### ### SDK Sandbox process. ### ### This file defines the security policy for the sdk sandbox processes. type sdk_sandbox, domain; typeattribute sdk_sandbox coredomain; net_domain(sdk_sandbox) app_domain(sdk_sandbox) # Allow finding services. This is different from ephemeral_app policy. # Adding services manually to the allowlist is preferred hence app_api_service is not used. allow sdk_sandbox activity_service:service_manager find; allow sdk_sandbox activity_task_service:service_manager find; allow sdk_sandbox audio_service:service_manager find; # Audit the access to signal that we are still investigating whether sdk_sandbox # should have access to audio_service # TODO(b/211632068): remove this line auditallow sdk_sandbox audio_service:service_manager find; allow sdk_sandbox hint_service:service_manager find; allow sdk_sandbox surfaceflinger_service:service_manager find; allow sdk_sandbox thermal_service:service_manager find; allow sdk_sandbox trust_service:service_manager find; allow sdk_sandbox uimode_service:service_manager find; allow sdk_sandbox webviewupdate_service:service_manager find; # Write app-specific trace data to the Perfetto traced damon. This requires # connecting to its producer socket and obtaining a (per-process) tmpfs fd. perfetto_producer(sdk_sandbox) # Allow profiling if the app opts in by being marked profileable/debuggable. can_profile_heap(sdk_sandbox) can_profile_perf(sdk_sandbox) # allow sdk sandbox to use UDP sockets provided by the system server but not # modify them other than to connect allow sdk_sandbox system_server:udp_socket { connect getattr read recvfrom sendto write getopt setopt }; # allow sandbox to search in sdk system server directory # additionally, for webview to work, getattr has been permitted allow sdk_sandbox sdk_sandbox_system_data_file:dir { getattr search }; # allow sandbox to create files and dirs in sdk data directory allow sdk_sandbox sdk_sandbox_data_file:dir create_dir_perms; allow sdk_sandbox sdk_sandbox_data_file:file create_file_perms; ### ### neverallow rules ### neverallow sdk_sandbox { app_data_file privapp_data_file }:file { execute execute_no_trans }; # Receive or send uevent messages. neverallow sdk_sandbox domain:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket *; # Receive or send generic netlink messages neverallow sdk_sandbox domain:netlink_socket *; # Too much leaky information in debugfs. It's a security # best practice to ensure these files aren't readable. neverallow sdk_sandbox debugfs:file read; # execute gpu_device neverallow sdk_sandbox gpu_device:chr_file execute; # access files in /sys with the default sysfs label neverallow sdk_sandbox sysfs:file *; # Avoid reads from generically labeled /proc files # Create a more specific label if needed neverallow sdk_sandbox proc:file { no_rw_file_perms no_x_file_perms }; # Directly access external storage neverallow sdk_sandbox { sdcard_type media_rw_data_file }:file {open create}; neverallow sdk_sandbox { sdcard_type media_rw_data_file }:dir search; # Avoid reads to proc_net, it contains too much device wide information about # ongoing connections. neverallow sdk_sandbox proc_net:file no_rw_file_perms; # SDK sandbox processes have their own storage not related to app_data_file or privapp_data_file neverallow sdk_sandbox { app_data_file privapp_data_file }:dir no_rw_file_perms; neverallow sdk_sandbox { app_data_file privapp_data_file }:file no_rw_file_perms; # SDK sandbox processes don't have any access to external storage neverallow sdk_sandbox { media_rw_data_file }:dir no_rw_file_perms; neverallow sdk_sandbox { media_rw_data_file }:file no_rw_file_perms; neverallow { sdk_sandbox } tmpfs:dir no_rw_file_perms; neverallow sdk_sandbox hal_drm_service:service_manager find; # Only certain system components should have access to sdk_sandbox_system_data_file # sdk_sandbox only needs search. Restricted in follow up neverallow rule. neverallow { domain -init -installd -system_server -vold_prepare_subdirs } sdk_sandbox_system_data_file:dir { relabelfrom }; neverallow { domain -init -installd -sdk_sandbox -system_server -vold_prepare_subdirs -zygote } sdk_sandbox_system_data_file:dir { create_dir_perms relabelto }; # sdk_sandbox only needs to traverse through the sdk_sandbox_system_data_file neverallow sdk_sandbox sdk_sandbox_system_data_file:dir ~{ getattr search }; # Only dirs should be created at sdk_sandbox_system_data_file level neverallow { domain -init } sdk_sandbox_system_data_file:file *;