLogCTVerifier::VerifySingleSCT( scoped_refptr sct, const ct::SignedEntryData& expected_entry, base::Time current_time, X509Certificate* cert, SignedCertificateTimestampAndStatusList* output_scts) const { // Assume this SCT is untrusted until proven otherwise. const auto& it = logs_.find(sct->log_id); if (it == logs_.end()) { AddSCTAndLogStatus(sct, ct::SCT_STATUS_LOG_UNKNOWN, output_scts); return false; } sct->log_description = it->second->description(); if (!it->second->Verify(expected_entry, *sct.get())) { AddSCTAndLogStatus(sct, ct::SCT_STATUS_INVALID_SIGNATURE, output_scts); return false; } // SCT verified ok, just make sure the timestamp is legitimate. if (sct->timestamp > current_time) { AddSCTAndLogStatus(sct, ct::SCT_STATUS_INVALID_TIMESTAMP, output_scts); return false; } AddSCTAndLogStatus(sct, ct::SCT_STATUS_OK, output_scts); return true; } } // namespace net