1 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
2 * All rights reserved.
3 *
4 * This package is an SSL implementation written
5 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
6 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
7 *
8 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
9 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
10 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
11 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
12 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
13 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
14 *
15 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
16 * the code are not to be removed.
17 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
18 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
19 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
20 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
21 *
22 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
23 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
24 * are met:
25 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
26 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
27 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
28 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
29 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
30 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
31 * must display the following acknowledgement:
32 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
33 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
34 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
35 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
36 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
37 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
38 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
39 *
40 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
41 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
42 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
43 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
44 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
45 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
46 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
47 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
48 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
49 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
50 * SUCH DAMAGE.
51 *
52 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
53 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
54 * copied and put under another distribution licence
55 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */
56
57 #include <ctype.h>
58 #include <string.h>
59 #include <time.h>
60
61 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
62 #include <openssl/err.h>
63 #include <openssl/evp.h>
64 #include <openssl/mem.h>
65 #include <openssl/obj.h>
66 #include <openssl/thread.h>
67 #include <openssl/x509.h>
68 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
69
70 #include "internal.h"
71 #include "../internal.h"
72 #include "../x509v3/internal.h"
73
74 static CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS g_ex_data_class =
75 CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS_INIT_WITH_APP_DATA;
76
77 /* CRL score values */
78
79 /* No unhandled critical extensions */
80
81 #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100
82
83 /* certificate is within CRL scope */
84
85 #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080
86
87 /* CRL times valid */
88
89 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040
90
91 /* Issuer name matches certificate */
92
93 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020
94
95 /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */
96
97 #define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
98
99 /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
100
101 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018
102
103 /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
104
105 #define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008
106
107 /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
108
109 #define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004
110
111 /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */
112
113 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002
114
115 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e);
116 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
117 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
118 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
119 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
120 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
121 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
122 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
123 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
124 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
125
126 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
127 unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x);
128 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
129 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x);
130 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl,
131 int *pcrl_score, X509_CRL *base,
132 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls);
133 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 **pissuer,
134 int *pcrl_score);
135 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
136 unsigned int *preasons);
137 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
138 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
139 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
140 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path);
141
142 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
143
null_callback(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX * e)144 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
145 {
146 return ok;
147 }
148
149 /* cert_self_signed checks if |x| is self-signed. If |x| is valid, it returns
150 * one and sets |*out_is_self_signed| to the result. If |x| is invalid, it
151 * returns zero. */
cert_self_signed(X509 * x,int * out_is_self_signed)152 static int cert_self_signed(X509 *x, int *out_is_self_signed)
153 {
154 if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(x)) {
155 return 0;
156 }
157 *out_is_self_signed = (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS) != 0;
158 return 1;
159 }
160
161 /* Given a certificate try and find an exact match in the store */
162
lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509 * x)163 static X509 *lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
164 {
165 STACK_OF(X509) *certs;
166 X509 *xtmp = NULL;
167 size_t i;
168 /* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */
169 certs = ctx->lookup_certs(ctx, X509_get_subject_name(x));
170 if (certs == NULL)
171 return NULL;
172 /* Look for exact match */
173 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) {
174 xtmp = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
175 if (!X509_cmp(xtmp, x))
176 break;
177 }
178 if (i < sk_X509_num(certs))
179 X509_up_ref(xtmp);
180 else
181 xtmp = NULL;
182 sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free);
183 return xtmp;
184 }
185
X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)186 int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
187 {
188 X509 *x, *xtmp, *xtmp2, *chain_ss = NULL;
189 int bad_chain = 0;
190 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;
191 int depth, i, ok = 0;
192 int num, j, retry, trust;
193 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
194 STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp = NULL;
195 if (ctx->cert == NULL) {
196 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
197 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
198 return -1;
199 }
200 if (ctx->chain != NULL) {
201 /*
202 * This X509_STORE_CTX has already been used to verify a cert. We
203 * cannot do another one.
204 */
205 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
206 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
207 return -1;
208 }
209
210 cb = ctx->verify_cb;
211
212 /*
213 * first we make sure the chain we are going to build is present and that
214 * the first entry is in place
215 */
216 ctx->chain = sk_X509_new_null();
217 if (ctx->chain == NULL || !sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, ctx->cert)) {
218 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
219 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
220 goto end;
221 }
222 X509_up_ref(ctx->cert);
223 ctx->last_untrusted = 1;
224
225 /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it.
226 * sktmp = ctx->untrusted ++ ctx->ctx->additional_untrusted */
227 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL
228 && (sktmp = sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) {
229 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
230 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
231 goto end;
232 }
233
234 if (ctx->ctx->additional_untrusted != NULL) {
235 if (sktmp == NULL) {
236 sktmp = sk_X509_new_null();
237 if (sktmp == NULL) {
238 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
239 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
240 goto end;
241 }
242 }
243
244 for (size_t k = 0; k < sk_X509_num(ctx->ctx->additional_untrusted);
245 k++) {
246 if (!sk_X509_push(sktmp,
247 sk_X509_value(ctx->ctx->additional_untrusted,
248 k))) {
249 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
250 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
251 goto end;
252 }
253 }
254 }
255
256 num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
257 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
258 depth = param->depth;
259
260 for (;;) {
261 /* If we have enough, we break */
262 if (depth < num)
263 break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take
264 * note of it and, if appropriate, use the
265 * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error code
266 * later. */
267
268 int is_self_signed;
269 if (!cert_self_signed(x, &is_self_signed)) {
270 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
271 goto end;
272 }
273
274 /* If we are self signed, we break */
275 if (is_self_signed)
276 break;
277 /*
278 * If asked see if we can find issuer in trusted store first
279 */
280 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST) {
281 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
282 if (ok < 0) {
283 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP;
284 goto end;
285 }
286 /*
287 * If successful for now free up cert so it will be picked up
288 * again later.
289 */
290 if (ok > 0) {
291 X509_free(xtmp);
292 break;
293 }
294 }
295
296 /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
297 if (sktmp != NULL) {
298 xtmp = find_issuer(ctx, sktmp, x);
299 if (xtmp != NULL) {
300 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, xtmp)) {
301 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
302 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
303 ok = 0;
304 goto end;
305 }
306 X509_up_ref(xtmp);
307 (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp, xtmp);
308 ctx->last_untrusted++;
309 x = xtmp;
310 num++;
311 /*
312 * reparse the full chain for the next one
313 */
314 continue;
315 }
316 }
317 break;
318 }
319
320 /* Remember how many untrusted certs we have */
321 j = num;
322 /*
323 * at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted certificates.
324 * We now need to add at least one trusted one, if possible, otherwise we
325 * complain.
326 */
327
328 do {
329 /*
330 * Examine last certificate in chain and see if it is self signed.
331 */
332 i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
333 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i - 1);
334
335 int is_self_signed;
336 if (!cert_self_signed(x, &is_self_signed)) {
337 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
338 goto end;
339 }
340
341 if (is_self_signed) {
342 /* we have a self signed certificate */
343 if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1) {
344 /*
345 * We have a single self signed certificate: see if we can
346 * find it in the store. We must have an exact match to avoid
347 * possible impersonation.
348 */
349 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
350 if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp)) {
351 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
352 ctx->current_cert = x;
353 ctx->error_depth = i - 1;
354 if (ok == 1)
355 X509_free(xtmp);
356 bad_chain = 1;
357 ok = cb(0, ctx);
358 if (!ok)
359 goto end;
360 } else {
361 /*
362 * We have a match: replace certificate with store
363 * version so we get any trust settings.
364 */
365 X509_free(x);
366 x = xtmp;
367 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
368 ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
369 }
370 } else {
371 /*
372 * extract and save self signed certificate for later use
373 */
374 chain_ss = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
375 ctx->last_untrusted--;
376 num--;
377 j--;
378 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
379 }
380 }
381 /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
382 for (;;) {
383 /* If we have enough, we break */
384 if (depth < num)
385 break;
386 if (!cert_self_signed(x, &is_self_signed)) {
387 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
388 goto end;
389 }
390 /* If we are self signed, we break */
391 if (is_self_signed)
392 break;
393 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
394
395 if (ok < 0) {
396 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP;
397 goto end;
398 }
399 if (ok == 0)
400 break;
401 x = xtmp;
402 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, x)) {
403 X509_free(xtmp);
404 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
405 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
406 ok = 0;
407 goto end;
408 }
409 num++;
410 }
411
412 /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
413 trust = check_trust(ctx);
414
415 /* If explicitly rejected error */
416 if (trust == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) {
417 ok = 0;
418 goto end;
419 }
420 /*
421 * If it's not explicitly trusted then check if there is an alternative
422 * chain that could be used. We only do this if we haven't already
423 * checked via TRUSTED_FIRST and the user hasn't switched off alternate
424 * chain checking
425 */
426 retry = 0;
427 if (trust != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
428 && !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST)
429 && !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS)) {
430 while (j-- > 1) {
431 xtmp2 = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j - 1);
432 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, xtmp2);
433 if (ok < 0)
434 goto end;
435 /* Check if we found an alternate chain */
436 if (ok > 0) {
437 /*
438 * Free up the found cert we'll add it again later
439 */
440 X509_free(xtmp);
441
442 /*
443 * Dump all the certs above this point - we've found an
444 * alternate chain
445 */
446 while (num > j) {
447 xtmp = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
448 X509_free(xtmp);
449 num--;
450 }
451 ctx->last_untrusted = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
452 retry = 1;
453 break;
454 }
455 }
456 }
457 } while (retry);
458
459 /*
460 * If not explicitly trusted then indicate error unless it's a single
461 * self signed certificate in which case we've indicated an error already
462 * and set bad_chain == 1
463 */
464 if (trust != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED && !bad_chain) {
465 if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss)) {
466 if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num)
467 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
468 else
469 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;
470 ctx->current_cert = x;
471 } else {
472
473 sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, chain_ss);
474 num++;
475 ctx->last_untrusted = num;
476 ctx->current_cert = chain_ss;
477 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN;
478 chain_ss = NULL;
479 }
480
481 ctx->error_depth = num - 1;
482 bad_chain = 1;
483 ok = cb(0, ctx);
484 if (!ok)
485 goto end;
486 }
487
488 /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
489 ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx);
490
491 if (!ok)
492 goto end;
493
494 ok = check_id(ctx);
495
496 if (!ok)
497 goto end;
498
499 /*
500 * Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters because
501 * they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
502 */
503
504 ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx);
505 if (!ok)
506 goto end;
507
508 int err = X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx->error_depth, NULL, ctx->chain,
509 ctx->param->flags);
510 if (err != X509_V_OK) {
511 ctx->error = err;
512 ctx->current_cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, ctx->error_depth);
513 ok = cb(0, ctx);
514 if (!ok)
515 goto end;
516 }
517
518 /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */
519 if (ctx->verify != NULL)
520 ok = ctx->verify(ctx);
521 else
522 ok = internal_verify(ctx);
523 if (!ok)
524 goto end;
525
526 /* Check name constraints */
527
528 ok = check_name_constraints(ctx);
529 if (!ok)
530 goto end;
531
532 /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
533 if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK))
534 ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
535
536 end:
537 if (sktmp != NULL)
538 sk_X509_free(sktmp);
539 if (chain_ss != NULL)
540 X509_free(chain_ss);
541
542 /* Safety net, error returns must set ctx->error */
543 if (ok <= 0 && ctx->error == X509_V_OK)
544 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
545 return ok;
546 }
547
548 /*
549 * Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
550 */
551
find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,STACK_OF (X509)* sk,X509 * x)552 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
553 {
554 size_t i;
555 X509 *issuer;
556 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
557 issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
558 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer))
559 return issuer;
560 }
561 return NULL;
562 }
563
564 /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
565
check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509 * x,X509 * issuer)566 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
567 {
568 int ret;
569 ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
570 if (ret == X509_V_OK)
571 return 1;
572 /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
573 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK))
574 return 0;
575
576 ctx->error = ret;
577 ctx->current_cert = x;
578 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
579 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
580 }
581
582 /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
583
get_issuer_sk(X509 ** issuer,X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509 * x)584 static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
585 {
586 *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
587 if (*issuer) {
588 X509_up_ref(*issuer);
589 return 1;
590 } else
591 return 0;
592 }
593
594 /*
595 * Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency with the supplied
596 * purpose
597 */
598
check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)599 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
600 {
601 int i, ok = 0, plen = 0;
602 X509 *x;
603 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
604 int proxy_path_length = 0;
605 int purpose;
606 int allow_proxy_certs;
607 cb = ctx->verify_cb;
608
609 enum {
610 // ca_or_leaf allows either type of certificate so that direct use of
611 // self-signed certificates works.
612 ca_or_leaf,
613 must_be_ca,
614 must_not_be_ca,
615 } ca_requirement;
616
617 /* CRL path validation */
618 if (ctx->parent) {
619 allow_proxy_certs = 0;
620 purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN;
621 } else {
622 allow_proxy_certs =
623 ! !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
624 purpose = ctx->param->purpose;
625 }
626
627 ca_requirement = ca_or_leaf;
628
629 /* Check all untrusted certificates */
630 for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++) {
631 int ret;
632 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
633 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
634 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) {
635 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;
636 ctx->error_depth = i;
637 ctx->current_cert = x;
638 ok = cb(0, ctx);
639 if (!ok)
640 goto end;
641 }
642 if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)) {
643 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED;
644 ctx->error_depth = i;
645 ctx->current_cert = x;
646 ok = cb(0, ctx);
647 if (!ok)
648 goto end;
649 }
650
651 switch (ca_requirement) {
652 case ca_or_leaf:
653 ret = 1;
654 break;
655 case must_not_be_ca:
656 if (X509_check_ca(x)) {
657 ret = 0;
658 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
659 } else
660 ret = 1;
661 break;
662 case must_be_ca:
663 if (!X509_check_ca(x)) {
664 ret = 0;
665 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
666 } else
667 ret = 1;
668 break;
669 default:
670 // impossible.
671 ret = 0;
672 }
673
674 if (ret == 0) {
675 ctx->error_depth = i;
676 ctx->current_cert = x;
677 ok = cb(0, ctx);
678 if (!ok)
679 goto end;
680 }
681 if (ctx->param->purpose > 0) {
682 ret = X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, ca_requirement == must_be_ca);
683 if (ret != 1) {
684 ret = 0;
685 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
686 ctx->error_depth = i;
687 ctx->current_cert = x;
688 ok = cb(0, ctx);
689 if (!ok)
690 goto end;
691 }
692 }
693 /* Check pathlen if not self issued */
694 if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)
695 && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
696 && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1))) {
697 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
698 ctx->error_depth = i;
699 ctx->current_cert = x;
700 ok = cb(0, ctx);
701 if (!ok)
702 goto end;
703 }
704 /* Increment path length if not self issued */
705 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
706 plen++;
707 /*
708 * If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next certificate
709 * must be another proxy certificate or a EE certificate. If not,
710 * the next certificate must be a CA certificate.
711 */
712 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) {
713 if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen) {
714 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
715 ctx->error_depth = i;
716 ctx->current_cert = x;
717 ok = cb(0, ctx);
718 if (!ok)
719 goto end;
720 }
721 proxy_path_length++;
722 ca_requirement = must_not_be_ca;
723 } else {
724 ca_requirement = must_be_ca;
725 }
726 }
727 ok = 1;
728 end:
729 return ok;
730 }
731
reject_dns_name_in_common_name(X509 * x509)732 static int reject_dns_name_in_common_name(X509 *x509)
733 {
734 X509_NAME *name = X509_get_subject_name(x509);
735 int i = -1;
736 for (;;) {
737 i = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(name, NID_commonName, i);
738 if (i == -1) {
739 return X509_V_OK;
740 }
741
742 X509_NAME_ENTRY *entry = X509_NAME_get_entry(name, i);
743 ASN1_STRING *common_name = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(entry);
744 unsigned char *idval;
745 int idlen = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&idval, common_name);
746 if (idlen < 0) {
747 return X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
748 }
749 /* Only process attributes that look like host names. Note it is
750 * important that this check be mirrored in |X509_check_host|. */
751 int looks_like_dns = x509v3_looks_like_dns_name(idval, (size_t)idlen);
752 OPENSSL_free(idval);
753 if (looks_like_dns) {
754 return X509_V_ERR_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_WITHOUT_SANS;
755 }
756 }
757 }
758
check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)759 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
760 {
761 int i, j, rv;
762 int has_name_constraints = 0;
763 /* Check name constraints for all certificates */
764 for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
765 X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
766 /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */
767 if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
768 continue;
769 /*
770 * Check against constraints for all certificates higher in chain
771 * including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly speaking needed
772 * but if it includes constraints it is to be assumed it expects them
773 * to be obeyed.
774 */
775 for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--) {
776 NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc;
777 if (nc) {
778 has_name_constraints = 1;
779 rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc);
780 switch (rv) {
781 case X509_V_OK:
782 continue;
783 case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM:
784 ctx->error = rv;
785 return 0;
786 default:
787 ctx->error = rv;
788 ctx->error_depth = i;
789 ctx->current_cert = x;
790 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
791 return 0;
792 break;
793 }
794 }
795 }
796 }
797
798 /* Name constraints do not match against the common name, but
799 * |X509_check_host| still implements the legacy behavior where, on
800 * certificates lacking a SAN list, DNS-like names in the common name are
801 * checked instead.
802 *
803 * While we could apply the name constraints to the common name, name
804 * constraints are rare enough that can hold such certificates to a higher
805 * standard. Note this does not make "DNS-like" heuristic failures any
806 * worse. A decorative common-name misidentified as a DNS name would fail
807 * the name constraint anyway. */
808 X509 *leaf = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, 0);
809 if (has_name_constraints && leaf->altname == NULL) {
810 rv = reject_dns_name_in_common_name(leaf);
811 switch (rv) {
812 case X509_V_OK:
813 break;
814 case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM:
815 ctx->error = rv;
816 return 0;
817 default:
818 ctx->error = rv;
819 ctx->error_depth = i;
820 ctx->current_cert = leaf;
821 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
822 return 0;
823 break;
824 }
825 }
826
827 return 1;
828 }
829
check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,int errcode)830 static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int errcode)
831 {
832 ctx->error = errcode;
833 ctx->current_cert = ctx->cert;
834 ctx->error_depth = 0;
835 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
836 }
837
check_hosts(X509 * x,X509_VERIFY_PARAM * param)838 static int check_hosts(X509 *x, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
839 {
840 size_t i;
841 size_t n = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(param->hosts);
842 char *name;
843
844 if (param->peername != NULL) {
845 OPENSSL_free(param->peername);
846 param->peername = NULL;
847 }
848 for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
849 name = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(param->hosts, i);
850 if (X509_check_host(x, name, strlen(name), param->hostflags,
851 ¶m->peername) > 0)
852 return 1;
853 }
854 return n == 0;
855 }
856
check_id(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)857 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
858 {
859 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ctx->param;
860 X509 *x = ctx->cert;
861 if (vpm->poison) {
862 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL))
863 return 0;
864 }
865 if (vpm->hosts && check_hosts(x, vpm) <= 0) {
866 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH))
867 return 0;
868 }
869 if (vpm->email && X509_check_email(x, vpm->email, vpm->emaillen, 0) <= 0) {
870 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH))
871 return 0;
872 }
873 if (vpm->ip && X509_check_ip(x, vpm->ip, vpm->iplen, 0) <= 0) {
874 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH))
875 return 0;
876 }
877 return 1;
878 }
879
check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)880 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
881 {
882 size_t i;
883 int ok;
884 X509 *x = NULL;
885 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
886 cb = ctx->verify_cb;
887 /* Check all trusted certificates in chain */
888 for (i = ctx->last_untrusted; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
889 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
890 ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
891 /* If explicitly trusted return trusted */
892 if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
893 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
894 /*
895 * If explicitly rejected notify callback and reject if not
896 * overridden.
897 */
898 if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) {
899 ctx->error_depth = i;
900 ctx->current_cert = x;
901 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
902 ok = cb(0, ctx);
903 if (!ok)
904 return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
905 }
906 }
907 /*
908 * If we accept partial chains and have at least one trusted certificate
909 * return success.
910 */
911 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) {
912 X509 *mx;
913 if (ctx->last_untrusted < (int)sk_X509_num(ctx->chain))
914 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
915 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, 0);
916 mx = lookup_cert_match(ctx, x);
917 if (mx) {
918 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, 0, mx);
919 X509_free(x);
920 ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
921 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
922 }
923 }
924
925 /*
926 * If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and allow
927 * standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated.
928 */
929 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
930 }
931
check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)932 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
933 {
934 int i, last, ok;
935 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
936 return 1;
937 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
938 last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
939 else {
940 /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */
941 if (ctx->parent)
942 return 1;
943 last = 0;
944 }
945 for (i = 0; i <= last; i++) {
946 ctx->error_depth = i;
947 ok = check_cert(ctx);
948 if (!ok)
949 return ok;
950 }
951 return 1;
952 }
953
check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)954 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
955 {
956 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
957 X509 *x;
958 int ok = 0, cnum;
959 unsigned int last_reasons;
960 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
961 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
962 ctx->current_cert = x;
963 ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
964 ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
965 ctx->current_reasons = 0;
966 while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS) {
967 last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
968 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
969 if (ctx->get_crl)
970 ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
971 else
972 ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x);
973 /*
974 * If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except notify callback
975 */
976 if (!ok) {
977 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
978 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
979 goto err;
980 }
981 ctx->current_crl = crl;
982 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
983 if (!ok)
984 goto err;
985
986 if (dcrl) {
987 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl);
988 if (!ok)
989 goto err;
990 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x);
991 if (!ok)
992 goto err;
993 } else
994 ok = 1;
995
996 /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
997 if (ok != 2) {
998 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
999 if (!ok)
1000 goto err;
1001 }
1002
1003 X509_CRL_free(crl);
1004 X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
1005 crl = NULL;
1006 dcrl = NULL;
1007 /*
1008 * If reasons not updated we wont get anywhere by another iteration,
1009 * so exit loop.
1010 */
1011 if (last_reasons == ctx->current_reasons) {
1012 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
1013 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1014 goto err;
1015 }
1016 }
1017 err:
1018 X509_CRL_free(crl);
1019 X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
1020
1021 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
1022 return ok;
1023
1024 }
1025
1026 /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
1027
check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509_CRL * crl,int notify)1028 static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
1029 {
1030 time_t *ptime;
1031 int i;
1032 if (notify)
1033 ctx->current_crl = crl;
1034 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
1035 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
1036 else
1037 ptime = NULL;
1038
1039 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
1040 if (i == 0) {
1041 if (!notify)
1042 return 0;
1043 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD;
1044 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1045 return 0;
1046 }
1047
1048 if (i > 0) {
1049 if (!notify)
1050 return 0;
1051 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID;
1052 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1053 return 0;
1054 }
1055
1056 if (X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(crl)) {
1057 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
1058
1059 if (i == 0) {
1060 if (!notify)
1061 return 0;
1062 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD;
1063 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1064 return 0;
1065 }
1066 /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */
1067 if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA)) {
1068 if (!notify)
1069 return 0;
1070 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED;
1071 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1072 return 0;
1073 }
1074 }
1075
1076 if (notify)
1077 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
1078
1079 return 1;
1080 }
1081
get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509_CRL ** pcrl,X509_CRL ** pdcrl,X509 ** pissuer,int * pscore,unsigned int * preasons,STACK_OF (X509_CRL)* crls)1082 static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl,
1083 X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons,
1084 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
1085 {
1086 int crl_score, best_score = *pscore;
1087 size_t i;
1088 unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0;
1089 X509 *x = ctx->current_cert;
1090 X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
1091 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL;
1092
1093 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
1094 crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
1095 reasons = *preasons;
1096 crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x);
1097 if (crl_score < best_score || crl_score == 0)
1098 continue;
1099 /* If current CRL is equivalent use it if it is newer */
1100 if (crl_score == best_score && best_crl != NULL) {
1101 int day, sec;
1102 if (ASN1_TIME_diff(&day, &sec, X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(best_crl),
1103 X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(crl)) == 0)
1104 continue;
1105 /*
1106 * ASN1_TIME_diff never returns inconsistent signs for |day|
1107 * and |sec|.
1108 */
1109 if (day <= 0 && sec <= 0)
1110 continue;
1111 }
1112 best_crl = crl;
1113 best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer;
1114 best_score = crl_score;
1115 best_reasons = reasons;
1116 }
1117
1118 if (best_crl) {
1119 if (*pcrl)
1120 X509_CRL_free(*pcrl);
1121 *pcrl = best_crl;
1122 *pissuer = best_crl_issuer;
1123 *pscore = best_score;
1124 *preasons = best_reasons;
1125 X509_CRL_up_ref(best_crl);
1126 if (*pdcrl) {
1127 X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl);
1128 *pdcrl = NULL;
1129 }
1130 get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls);
1131 }
1132
1133 if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID)
1134 return 1;
1135
1136 return 0;
1137 }
1138
1139 /*
1140 * Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
1141 * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical.
1142 */
1143
crl_extension_match(X509_CRL * a,X509_CRL * b,int nid)1144 static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid)
1145 {
1146 ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb;
1147 int i;
1148 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1);
1149 if (i >= 0) {
1150 /* Can't have multiple occurrences */
1151 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1)
1152 return 0;
1153 exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i));
1154 } else
1155 exta = NULL;
1156
1157 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1);
1158
1159 if (i >= 0) {
1160
1161 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1)
1162 return 0;
1163 extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i));
1164 } else
1165 extb = NULL;
1166
1167 if (!exta && !extb)
1168 return 1;
1169
1170 if (!exta || !extb)
1171 return 0;
1172
1173 if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb))
1174 return 0;
1175
1176 return 1;
1177 }
1178
1179 /* See if a base and delta are compatible */
1180
check_delta_base(X509_CRL * delta,X509_CRL * base)1181 static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base)
1182 {
1183 /* Delta CRL must be a delta */
1184 if (!delta->base_crl_number)
1185 return 0;
1186 /* Base must have a CRL number */
1187 if (!base->crl_number)
1188 return 0;
1189 /* Issuer names must match */
1190 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta)))
1191 return 0;
1192 /* AKID and IDP must match */
1193 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier))
1194 return 0;
1195 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point))
1196 return 0;
1197 /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */
1198 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
1199 return 0;
1200 /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
1201 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
1202 return 1;
1203 return 0;
1204 }
1205
1206 /*
1207 * For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring or
1208 * retrieve a chain of deltas...
1209 */
1210
get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509_CRL ** dcrl,int * pscore,X509_CRL * base,STACK_OF (X509_CRL)* crls)1211 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore,
1212 X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
1213 {
1214 X509_CRL *delta;
1215 size_t i;
1216 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS))
1217 return;
1218 if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST))
1219 return;
1220 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
1221 delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
1222 if (check_delta_base(delta, base)) {
1223 if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0))
1224 *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA;
1225 X509_CRL_up_ref(delta);
1226 *dcrl = delta;
1227 return;
1228 }
1229 }
1230 *dcrl = NULL;
1231 }
1232
1233 /*
1234 * For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate
1235 * 'x'. The return value is a mask of several criteria. If the issuer is not
1236 * the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer. The reasons mask is
1237 * also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if no new reasons the CRL
1238 * is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
1239 */
1240
get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509 ** pissuer,unsigned int * preasons,X509_CRL * crl,X509 * x)1241 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
1242 unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1243 {
1244
1245 int crl_score = 0;
1246 unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons;
1247
1248 /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
1249
1250 /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
1251 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
1252 return 0;
1253 /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
1254 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) {
1255 if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS))
1256 return 0;
1257 } else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS) {
1258 /* If no new reasons reject */
1259 if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1260 return 0;
1261 }
1262 /* Don't process deltas at this stage */
1263 else if (crl->base_crl_number)
1264 return 0;
1265 /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
1266 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))) {
1267 if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT))
1268 return 0;
1269 } else
1270 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME;
1271
1272 if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
1273 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL;
1274
1275 /* Check expiry */
1276 if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
1277 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME;
1278
1279 /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */
1280 crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score);
1281
1282 /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
1283
1284 if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID))
1285 return 0;
1286
1287 /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
1288
1289 if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons)) {
1290 /* If no new reasons reject */
1291 if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1292 return 0;
1293 tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons;
1294 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
1295 }
1296
1297 *preasons = tmp_reasons;
1298
1299 return crl_score;
1300
1301 }
1302
crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509_CRL * crl,X509 ** pissuer,int * pcrl_score)1303 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
1304 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score)
1305 {
1306 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL;
1307 X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1308 int cidx = ctx->error_depth;
1309 size_t i;
1310
1311 if ((size_t)cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1)
1312 cidx++;
1313
1314 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1315
1316 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1317 if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME) {
1318 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT;
1319 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1320 return;
1321 }
1322 }
1323
1324 for (cidx++; cidx < (int)sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++) {
1325 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1326 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1327 continue;
1328 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1329 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH;
1330 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1331 return;
1332 }
1333 }
1334
1335 /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
1336
1337 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
1338 return;
1339
1340 /*
1341 * Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the set of
1342 * untrusted certificates.
1343 */
1344 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++) {
1345 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i);
1346 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1347 continue;
1348 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1349 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1350 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
1351 return;
1352 }
1353 }
1354
1355 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->ctx->additional_untrusted); i++) {
1356 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->ctx->additional_untrusted, i);
1357 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1358 continue;
1359 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1360 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1361 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
1362 return;
1363 }
1364 }
1365 }
1366
1367 /*
1368 * Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new
1369 * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the
1370 * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking will
1371 * be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in practice.
1372 */
1373
check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509 * x)1374 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1375 {
1376 X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx;
1377 int ret;
1378 /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
1379 if (ctx->parent)
1380 return 0;
1381 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted))
1382 return -1;
1383
1384 crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls;
1385 /* Copy verify params across */
1386 X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param);
1387
1388 crl_ctx.parent = ctx;
1389 crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb;
1390
1391 /* Verify CRL issuer */
1392 ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx);
1393
1394 if (ret <= 0)
1395 goto err;
1396
1397 /* Check chain is acceptable */
1398
1399 ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain);
1400 err:
1401 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx);
1402 return ret;
1403 }
1404
1405 /*
1406 * RFC 3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path and
1407 * certificate path, which could lead to situations where a certificate could
1408 * be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised to do so. RFC 5280 is more
1409 * strict and states that the two paths must end in the same trust anchor,
1410 * though some discussions remain... until this is resolved we use the
1411 * RFC 5280 version
1412 */
1413
check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,STACK_OF (X509)* cert_path,STACK_OF (X509)* crl_path)1414 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1415 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
1416 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path)
1417 {
1418 X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta;
1419 cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1);
1420 crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1);
1421 if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta))
1422 return 1;
1423 return 0;
1424 }
1425
1426 /*
1427 * Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases. 1.
1428 * Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types. 2. One full, one
1429 * relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES. 3. Both are full names and
1430 * compare two GENERAL_NAMES. 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
1431 */
1432
idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME * a,DIST_POINT_NAME * b)1433 static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b)
1434 {
1435 X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
1436 GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
1437 GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb;
1438 size_t i, j;
1439 if (!a || !b)
1440 return 1;
1441 if (a->type == 1) {
1442 if (!a->dpname)
1443 return 0;
1444 /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
1445 if (b->type == 1) {
1446 if (!b->dpname)
1447 return 0;
1448 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname))
1449 return 1;
1450 else
1451 return 0;
1452 }
1453 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1454 nm = a->dpname;
1455 gens = b->name.fullname;
1456 } else if (b->type == 1) {
1457 if (!b->dpname)
1458 return 0;
1459 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1460 gens = a->name.fullname;
1461 nm = b->dpname;
1462 }
1463
1464 /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
1465 if (nm) {
1466 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) {
1467 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
1468 if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1469 continue;
1470 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName))
1471 return 1;
1472 }
1473 return 0;
1474 }
1475
1476 /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */
1477
1478 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++) {
1479 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i);
1480 for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++) {
1481 genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j);
1482 if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb))
1483 return 1;
1484 }
1485 }
1486
1487 return 0;
1488
1489 }
1490
crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT * dp,X509_CRL * crl,int crl_score)1491 static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score)
1492 {
1493 size_t i;
1494 X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1495 /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
1496 if (!dp->CRLissuer)
1497 return ! !(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME);
1498 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) {
1499 GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
1500 if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1501 continue;
1502 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm))
1503 return 1;
1504 }
1505 return 0;
1506 }
1507
1508 /* Check CRLDP and IDP */
1509
crl_crldp_check(X509 * x,X509_CRL * crl,int crl_score,unsigned int * preasons)1510 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
1511 unsigned int *preasons)
1512 {
1513 size_t i;
1514 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR)
1515 return 0;
1516 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) {
1517 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER)
1518 return 0;
1519 } else {
1520 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA)
1521 return 0;
1522 }
1523 *preasons = crl->idp_reasons;
1524 for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) {
1525 DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i);
1526 if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score)) {
1527 if (!crl->idp || idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint)) {
1528 *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons;
1529 return 1;
1530 }
1531 }
1532 }
1533 if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint)
1534 && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME))
1535 return 1;
1536 return 0;
1537 }
1538
1539 /*
1540 * Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. If deltas enabled try
1541 * to find a delta CRL too
1542 */
1543
get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509_CRL ** pcrl,X509_CRL ** pdcrl,X509 * x)1544 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1545 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x)
1546 {
1547 int ok;
1548 X509 *issuer = NULL;
1549 int crl_score = 0;
1550 unsigned int reasons;
1551 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
1552 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl;
1553 X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
1554 reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
1555 ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl,
1556 &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls);
1557
1558 if (ok)
1559 goto done;
1560
1561 /* Lookup CRLs from store */
1562
1563 skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm);
1564
1565 /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
1566 if (!skcrl && crl)
1567 goto done;
1568
1569 get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl);
1570
1571 sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free);
1572
1573 done:
1574
1575 /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
1576 if (crl) {
1577 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
1578 ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score;
1579 ctx->current_reasons = reasons;
1580 *pcrl = crl;
1581 *pdcrl = dcrl;
1582 return 1;
1583 }
1584
1585 return 0;
1586 }
1587
1588 /* Check CRL validity */
check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509_CRL * crl)1589 static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
1590 {
1591 X509 *issuer = NULL;
1592 EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
1593 int ok = 0, chnum, cnum;
1594 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
1595 chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
1596 /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
1597 if (ctx->current_issuer)
1598 issuer = ctx->current_issuer;
1599
1600 /*
1601 * Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer is next
1602 * certificate in chain.
1603 */
1604 else if (cnum < chnum)
1605 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
1606 else {
1607 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
1608 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
1609 if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer)) {
1610 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER;
1611 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1612 if (!ok)
1613 goto err;
1614 }
1615 }
1616
1617 if (issuer) {
1618 /*
1619 * Skip most tests for deltas because they have already been done
1620 */
1621 if (!crl->base_crl_number) {
1622 /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
1623 if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
1624 !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN)) {
1625 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN;
1626 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1627 if (!ok)
1628 goto err;
1629 }
1630
1631 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)) {
1632 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE;
1633 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1634 if (!ok)
1635 goto err;
1636 }
1637
1638 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH)) {
1639 if (check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0) {
1640 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR;
1641 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1642 if (!ok)
1643 goto err;
1644 }
1645 }
1646
1647 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) {
1648 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
1649 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1650 if (!ok)
1651 goto err;
1652 }
1653
1654 }
1655
1656 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME)) {
1657 ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1);
1658 if (!ok)
1659 goto err;
1660 }
1661
1662 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
1663 ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer);
1664
1665 if (!ikey) {
1666 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1667 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1668 if (!ok)
1669 goto err;
1670 } else {
1671 int rv;
1672 rv = X509_CRL_check_suiteb(crl, ikey, ctx->param->flags);
1673 if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
1674 ctx->error = rv;
1675 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1676 if (!ok)
1677 goto err;
1678 }
1679 /* Verify CRL signature */
1680 if (X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0) {
1681 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1682 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1683 if (!ok)
1684 goto err;
1685 }
1686 }
1687 }
1688
1689 ok = 1;
1690
1691 err:
1692 EVP_PKEY_free(ikey);
1693 return ok;
1694 }
1695
1696 /* Check certificate against CRL */
cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509_CRL * crl,X509 * x)1697 static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1698 {
1699 int ok;
1700 X509_REVOKED *rev;
1701 /*
1702 * The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained unhandled
1703 * critical extensions it could still be used to indicate a certificate
1704 * was revoked. This has since been changed since critical extension can
1705 * change the meaning of CRL entries.
1706 */
1707 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
1708 && (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) {
1709 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
1710 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1711 if (!ok)
1712 return 0;
1713 }
1714 /*
1715 * Look for serial number of certificate in CRL If found make sure reason
1716 * is not removeFromCRL.
1717 */
1718 if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x)) {
1719 if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL)
1720 return 2;
1721 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
1722 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1723 if (!ok)
1724 return 0;
1725 }
1726
1727 return 1;
1728 }
1729
check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)1730 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1731 {
1732 int ret;
1733 if (ctx->parent)
1734 return 1;
1735 ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain,
1736 ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
1737 if (ret == 0) {
1738 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1739 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
1740 return 0;
1741 }
1742 /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
1743 if (ret == -1) {
1744 /*
1745 * Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback.
1746 */
1747 X509 *x;
1748 size_t i;
1749 for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
1750 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
1751 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
1752 continue;
1753 ctx->current_cert = x;
1754 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION;
1755 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1756 return 0;
1757 }
1758 return 1;
1759 }
1760 if (ret == -2) {
1761 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1762 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
1763 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1764 }
1765
1766 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY) {
1767 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1768 /*
1769 * Verification errors need to be "sticky", a callback may have allowed
1770 * an SSL handshake to continue despite an error, and we must then
1771 * remain in an error state. Therefore, we MUST NOT clear earlier
1772 * verification errors by setting the error to X509_V_OK.
1773 */
1774 if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx))
1775 return 0;
1776 }
1777
1778 return 1;
1779 }
1780
check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509 * x)1781 static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1782 {
1783 time_t *ptime;
1784 int i;
1785
1786 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
1787 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
1788 else
1789 ptime = NULL;
1790
1791 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime);
1792 if (i == 0) {
1793 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
1794 ctx->current_cert = x;
1795 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1796 return 0;
1797 }
1798
1799 if (i > 0) {
1800 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;
1801 ctx->current_cert = x;
1802 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1803 return 0;
1804 }
1805
1806 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime);
1807 if (i == 0) {
1808 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
1809 ctx->current_cert = x;
1810 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1811 return 0;
1812 }
1813
1814 if (i < 0) {
1815 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED;
1816 ctx->current_cert = x;
1817 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1818 return 0;
1819 }
1820
1821 return 1;
1822 }
1823
internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)1824 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1825 {
1826 int ok = 0, n;
1827 X509 *xs, *xi;
1828 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1829 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
1830
1831 cb = ctx->verify_cb;
1832
1833 n = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
1834 ctx->error_depth = n - 1;
1835 n--;
1836 xi = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
1837
1838 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
1839 xs = xi;
1840 else {
1841 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) {
1842 xs = xi;
1843 goto check_cert;
1844 }
1845 if (n <= 0) {
1846 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
1847 ctx->current_cert = xi;
1848 ok = cb(0, ctx);
1849 goto end;
1850 } else {
1851 n--;
1852 ctx->error_depth = n;
1853 xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
1854 }
1855 }
1856
1857 /* ctx->error=0; not needed */
1858 while (n >= 0) {
1859 ctx->error_depth = n;
1860
1861 /*
1862 * Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless
1863 * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and just wastes
1864 * time.
1865 */
1866 if (xs != xi || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE)) {
1867 if ((pkey = X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) {
1868 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1869 ctx->current_cert = xi;
1870 ok = (*cb) (0, ctx);
1871 if (!ok)
1872 goto end;
1873 } else if (X509_verify(xs, pkey) <= 0) {
1874 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1875 ctx->current_cert = xs;
1876 ok = (*cb) (0, ctx);
1877 if (!ok) {
1878 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1879 goto end;
1880 }
1881 }
1882 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1883 pkey = NULL;
1884 }
1885
1886 check_cert:
1887 ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs);
1888 if (!ok)
1889 goto end;
1890
1891 /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
1892 ctx->current_issuer = xi;
1893 ctx->current_cert = xs;
1894 ok = (*cb) (1, ctx);
1895 if (!ok)
1896 goto end;
1897
1898 n--;
1899 if (n >= 0) {
1900 xi = xs;
1901 xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
1902 }
1903 }
1904 ok = 1;
1905 end:
1906 return ok;
1907 }
1908
X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME * ctm)1909 int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm)
1910 {
1911 return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
1912 }
1913
X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME * ctm,time_t * cmp_time)1914 int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
1915 {
1916 static const size_t utctime_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMSSZ") - 1;
1917 static const size_t generalizedtime_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ") - 1;
1918 ASN1_TIME *asn1_cmp_time = NULL;
1919 int i, day, sec, ret = 0;
1920
1921 /*
1922 * Note that ASN.1 allows much more slack in the time format than RFC 5280.
1923 * In RFC 5280, the representation is fixed:
1924 * UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ
1925 * GeneralizedTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ
1926 *
1927 * We do NOT currently enforce the following RFC 5280 requirement:
1928 * "CAs conforming to this profile MUST always encode certificate
1929 * validity dates through the year 2049 as UTCTime; certificate validity
1930 * dates in 2050 or later MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime."
1931 */
1932 switch (ctm->type) {
1933 case V_ASN1_UTCTIME:
1934 if (ctm->length != (int)(utctime_length))
1935 return 0;
1936 break;
1937 case V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME:
1938 if (ctm->length != (int)(generalizedtime_length))
1939 return 0;
1940 break;
1941 default:
1942 return 0;
1943 }
1944
1945 /**
1946 * Verify the format: the ASN.1 functions we use below allow a more
1947 * flexible format than what's mandated by RFC 5280.
1948 * Digit and date ranges will be verified in the conversion methods.
1949 */
1950 for (i = 0; i < ctm->length - 1; i++) {
1951 if (!isdigit(ctm->data[i]))
1952 return 0;
1953 }
1954 if (ctm->data[ctm->length - 1] != 'Z')
1955 return 0;
1956
1957 /*
1958 * There is ASN1_UTCTIME_cmp_time_t but no
1959 * ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_cmp_time_t or ASN1_TIME_cmp_time_t,
1960 * so we go through ASN.1
1961 */
1962 asn1_cmp_time = X509_time_adj(NULL, 0, cmp_time);
1963 if (asn1_cmp_time == NULL)
1964 goto err;
1965 if (!ASN1_TIME_diff(&day, &sec, ctm, asn1_cmp_time))
1966 goto err;
1967
1968 /*
1969 * X509_cmp_time comparison is <=.
1970 * The return value 0 is reserved for errors.
1971 */
1972 ret = (day >= 0 && sec >= 0) ? -1 : 1;
1973
1974 err:
1975 ASN1_TIME_free(asn1_cmp_time);
1976 return ret;
1977 }
1978
X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME * s,long offset_sec)1979 ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec)
1980 {
1981 return X509_time_adj(s, offset_sec, NULL);
1982 }
1983
X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME * s,long offset_sec,time_t * in_tm)1984 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1985 {
1986 return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm);
1987 }
1988
X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME * s,int offset_day,long offset_sec,time_t * in_tm)1989 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s,
1990 int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1991 {
1992 time_t t = 0;
1993
1994 if (in_tm) {
1995 t = *in_tm;
1996 } else {
1997 time(&t);
1998 }
1999
2000 return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
2001 }
2002
2003 /* Make a delta CRL as the diff between two full CRLs */
2004
X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL * base,X509_CRL * newer,EVP_PKEY * skey,const EVP_MD * md,unsigned int flags)2005 X509_CRL *X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL *base, X509_CRL *newer,
2006 EVP_PKEY *skey, const EVP_MD *md, unsigned int flags)
2007 {
2008 X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
2009 int i;
2010 size_t j;
2011 STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *revs = NULL;
2012 /* CRLs can't be delta already */
2013 if (base->base_crl_number || newer->base_crl_number) {
2014 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA);
2015 return NULL;
2016 }
2017 /* Base and new CRL must have a CRL number */
2018 if (!base->crl_number || !newer->crl_number) {
2019 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER);
2020 return NULL;
2021 }
2022 /* Issuer names must match */
2023 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer))) {
2024 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH);
2025 return NULL;
2026 }
2027 /* AKID and IDP must match */
2028 if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_authority_key_identifier)) {
2029 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH);
2030 return NULL;
2031 }
2032 if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_issuing_distribution_point)) {
2033 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH);
2034 return NULL;
2035 }
2036 /* Newer CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
2037 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(newer->crl_number, base->crl_number) <= 0) {
2038 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER);
2039 return NULL;
2040 }
2041 /* CRLs must verify */
2042 if (skey && (X509_CRL_verify(base, skey) <= 0 ||
2043 X509_CRL_verify(newer, skey) <= 0)) {
2044 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE);
2045 return NULL;
2046 }
2047 /* Create new CRL */
2048 crl = X509_CRL_new();
2049 if (!crl || !X509_CRL_set_version(crl, X509_CRL_VERSION_2))
2050 goto memerr;
2051 /* Set issuer name */
2052 if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl, X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer)))
2053 goto memerr;
2054
2055 if (!X509_CRL_set1_lastUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(newer)))
2056 goto memerr;
2057 if (!X509_CRL_set1_nextUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(newer)))
2058 goto memerr;
2059
2060 /* Set base CRL number: must be critical */
2061
2062 if (!X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl, NID_delta_crl, base->crl_number, 1, 0))
2063 goto memerr;
2064
2065 /*
2066 * Copy extensions across from newest CRL to delta: this will set CRL
2067 * number to correct value too.
2068 */
2069
2070 for (i = 0; i < X509_CRL_get_ext_count(newer); i++) {
2071 X509_EXTENSION *ext;
2072 ext = X509_CRL_get_ext(newer, i);
2073 if (!X509_CRL_add_ext(crl, ext, -1))
2074 goto memerr;
2075 }
2076
2077 /* Go through revoked entries, copying as needed */
2078
2079 revs = X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(newer);
2080
2081 for (j = 0; j < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revs); j++) {
2082 X509_REVOKED *rvn, *rvtmp;
2083 rvn = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revs, j);
2084 /*
2085 * Add only if not also in base. TODO: need something cleverer here
2086 * for some more complex CRLs covering multiple CAs.
2087 */
2088 if (!X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(base, &rvtmp, rvn->serialNumber)) {
2089 rvtmp = X509_REVOKED_dup(rvn);
2090 if (!rvtmp)
2091 goto memerr;
2092 if (!X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl, rvtmp)) {
2093 X509_REVOKED_free(rvtmp);
2094 goto memerr;
2095 }
2096 }
2097 }
2098 /* TODO: optionally prune deleted entries */
2099
2100 if (skey && md && !X509_CRL_sign(crl, skey, md))
2101 goto memerr;
2102
2103 return crl;
2104
2105 memerr:
2106 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2107 if (crl)
2108 X509_CRL_free(crl);
2109 return NULL;
2110 }
2111
X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl,void * argp,CRYPTO_EX_unused * unused,CRYPTO_EX_dup * dup_unused,CRYPTO_EX_free * free_func)2112 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp,
2113 CRYPTO_EX_unused * unused,
2114 CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_unused,
2115 CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
2116 {
2117 /*
2118 * This function is (usually) called only once, by
2119 * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c).
2120 */
2121 int index;
2122 if (!CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(&g_ex_data_class, &index, argl, argp,
2123 free_func)) {
2124 return -1;
2125 }
2126 return index;
2127 }
2128
X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,int idx,void * data)2129 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
2130 {
2131 return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx, data);
2132 }
2133
X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,int idx)2134 void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
2135 {
2136 return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx);
2137 }
2138
X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)2139 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2140 {
2141 return ctx->error;
2142 }
2143
X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,int err)2144 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
2145 {
2146 ctx->error = err;
2147 }
2148
X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)2149 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2150 {
2151 return ctx->error_depth;
2152 }
2153
X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)2154 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2155 {
2156 return ctx->current_cert;
2157 }
2158
STACK_OF(X509)2159 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2160 {
2161 return ctx->chain;
2162 }
2163
STACK_OF(X509)2164 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2165 {
2166 return ctx->chain;
2167 }
2168
STACK_OF(X509)2169 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2170 {
2171 if (!ctx->chain)
2172 return NULL;
2173 return X509_chain_up_ref(ctx->chain);
2174 }
2175
X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)2176 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2177 {
2178 return ctx->current_issuer;
2179 }
2180
X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)2181 X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2182 {
2183 return ctx->current_crl;
2184 }
2185
X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)2186 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2187 {
2188 return ctx->parent;
2189 }
2190
X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509 * x)2191 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
2192 {
2193 ctx->cert = x;
2194 }
2195
X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,STACK_OF (X509)* sk)2196 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2197 {
2198 ctx->untrusted = sk;
2199 }
2200
STACK_OF(X509)2201 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2202 {
2203 return ctx->untrusted;
2204 }
2205
X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,STACK_OF (X509_CRL)* sk)2206 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk)
2207 {
2208 ctx->crls = sk;
2209 }
2210
X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,int purpose)2211 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
2212 {
2213 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
2214 }
2215
X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,int trust)2216 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)
2217 {
2218 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
2219 }
2220
2221 /*
2222 * This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust values.
2223 * This is intended to be used when another structure has its own trust and
2224 * purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by the ctx. If they aren't
2225 * set then we will usually have a default purpose in mind which should then
2226 * be used to set the trust value. An example of this is SSL use: an SSL
2227 * structure will have its own purpose and trust settings which the
2228 * application can set: if they aren't set then we use the default of SSL
2229 * client/server.
2230 */
2231
X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,int def_purpose,int purpose,int trust)2232 int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
2233 int purpose, int trust)
2234 {
2235 int idx;
2236 /* If purpose not set use default */
2237 if (!purpose)
2238 purpose = def_purpose;
2239 /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
2240 if (purpose) {
2241 X509_PURPOSE *ptmp;
2242 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
2243 if (idx == -1) {
2244 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
2245 return 0;
2246 }
2247 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2248 if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) {
2249 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
2250 if (idx == -1) {
2251 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
2252 return 0;
2253 }
2254 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2255 }
2256 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
2257 if (!trust)
2258 trust = ptmp->trust;
2259 }
2260 if (trust) {
2261 idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
2262 if (idx == -1) {
2263 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
2264 return 0;
2265 }
2266 }
2267
2268 if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose)
2269 ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
2270 if (trust && !ctx->param->trust)
2271 ctx->param->trust = trust;
2272 return 1;
2273 }
2274
X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)2275 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
2276 {
2277 X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
2278 ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
2279 if (!ctx) {
2280 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2281 return NULL;
2282 }
2283 X509_STORE_CTX_zero(ctx);
2284 return ctx;
2285 }
2286
X509_STORE_CTX_zero(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)2287 void X509_STORE_CTX_zero(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2288 {
2289 OPENSSL_memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
2290 }
2291
X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)2292 void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2293 {
2294 if (ctx == NULL) {
2295 return;
2296 }
2297 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
2298 OPENSSL_free(ctx);
2299 }
2300
X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509_STORE * store,X509 * x509,STACK_OF (X509)* chain)2301 int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
2302 STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2303 {
2304 X509_STORE_CTX_zero(ctx);
2305 ctx->ctx = store;
2306 ctx->cert = x509;
2307 ctx->untrusted = chain;
2308
2309 CRYPTO_new_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data);
2310
2311 if (store == NULL) {
2312 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
2313 goto err;
2314 }
2315
2316 ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
2317 if (!ctx->param)
2318 goto err;
2319
2320 /*
2321 * Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE.
2322 */
2323
2324 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2325 ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
2326
2327 if (!X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param) ||
2328 !X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
2329 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"))) {
2330 goto err;
2331 }
2332
2333 if (store->check_issued)
2334 ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
2335 else
2336 ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
2337
2338 if (store->get_issuer)
2339 ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
2340 else
2341 ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
2342
2343 if (store->verify_cb)
2344 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2345 else
2346 ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
2347
2348 if (store->verify)
2349 ctx->verify = store->verify;
2350 else
2351 ctx->verify = internal_verify;
2352
2353 if (store->check_revocation)
2354 ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
2355 else
2356 ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
2357
2358 if (store->get_crl)
2359 ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
2360 else
2361 ctx->get_crl = NULL;
2362
2363 if (store->check_crl)
2364 ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
2365 else
2366 ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
2367
2368 if (store->cert_crl)
2369 ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
2370 else
2371 ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
2372
2373 if (store->lookup_certs)
2374 ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs;
2375 else
2376 ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs;
2377
2378 if (store->lookup_crls)
2379 ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls;
2380 else
2381 ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls;
2382
2383 ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
2384
2385 return 1;
2386
2387 err:
2388 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, ctx, &ctx->ex_data);
2389 if (ctx->param != NULL) {
2390 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2391 }
2392
2393 OPENSSL_memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
2394 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2395 return 0;
2396 }
2397
2398 /*
2399 * Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. This
2400 * avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
2401 */
2402
X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,STACK_OF (X509)* sk)2403 void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2404 {
2405 ctx->other_ctx = sk;
2406 ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
2407 }
2408
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)2409 void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2410 {
2411 /* We need to be idempotent because, unfortunately, |X509_STORE_CTX_free|
2412 * also calls this function. */
2413 if (ctx->cleanup != NULL) {
2414 ctx->cleanup(ctx);
2415 ctx->cleanup = NULL;
2416 }
2417 if (ctx->param != NULL) {
2418 if (ctx->parent == NULL)
2419 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2420 ctx->param = NULL;
2421 }
2422 if (ctx->tree != NULL) {
2423 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
2424 ctx->tree = NULL;
2425 }
2426 if (ctx->chain != NULL) {
2427 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free);
2428 ctx->chain = NULL;
2429 }
2430 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
2431 OPENSSL_memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA));
2432 }
2433
X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,int depth)2434 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
2435 {
2436 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
2437 }
2438
X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,unsigned long flags)2439 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
2440 {
2441 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
2442 }
2443
X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,unsigned long flags,time_t t)2444 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags,
2445 time_t t)
2446 {
2447 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t);
2448 }
2449
X509_STORE_CTX_get0_cert(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)2450 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2451 {
2452 return ctx->cert;
2453 }
2454
X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,int (* verify_cb)(int,X509_STORE_CTX *))2455 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
2456 int (*verify_cb) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
2457 {
2458 ctx->verify_cb = verify_cb;
2459 }
2460
X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)2461 X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2462 {
2463 return ctx->tree;
2464 }
2465
X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)2466 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2467 {
2468 return ctx->explicit_policy;
2469 }
2470
X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,const char * name)2471 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
2472 {
2473 const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
2474 param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
2475 if (!param)
2476 return 0;
2477 return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
2478 }
2479
X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)2480 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2481 {
2482 return ctx->param;
2483 }
2484
X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509_VERIFY_PARAM * param)2485 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
2486 {
2487 if (ctx->param)
2488 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2489 ctx->param = param;
2490 }
2491