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1 /*
2  * Copyright (c) 2019, The Android Open Source Project
3  *
4  * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
5  * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
6  * You may obtain a copy of the License at
7  *
8  *     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
9  *
10  * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
11  * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
12  * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
13  * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
14  * limitations under the License.
15  */
16 
17 #pragma once
18 
19 #include <memory>
20 #include <string>
21 #include <vector>
22 #include "aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IRemotelyProvisionedComponent.h"
23 
24 #include <hwtrust/hwtrust.h>
25 #include <keymaster/cppcose/cppcose.h>
26 
27 namespace aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::remote_prov {
28 
29 using bytevec = std::vector<uint8_t>;
30 using namespace cppcose;
31 
32 constexpr std::string_view kErrorChallengeMismatch = "challenges do not match";
33 constexpr std::string_view kErrorUdsCertsAreRequired = "UdsCerts are required";
34 constexpr std::string_view kErrorKeysToSignMismatch = "KeysToSign do not match";
35 constexpr std::string_view kErrorDiceChainIsDegenerate = "DICE chain is degenerate";
36 
37 extern bytevec kTestMacKey;
38 
39 // The Google root key for the Endpoint Encryption Key chain, encoded as COSE_Sign1
40 inline constexpr uint8_t kCoseEncodedRootCert[] = {
41         0x84, 0x43, 0xa1, 0x01, 0x27, 0xa0, 0x58, 0x2a, 0xa4, 0x01, 0x01, 0x03, 0x27, 0x20, 0x06,
42         0x21, 0x58, 0x20, 0x99, 0xb9, 0xee, 0xdd, 0x5e, 0xe4, 0x52, 0xf6, 0x85, 0xc6, 0x4c, 0x62,
43         0xdc, 0x3e, 0x61, 0xab, 0x57, 0x48, 0x7d, 0x75, 0x37, 0x29, 0xad, 0x76, 0x80, 0x32, 0xd2,
44         0xb3, 0xcb, 0x63, 0x58, 0xd9, 0x58, 0x40, 0x1e, 0x22, 0x08, 0x4b, 0xa4, 0xb7, 0xa4, 0xc8,
45         0xd7, 0x4e, 0x03, 0x0e, 0xfe, 0xb8, 0xaf, 0x14, 0x4c, 0xa7, 0x3b, 0x6f, 0xa5, 0xcd, 0xdc,
46         0xda, 0x79, 0xc6, 0x2b, 0x64, 0xfe, 0x99, 0x39, 0xaf, 0x76, 0xe7, 0x80, 0xfa, 0x66, 0x00,
47         0x85, 0x0d, 0x07, 0x98, 0x2a, 0xac, 0x91, 0x5c, 0xa7, 0x25, 0x14, 0x49, 0x06, 0x34, 0x75,
48         0xca, 0x8a, 0x27, 0x7a, 0xd9, 0xe3, 0x5a, 0x49, 0xeb, 0x02, 0x03};
49 
50 // The Google Endpoint Encryption Key certificate, encoded as COSE_Sign1
51 inline constexpr uint8_t kCoseEncodedGeekCert[] = {
52         0x84, 0x43, 0xa1, 0x01, 0x27, 0xa0, 0x58, 0x4e, 0xa5, 0x01, 0x01, 0x02, 0x58, 0x20,
53         0xd0, 0xae, 0xc1, 0x15, 0xca, 0x2a, 0xcf, 0x73, 0xae, 0x6b, 0xcc, 0xcb, 0xd1, 0x96,
54         0x1d, 0x65, 0xe8, 0xb1, 0xdd, 0xd7, 0x4a, 0x1a, 0x37, 0xb9, 0x43, 0x3a, 0x97, 0xd5,
55         0x99, 0xdf, 0x98, 0x08, 0x03, 0x38, 0x18, 0x20, 0x04, 0x21, 0x58, 0x20, 0xbe, 0x85,
56         0xe7, 0x46, 0xc4, 0xa3, 0x42, 0x5a, 0x40, 0xd9, 0x36, 0x3a, 0xa6, 0x15, 0xd0, 0x2c,
57         0x58, 0x7e, 0x3d, 0xdc, 0x33, 0x02, 0x32, 0xd2, 0xfc, 0x5e, 0x1e, 0x87, 0x25, 0x5f,
58         0x72, 0x60, 0x58, 0x40, 0x9b, 0xcf, 0x90, 0xe2, 0x2e, 0x4b, 0xab, 0xd1, 0x18, 0xb1,
59         0x0e, 0x8e, 0x5d, 0x20, 0x27, 0x4b, 0x84, 0x58, 0xfe, 0xfc, 0x32, 0x90, 0x7e, 0x72,
60         0x05, 0x83, 0xbc, 0xd7, 0x82, 0xbe, 0xfa, 0x64, 0x78, 0x2d, 0x54, 0x10, 0x4b, 0xc0,
61         0x31, 0xbf, 0x6b, 0xe8, 0x1e, 0x35, 0xe2, 0xf0, 0x2d, 0xce, 0x6c, 0x2f, 0x4f, 0xf2,
62         0xf5, 0x4f, 0xa5, 0xd4, 0x83, 0xad, 0x96, 0xa2, 0xf1, 0x87, 0x58, 0x04};
63 
64 // The Google ECDSA P256 root key for the Endpoint Encryption Key chain, encoded as COSE_Sign1
65 inline constexpr uint8_t kCoseEncodedEcdsa256RootCert[] = {
66     0x84, 0x43, 0xa1, 0x01, 0x26, 0xa0, 0x58, 0x4d, 0xa5, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x26, 0x20, 0x01, 0x21,
67     0x58, 0x20, 0xf7, 0x14, 0x8a, 0xdb, 0x97, 0xf4, 0xcc, 0x53, 0xef, 0xd2, 0x64, 0x11, 0xc4, 0xe3,
68     0x75, 0x1f, 0x66, 0x1f, 0xa4, 0x71, 0x0c, 0x6c, 0xcf, 0xfa, 0x09, 0x46, 0x80, 0x74, 0x87, 0x54,
69     0xf2, 0xad, 0x22, 0x58, 0x20, 0x5e, 0x7f, 0x5b, 0xf6, 0xec, 0xe4, 0xf6, 0x19, 0xcc, 0xff, 0x13,
70     0x37, 0xfd, 0x0f, 0xa1, 0xc8, 0x93, 0xdb, 0x18, 0x06, 0x76, 0xc4, 0x5d, 0xe6, 0xd7, 0x6a, 0x77,
71     0x86, 0xc3, 0x2d, 0xaf, 0x8f, 0x58, 0x40, 0x2f, 0x97, 0x8e, 0x42, 0xfb, 0xbe, 0x07, 0x2d, 0x95,
72     0x47, 0x85, 0x47, 0x93, 0x40, 0xb0, 0x1f, 0xd4, 0x9b, 0x47, 0xa4, 0xc4, 0x44, 0xa9, 0xf2, 0xa1,
73     0x07, 0x87, 0x10, 0xc7, 0x9f, 0xcb, 0x11, 0xf4, 0xbf, 0x9f, 0xe8, 0x3b, 0xe0, 0xe7, 0x34, 0x4c,
74     0x15, 0xfc, 0x7b, 0xc3, 0x7e, 0x33, 0x05, 0xf4, 0xd1, 0x34, 0x3c, 0xed, 0x02, 0x04, 0x60, 0x7a,
75     0x15, 0xe0, 0x79, 0xd3, 0x8a, 0xff, 0x24};
76 
77 // The Google ECDSA P256 Endpoint Encryption Key certificate, encoded as COSE_Sign1
78 inline constexpr uint8_t kCoseEncodedEcdsa256GeekCert[] = {
79     0x84, 0x43, 0xa1, 0x01, 0x26, 0xa0, 0x58, 0x71, 0xa6, 0x01, 0x02, 0x02, 0x58, 0x20, 0x35, 0x73,
80     0xb7, 0x3f, 0xa0, 0x8a, 0x80, 0x89, 0xb1, 0x26, 0x67, 0xe9, 0xcb, 0x7c, 0x75, 0xa1, 0xaf, 0x02,
81     0x61, 0xfc, 0x6e, 0x65, 0x03, 0x91, 0x3b, 0xd3, 0x4b, 0x7d, 0x14, 0x94, 0x3e, 0x46, 0x03, 0x38,
82     0x18, 0x20, 0x01, 0x21, 0x58, 0x20, 0xe0, 0x41, 0xcf, 0x2f, 0x0f, 0x34, 0x0f, 0x1c, 0x33, 0x2c,
83     0x41, 0xb0, 0xcf, 0xd7, 0x0c, 0x30, 0x55, 0x35, 0xd2, 0x1e, 0x6a, 0x47, 0x13, 0x4b, 0x2e, 0xd1,
84     0x48, 0x96, 0x7e, 0x24, 0x9c, 0x68, 0x22, 0x58, 0x20, 0x1f, 0xce, 0x45, 0xc5, 0xfb, 0x61, 0xba,
85     0x81, 0x21, 0xf9, 0xe5, 0x05, 0x9b, 0x9b, 0x39, 0x0e, 0x76, 0x86, 0x86, 0x47, 0xb8, 0x1e, 0x2f,
86     0x45, 0xf1, 0xce, 0xaf, 0xda, 0x3f, 0x80, 0x68, 0xdb, 0x58, 0x40, 0x8c, 0xb3, 0xba, 0x7e, 0x20,
87     0x3e, 0x32, 0xb0, 0x68, 0xdf, 0x60, 0xd1, 0x1d, 0x7d, 0xf0, 0xac, 0x38, 0x8e, 0x51, 0xbc, 0xff,
88     0x6c, 0xe1, 0x67, 0x3b, 0x4a, 0x79, 0xbc, 0x56, 0x78, 0xb3, 0x99, 0xd8, 0x7c, 0x8a, 0x07, 0xd8,
89     0xda, 0xb5, 0xb5, 0x7f, 0x71, 0xf4, 0xd8, 0x6b, 0xdf, 0x33, 0x27, 0x34, 0x7b, 0x65, 0xd1, 0x2a,
90     0xeb, 0x86, 0x99, 0x98, 0xab, 0x3a, 0xb4, 0x80, 0xaa, 0xbd, 0x50};
91 
92 /**
93  * Generates random bytes.
94  */
95 bytevec randomBytes(size_t numBytes);
96 
97 const std::string DEFAULT_INSTANCE_NAME =
98         "android.hardware.security.keymint.IRemotelyProvisionedComponent/default";
99 const std::string RKPVM_INSTANCE_NAME =
100         "android.hardware.security.keymint.IRemotelyProvisionedComponent/avf";
101 
102 /**
103  * Returns the portion of an instance name after the /
104  * e.g. for "android.hardware.security.keymint.IRemotelyProvisionedComponent/avf",
105  * it returns "avf".
106  */
107 std::string_view deviceSuffix(std::string_view name);
108 
109 struct EekChain {
110     bytevec chain;
111     bytevec last_pubkey;
112     bytevec last_privkey;
113 };
114 
115 /**
116  * Based on the supportedEekCurve, Generates an X25519/ECDH with the specified eekId
117  * and an Ed25519/ECDSA chain of the specified length. All keys are generated randomly.
118  */
119 ErrMsgOr<EekChain> generateEekChain(int32_t supportedEekCurve, size_t length, const bytevec& eekId);
120 
121 /**
122  * Returns the CBOR-encoded, production Google Endpoint Encryption Key chain.
123  */
124 bytevec getProdEekChain(int32_t supportedEekCurve);
125 
126 struct BccEntryData {
127     bytevec pubKey;
128 };
129 
130 struct JsonOutput {
OkJsonOutput131     static JsonOutput Ok(std::string json) { return {std::move(json), ""}; }
ErrorJsonOutput132     static JsonOutput Error(std::string error) { return {"", std::move(error)}; }
133 
134     std::string output;
135     std::string error;  // if non-empty, this describes what went wrong
136 };
137 
138 /**
139  * Take a given instance name and certificate request, then output a JSON blob
140  * containing the name, build fingerprint and certificate request. This data may
141  * be serialized, then later uploaded to the remote provisioning service. The
142  * input csr is not validated, only encoded.
143  *
144  * Output format:
145  *   {
146  *     "build_fingerprint": <string>
147  *     "csr": <base64 CBOR CSR>
148  *     "name": <string>
149  *   }
150  */
151 JsonOutput jsonEncodeCsrWithBuild(const std::string& instance_name, const cppbor::Array& csr,
152                                   const std::string& serialno_prop);
153 
154 /**
155  * Parses a DeviceInfo structure from the given CBOR data. The parsed data is then validated to
156  * ensure it contains the minimum required data at the time of manufacturing. This is only a
157  * partial validation, as some fields may not be provisioned yet at the time this information
158  * is parsed in the manufacturing process.
159  */
160 ErrMsgOr<std::unique_ptr<cppbor::Map>> parseAndValidateFactoryDeviceInfo(
161         const std::vector<uint8_t>& deviceInfoBytes, const RpcHardwareInfo& info);
162 
163 /**
164  * Parses a DeviceInfo structure from the given CBOR data. The parsed data is then validated to
165  * ensure it is formatted correctly and that it contains the required values for Remote Key
166  * Provisioning. This is a full validation, and assumes the device is provisioned as if it is
167  * suitable for the end user.
168  */
169 ErrMsgOr<std::unique_ptr<cppbor::Map>> parseAndValidateProductionDeviceInfo(
170         const std::vector<uint8_t>& deviceInfoBytes, const RpcHardwareInfo& info);
171 
172 /**
173  * Verify the protected data as if the device is still early in the factory process and may not
174  * have all device identifiers provisioned yet.
175  */
176 ErrMsgOr<std::vector<BccEntryData>> verifyFactoryProtectedData(
177         const DeviceInfo& deviceInfo, const cppbor::Array& keysToSign,
178         const std::vector<uint8_t>& keysToSignMac, const ProtectedData& protectedData,
179         const EekChain& eekChain, const std::vector<uint8_t>& eekId, const RpcHardwareInfo& info,
180         const std::string& instanceName, const std::vector<uint8_t>& challenge);
181 /**
182  * Verify the protected data as if the device is a final production sample.
183  */
184 ErrMsgOr<std::vector<BccEntryData>> verifyProductionProtectedData(
185         const DeviceInfo& deviceInfo, const cppbor::Array& keysToSign,
186         const std::vector<uint8_t>& keysToSignMac, const ProtectedData& protectedData,
187         const EekChain& eekChain, const std::vector<uint8_t>& eekId, const RpcHardwareInfo& info,
188         const std::string& instanceName, const std::vector<uint8_t>& challenge,
189         bool allowAnyMode = false);
190 
191 /**
192  * Verify the CSR as if the device is still early in the factory process and may not
193  * have all device identifiers provisioned yet.
194  */
195 ErrMsgOr<std::unique_ptr<cppbor::Array>> verifyFactoryCsr(const cppbor::Array& keysToSign,
196                                                           const std::vector<uint8_t>& csr,
197                                                           const RpcHardwareInfo& info,
198                                                           const std::string& instanceName,
199                                                           const std::vector<uint8_t>& challenge,
200                                                           bool allowDegenerate = true,
201                                                           bool requireUdsCerts = false);
202 
203 /**
204  * Verify the CSR as if the device is a final production sample.
205  */
206 ErrMsgOr<std::unique_ptr<cppbor::Array>> verifyProductionCsr(const cppbor::Array& keysToSign,
207                                                              const std::vector<uint8_t>& csr,
208                                                              const RpcHardwareInfo& info,
209                                                              const std::string& instanceName,
210                                                              const std::vector<uint8_t>& challenge,
211                                                              bool allowAnyMode = false);
212 
213 /** Checks whether the CSR has a proper DICE chain. */
214 ErrMsgOr<bool> isCsrWithProperDiceChain(const std::vector<uint8_t>& csr,
215                                         const std::string& instanceName);
216 
217 /** Checks whether the CSRs contain DICE certificate chains that have root certificates
218  * with the same public key.
219  */
220 ErrMsgOr<bool> compareRootPublicKeysInDiceChains(const std::vector<uint8_t>& csr1,
221                                                  std::string_view instanceName1,
222                                                  const std::vector<uint8_t>& csr2,
223                                                  std::string_view instanceName2);
224 
225 /** Checks whether the component name in the configuration descriptor in the leaf certificate
226  * of the primary KeyMint instance's DICE certificate chain contains "keymint"
227  */
228 ErrMsgOr<bool> verifyComponentNameInKeyMintDiceChain(const std::vector<uint8_t>& csr);
229 
230 /** Checks whether the DICE chain in the CSR has a certificate with a non-normal mode. */
231 ErrMsgOr<bool> hasNonNormalModeInDiceChain(const std::vector<uint8_t>& csr,
232                                            std::string_view instanceName);
233 
234 /** Verify the DICE chain. */
235 ErrMsgOr<std::vector<BccEntryData>> validateBcc(const cppbor::Array* bcc,
236                                                 hwtrust::DiceChain::Kind kind, bool allowAnyMode,
237                                                 bool allowDegenerate,
238                                                 const std::string& instanceName);
239 
240 }  // namespace aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::remote_prov
241