1 /* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58
59 #include <stdio.h>
60 #include <time.h>
61 #include <errno.h>
62
63 #include "cryptlib.h"
64 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
65 #include <openssl/lhash.h>
66 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
67 #include <openssl/evp.h>
68 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
69 #include <openssl/x509.h>
70 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
71 #include <openssl/objects.h>
72
73 static int null_callback(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *e);
74 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
75 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
76 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
77 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
78 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
79 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
80 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
81 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
82 const char X509_version[]="X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
83
84
null_callback(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX * e)85 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
86 {
87 return ok;
88 }
89
90 #if 0
91 static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b)
92 {
93 return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a,*b);
94 }
95 #endif
96
X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)97 int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
98 {
99 X509 *x,*xtmp,*chain_ss=NULL;
100 X509_NAME *xn;
101 int bad_chain = 0;
102 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;
103 int depth,i,ok=0;
104 int num;
105 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
106 STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp=NULL;
107 if (ctx->cert == NULL)
108 {
109 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
110 return -1;
111 }
112
113 cb=ctx->verify_cb;
114
115 /* first we make sure the chain we are going to build is
116 * present and that the first entry is in place */
117 if (ctx->chain == NULL)
118 {
119 if ( ((ctx->chain=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
120 (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,ctx->cert)))
121 {
122 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
123 goto end;
124 }
125 CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
126 ctx->last_untrusted=1;
127 }
128
129 /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */
130 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL
131 && (sktmp=sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL)
132 {
133 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
134 goto end;
135 }
136
137 num=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
138 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
139 depth=param->depth;
140
141
142 for (;;)
143 {
144 /* If we have enough, we break */
145 if (depth < num) break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take
146 * note of it and, if appropriate, use the
147 * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error
148 * code later.
149 */
150
151 /* If we are self signed, we break */
152 xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);
153 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x,x)) break;
154
155 /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
156 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL)
157 {
158 xtmp=find_issuer(ctx, sktmp,x);
159 if (xtmp != NULL)
160 {
161 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,xtmp))
162 {
163 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
164 goto end;
165 }
166 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
167 (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp,xtmp);
168 ctx->last_untrusted++;
169 x=xtmp;
170 num++;
171 /* reparse the full chain for
172 * the next one */
173 continue;
174 }
175 }
176 break;
177 }
178
179 /* at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted
180 * certificates. We now need to add at least one trusted one,
181 * if possible, otherwise we complain. */
182
183 /* Examine last certificate in chain and see if it
184 * is self signed.
185 */
186
187 i=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
188 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,i-1);
189 xn = X509_get_subject_name(x);
190 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x))
191 {
192 /* we have a self signed certificate */
193 if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
194 {
195 /* We have a single self signed certificate: see if
196 * we can find it in the store. We must have an exact
197 * match to avoid possible impersonation.
198 */
199 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
200 if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp))
201 {
202 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
203 ctx->current_cert=x;
204 ctx->error_depth=i-1;
205 if (ok == 1) X509_free(xtmp);
206 bad_chain = 1;
207 ok=cb(0,ctx);
208 if (!ok) goto end;
209 }
210 else
211 {
212 /* We have a match: replace certificate with store version
213 * so we get any trust settings.
214 */
215 X509_free(x);
216 x = xtmp;
217 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
218 ctx->last_untrusted=0;
219 }
220 }
221 else
222 {
223 /* extract and save self signed certificate for later use */
224 chain_ss=sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
225 ctx->last_untrusted--;
226 num--;
227 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
228 }
229 }
230
231 /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
232 for (;;)
233 {
234 /* If we have enough, we break */
235 if (depth < num) break;
236
237 /* If we are self signed, we break */
238 xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);
239 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x)) break;
240
241 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
242
243 if (ok < 0) return ok;
244 if (ok == 0) break;
245
246 x = xtmp;
247 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,x))
248 {
249 X509_free(xtmp);
250 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
251 return 0;
252 }
253 num++;
254 }
255
256 /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
257 xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);
258
259 /* Is last certificate looked up self signed? */
260 if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x))
261 {
262 if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss))
263 {
264 if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num)
265 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
266 else
267 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;
268 ctx->current_cert=x;
269 }
270 else
271 {
272
273 sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,chain_ss);
274 num++;
275 ctx->last_untrusted=num;
276 ctx->current_cert=chain_ss;
277 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN;
278 chain_ss=NULL;
279 }
280
281 ctx->error_depth=num-1;
282 bad_chain = 1;
283 ok=cb(0,ctx);
284 if (!ok) goto end;
285 }
286
287 /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
288 ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx);
289
290 if (!ok) goto end;
291
292 /* The chain extensions are OK: check trust */
293
294 if (param->trust > 0) ok = check_trust(ctx);
295
296 if (!ok) goto end;
297
298 /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */
299 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
300
301 /* Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters
302 * because they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
303 */
304
305 ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx);
306 if(!ok) goto end;
307
308 /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */
309 if (ctx->verify != NULL)
310 ok=ctx->verify(ctx);
311 else
312 ok=internal_verify(ctx);
313 if(!ok) goto end;
314
315 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
316 /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */
317 ok = v3_asid_validate_path(ctx);
318 if (!ok) goto end;
319 ok = v3_addr_validate_path(ctx);
320 if (!ok) goto end;
321 #endif
322
323 /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
324 if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK))
325 ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
326 if(!ok) goto end;
327 if (0)
328 {
329 end:
330 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
331 }
332 if (sktmp != NULL) sk_X509_free(sktmp);
333 if (chain_ss != NULL) X509_free(chain_ss);
334 return ok;
335 }
336
337
338 /* Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
339 */
340
find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,STACK_OF (X509)* sk,X509 * x)341 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
342 {
343 int i;
344 X509 *issuer;
345 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
346 {
347 issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
348 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer))
349 return issuer;
350 }
351 return NULL;
352 }
353
354 /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
355
check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509 * x,X509 * issuer)356 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
357 {
358 int ret;
359 ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
360 if (ret == X509_V_OK)
361 return 1;
362 /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
363 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK))
364 return 0;
365
366 ctx->error = ret;
367 ctx->current_cert = x;
368 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
369 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
370 return 0;
371 }
372
373 /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
374
get_issuer_sk(X509 ** issuer,X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509 * x)375 static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
376 {
377 *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
378 if (*issuer)
379 {
380 CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
381 return 1;
382 }
383 else
384 return 0;
385 }
386
387
388 /* Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency
389 * with the supplied purpose
390 */
391
check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)392 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
393 {
394 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
395 return 1;
396 #else
397 int i, ok=0, must_be_ca;
398 X509 *x;
399 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
400 int proxy_path_length = 0;
401 int allow_proxy_certs =
402 !!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
403 cb=ctx->verify_cb;
404
405 /* must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
406 -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
407 use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
408 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not
409 used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
410 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for
411 all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
412 */
413 must_be_ca = -1;
414
415 /* A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their software
416 happy */
417 if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS"))
418 allow_proxy_certs = 1;
419
420 /* Check all untrusted certificates */
421 for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++)
422 {
423 int ret;
424 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
425 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
426 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
427 {
428 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;
429 ctx->error_depth = i;
430 ctx->current_cert = x;
431 ok=cb(0,ctx);
432 if (!ok) goto end;
433 }
434 if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY))
435 {
436 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED;
437 ctx->error_depth = i;
438 ctx->current_cert = x;
439 ok=cb(0,ctx);
440 if (!ok) goto end;
441 }
442 ret = X509_check_ca(x);
443 switch(must_be_ca)
444 {
445 case -1:
446 if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
447 && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0))
448 {
449 ret = 0;
450 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
451 }
452 else
453 ret = 1;
454 break;
455 case 0:
456 if (ret != 0)
457 {
458 ret = 0;
459 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
460 }
461 else
462 ret = 1;
463 break;
464 default:
465 if ((ret == 0)
466 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
467 && (ret != 1)))
468 {
469 ret = 0;
470 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
471 }
472 else
473 ret = 1;
474 break;
475 }
476 if (ret == 0)
477 {
478 ctx->error_depth = i;
479 ctx->current_cert = x;
480 ok=cb(0,ctx);
481 if (!ok) goto end;
482 }
483 if (ctx->param->purpose > 0)
484 {
485 ret = X509_check_purpose(x, ctx->param->purpose,
486 must_be_ca > 0);
487 if ((ret == 0)
488 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
489 && (ret != 1)))
490 {
491 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
492 ctx->error_depth = i;
493 ctx->current_cert = x;
494 ok=cb(0,ctx);
495 if (!ok) goto end;
496 }
497 }
498 /* Check pathlen */
499 if ((i > 1) && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
500 && (i > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1)))
501 {
502 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
503 ctx->error_depth = i;
504 ctx->current_cert = x;
505 ok=cb(0,ctx);
506 if (!ok) goto end;
507 }
508 /* If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next
509 certificate must be another proxy certificate or a EE
510 certificate. If not, the next certificate must be a
511 CA certificate. */
512 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)
513 {
514 if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen)
515 {
516 ctx->error =
517 X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
518 ctx->error_depth = i;
519 ctx->current_cert = x;
520 ok=cb(0,ctx);
521 if (!ok) goto end;
522 }
523 proxy_path_length++;
524 must_be_ca = 0;
525 }
526 else
527 must_be_ca = 1;
528 }
529 ok = 1;
530 end:
531 return ok;
532 #endif
533 }
534
check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)535 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
536 {
537 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
538 return 1;
539 #else
540 int i, ok;
541 X509 *x;
542 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
543 cb=ctx->verify_cb;
544 /* For now just check the last certificate in the chain */
545 i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
546 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
547 ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
548 if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
549 return 1;
550 ctx->error_depth = i;
551 ctx->current_cert = x;
552 if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
553 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
554 else
555 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED;
556 ok = cb(0, ctx);
557 return ok;
558 #endif
559 }
560
check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)561 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
562 {
563 int i, last, ok;
564 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
565 return 1;
566 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
567 last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
568 else
569 last = 0;
570 for(i = 0; i <= last; i++)
571 {
572 ctx->error_depth = i;
573 ok = check_cert(ctx);
574 if (!ok) return ok;
575 }
576 return 1;
577 }
578
check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)579 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
580 {
581 X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
582 X509 *x;
583 int ok, cnum;
584 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
585 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
586 ctx->current_cert = x;
587 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
588 ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
589 /* If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except
590 * notify callback
591 */
592 if(!ok)
593 {
594 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
595 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
596 goto err;
597 }
598 ctx->current_crl = crl;
599 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
600 if (!ok) goto err;
601 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
602 err:
603 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
604 X509_CRL_free(crl);
605 return ok;
606
607 }
608
609 /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
610
check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509_CRL * crl,int notify)611 static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
612 {
613 time_t *ptime;
614 int i;
615 ctx->current_crl = crl;
616 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
617 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
618 else
619 ptime = NULL;
620
621 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
622 if (i == 0)
623 {
624 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD;
625 if (!notify || !ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
626 return 0;
627 }
628
629 if (i > 0)
630 {
631 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID;
632 if (!notify || !ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
633 return 0;
634 }
635
636 if(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl))
637 {
638 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
639
640 if (i == 0)
641 {
642 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD;
643 if (!notify || !ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
644 return 0;
645 }
646
647 if (i < 0)
648 {
649 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED;
650 if (!notify || !ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
651 return 0;
652 }
653 }
654
655 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
656
657 return 1;
658 }
659
660 /* Lookup CRLs from the supplied list. Look for matching isser name
661 * and validity. If we can't find a valid CRL return the last one
662 * with matching name. This gives more meaningful error codes. Otherwise
663 * we'd get a CRL not found error if a CRL existed with matching name but
664 * was invalid.
665 */
666
get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509_CRL ** pcrl,X509_NAME * nm,STACK_OF (X509_CRL)* crls)667 static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl,
668 X509_NAME *nm, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
669 {
670 int i;
671 X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
672 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++)
673 {
674 crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
675 if (X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl)))
676 continue;
677 if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
678 {
679 *pcrl = crl;
680 CRYPTO_add(&crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
681 return 1;
682 }
683 best_crl = crl;
684 }
685 if (best_crl)
686 {
687 *pcrl = best_crl;
688 CRYPTO_add(&best_crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
689 }
690
691 return 0;
692 }
693
694 /* Retrieve CRL corresponding to certificate: currently just a
695 * subject lookup: maybe use AKID later...
696 */
get_crl(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509_CRL ** pcrl,X509 * x)697 static int get_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509 *x)
698 {
699 int ok;
700 X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
701 X509_OBJECT xobj;
702 X509_NAME *nm;
703 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
704 ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, nm, ctx->crls);
705 if (ok)
706 {
707 *pcrl = crl;
708 return 1;
709 }
710
711 ok = X509_STORE_get_by_subject(ctx, X509_LU_CRL, nm, &xobj);
712
713 if (!ok)
714 {
715 /* If we got a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
716 if (crl)
717 {
718 *pcrl = crl;
719 return 1;
720 }
721 return 0;
722 }
723
724 *pcrl = xobj.data.crl;
725 if (crl)
726 X509_CRL_free(crl);
727 return 1;
728 }
729
730 /* Check CRL validity */
check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509_CRL * crl)731 static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
732 {
733 X509 *issuer = NULL;
734 EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
735 int ok = 0, chnum, cnum;
736 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
737 chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
738 /* Find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer
739 * is next certificate in chain.
740 */
741 if(cnum < chnum)
742 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
743 else
744 {
745 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
746 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
747 if(!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer))
748 {
749 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER;
750 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
751 if(!ok) goto err;
752 }
753 }
754
755 if(issuer)
756 {
757 /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
758 if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
759 !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN))
760 {
761 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN;
762 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
763 if(!ok) goto err;
764 }
765
766 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
767 ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer);
768
769 if(!ikey)
770 {
771 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
772 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
773 if (!ok) goto err;
774 }
775 else
776 {
777 /* Verify CRL signature */
778 if(X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0)
779 {
780 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
781 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
782 if (!ok) goto err;
783 }
784 }
785 }
786
787 ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1);
788 if (!ok)
789 goto err;
790
791 ok = 1;
792
793 err:
794 EVP_PKEY_free(ikey);
795 return ok;
796 }
797
798 /* Check certificate against CRL */
cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509_CRL * crl,X509 * x)799 static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
800 {
801 int idx, ok;
802 X509_REVOKED rtmp;
803 STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts;
804 X509_EXTENSION *ext;
805 /* Look for serial number of certificate in CRL */
806 rtmp.serialNumber = X509_get_serialNumber(x);
807 /* Sort revoked into serial number order if not already sorted.
808 * Do this under a lock to avoid race condition.
809 */
810 if (!sk_X509_REVOKED_is_sorted(crl->crl->revoked))
811 {
812 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
813 sk_X509_REVOKED_sort(crl->crl->revoked);
814 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
815 }
816 idx = sk_X509_REVOKED_find(crl->crl->revoked, &rtmp);
817 /* If found assume revoked: want something cleverer than
818 * this to handle entry extensions in V2 CRLs.
819 */
820 if(idx >= 0)
821 {
822 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
823 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
824 if (!ok) return 0;
825 }
826
827 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
828 return 1;
829
830 /* See if we have any critical CRL extensions: since we
831 * currently don't handle any CRL extensions the CRL must be
832 * rejected.
833 * This code accesses the X509_CRL structure directly: applications
834 * shouldn't do this.
835 */
836
837 exts = crl->crl->extensions;
838
839 for (idx = 0; idx < sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts); idx++)
840 {
841 ext = sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(exts, idx);
842 if (ext->critical > 0)
843 {
844 ctx->error =
845 X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
846 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
847 if(!ok) return 0;
848 break;
849 }
850 }
851 return 1;
852 }
853
check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)854 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
855 {
856 int ret;
857 ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain,
858 ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
859 if (ret == 0)
860 {
861 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
862 return 0;
863 }
864 /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
865 if (ret == -1)
866 {
867 /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify
868 * callback.
869 */
870 X509 *x;
871 int i;
872 for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++)
873 {
874 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
875 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
876 continue;
877 ctx->current_cert = x;
878 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION;
879 ret = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
880 }
881 return 1;
882 }
883 if (ret == -2)
884 {
885 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
886 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
887 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
888 }
889
890 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY)
891 {
892 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
893 ctx->error = X509_V_OK;
894 if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx))
895 return 0;
896 }
897
898 return 1;
899 }
900
check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509 * x)901 static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
902 {
903 time_t *ptime;
904 int i;
905
906 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
907 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
908 else
909 ptime = NULL;
910
911 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime);
912 if (i == 0)
913 {
914 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
915 ctx->current_cert=x;
916 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
917 return 0;
918 }
919
920 if (i > 0)
921 {
922 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;
923 ctx->current_cert=x;
924 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
925 return 0;
926 }
927
928 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime);
929 if (i == 0)
930 {
931 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
932 ctx->current_cert=x;
933 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
934 return 0;
935 }
936
937 if (i < 0)
938 {
939 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED;
940 ctx->current_cert=x;
941 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
942 return 0;
943 }
944
945 return 1;
946 }
947
internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)948 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
949 {
950 int ok=0,n;
951 X509 *xs,*xi;
952 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
953 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
954
955 cb=ctx->verify_cb;
956
957 n=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
958 ctx->error_depth=n-1;
959 n--;
960 xi=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
961
962 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
963 xs=xi;
964 else
965 {
966 if (n <= 0)
967 {
968 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
969 ctx->current_cert=xi;
970 ok=cb(0,ctx);
971 goto end;
972 }
973 else
974 {
975 n--;
976 ctx->error_depth=n;
977 xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
978 }
979 }
980
981 /* ctx->error=0; not needed */
982 while (n >= 0)
983 {
984 ctx->error_depth=n;
985 if (!xs->valid)
986 {
987 if ((pkey=X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL)
988 {
989 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
990 ctx->current_cert=xi;
991 ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
992 if (!ok) goto end;
993 }
994 else if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0)
995 /* XXX For the final trusted self-signed cert,
996 * this is a waste of time. That check should
997 * optional so that e.g. 'openssl x509' can be
998 * used to detect invalid self-signatures, but
999 * we don't verify again and again in SSL
1000 * handshakes and the like once the cert has
1001 * been declared trusted. */
1002 {
1003 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1004 ctx->current_cert=xs;
1005 ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
1006 if (!ok)
1007 {
1008 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1009 goto end;
1010 }
1011 }
1012 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1013 pkey=NULL;
1014 }
1015
1016 xs->valid = 1;
1017
1018 ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs);
1019 if (!ok)
1020 goto end;
1021
1022 /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
1023 ctx->current_issuer=xi;
1024 ctx->current_cert=xs;
1025 ok=(*cb)(1,ctx);
1026 if (!ok) goto end;
1027
1028 n--;
1029 if (n >= 0)
1030 {
1031 xi=xs;
1032 xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1033 }
1034 }
1035 ok=1;
1036 end:
1037 return ok;
1038 }
1039
X509_cmp_current_time(ASN1_TIME * ctm)1040 int X509_cmp_current_time(ASN1_TIME *ctm)
1041 {
1042 return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
1043 }
1044
X509_cmp_time(ASN1_TIME * ctm,time_t * cmp_time)1045 int X509_cmp_time(ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
1046 {
1047 char *str;
1048 ASN1_TIME atm;
1049 long offset;
1050 char buff1[24],buff2[24],*p;
1051 int i,j;
1052
1053 p=buff1;
1054 i=ctm->length;
1055 str=(char *)ctm->data;
1056 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1057 {
1058 if ((i < 11) || (i > 17)) return 0;
1059 memcpy(p,str,10);
1060 p+=10;
1061 str+=10;
1062 }
1063 else
1064 {
1065 if (i < 13) return 0;
1066 memcpy(p,str,12);
1067 p+=12;
1068 str+=12;
1069 }
1070
1071 if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+'))
1072 { *(p++)='0'; *(p++)='0'; }
1073 else
1074 {
1075 *(p++)= *(str++);
1076 *(p++)= *(str++);
1077 /* Skip any fractional seconds... */
1078 if (*str == '.')
1079 {
1080 str++;
1081 while ((*str >= '0') && (*str <= '9')) str++;
1082 }
1083
1084 }
1085 *(p++)='Z';
1086 *(p++)='\0';
1087
1088 if (*str == 'Z')
1089 offset=0;
1090 else
1091 {
1092 if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-'))
1093 return 0;
1094 offset=((str[1]-'0')*10+(str[2]-'0'))*60;
1095 offset+=(str[3]-'0')*10+(str[4]-'0');
1096 if (*str == '-')
1097 offset= -offset;
1098 }
1099 atm.type=ctm->type;
1100 atm.length=sizeof(buff2);
1101 atm.data=(unsigned char *)buff2;
1102
1103 if (X509_time_adj(&atm,-offset*60, cmp_time) == NULL)
1104 return 0;
1105
1106 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1107 {
1108 i=(buff1[0]-'0')*10+(buff1[1]-'0');
1109 if (i < 50) i+=100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */
1110 j=(buff2[0]-'0')*10+(buff2[1]-'0');
1111 if (j < 50) j+=100;
1112
1113 if (i < j) return -1;
1114 if (i > j) return 1;
1115 }
1116 i=strcmp(buff1,buff2);
1117 if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
1118 return -1;
1119 else
1120 return i;
1121 }
1122
X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME * s,long adj)1123 ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
1124 {
1125 return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL);
1126 }
1127
X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME * s,long adj,time_t * in_tm)1128 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj, time_t *in_tm)
1129 {
1130 time_t t;
1131 int type = -1;
1132
1133 if (in_tm) t = *in_tm;
1134 else time(&t);
1135
1136 t+=adj;
1137 if (s) type = s->type;
1138 if (type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) return ASN1_UTCTIME_set(s,t);
1139 if (type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME) return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_set(s, t);
1140 return ASN1_TIME_set(s, t);
1141 }
1142
X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY * pkey,STACK_OF (X509)* chain)1143 int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
1144 {
1145 EVP_PKEY *ktmp=NULL,*ktmp2;
1146 int i,j;
1147
1148 if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) return 1;
1149
1150 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
1151 {
1152 ktmp=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,i));
1153 if (ktmp == NULL)
1154 {
1155 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
1156 return 0;
1157 }
1158 if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp))
1159 break;
1160 else
1161 {
1162 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
1163 ktmp=NULL;
1164 }
1165 }
1166 if (ktmp == NULL)
1167 {
1168 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN);
1169 return 0;
1170 }
1171
1172 /* first, populate the other certs */
1173 for (j=i-1; j >= 0; j--)
1174 {
1175 ktmp2=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,j));
1176 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2,ktmp);
1177 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2);
1178 }
1179
1180 if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey,ktmp);
1181 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
1182 return 1;
1183 }
1184
X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl,void * argp,CRYPTO_EX_new * new_func,CRYPTO_EX_dup * dup_func,CRYPTO_EX_free * free_func)1185 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
1186 CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
1187 {
1188 /* This function is (usually) called only once, by
1189 * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c). */
1190 return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, argp,
1191 new_func, dup_func, free_func);
1192 }
1193
X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,int idx,void * data)1194 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
1195 {
1196 return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx,data);
1197 }
1198
X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,int idx)1199 void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
1200 {
1201 return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx);
1202 }
1203
X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)1204 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1205 {
1206 return ctx->error;
1207 }
1208
X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,int err)1209 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
1210 {
1211 ctx->error=err;
1212 }
1213
X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)1214 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1215 {
1216 return ctx->error_depth;
1217 }
1218
X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)1219 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1220 {
1221 return ctx->current_cert;
1222 }
1223
STACK_OF(X509)1224 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1225 {
1226 return ctx->chain;
1227 }
1228
STACK_OF(X509)1229 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1230 {
1231 int i;
1232 X509 *x;
1233 STACK_OF(X509) *chain;
1234 if (!ctx->chain || !(chain = sk_X509_dup(ctx->chain))) return NULL;
1235 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
1236 {
1237 x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
1238 CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
1239 }
1240 return chain;
1241 }
1242
X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509 * x)1243 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1244 {
1245 ctx->cert=x;
1246 }
1247
X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,STACK_OF (X509)* sk)1248 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
1249 {
1250 ctx->untrusted=sk;
1251 }
1252
X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,STACK_OF (X509_CRL)* sk)1253 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk)
1254 {
1255 ctx->crls=sk;
1256 }
1257
X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,int purpose)1258 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
1259 {
1260 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
1261 }
1262
X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,int trust)1263 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)
1264 {
1265 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
1266 }
1267
1268 /* This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust
1269 * values. This is intended to be used when another structure has its
1270 * own trust and purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by
1271 * the ctx. If they aren't set then we will usually have a default
1272 * purpose in mind which should then be used to set the trust value.
1273 * An example of this is SSL use: an SSL structure will have its own
1274 * purpose and trust settings which the application can set: if they
1275 * aren't set then we use the default of SSL client/server.
1276 */
1277
X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,int def_purpose,int purpose,int trust)1278 int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
1279 int purpose, int trust)
1280 {
1281 int idx;
1282 /* If purpose not set use default */
1283 if (!purpose) purpose = def_purpose;
1284 /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
1285 if (purpose)
1286 {
1287 X509_PURPOSE *ptmp;
1288 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
1289 if (idx == -1)
1290 {
1291 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
1292 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
1293 return 0;
1294 }
1295 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
1296 if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT)
1297 {
1298 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
1299 if (idx == -1)
1300 {
1301 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
1302 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
1303 return 0;
1304 }
1305 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
1306 }
1307 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
1308 if (!trust) trust = ptmp->trust;
1309 }
1310 if (trust)
1311 {
1312 idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
1313 if (idx == -1)
1314 {
1315 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
1316 X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
1317 return 0;
1318 }
1319 }
1320
1321 if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose) ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
1322 if (trust && !ctx->param->trust) ctx->param->trust = trust;
1323 return 1;
1324 }
1325
X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)1326 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
1327 {
1328 X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
1329 ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
1330 if (!ctx)
1331 {
1332 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1333 return NULL;
1334 }
1335 memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
1336 return ctx;
1337 }
1338
X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)1339 void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1340 {
1341 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
1342 OPENSSL_free(ctx);
1343 }
1344
X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509_STORE * store,X509 * x509,STACK_OF (X509)* chain)1345 int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
1346 STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
1347 {
1348 int ret = 1;
1349 ctx->ctx=store;
1350 ctx->current_method=0;
1351 ctx->cert=x509;
1352 ctx->untrusted=chain;
1353 ctx->crls = NULL;
1354 ctx->last_untrusted=0;
1355 ctx->other_ctx=NULL;
1356 ctx->valid=0;
1357 ctx->chain=NULL;
1358 ctx->error=0;
1359 ctx->explicit_policy=0;
1360 ctx->error_depth=0;
1361 ctx->current_cert=NULL;
1362 ctx->current_issuer=NULL;
1363 ctx->tree = NULL;
1364
1365 ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
1366
1367 if (!ctx->param)
1368 {
1369 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1370 return 0;
1371 }
1372
1373 /* Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set
1374 * use defaults.
1375 */
1376
1377
1378 if (store)
1379 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param);
1380 else
1381 ctx->param->flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT|X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE;
1382
1383 if (store)
1384 {
1385 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
1386 ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
1387 }
1388 else
1389 ctx->cleanup = 0;
1390
1391 if (ret)
1392 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
1393 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
1394
1395 if (ret == 0)
1396 {
1397 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1398 return 0;
1399 }
1400
1401 if (store && store->check_issued)
1402 ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
1403 else
1404 ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
1405
1406 if (store && store->get_issuer)
1407 ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
1408 else
1409 ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
1410
1411 if (store && store->verify_cb)
1412 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
1413 else
1414 ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
1415
1416 if (store && store->verify)
1417 ctx->verify = store->verify;
1418 else
1419 ctx->verify = internal_verify;
1420
1421 if (store && store->check_revocation)
1422 ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
1423 else
1424 ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
1425
1426 if (store && store->get_crl)
1427 ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
1428 else
1429 ctx->get_crl = get_crl;
1430
1431 if (store && store->check_crl)
1432 ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
1433 else
1434 ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
1435
1436 if (store && store->cert_crl)
1437 ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
1438 else
1439 ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
1440
1441 ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
1442
1443
1444 /* This memset() can't make any sense anyway, so it's removed. As
1445 * X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we put a
1446 * corresponding "new" here and remove this bogus initialisation. */
1447 /* memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); */
1448 if(!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx,
1449 &(ctx->ex_data)))
1450 {
1451 OPENSSL_free(ctx);
1452 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1453 return 0;
1454 }
1455 return 1;
1456 }
1457
1458 /* Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates.
1459 * This avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
1460 */
1461
X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,STACK_OF (X509)* sk)1462 void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
1463 {
1464 ctx->other_ctx = sk;
1465 ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
1466 }
1467
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)1468 void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1469 {
1470 if (ctx->cleanup) ctx->cleanup(ctx);
1471 if (ctx->param != NULL)
1472 {
1473 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
1474 ctx->param=NULL;
1475 }
1476 if (ctx->tree != NULL)
1477 {
1478 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
1479 ctx->tree=NULL;
1480 }
1481 if (ctx->chain != NULL)
1482 {
1483 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain,X509_free);
1484 ctx->chain=NULL;
1485 }
1486 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
1487 memset(&ctx->ex_data,0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA));
1488 }
1489
X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,int depth)1490 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
1491 {
1492 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
1493 }
1494
X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,unsigned long flags)1495 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
1496 {
1497 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
1498 }
1499
X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,unsigned long flags,time_t t)1500 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags, time_t t)
1501 {
1502 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t);
1503 }
1504
X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,int (* verify_cb)(int,X509_STORE_CTX *))1505 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1506 int (*verify_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
1507 {
1508 ctx->verify_cb=verify_cb;
1509 }
1510
X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)1511 X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1512 {
1513 return ctx->tree;
1514 }
1515
X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)1516 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1517 {
1518 return ctx->explicit_policy;
1519 }
1520
X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,const char * name)1521 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
1522 {
1523 const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
1524 param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
1525 if (!param)
1526 return 0;
1527 return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
1528 }
1529
X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)1530 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1531 {
1532 return ctx->param;
1533 }
1534
X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509_VERIFY_PARAM * param)1535 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
1536 {
1537 if (ctx->param)
1538 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
1539 ctx->param = param;
1540 }
1541
1542 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509)
1543 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509)
1544
1545 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME)
1546
1547 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
1548 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
1549