1 /* ssl/s3_pkt.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
111
112 #include <stdio.h>
113 #include <errno.h>
114 #define USE_SOCKETS
115 #include "ssl_locl.h"
116 #include <openssl/evp.h>
117 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
118
119 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
120 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment);
121 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s);
122
ssl3_read_n(SSL * s,int n,int max,int extend)123 int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend)
124 {
125 /* If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
126 * packet by another n bytes.
127 * The packet will be in the sub-array of s->s3->rbuf.buf specified
128 * by s->packet and s->packet_length.
129 * (If s->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf
130 * [plus s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
131 */
132 int i,len,left;
133 long align=0;
134 unsigned char *pkt;
135 SSL3_BUFFER *rb;
136
137 if (n <= 0) return n;
138
139 rb = &(s->s3->rbuf);
140 if (rb->buf == NULL)
141 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
142 return -1;
143
144 left = rb->left;
145 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
146 align = (long)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
147 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
148 #endif
149
150 if (!extend)
151 {
152 /* start with empty packet ... */
153 if (left == 0)
154 rb->offset = align;
155 else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
156 {
157 /* check if next packet length is large
158 * enough to justify payload alignment... */
159 pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset;
160 if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
161 && (pkt[3]<<8|pkt[4]) >= 128)
162 {
163 /* Note that even if packet is corrupted
164 * and its length field is insane, we can
165 * only be led to wrong decision about
166 * whether memmove will occur or not.
167 * Header values has no effect on memmove
168 * arguments and therefore no buffer
169 * overrun can be triggered. */
170 memmove (rb->buf+align,pkt,left);
171 rb->offset = align;
172 }
173 }
174 s->packet = rb->buf + rb->offset;
175 s->packet_length = 0;
176 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
177 }
178
179 /* For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets
180 * because the read operation returns the whole packet
181 * at once (as long as it fits into the buffer). */
182 if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
183 {
184 if (left > 0 && n > left)
185 n = left;
186 }
187
188 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
189 if (left >= n)
190 {
191 s->packet_length+=n;
192 rb->left=left-n;
193 rb->offset+=n;
194 return(n);
195 }
196
197 /* else we need to read more data */
198
199 len = s->packet_length;
200 pkt = rb->buf+align;
201 /* Move any available bytes to front of buffer:
202 * 'len' bytes already pointed to by 'packet',
203 * 'left' extra ones at the end */
204 if (s->packet != pkt) /* len > 0 */
205 {
206 memmove(pkt, s->packet, len+left);
207 s->packet = pkt;
208 rb->offset = len + align;
209 }
210
211 if (n > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) /* does not happen */
212 {
213 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
214 return -1;
215 }
216
217 if (!s->read_ahead)
218 /* ignore max parameter */
219 max = n;
220 else
221 {
222 if (max < n)
223 max = n;
224 if (max > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset))
225 max = rb->len - rb->offset;
226 }
227
228 while (left < n)
229 {
230 /* Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf
231 * and need to read in more until we have len+n (up to
232 * len+max if possible) */
233
234 clear_sys_error();
235 if (s->rbio != NULL)
236 {
237 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
238 i=BIO_read(s->rbio,pkt+len+left, max-left);
239 }
240 else
241 {
242 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
243 i = -1;
244 }
245
246 if (i <= 0)
247 {
248 rb->left = left;
249 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS)
250 if (len+left == 0)
251 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
252 return(i);
253 }
254 left+=i;
255 /* reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because
256 * the underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed
257 * to byte oriented as in the TLS case. */
258 if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
259 {
260 if (n > left)
261 n = left; /* makes the while condition false */
262 }
263 }
264
265 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
266 rb->offset += n;
267 rb->left = left - n;
268 s->packet_length += n;
269 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
270 return(n);
271 }
272
273 /* Call this to get a new input record.
274 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
275 * or non-blocking IO.
276 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
277 * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
278 * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
279 * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
280 */
281 /* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */
ssl3_get_record(SSL * s)282 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
283 {
284 int ssl_major,ssl_minor,al;
285 int enc_err,n,i,ret= -1;
286 SSL3_RECORD *rr;
287 SSL_SESSION *sess;
288 unsigned char *p;
289 unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
290 short version;
291 int mac_size;
292 int clear=0;
293 size_t extra;
294 int decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 0;
295 unsigned char *mac = NULL;
296 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
297 long align=SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD;
298 #else
299 long align=0;
300 #endif
301
302 rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
303 sess=s->session;
304
305 if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER)
306 extra=SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA;
307 else
308 extra=0;
309 if (!(SSL_get_mode(s) & SSL_MODE_SMALL_BUFFERS) &&
310 extra && !s->s3->init_extra)
311 {
312 /* An application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER
313 * set after ssl3_setup_buffers() was done */
314 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
315 return -1;
316 }
317
318 again:
319 /* check if we have the header */
320 if ( (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
321 (s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH))
322 {
323 n=ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
324 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */
325 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
326
327 p=s->packet;
328
329 /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */
330 rr->type= *(p++);
331 ssl_major= *(p++);
332 ssl_minor= *(p++);
333 version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor;
334 n2s(p,rr->length);
335 #if 0
336 fprintf(stderr, "Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
337 #endif
338
339 /* Lets check version */
340 if (!s->first_packet)
341 {
342 if (version != s->version)
343 {
344 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
345 if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00))
346 /* Send back error using their minor version number :-) */
347 s->version = (unsigned short)version;
348 al=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
349 goto f_err;
350 }
351 }
352
353 if ((version>>8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
354 {
355 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
356 goto err;
357 }
358
359 /* If we receive a valid record larger than the current buffer size,
360 * allocate some memory for it.
361 */
362 if (rr->length > s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH - align)
363 {
364 if ((p=OPENSSL_realloc(s->s3->rbuf.buf, rr->length + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + align))==NULL)
365 {
366 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
367 goto err;
368 }
369 s->s3->rbuf.buf=p;
370 s->s3->rbuf.len=rr->length + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + align;
371 s->packet= &(s->s3->rbuf.buf[0]);
372 }
373
374 if (rr->length > s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
375 {
376 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
377 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
378 goto f_err;
379 }
380
381 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
382 }
383
384 /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
385
386 if (rr->length > s->packet_length-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
387 {
388 /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
389 i=rr->length;
390 n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1);
391 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */
392 /* now n == rr->length,
393 * and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */
394 }
395
396 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
397
398 /* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
399 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
400 */
401 rr->input= &(s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
402
403 /* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr'
404 * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which
405 * need to be copied into rr->data by either
406 * the decryption or by the decompression
407 * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer,
408 * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */
409
410 /* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
411 * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */
412
413 /* check is not needed I believe */
414 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+extra)
415 {
416 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
417 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
418 goto f_err;
419 }
420
421 /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
422 rr->data=rr->input;
423
424 enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
425 if (enc_err <= 0)
426 {
427 if (enc_err == 0)
428 /* SSLerr() and ssl3_send_alert() have been called */
429 goto err;
430
431 /* Otherwise enc_err == -1, which indicates bad padding
432 * (rec->length has not been changed in this case).
433 * To minimize information leaked via timing, we will perform
434 * the MAC computation anyway. */
435 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
436 }
437
438 #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
439 printf("dec %d\n",rr->length);
440 { unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c",rr->data[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
441 printf("\n");
442 #endif
443
444 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
445 if ( (sess == NULL) ||
446 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) ||
447 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) == NULL))
448 clear=1;
449
450 if (!clear)
451 {
452 /* !clear => s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
453 mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
454 OPENSSL_assert(mac_size >= 0);
455
456 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra+mac_size)
457 {
458 #if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers (then rr->length is visible from ciphertext anyway) */
459 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
460 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PRE_MAC_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
461 goto f_err;
462 #else
463 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
464 #endif
465 }
466 /* check the MAC for rr->input (it's in mac_size bytes at the tail) */
467 if (rr->length >= (unsigned int)mac_size)
468 {
469 rr->length -= mac_size;
470 mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
471 }
472 else
473 {
474 /* record (minus padding) is too short to contain a MAC */
475 #if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers */
476 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
477 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
478 goto f_err;
479 #else
480 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
481 rr->length = 0;
482 #endif
483 }
484 i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0);
485 if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
486 {
487 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
488 }
489 }
490
491 if (decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac)
492 {
493 /* A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
494 * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption
495 * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway,
496 * we should not reveal which kind of error occured -- this
497 * might become visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile) */
498 al=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
499 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
500 goto f_err;
501 }
502
503 /* r->length is now just compressed */
504 if (s->expand != NULL)
505 {
506 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra)
507 {
508 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
509 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
510 goto f_err;
511 }
512 if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s))
513 {
514 al=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
515 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
516 goto f_err;
517 }
518 }
519
520 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH+extra)
521 {
522 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
523 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
524 goto f_err;
525 }
526
527 rr->off=0;
528 /* So at this point the following is true
529 * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
530 * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
531 * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
532 * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
533 * after use :-).
534 */
535
536 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
537 s->packet_length=0;
538
539 /* just read a 0 length packet */
540 if (rr->length == 0) goto again;
541
542 #if 0
543 fprintf(stderr, "Ultimate Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
544 #endif
545
546 return(1);
547
548 f_err:
549 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
550 err:
551 return(ret);
552 }
553
ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL * ssl)554 int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl)
555 {
556 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
557 int i;
558 SSL3_RECORD *rr;
559
560 rr= &(ssl->s3->rrec);
561 i=COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand,rr->comp,
562 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,rr->data,(int)rr->length);
563 if (i < 0)
564 return(0);
565 else
566 rr->length=i;
567 rr->data=rr->comp;
568 #endif
569 return(1);
570 }
571
ssl3_do_compress(SSL * ssl)572 int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl)
573 {
574 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
575 int i;
576 SSL3_RECORD *wr;
577
578 wr= &(ssl->s3->wrec);
579 i=COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress,wr->data,
580 SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH,
581 wr->input,(int)wr->length);
582 if (i < 0)
583 return(0);
584 else
585 wr->length=i;
586
587 wr->input=wr->data;
588 #endif
589 return(1);
590 }
591
592 /* Call this to write data in records of type 'type'
593 * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
594 */
ssl3_write_bytes(SSL * s,int type,const void * buf_,int len)595 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
596 {
597 const unsigned char *buf=buf_;
598 unsigned int tot,n,nw;
599 int i;
600 unsigned int max_plain_length;
601
602 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
603 tot=s->s3->wnum;
604 s->s3->wnum=0;
605
606 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake)
607 {
608 i=s->handshake_func(s);
609 if (i < 0) return(i);
610 if (i == 0)
611 {
612 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
613 return -1;
614 }
615 }
616
617 n=(len-tot);
618 for (;;)
619 {
620 if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && (SSL_get_mode(s) & SSL_MODE_SMALL_BUFFERS))
621 max_plain_length = SSL3_RT_DEFAULT_PLAIN_LENGTH;
622 else
623 max_plain_length = s->max_send_fragment;
624
625 if (n > max_plain_length)
626 nw = max_plain_length;
627 else
628 nw=n;
629
630 i=do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0);
631 if (i <= 0)
632 {
633 s->s3->wnum=tot;
634 return i;
635 }
636
637 if ((i == (int)n) ||
638 (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
639 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE)))
640 {
641 /* next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
642 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: */
643 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
644
645 return tot+i;
646 }
647
648 n-=i;
649 tot+=i;
650 }
651 }
652
do_ssl3_write(SSL * s,int type,const unsigned char * buf,unsigned int len,int create_empty_fragment)653 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
654 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
655 {
656 unsigned char *p,*plen;
657 int i,mac_size,clear=0;
658 int prefix_len=0;
659 long align=0;
660 SSL3_RECORD *wr;
661 SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);
662 SSL_SESSION *sess;
663
664 if (wb->buf == NULL)
665 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s))
666 return -1;
667
668 /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
669 * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */
670 if (wb->left != 0)
671 return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len));
672
673 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
674 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
675 {
676 i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
677 if (i <= 0)
678 return(i);
679 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
680 }
681
682 if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
683 return 0;
684
685 wr= &(s->s3->wrec);
686 sess=s->session;
687
688 if ( (sess == NULL) ||
689 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
690 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL))
691 clear=1;
692
693 if (clear)
694 mac_size=0;
695 else
696 {
697 mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
698 if (mac_size < 0)
699 goto err;
700 }
701
702 /* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */
703 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done)
704 {
705 /* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites
706 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */
707
708 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
709 {
710 /* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set;
711 * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment
712 * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later
713 * together with the actual payload) */
714 prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);
715 if (prefix_len <= 0)
716 goto err;
717
718 if (prefix_len >
719 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD))
720 {
721 /* insufficient space */
722 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
723 goto err;
724 }
725 }
726
727 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
728 }
729
730 /* resize if necessary to hold the data. */
731 if (len + SSL3_RT_DEFAULT_WRITE_OVERHEAD > wb->len)
732 {
733 if ((p=OPENSSL_realloc(wb->buf, len + SSL3_RT_DEFAULT_WRITE_OVERHEAD))==NULL)
734 {
735 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
736 goto err;
737 }
738 wb->buf = p;
739 wb->len = len + SSL3_RT_DEFAULT_WRITE_OVERHEAD;
740 }
741
742 if (create_empty_fragment)
743 {
744 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
745 /* extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks,
746 * which would be multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so
747 * if we want to align the real payload, then we can
748 * just pretent we simply have two headers. */
749 align = (long)wb->buf + 2*SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
750 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
751 #endif
752 p = wb->buf + align;
753 wb->offset = align;
754 }
755 else if (prefix_len)
756 {
757 p = wb->buf + wb->offset + prefix_len;
758 }
759 else
760 {
761 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
762 align = (long)wb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
763 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
764 #endif
765 p = wb->buf + align;
766 wb->offset = align;
767 }
768
769 /* write the header */
770
771 *(p++)=type&0xff;
772 wr->type=type;
773
774 *(p++)=(s->version>>8);
775 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
776
777 /* field where we are to write out packet length */
778 plen=p;
779 p+=2;
780
781 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
782 wr->data=p;
783 wr->length=(int)len;
784 wr->input=(unsigned char *)buf;
785
786 /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into
787 * wr->data */
788
789 /* first we compress */
790 if (s->compress != NULL)
791 {
792 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s))
793 {
794 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
795 goto err;
796 }
797 }
798 else
799 {
800 memcpy(wr->data,wr->input,wr->length);
801 wr->input=wr->data;
802 }
803
804 /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input
805 * from wr->input. Length should be wr->length.
806 * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */
807
808 if (mac_size != 0)
809 {
810 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length]),1) < 0)
811 goto err;
812 wr->length+=mac_size;
813 wr->input=p;
814 wr->data=p;
815 }
816
817 /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */
818 s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1);
819
820 /* record length after mac and block padding */
821 s2n(wr->length,plen);
822
823 /* we should now have
824 * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
825 * wr->length long */
826 wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
827 wr->length+=SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
828
829 if (create_empty_fragment)
830 {
831 /* we are in a recursive call;
832 * just return the length, don't write out anything here
833 */
834 return wr->length;
835 }
836
837 /* now let's set up wb */
838 wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
839
840 /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */
841 s->s3->wpend_tot=len;
842 s->s3->wpend_buf=buf;
843 s->s3->wpend_type=type;
844 s->s3->wpend_ret=len;
845
846 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
847 return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len);
848 err:
849 return -1;
850 }
851
852 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */
ssl3_write_pending(SSL * s,int type,const unsigned char * buf,unsigned int len)853 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
854 unsigned int len)
855 {
856 int i;
857 SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);
858
859 /* XXXX */
860 if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len)
861 || ((s->s3->wpend_buf != buf) &&
862 !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER))
863 || (s->s3->wpend_type != type))
864 {
865 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
866 return(-1);
867 }
868
869 for (;;)
870 {
871 clear_sys_error();
872 if (s->wbio != NULL)
873 {
874 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
875 i=BIO_write(s->wbio,
876 (char *)&(wb->buf[wb->offset]),
877 (unsigned int)wb->left);
878 }
879 else
880 {
881 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
882 i= -1;
883 }
884 if (i == wb->left)
885 {
886 wb->left=0;
887 wb->offset+=i;
888 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS)
889 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
890 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
891 return(s->s3->wpend_ret);
892 }
893 else if (i <= 0) {
894 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION ||
895 s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
896 /* For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole
897 point in using a datagram service */
898 wb->left = 0;
899 }
900 return(i);
901 }
902 wb->offset+=i;
903 wb->left-=i;
904 }
905 }
906
907 /* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
908 * 'type' is one of the following:
909 *
910 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
911 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
912 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
913 *
914 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
915 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
916 *
917 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
918 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
919 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
920 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
921 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
922 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
923 * Change cipher spec protocol
924 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
925 * Alert protocol
926 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
927 * Handshake protocol
928 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
929 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
930 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
931 * Application data protocol
932 * none of our business
933 */
ssl3_read_bytes(SSL * s,int type,unsigned char * buf,int len,int peek)934 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
935 {
936 int al,i,j,ret;
937 unsigned int n;
938 SSL3_RECORD *rr;
939 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type2,int val)=NULL;
940
941 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
942 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
943 return(-1);
944
945 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && type) ||
946 (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)))
947 {
948 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
949 return -1;
950 }
951
952 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
953 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
954 {
955 unsigned char *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
956 unsigned char *dst = buf;
957 unsigned int k;
958
959 /* peek == 0 */
960 n = 0;
961 while ((len > 0) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
962 {
963 *dst++ = *src++;
964 len--; s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--;
965 n++;
966 }
967 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
968 for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
969 s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
970 return n;
971 }
972
973 /* Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */
974
975 if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s))
976 {
977 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
978 i=s->handshake_func(s);
979 if (i < 0) return(i);
980 if (i == 0)
981 {
982 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
983 return(-1);
984 }
985 }
986 start:
987 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
988
989 /* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
990 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
991 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
992 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. */
993 rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
994
995 /* get new packet if necessary */
996 if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY))
997 {
998 ret=ssl3_get_record(s);
999 if (ret <= 0) return(ret);
1000 }
1001
1002 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
1003
1004 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
1005 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
1006 && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE))
1007 {
1008 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1009 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
1010 goto f_err;
1011 }
1012
1013 /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away
1014 * (even in 'peek' mode) */
1015 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
1016 {
1017 rr->length=0;
1018 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1019 return(0);
1020 }
1021
1022
1023 if (type == rr->type) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
1024 {
1025 /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we
1026 * are doing a handshake for the first time */
1027 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
1028 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL))
1029 {
1030 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1031 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
1032 goto f_err;
1033 }
1034
1035 if (len <= 0) return(len);
1036
1037 if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
1038 n = rr->length;
1039 else
1040 n = (unsigned int)len;
1041
1042 memcpy(buf,&(rr->data[rr->off]),n);
1043 if (!peek)
1044 {
1045 rr->length-=n;
1046 rr->off+=n;
1047 if (rr->length == 0)
1048 {
1049 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
1050 rr->off=0;
1051 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS)
1052 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
1053 }
1054 }
1055 return(n);
1056 }
1057
1058
1059 /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake
1060 * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */
1061
1062 /* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage,
1063 * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
1064 */
1065 {
1066 unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0;
1067 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
1068 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
1069
1070 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
1071 {
1072 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->handshake_fragment;
1073 dest = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
1074 dest_len = &s->s3->handshake_fragment_len;
1075 }
1076 else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
1077 {
1078 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->alert_fragment;
1079 dest = s->s3->alert_fragment;
1080 dest_len = &s->s3->alert_fragment_len;
1081 }
1082
1083 if (dest_maxlen > 0)
1084 {
1085 n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
1086 if (rr->length < n)
1087 n = rr->length; /* available bytes */
1088
1089 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1090 while (n-- > 0)
1091 {
1092 dest[(*dest_len)++] = rr->data[rr->off++];
1093 rr->length--;
1094 }
1095
1096 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
1097 goto start; /* fragment was too small */
1098 }
1099 }
1100
1101 /* s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1102 * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
1103 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */
1104
1105 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
1106 if ((!s->server) &&
1107 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1108 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
1109 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))
1110 {
1111 s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
1112
1113 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
1114 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
1115 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[3] != 0))
1116 {
1117 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1118 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
1119 goto f_err;
1120 }
1121
1122 if (s->msg_callback)
1123 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->s3->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1124
1125 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1126 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
1127 !s->s3->renegotiate)
1128 {
1129 ssl3_renegotiate(s);
1130 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s))
1131 {
1132 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1133 if (i < 0) return(i);
1134 if (i == 0)
1135 {
1136 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1137 return(-1);
1138 }
1139
1140 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1141 {
1142 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1143 {
1144 BIO *bio;
1145 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1146 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1147 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1148 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1149 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1150 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1151 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1152 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1153 return(-1);
1154 }
1155 }
1156 }
1157 }
1158 /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request,
1159 * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */
1160 goto start;
1161 }
1162 /* If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
1163 * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on.
1164 * WARNING: experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
1165 */
1166 if (s->server &&
1167 SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1168 !s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
1169 (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) &&
1170 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1171 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
1172 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) &&
1173 !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
1174
1175 {
1176 /*s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;*/
1177 rr->length = 0;
1178 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1179 goto start;
1180 }
1181 if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2)
1182 {
1183 int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0];
1184 int alert_descr = s->s3->alert_fragment[1];
1185
1186 s->s3->alert_fragment_len = 0;
1187
1188 if (s->msg_callback)
1189 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1190
1191 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1192 cb=s->info_callback;
1193 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1194 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1195
1196 if (cb != NULL)
1197 {
1198 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1199 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1200 }
1201
1202 if (alert_level == 1) /* warning */
1203 {
1204 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1205 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)
1206 {
1207 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1208 return(0);
1209 }
1210 /* This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
1211 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with
1212 * a fatal alert because if application tried to
1213 * renegotiatie it presumably had a good reason and
1214 * expects it to succeed.
1215 *
1216 * In future we might have a renegotiation where we
1217 * don't care if the peer refused it where we carry on.
1218 */
1219 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION)
1220 {
1221 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1222 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1223 goto f_err;
1224 }
1225 }
1226 else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */
1227 {
1228 char tmp[16];
1229
1230 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1231 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1232 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1233 BIO_snprintf(tmp,sizeof tmp,"%d",alert_descr);
1234 ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp);
1235 s->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1236 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1237 return(0);
1238 }
1239 else
1240 {
1241 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1242 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1243 goto f_err;
1244 }
1245
1246 goto start;
1247 }
1248
1249 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) /* but we have not received a shutdown */
1250 {
1251 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1252 rr->length=0;
1253 return(0);
1254 }
1255
1256 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1257 {
1258 /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know
1259 * exactly what the record payload has to look like */
1260 if ( (rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) ||
1261 (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS))
1262 {
1263 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1264 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1265 goto f_err;
1266 }
1267
1268 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
1269 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)
1270 {
1271 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1272 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1273 goto f_err;
1274 }
1275
1276 rr->length=0;
1277
1278 if (s->msg_callback)
1279 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1280
1281 s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1;
1282 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
1283 goto err;
1284 else
1285 goto start;
1286 }
1287
1288 /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */
1289 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && !s->in_handshake)
1290 {
1291 if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
1292 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS))
1293 {
1294 #if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and
1295 * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting
1296 * protocol violations): */
1297 s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|(s->server)
1298 ?SSL_ST_ACCEPT
1299 :SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1300 #else
1301 s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1302 #endif
1303 s->new_session=1;
1304 }
1305 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1306 if (i < 0) return(i);
1307 if (i == 0)
1308 {
1309 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1310 return(-1);
1311 }
1312
1313 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1314 {
1315 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1316 {
1317 BIO *bio;
1318 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1319 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1320 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1321 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1322 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1323 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1324 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1325 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1326 return(-1);
1327 }
1328 }
1329 goto start;
1330 }
1331
1332 switch (rr->type)
1333 {
1334 default:
1335 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS
1336 /* TLS just ignores unknown message types */
1337 if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
1338 {
1339 rr->length = 0;
1340 goto start;
1341 }
1342 #endif
1343 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1344 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1345 goto f_err;
1346 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1347 case SSL3_RT_ALERT:
1348 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1349 /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception
1350 * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that
1351 * should not happen when type != rr->type */
1352 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1353 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1354 goto f_err;
1355 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1356 /* At this point, we were expecting handshake data,
1357 * but have application data. If the library was
1358 * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data
1359 * is set) and it makes sense to read application data
1360 * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started),
1361 * we will indulge it.
1362 */
1363 if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
1364 (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
1365 ((
1366 (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
1367 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
1368 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1369 ) || (
1370 (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
1371 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
1372 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1373 )
1374 ))
1375 {
1376 s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
1377 return(-1);
1378 }
1379 else
1380 {
1381 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1382 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1383 goto f_err;
1384 }
1385 }
1386 /* not reached */
1387
1388 f_err:
1389 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1390 err:
1391 return(-1);
1392 }
1393
ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL * s)1394 int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
1395 {
1396 int i;
1397 const char *sender;
1398 int slen;
1399
1400 if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
1401 i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ;
1402 else
1403 i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ;
1404
1405 if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL)
1406 {
1407 if (s->session == NULL)
1408 {
1409 /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */
1410 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1411 return (0);
1412 }
1413
1414 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
1415 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) return(0);
1416 }
1417
1418 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,i))
1419 return(0);
1420
1421 /* we have to record the message digest at
1422 * this point so we can get it before we read
1423 * the finished message */
1424 if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT)
1425 {
1426 sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
1427 slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
1428 }
1429 else
1430 {
1431 sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
1432 slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
1433 }
1434
1435 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
1436 sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
1437
1438 return(1);
1439 }
1440
ssl3_send_alert(SSL * s,int level,int desc)1441 int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc)
1442 {
1443 /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */
1444 desc=s->method->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc);
1445 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION)
1446 desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; /* SSL 3.0 does not have protocol_version alerts */
1447 if (desc < 0) return -1;
1448 /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */
1449 if ((level == 2) && (s->session != NULL))
1450 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1451
1452 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1453 s->s3->send_alert[0]=level;
1454 s->s3->send_alert[1]=desc;
1455 if (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) /* data still being written out? */
1456 return s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
1457 /* else data is still being written out, we will get written
1458 * some time in the future */
1459 return -1;
1460 }
1461
ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL * s)1462 int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
1463 {
1464 int i,j;
1465 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
1466
1467 s->s3->alert_dispatch=0;
1468 i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2, 0);
1469 if (i <= 0)
1470 {
1471 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1472 }
1473 else
1474 {
1475 /* Alert sent to BIO. If it is important, flush it now.
1476 * If the message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO,
1477 * we will not worry too much. */
1478 if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL)
1479 (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
1480
1481 if (s->msg_callback)
1482 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1483
1484 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1485 cb=s->info_callback;
1486 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1487 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1488
1489 if (cb != NULL)
1490 {
1491 j=(s->s3->send_alert[0]<<8)|s->s3->send_alert[1];
1492 cb(s,SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT,j);
1493 }
1494 }
1495 return(i);
1496 }
1497