1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
113 *
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
116 *
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
119 *
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
122 *
123 */
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
126 *
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
129 * license.
130 *
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
134 *
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
138 *
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
143 *
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
148 * OTHERWISE.
149 */
150
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
153
154 #include <stdio.h>
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
158 #include <openssl/rand.h>
159 #include <openssl/objects.h>
160 #include <openssl/evp.h>
161 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
162 #include <openssl/x509.h>
163 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
164 #include <openssl/dh.h>
165 #endif
166 #include <openssl/bn.h>
167 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
168 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
169 #endif
170 #include <openssl/md5.h>
171
172 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
173
ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)174 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
175 {
176 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
177 return(SSLv3_server_method());
178 else
179 return(NULL);
180 }
181
IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,ssl3_accept,ssl_undefined_function,ssl3_get_server_method)182 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
183 ssl3_accept,
184 ssl_undefined_function,
185 ssl3_get_server_method)
186
187 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
188 {
189 BUF_MEM *buf;
190 unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
191 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
192 int ret= -1;
193 int new_state,state,skip=0;
194
195 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
196 ERR_clear_error();
197 clear_sys_error();
198
199 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
200 cb=s->info_callback;
201 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
202 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
203
204 /* init things to blank */
205 s->in_handshake++;
206 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
207
208 if (s->cert == NULL)
209 {
210 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
211 return(-1);
212 }
213
214 for (;;)
215 {
216 state=s->state;
217
218 switch (s->state)
219 {
220 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
221 s->new_session=1;
222 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
223
224 case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
225 case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
226 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
227 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
228
229 s->server=1;
230 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
231
232 if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
233 {
234 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
235 return -1;
236 }
237 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
238
239 if (s->init_buf == NULL)
240 {
241 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
242 {
243 ret= -1;
244 goto end;
245 }
246 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
247 {
248 ret= -1;
249 goto end;
250 }
251 s->init_buf=buf;
252 }
253
254 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
255 {
256 ret= -1;
257 goto end;
258 }
259
260 s->init_num=0;
261
262 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
263 {
264 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
265 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
266 */
267 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
268
269 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
270 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
271 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
272 }
273 else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
274 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
275 {
276 /* Server attempting to renegotiate with
277 * client that doesn't support secure
278 * renegotiation.
279 */
280 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
281 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
282 ret = -1;
283 goto end;
284 }
285 else
286 {
287 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
288 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
289 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
290 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
291 }
292 break;
293
294 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
295 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
296
297 s->shutdown=0;
298 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
299 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
300 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
301 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
302 s->init_num=0;
303
304 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
305 break;
306
307 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
308 s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
309 break;
310
311 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
312 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
313 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
314
315 s->shutdown=0;
316 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
317 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
318
319 s->new_session = 2;
320 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
321 s->init_num=0;
322 break;
323
324 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
325 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
326 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
327 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
328 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
329 if (s->hit)
330 {
331 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
332 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
333 else
334 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
335 }
336 #else
337 if (s->hit)
338 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
339 #endif
340 else
341 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
342 s->init_num=0;
343 break;
344
345 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
346 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
347 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
348 /* normal PSK or KRB5 */
349 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
350 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)
351 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
352 {
353 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
354 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
355 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
356 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
357 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
358 else
359 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
360 }
361 else
362 {
363 skip = 1;
364 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
365 }
366 #else
367 }
368 else
369 skip=1;
370
371 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
372 #endif
373 s->init_num=0;
374 break;
375
376 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
377 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
378 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
379
380 /* clear this, it may get reset by
381 * send_server_key_exchange */
382 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
383 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
384 && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
385 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
386 )
387 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
388 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
389 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
390 * be able to handle this) */
391 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
392 else
393 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
394
395
396 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
397 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
398 *
399 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints
400 *
401 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
402 * message only if the cipher suite is either
403 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
404 * server certificate contains the server's
405 * public key for key exchange.
406 */
407 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
408 /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
409 * hint if provided */
410 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
411 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
412 #endif
413 || (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd|SSL_kEDH))
414 || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
415 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
416 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
417 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
418 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
419 )
420 )
421 )
422 )
423 {
424 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
425 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
426 }
427 else
428 skip=1;
429
430 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
431 s->init_num=0;
432 break;
433
434 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
435 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
436 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
437 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
438 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
439 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
440 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
441 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
442 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
443 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
444 * and in RFC 2246): */
445 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
446 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
447 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
448 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
449 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
450 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)
451 /* With normal PSK Certificates and
452 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
453 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
454 {
455 /* no cert request */
456 skip=1;
457 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
458 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
459 }
460 else
461 {
462 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
463 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
464 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
465 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
466 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
467 #else
468 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
469 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
470 #endif
471 s->init_num=0;
472 }
473 break;
474
475 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
476 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
477 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
478 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
479 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
480 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
481 s->init_num=0;
482 break;
483
484 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
485
486 /* This code originally checked to see if
487 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
488 * and then flushed. This caused problems
489 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
490 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
491 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
492 * still exist. So instead we just flush
493 * unconditionally.
494 */
495
496 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
497 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
498 {
499 ret= -1;
500 goto end;
501 }
502 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
503
504 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
505 break;
506
507 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
508 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
509 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
510 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
511 if (ret <= 0)
512 goto end;
513 if (ret == 2)
514 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
515 else {
516 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
517 {
518 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
519 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
520 }
521 s->init_num=0;
522 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
523 }
524 break;
525
526 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
527 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
528 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
529 if (ret <= 0)
530 goto end;
531 if (ret == 2)
532 {
533 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
534 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
535 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
536 * message is not sent.
537 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when
538 * the client uses its key from the certificate
539 * for key exchange.
540 */
541 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
542 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
543 #else
544 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
545 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
546 else
547 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
548 #endif
549 s->init_num = 0;
550 }
551 else
552 {
553 int offset=0;
554 int dgst_num;
555
556 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
557 s->init_num=0;
558
559 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
560 * a client cert, it can be verified
561 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
562 * should be generalized. But it is next step
563 */
564 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
565 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
566 return -1;
567 for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_num++)
568 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num])
569 {
570 int dgst_size;
571
572 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset]));
573 dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
574 if (dgst_size < 0)
575 {
576 ret = -1;
577 goto end;
578 }
579 offset+=dgst_size;
580 }
581 }
582 break;
583
584 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
585 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
586
587 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
588 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
589 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
590
591 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
592 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
593 #else
594 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
595 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
596 else
597 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
598 #endif
599 s->init_num=0;
600 break;
601
602 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
603 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
604 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
605 ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
606 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
607 s->init_num = 0;
608 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
609 break;
610 #endif
611
612 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
613 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
614 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
615 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
616 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
617 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
618 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
619 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
620 else if (s->hit)
621 s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
622 #else
623 if (s->hit)
624 s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
625 #endif
626 else
627 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
628 s->init_num=0;
629 break;
630
631 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
632 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
633 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
634 ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
635 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
636 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
637 s->init_num=0;
638 break;
639
640 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
641 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
642 ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
643 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
644 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
645 s->init_num=0;
646 break;
647
648 #endif
649
650 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
651 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
652
653 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
654 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
655 { ret= -1; goto end; }
656
657 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
658 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
659
660 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
661 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
662 s->init_num=0;
663
664 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
665 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
666 {
667 ret= -1;
668 goto end;
669 }
670
671 break;
672
673 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
674 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
675 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
676 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
677 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
678 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
679 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
680 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
681 if (s->hit)
682 {
683 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
684 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
685 #else
686 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
687 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
688 else
689 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
690 #endif
691 }
692 else
693 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
694 s->init_num=0;
695 break;
696
697 case SSL_ST_OK:
698 /* clean a few things up */
699 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
700
701 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
702 s->init_buf=NULL;
703
704 /* remove buffering on output */
705 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
706
707 s->init_num=0;
708
709 if (s->new_session == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
710 {
711 /* actually not necessarily a 'new' session unless
712 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */
713
714 s->new_session=0;
715
716 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
717
718 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
719 /* s->server=1; */
720 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
721
722 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
723 }
724
725 ret = 1;
726 goto end;
727 /* break; */
728
729 default:
730 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
731 ret= -1;
732 goto end;
733 /* break; */
734 }
735
736 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
737 {
738 if (s->debug)
739 {
740 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
741 goto end;
742 }
743
744
745 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
746 {
747 new_state=s->state;
748 s->state=state;
749 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
750 s->state=new_state;
751 }
752 }
753 skip=0;
754 }
755 end:
756 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
757
758 s->in_handshake--;
759 if (cb != NULL)
760 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
761 return(ret);
762 }
763
ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL * s)764 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
765 {
766 unsigned char *p;
767
768 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
769 {
770 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
771 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
772 *(p++)=0;
773 *(p++)=0;
774 *(p++)=0;
775
776 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
777 /* number of bytes to write */
778 s->init_num=4;
779 s->init_off=0;
780 }
781
782 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
783 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
784 }
785
ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL * s)786 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
787 {
788 int ok;
789 long n;
790
791 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
792 * so permit appropriate message length */
793 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
794 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
795 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
796 -1,
797 s->max_cert_list,
798 &ok);
799 if (!ok) return((int)n);
800 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
801 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
802 {
803 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
804 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) */
805 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
806 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
807 {
808 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
809 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
810 }
811 #endif
812 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
813 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
814 {
815 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
816 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
817 }
818 #endif
819 return 2;
820 }
821 return 1;
822 }
823
ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL * s)824 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
825 {
826 int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1;
827 unsigned int cookie_len;
828 long n;
829 unsigned long id;
830 unsigned char *p,*d,*q;
831 SSL_CIPHER *c;
832 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
833 SSL_COMP *comp=NULL;
834 #endif
835 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
836
837 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
838 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
839 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
840 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
841 * TLSv1.
842 */
843 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
844 {
845 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
846 }
847 s->first_packet=1;
848 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
849 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
850 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
851 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
852 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
853 &ok);
854
855 if (!ok) return((int)n);
856 s->first_packet=0;
857 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
858
859 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
860 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
861 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
862 p+=2;
863
864 if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) ||
865 (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version))
866 {
867 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
868 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
869 {
870 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
871 s->version = s->client_version;
872 }
873 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
874 goto f_err;
875 }
876
877 /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
878 * contain one, just return since we do not want to
879 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
880 */
881 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)
882 {
883 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
884
885 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
886 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
887
888 if (cookie_length == 0)
889 return 1;
890 }
891
892 /* load the client random */
893 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
894 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
895
896 /* get the session-id */
897 j= *(p++);
898
899 s->hit=0;
900 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow session reuse during renegotiation
901 * (i.e. when s->new_session is true), option
902 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is new with 0.9.7.
903 * Maybe this optional behaviour should always have been the default,
904 * but we cannot safely change the default behaviour (or new applications
905 * might be written that become totally unsecure when compiled with
906 * an earlier library version)
907 */
908 if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
909 {
910 if (!s->session_creation_enabled)
911 {
912 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
913 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_SESSION_MAY_NOT_BE_CREATED);
914 goto err;
915 }
916 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
917 goto err;
918 }
919 else
920 {
921 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
922 if (i == 1)
923 { /* previous session */
924 s->hit=1;
925 }
926 else if (i == -1)
927 goto err;
928 else /* i == 0 */
929 {
930 if (!s->session_creation_enabled)
931 {
932 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
933 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_SESSION_MAY_NOT_BE_CREATED);
934 goto err;
935 }
936 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
937 goto err;
938 }
939 }
940
941 p+=j;
942
943 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
944 {
945 /* cookie stuff */
946 cookie_len = *(p++);
947
948 /*
949 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
950 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
951 * does not cause an overflow.
952 */
953 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
954 {
955 /* too much data */
956 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
957 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
958 goto f_err;
959 }
960
961 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
962 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
963 cookie_len > 0)
964 {
965 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
966
967 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
968 {
969 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
970 cookie_len) == 0)
971 {
972 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
973 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
974 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
975 goto f_err;
976 }
977 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
978 }
979 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
980 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
981 {
982 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
983 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
984 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
985 goto f_err;
986 }
987
988 ret = 2;
989 }
990
991 p += cookie_len;
992 }
993
994 n2s(p,i);
995 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
996 {
997 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
998 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
999 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
1000 goto f_err;
1001 }
1002 if ((p+i) >= (d+n))
1003 {
1004 /* not enough data */
1005 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1006 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1007 goto f_err;
1008 }
1009 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
1010 == NULL))
1011 {
1012 goto err;
1013 }
1014 p+=i;
1015
1016 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1017 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
1018 {
1019 j=0;
1020 id=s->session->cipher->id;
1021
1022 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
1023 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
1024 #endif
1025 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
1026 {
1027 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
1028 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
1029 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1030 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1031 #endif
1032 if (c->id == id)
1033 {
1034 j=1;
1035 break;
1036 }
1037 }
1038 /* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade
1039 * attack: CVE-2010-4180.
1040 */
1041 #if 0
1042 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
1043 {
1044 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
1045 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
1046 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
1047 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
1048 * enabled, though. */
1049 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
1050 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0)
1051 {
1052 s->session->cipher = c;
1053 j = 1;
1054 }
1055 }
1056 #endif
1057 if (j == 0)
1058 {
1059 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
1060 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
1061 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1062 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1063 goto f_err;
1064 }
1065 }
1066
1067 /* compression */
1068 i= *(p++);
1069 if ((p+i) > (d+n))
1070 {
1071 /* not enough data */
1072 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1073 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1074 goto f_err;
1075 }
1076 q=p;
1077 for (j=0; j<i; j++)
1078 {
1079 if (p[j] == 0) break;
1080 }
1081
1082 p+=i;
1083 if (j >= i)
1084 {
1085 /* no compress */
1086 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1087 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1088 goto f_err;
1089 }
1090
1091 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1092 /* TLS extensions*/
1093 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1094 {
1095 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al))
1096 {
1097 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
1098 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1099 goto f_err;
1100 }
1101 }
1102 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
1103 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1104 goto err;
1105 }
1106
1107 /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
1108 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
1109 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
1110 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
1111 {
1112 unsigned long Time;
1113 unsigned char *pos;
1114 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
1115 pos=s->s3->server_random;
1116 l2n(Time,pos);
1117 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(pos,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1118 {
1119 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1120 goto f_err;
1121 }
1122 }
1123
1124 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb)
1125 {
1126 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL;
1127
1128 s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1129 if(s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length,
1130 ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg))
1131 {
1132 s->hit=1;
1133 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1134 s->session->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
1135
1136 ciphers=NULL;
1137
1138 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1139 pref_cipher=pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1140 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1141 {
1142 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1143 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1144 goto f_err;
1145 }
1146
1147 s->session->cipher=pref_cipher;
1148
1149 if (s->cipher_list)
1150 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1151
1152 if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
1153 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1154
1155 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1156 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1157 }
1158 }
1159 #endif
1160
1161 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1162 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1163 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
1164 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
1165 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1166 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1167 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1168 {
1169 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1170 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1171 /* Can't disable compression */
1172 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
1173 {
1174 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1175 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1176 goto f_err;
1177 }
1178 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1179 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++)
1180 {
1181 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1182 if (comp_id == comp->id)
1183 {
1184 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1185 break;
1186 }
1187 }
1188 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1189 {
1190 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1191 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1192 goto f_err;
1193 }
1194 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1195 for (m = 0; m < i; m++)
1196 {
1197 if (q[m] == comp_id)
1198 break;
1199 }
1200 if (m >= i)
1201 {
1202 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1203 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1204 goto f_err;
1205 }
1206 }
1207 else if (s->hit)
1208 comp = NULL;
1209 else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods)
1210 { /* See if we have a match */
1211 int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
1212
1213 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1214 for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
1215 {
1216 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1217 v=comp->id;
1218 for (o=0; o<i; o++)
1219 {
1220 if (v == q[o])
1221 {
1222 done=1;
1223 break;
1224 }
1225 }
1226 if (done) break;
1227 }
1228 if (done)
1229 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1230 else
1231 comp=NULL;
1232 }
1233 #else
1234 /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1235 * using compression.
1236 */
1237 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1238 {
1239 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1240 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1241 goto f_err;
1242 }
1243 #endif
1244
1245 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1246 * pick a cipher */
1247
1248 if (!s->hit)
1249 {
1250 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1251 s->session->compress_meth=0;
1252 #else
1253 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
1254 #endif
1255 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1256 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1257 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1258 if (ciphers == NULL)
1259 {
1260 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1261 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
1262 goto f_err;
1263 }
1264 ciphers=NULL;
1265 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
1266 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1267
1268 if (c == NULL)
1269 {
1270 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1271 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1272 goto f_err;
1273 }
1274 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
1275 }
1276 else
1277 {
1278 /* Session-id reuse */
1279 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1280 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1281 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
1282 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
1283
1284 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1285 {
1286 sk=s->session->ciphers;
1287 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
1288 {
1289 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
1290 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
1291 nc=c;
1292 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1293 ec=c;
1294 }
1295 if (nc != NULL)
1296 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
1297 else if (ec != NULL)
1298 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
1299 else
1300 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1301 }
1302 else
1303 #endif
1304 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1305 }
1306
1307 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
1308 goto f_err;
1309
1310 /* we now have the following setup.
1311 * client_random
1312 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1313 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1314 * compression - basically ignored right now
1315 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1316 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1317 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1318 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1319 */
1320
1321 if (ret < 0) ret=1;
1322 if (0)
1323 {
1324 f_err:
1325 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1326 }
1327 err:
1328 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1329 return(ret);
1330 }
1331
ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL * s)1332 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1333 {
1334 unsigned char *buf;
1335 unsigned char *p,*d;
1336 int i,sl;
1337 unsigned long l;
1338 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1339 unsigned long Time;
1340 #endif
1341
1342 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1343 {
1344 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1345 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1346 p=s->s3->server_random;
1347 /* Generate server_random if it was not needed previously */
1348 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
1349 l2n(Time,p);
1350 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1351 return -1;
1352 #endif
1353 /* Do the message type and length last */
1354 d=p= &(buf[4]);
1355
1356 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1357 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1358
1359 /* Random stuff */
1360 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1361 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1362
1363 /* now in theory we have 3 options to sending back the
1364 * session id. If it is a re-use, we send back the
1365 * old session-id, if it is a new session, we send
1366 * back the new session-id or we send back a 0 length
1367 * session-id if we want it to be single use.
1368 * Currently I will not implement the '0' length session-id
1369 * 12-Jan-98 - I'll now support the '0' length stuff.
1370 *
1371 * We also have an additional case where stateless session
1372 * resumption is successful: we always send back the old
1373 * session id. In this case s->hit is non zero: this can
1374 * only happen if stateless session resumption is succesful
1375 * if session caching is disabled so existing functionality
1376 * is unaffected.
1377 */
1378 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1379 && !s->hit)
1380 s->session->session_id_length=0;
1381
1382 sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1383 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
1384 {
1385 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1386 return -1;
1387 }
1388 *(p++)=sl;
1389 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1390 p+=sl;
1391
1392 /* put the cipher */
1393 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1394 p+=i;
1395
1396 /* put the compression method */
1397 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1398 *(p++)=0;
1399 #else
1400 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1401 *(p++)=0;
1402 else
1403 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1404 #endif
1405 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1406 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
1407 {
1408 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1409 return -1;
1410 }
1411 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
1412 {
1413 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1414 return -1;
1415 }
1416 #endif
1417 /* do the header */
1418 l=(p-d);
1419 d=buf;
1420 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
1421 l2n3(l,d);
1422
1423 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1424 /* number of bytes to write */
1425 s->init_num=p-buf;
1426 s->init_off=0;
1427 }
1428
1429 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1430 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1431 }
1432
ssl3_send_server_done(SSL * s)1433 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1434 {
1435 unsigned char *p;
1436
1437 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1438 {
1439 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1440
1441 /* do the header */
1442 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1443 *(p++)=0;
1444 *(p++)=0;
1445 *(p++)=0;
1446
1447 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1448 /* number of bytes to write */
1449 s->init_num=4;
1450 s->init_off=0;
1451 }
1452
1453 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1454 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1455 }
1456
ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL * s)1457 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1458 {
1459 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1460 unsigned char *q;
1461 int j,num;
1462 RSA *rsa;
1463 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1464 unsigned int u;
1465 #endif
1466 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1467 DH *dh=NULL,*dhp;
1468 #endif
1469 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1470 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1471 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1472 int encodedlen = 0;
1473 int curve_id = 0;
1474 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1475 #endif
1476 EVP_PKEY *pkey;
1477 unsigned char *p,*d;
1478 int al,i;
1479 unsigned long type;
1480 int n;
1481 CERT *cert;
1482 BIGNUM *r[4];
1483 int nr[4],kn;
1484 BUF_MEM *buf;
1485 EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
1486
1487 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1488 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1489 {
1490 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1491 cert=s->cert;
1492
1493 buf=s->init_buf;
1494
1495 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1496 n=0;
1497 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1498 if (type & SSL_kRSA)
1499 {
1500 rsa=cert->rsa_tmp;
1501 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1502 {
1503 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1504 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1505 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1506 if(rsa == NULL)
1507 {
1508 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1509 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1510 goto f_err;
1511 }
1512 RSA_up_ref(rsa);
1513 cert->rsa_tmp=rsa;
1514 }
1515 if (rsa == NULL)
1516 {
1517 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1518 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1519 goto f_err;
1520 }
1521 r[0]=rsa->n;
1522 r[1]=rsa->e;
1523 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1524 }
1525 else
1526 #endif
1527 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1528 if (type & SSL_kEDH)
1529 {
1530 dhp=cert->dh_tmp;
1531 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1532 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1533 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1534 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1535 if (dhp == NULL)
1536 {
1537 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1538 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1539 goto f_err;
1540 }
1541
1542 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1543 {
1544 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1545 goto err;
1546 }
1547
1548 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1549 {
1550 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1551 goto err;
1552 }
1553
1554 s->s3->tmp.dh=dh;
1555 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1556 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1557 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1558 {
1559 if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1560 {
1561 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1562 ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1563 goto err;
1564 }
1565 }
1566 else
1567 {
1568 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1569 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1570 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1571 (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1572 {
1573 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1574 goto err;
1575 }
1576 }
1577 r[0]=dh->p;
1578 r[1]=dh->g;
1579 r[2]=dh->pub_key;
1580 }
1581 else
1582 #endif
1583 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1584 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1585 {
1586 const EC_GROUP *group;
1587
1588 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1589 if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1590 {
1591 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1592 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1593 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1594 }
1595 if (ecdhp == NULL)
1596 {
1597 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1598 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1599 goto f_err;
1600 }
1601
1602 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1603 {
1604 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1605 goto err;
1606 }
1607
1608 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1609 if (ecdhp == NULL)
1610 {
1611 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1612 goto err;
1613 }
1614 if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL)
1615 {
1616 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1617 goto err;
1618 }
1619
1620 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1621 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1622 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1623 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1624 {
1625 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1626 {
1627 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1628 goto err;
1629 }
1630 }
1631
1632 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1633 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1634 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
1635 {
1636 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1637 goto err;
1638 }
1639
1640 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1641 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
1642 {
1643 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1644 goto err;
1645 }
1646
1647 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1648 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1649 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1650 */
1651 if ((curve_id =
1652 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1653 == 0)
1654 {
1655 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1656 goto err;
1657 }
1658
1659 /* Encode the public key.
1660 * First check the size of encoding and
1661 * allocate memory accordingly.
1662 */
1663 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1664 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1665 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1666 NULL, 0, NULL);
1667
1668 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1669 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1670 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1671 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1672 {
1673 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1674 goto err;
1675 }
1676
1677
1678 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1679 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1680 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1681 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1682
1683 if (encodedlen == 0)
1684 {
1685 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1686 goto err;
1687 }
1688
1689 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1690
1691 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1692 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1693 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1694 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1695 * structure.
1696 */
1697 n = 4 + encodedlen;
1698
1699 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1700 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1701 */
1702 r[0]=NULL;
1703 r[1]=NULL;
1704 r[2]=NULL;
1705 r[3]=NULL;
1706 }
1707 else
1708 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1709 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1710 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1711 {
1712 /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
1713 n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1714 }
1715 else
1716 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1717 {
1718 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1719 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1720 goto f_err;
1721 }
1722 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
1723 {
1724 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1725 n+=2+nr[i];
1726 }
1727
1728 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
1729 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
1730 {
1731 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
1732 == NULL)
1733 {
1734 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1735 goto f_err;
1736 }
1737 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1738 }
1739 else
1740 {
1741 pkey=NULL;
1742 kn=0;
1743 }
1744
1745 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn))
1746 {
1747 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1748 goto err;
1749 }
1750 d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1751 p= &(d[4]);
1752
1753 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
1754 {
1755 s2n(nr[i],p);
1756 BN_bn2bin(r[i],p);
1757 p+=nr[i];
1758 }
1759
1760 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1761 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1762 {
1763 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1764 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1765 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1766 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1767 * the actual encoded point itself
1768 */
1769 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1770 p += 1;
1771 *p = 0;
1772 p += 1;
1773 *p = curve_id;
1774 p += 1;
1775 *p = encodedlen;
1776 p += 1;
1777 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
1778 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
1779 encodedlen);
1780 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1781 encodedPoint = NULL;
1782 p += encodedlen;
1783 }
1784 #endif
1785
1786 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1787 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1788 {
1789 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1790 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
1791 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
1792 p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1793 }
1794 #endif
1795
1796 /* not anonymous */
1797 if (pkey != NULL)
1798 {
1799 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1800 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1801 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1802 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1803 {
1804 q=md_buf;
1805 j=0;
1806 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
1807 {
1808 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
1809 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1810 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1811 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1812 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1813 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
1814 (unsigned int *)&i);
1815 q+=i;
1816 j+=i;
1817 }
1818 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1819 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
1820 {
1821 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
1822 goto err;
1823 }
1824 s2n(u,p);
1825 n+=u+2;
1826 }
1827 else
1828 #endif
1829 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA)
1830 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
1831 {
1832 /* lets do DSS */
1833 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_dss1(), NULL);
1834 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1835 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1836 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1837 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1838 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1839 {
1840 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_DSA);
1841 goto err;
1842 }
1843 s2n(i,p);
1844 n+=i+2;
1845 }
1846 else
1847 #endif
1848 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA)
1849 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
1850 {
1851 /* let's do ECDSA */
1852 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL);
1853 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1854 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1855 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1856 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1857 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1858 {
1859 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_ECDSA);
1860 goto err;
1861 }
1862 s2n(i,p);
1863 n+=i+2;
1864 }
1865 else
1866 #endif
1867 {
1868 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1869 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1870 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
1871 goto f_err;
1872 }
1873 }
1874
1875 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
1876 l2n3(n,d);
1877
1878 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1879 * it off */
1880 s->init_num=n+4;
1881 s->init_off=0;
1882 }
1883
1884 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
1885 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1886 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1887 f_err:
1888 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1889 err:
1890 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1891 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1892 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1893 #endif
1894 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1895 return(-1);
1896 }
1897
ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL * s)1898 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
1899 {
1900 unsigned char *p,*d;
1901 int i,j,nl,off,n;
1902 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
1903 X509_NAME *name;
1904 BUF_MEM *buf;
1905
1906 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
1907 {
1908 buf=s->init_buf;
1909
1910 d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
1911
1912 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
1913 p++;
1914 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
1915 d[0]=n;
1916 p+=n;
1917 n++;
1918
1919 off=n;
1920 p+=2;
1921 n+=2;
1922
1923 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
1924 nl=0;
1925 if (sk != NULL)
1926 {
1927 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
1928 {
1929 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
1930 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
1931 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2))
1932 {
1933 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
1934 goto err;
1935 }
1936 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]);
1937 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
1938 {
1939 s2n(j,p);
1940 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
1941 n+=2+j;
1942 nl+=2+j;
1943 }
1944 else
1945 {
1946 d=p;
1947 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
1948 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
1949 n+=j;
1950 nl+=j;
1951 }
1952 }
1953 }
1954 /* else no CA names */
1955 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]);
1956 s2n(nl,p);
1957
1958 d=(unsigned char *)buf->data;
1959 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
1960 l2n3(n,d);
1961
1962 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1963 * it off */
1964
1965 s->init_num=n+4;
1966 s->init_off=0;
1967 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
1968 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
1969
1970 /* do the header */
1971 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1972 *(p++)=0;
1973 *(p++)=0;
1974 *(p++)=0;
1975 s->init_num += 4;
1976 #endif
1977
1978 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
1979 }
1980
1981 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
1982 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1983 err:
1984 return(-1);
1985 }
1986
ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL * s)1987 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1988 {
1989 int i,al,ok;
1990 long n;
1991 unsigned long alg_k;
1992 unsigned char *p;
1993 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1994 RSA *rsa=NULL;
1995 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
1996 #endif
1997 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1998 BIGNUM *pub=NULL;
1999 DH *dh_srvr;
2000 #endif
2001 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2002 KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
2003 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2004
2005 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2006 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
2007 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
2008 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
2009 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2010 #endif
2011
2012 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2013 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
2014 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
2015 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2016 2048, /* ??? */
2017 &ok);
2018
2019 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2020 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2021
2022 alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2023
2024 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2025 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
2026 {
2027 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2028 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
2029 {
2030 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
2031 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
2032 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
2033 * be sent already */
2034 if (rsa == NULL)
2035 {
2036 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2037 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
2038 goto f_err;
2039
2040 }
2041 }
2042 else
2043 {
2044 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
2045 if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
2046 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
2047 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
2048 {
2049 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2050 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2051 goto f_err;
2052 }
2053 rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa;
2054 }
2055
2056 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2057 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2058 {
2059 n2s(p,i);
2060 if (n != i+2)
2061 {
2062 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
2063 {
2064 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2065 goto err;
2066 }
2067 else
2068 p-=2;
2069 }
2070 else
2071 n=i;
2072 }
2073
2074 i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2075
2076 al = -1;
2077
2078 if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2079 {
2080 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2081 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
2082 }
2083
2084 if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2085 {
2086 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2087 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2088 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2089 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2090 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2091 * protocol version.
2092 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
2093 if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
2094 (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
2095 {
2096 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2097 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
2098
2099 /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2100 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
2101 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
2102 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
2103 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
2104 * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
2105 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
2106 }
2107 }
2108
2109 if (al != -1)
2110 {
2111 /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
2112 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
2113 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
2114 ERR_clear_error();
2115 i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2116 p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2117 p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2118 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
2119 goto err;
2120 }
2121
2122 s->session->master_key_length=
2123 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2124 s->session->master_key,
2125 p,i);
2126 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2127 }
2128 else
2129 #endif
2130 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2131 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
2132 {
2133 n2s(p,i);
2134 if (n != i+2)
2135 {
2136 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
2137 {
2138 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2139 goto err;
2140 }
2141 else
2142 {
2143 p-=2;
2144 i=(int)n;
2145 }
2146 }
2147
2148 if (n == 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */
2149 {
2150 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2151 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS);
2152 goto f_err;
2153 }
2154 else
2155 {
2156 if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
2157 {
2158 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2159 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2160 goto f_err;
2161 }
2162 else
2163 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
2164 }
2165
2166 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
2167 if (pub == NULL)
2168 {
2169 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2170 goto err;
2171 }
2172
2173 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
2174
2175 if (i <= 0)
2176 {
2177 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2178 goto err;
2179 }
2180
2181 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2182 s->s3->tmp.dh=NULL;
2183
2184 BN_clear_free(pub);
2185 pub=NULL;
2186 s->session->master_key_length=
2187 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2188 s->session->master_key,p,i);
2189 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2190 }
2191 else
2192 #endif
2193 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2194 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
2195 {
2196 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2197 krb5_data enc_ticket;
2198 krb5_data authenticator;
2199 krb5_data enc_pms;
2200 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2201 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2202 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2203 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2204 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
2205 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
2206 int padl, outl;
2207 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
2208 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
2209
2210 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2211
2212 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
2213
2214 n2s(p,i);
2215 enc_ticket.length = i;
2216
2217 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6))
2218 {
2219 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2220 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2221 goto err;
2222 }
2223
2224 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2225 p+=enc_ticket.length;
2226
2227 n2s(p,i);
2228 authenticator.length = i;
2229
2230 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6))
2231 {
2232 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2233 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2234 goto err;
2235 }
2236
2237 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2238 p+=authenticator.length;
2239
2240 n2s(p,i);
2241 enc_pms.length = i;
2242 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2243 p+=enc_pms.length;
2244
2245 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
2246 ** after decryption
2247 */
2248 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
2249 {
2250 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2251 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2252 goto err;
2253 }
2254
2255 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2256 enc_pms.length + 6))
2257 {
2258 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2259 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2260 goto err;
2261 }
2262
2263 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2264 &kssl_err)) != 0)
2265 {
2266 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
2267 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2268 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2269 if (kssl_err.text)
2270 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2271 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2272 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2273 kssl_err.reason);
2274 goto err;
2275 }
2276
2277 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2278 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2279 */
2280 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2281 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
2282 {
2283 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
2284 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2285 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2286 if (kssl_err.text)
2287 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2288 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2289 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2290 kssl_err.reason);
2291 goto err;
2292 }
2293
2294 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
2295 {
2296 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2297 goto err;
2298 }
2299
2300 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
2301 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2302 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2303
2304 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2305 if (enc == NULL)
2306 goto err;
2307
2308 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2309
2310 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
2311 {
2312 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2313 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2314 goto err;
2315 }
2316 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
2317 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2318 {
2319 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2320 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2321 goto err;
2322 }
2323 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2324 {
2325 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2326 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2327 goto err;
2328 }
2329 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
2330 {
2331 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2332 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2333 goto err;
2334 }
2335 outl += padl;
2336 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2337 {
2338 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2339 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2340 goto err;
2341 }
2342 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2343 {
2344 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2345 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2346 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2347 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2348 * the protocol version.
2349 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2350 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2351 */
2352 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG))
2353 {
2354 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2355 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2356 goto err;
2357 }
2358 }
2359
2360 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2361
2362 s->session->master_key_length=
2363 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2364 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
2365
2366 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
2367 {
2368 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2369 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
2370 {
2371 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2372 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
2373 }
2374 }
2375
2376
2377 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2378 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2379 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2380 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2381 */
2382 }
2383 else
2384 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2385
2386 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2387 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2388 {
2389 int ret = 1;
2390 int field_size = 0;
2391 const EC_KEY *tkey;
2392 const EC_GROUP *group;
2393 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2394
2395 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2396 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
2397 {
2398 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2399 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2400 goto err;
2401 }
2402
2403 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2404 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2405 {
2406 /* use the certificate */
2407 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2408 }
2409 else
2410 {
2411 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2412 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2413 */
2414 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2415 }
2416
2417 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2418 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2419
2420 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2421 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
2422 {
2423 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2424 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2425 goto err;
2426 }
2427
2428 /* Let's get client's public key */
2429 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
2430 {
2431 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2432 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2433 goto err;
2434 }
2435
2436 if (n == 0L)
2437 {
2438 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2439
2440 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
2441 {
2442 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2443 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2444 goto f_err;
2445 }
2446 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2447 == NULL) ||
2448 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
2449 {
2450 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2451 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2452 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2453 * never executed. When that support is
2454 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2455 * received in the certificate is
2456 * authorized for key agreement.
2457 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2458 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2459 * group.
2460 */
2461 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2462 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2463 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2464 goto f_err;
2465 }
2466
2467 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2468 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
2469 {
2470 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2471 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2472 goto err;
2473 }
2474 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2475 }
2476 else
2477 {
2478 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2479 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2480 */
2481 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
2482 {
2483 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2484 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2485 goto err;
2486 }
2487
2488 /* Get encoded point length */
2489 i = *p;
2490 p += 1;
2491 if (n != 1 + i)
2492 {
2493 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2494 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2495 goto err;
2496 }
2497 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
2498 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
2499 {
2500 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2501 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2502 goto err;
2503 }
2504 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2505 * currently, so set it to the start
2506 */
2507 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2508 }
2509
2510 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2511 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2512 if (field_size <= 0)
2513 {
2514 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2515 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2516 goto err;
2517 }
2518 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
2519 if (i <= 0)
2520 {
2521 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2522 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2523 goto err;
2524 }
2525
2526 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2527 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2528 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2529 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2530 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2531 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2532
2533 /* Compute the master secret */
2534 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
2535 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
2536
2537 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2538 return (ret);
2539 }
2540 else
2541 #endif
2542 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2543 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
2544 {
2545 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2546 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
2547 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2548 int psk_err = 1;
2549 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
2550
2551 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2552
2553 n2s(p,i);
2554 if (n != i+2)
2555 {
2556 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2557 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2558 goto psk_err;
2559 }
2560 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
2561 {
2562 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2563 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2564 goto psk_err;
2565 }
2566 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL)
2567 {
2568 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2569 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2570 goto psk_err;
2571 }
2572
2573 /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity
2574 * string for the callback */
2575 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2576 memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
2577 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2578 psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2579 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1);
2580
2581 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
2582 {
2583 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2584 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2585 goto psk_err;
2586 }
2587 else if (psk_len == 0)
2588 {
2589 /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
2590 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2591 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2592 al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2593 goto psk_err;
2594 }
2595
2596 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2597 pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
2598 t = psk_or_pre_ms;
2599 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
2600 s2n(psk_len, t);
2601 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2602 t+=psk_len;
2603 s2n(psk_len, t);
2604
2605 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2606 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2607 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
2608 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
2609 {
2610 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2611 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2612 goto psk_err;
2613 }
2614
2615 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2616 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2617 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2618 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2619 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2620 {
2621 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2622 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2623 goto psk_err;
2624 }
2625
2626 s->session->master_key_length=
2627 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2628 s->session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
2629 psk_err = 0;
2630 psk_err:
2631 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2632 if (psk_err != 0)
2633 goto f_err;
2634 }
2635 else
2636 #endif
2637 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)
2638 {
2639 int ret = 0;
2640 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2641 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2642 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2643 size_t outlen=32, inlen;
2644 unsigned long alg_a;
2645
2646 /* Get our certificate private key*/
2647 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2648 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
2649 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
2650 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
2651 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2652
2653 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk,NULL);
2654 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2655 /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2656 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2657 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use
2658 * a client certificate for authorization only. */
2659 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2660 if (client_pub_pkey)
2661 {
2662 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2663 ERR_clear_error();
2664 }
2665 /* Decrypt session key */
2666 if ((*p!=( V_ASN1_SEQUENCE| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)))
2667 {
2668 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2669 goto gerr;
2670 }
2671 if (p[1] == 0x81)
2672 {
2673 start = p+3;
2674 inlen = p[2];
2675 }
2676 else if (p[1] < 0x80)
2677 {
2678 start = p+2;
2679 inlen = p[1];
2680 }
2681 else
2682 {
2683 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2684 goto gerr;
2685 }
2686 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,start,inlen) <=0)
2687
2688 {
2689 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2690 goto gerr;
2691 }
2692 /* Generate master secret */
2693 s->session->master_key_length=
2694 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2695 s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32);
2696 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2697 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2698 ret = 2;
2699 else
2700 ret = 1;
2701 gerr:
2702 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2703 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2704 if (ret)
2705 return ret;
2706 else
2707 goto err;
2708 }
2709 else
2710 {
2711 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2712 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2713 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2714 goto f_err;
2715 }
2716
2717 return(1);
2718 f_err:
2719 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2720 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH)
2721 err:
2722 #endif
2723 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2724 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2725 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2726 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2727 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2728 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2729 #endif
2730 return(-1);
2731 }
2732
ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL * s)2733 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2734 {
2735 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2736 unsigned char *p;
2737 int al,ok,ret=0;
2738 long n;
2739 int type=0,i,j;
2740 X509 *peer;
2741
2742 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2743 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2744 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2745 -1,
2746 514, /* 514? */
2747 &ok);
2748
2749 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2750
2751 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
2752 {
2753 peer=s->session->peer;
2754 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2755 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
2756 }
2757 else
2758 {
2759 peer=NULL;
2760 pkey=NULL;
2761 }
2762
2763 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
2764 {
2765 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2766 if ((peer != NULL) && (type | EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2767 {
2768 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2769 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
2770 goto f_err;
2771 }
2772 ret=1;
2773 goto end;
2774 }
2775
2776 if (peer == NULL)
2777 {
2778 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
2779 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2780 goto f_err;
2781 }
2782
2783 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2784 {
2785 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2786 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2787 goto f_err;
2788 }
2789
2790 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
2791 {
2792 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
2793 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2794 goto f_err;
2795 }
2796
2797 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
2798 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2799 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
2800 /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare
2801 * signature without length field */
2802 if (n==64 && (pkey->type==NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
2803 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) )
2804 {
2805 i=64;
2806 }
2807 else
2808 {
2809 n2s(p,i);
2810 n-=2;
2811 if (i > n)
2812 {
2813 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2814 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2815 goto f_err;
2816 }
2817 }
2818 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2819 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
2820 {
2821 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
2822 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2823 goto f_err;
2824 }
2825
2826 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2827 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2828 {
2829 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
2830 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
2831 pkey->pkey.rsa);
2832 if (i < 0)
2833 {
2834 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2835 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
2836 goto f_err;
2837 }
2838 if (i == 0)
2839 {
2840 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2841 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
2842 goto f_err;
2843 }
2844 }
2845 else
2846 #endif
2847 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2848 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
2849 {
2850 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2851 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2852 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
2853 if (j <= 0)
2854 {
2855 /* bad signature */
2856 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2857 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
2858 goto f_err;
2859 }
2860 }
2861 else
2862 #endif
2863 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2864 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
2865 {
2866 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2867 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2868 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
2869 if (j <= 0)
2870 {
2871 /* bad signature */
2872 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2873 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2874 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
2875 goto f_err;
2876 }
2877 }
2878 else
2879 #endif
2880 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)
2881 { unsigned char signature[64];
2882 int idx;
2883 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL);
2884 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
2885 if (i!=64) {
2886 fprintf(stderr,"GOST signature length is %d",i);
2887 }
2888 for (idx=0;idx<64;idx++) {
2889 signature[63-idx]=p[idx];
2890 }
2891 j=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx,signature,64,s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,32);
2892 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2893 if (j<=0)
2894 {
2895 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2896 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2897 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
2898 goto f_err;
2899 }
2900 }
2901 else
2902 {
2903 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2904 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
2905 goto f_err;
2906 }
2907
2908
2909 ret=1;
2910 if (0)
2911 {
2912 f_err:
2913 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2914 }
2915 end:
2916 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
2917 return(ret);
2918 }
2919
ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL * s)2920 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
2921 {
2922 int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
2923 X509 *x=NULL;
2924 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
2925 const unsigned char *p,*q;
2926 unsigned char *d;
2927 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
2928
2929 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2930 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
2931 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
2932 -1,
2933 s->max_cert_list,
2934 &ok);
2935
2936 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2937
2938 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
2939 {
2940 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2941 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
2942 {
2943 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2944 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2945 goto f_err;
2946 }
2947 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
2948 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
2949 {
2950 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
2951 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2952 goto f_err;
2953 }
2954 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2955 return(1);
2956 }
2957
2958 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
2959 {
2960 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2961 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
2962 goto f_err;
2963 }
2964 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2965
2966 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
2967 {
2968 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2969 goto err;
2970 }
2971
2972 n2l3(p,llen);
2973 if (llen+3 != n)
2974 {
2975 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2976 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2977 goto f_err;
2978 }
2979 for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
2980 {
2981 n2l3(p,l);
2982 if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
2983 {
2984 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2985 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2986 goto f_err;
2987 }
2988
2989 q=p;
2990 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
2991 if (x == NULL)
2992 {
2993 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2994 goto err;
2995 }
2996 if (p != (q+l))
2997 {
2998 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2999 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3000 goto f_err;
3001 }
3002 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
3003 {
3004 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3005 goto err;
3006 }
3007 x=NULL;
3008 nc+=l+3;
3009 }
3010
3011 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
3012 {
3013 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3014 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
3015 {
3016 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3017 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3018 goto f_err;
3019 }
3020 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3021 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3022 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3023 {
3024 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3025 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3026 goto f_err;
3027 }
3028 }
3029 else
3030 {
3031 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
3032 if (i <= 0)
3033 {
3034 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3035 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
3036 goto f_err;
3037 }
3038 }
3039
3040 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
3041 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3042 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
3043 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3044
3045 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
3046 * when we arrive here. */
3047 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3048 {
3049 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
3050 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3051 {
3052 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3053 goto err;
3054 }
3055 }
3056 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
3057 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
3058 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
3059 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
3060 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
3061
3062 sk=NULL;
3063
3064 ret=1;
3065 if (0)
3066 {
3067 f_err:
3068 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3069 }
3070 err:
3071 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
3072 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
3073 return(ret);
3074 }
3075
ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL * s)3076 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3077 {
3078 unsigned long l;
3079 X509 *x;
3080
3081 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
3082 {
3083 x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
3084 if (x == NULL)
3085 {
3086 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3087 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
3088 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5))
3089 {
3090 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3091 return(0);
3092 }
3093 }
3094
3095 l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x);
3096 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
3097 s->init_num=(int)l;
3098 s->init_off=0;
3099 }
3100
3101 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3102 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3103 }
3104 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL * s)3105 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
3106 {
3107 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
3108 {
3109 unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
3110 int len, slen;
3111 unsigned int hlen;
3112 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
3113 HMAC_CTX hctx;
3114 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3115 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3116 unsigned char key_name[16];
3117
3118 /* get session encoding length */
3119 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3120 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
3121 * too long
3122 */
3123 if (slen > 0xFF00)
3124 return -1;
3125 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3126 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
3127 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3128 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3129 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3130 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3131 */
3132 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3133 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
3134 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3135 return -1;
3136 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen);
3137 if (!senc)
3138 return -1;
3139 p = senc;
3140 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
3141
3142 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3143 /* do the header */
3144 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
3145 /* Skip message length for now */
3146 p += 3;
3147 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3148 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3149 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
3150 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
3151 * from parent ctx.
3152 */
3153 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3154 {
3155 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
3156 &hctx, 1) < 0)
3157 {
3158 OPENSSL_free(senc);
3159 return -1;
3160 }
3161 }
3162 else
3163 {
3164 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
3165 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3166 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
3167 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3168 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3169 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3170 }
3171 l2n(s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint, p);
3172 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3173 p += 2;
3174 /* Output key name */
3175 macstart = p;
3176 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3177 p += 16;
3178 /* output IV */
3179 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3180 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3181 /* Encrypt session data */
3182 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
3183 p += len;
3184 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
3185 p += len;
3186 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3187
3188 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
3189 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
3190 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3191
3192 p += hlen;
3193 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3194 /* Total length */
3195 len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3196 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1;
3197 l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */
3198 p += 4;
3199 s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */
3200
3201 /* number of bytes to write */
3202 s->init_num= len;
3203 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3204 s->init_off=0;
3205 OPENSSL_free(senc);
3206 }
3207
3208 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3209 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3210 }
3211
ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL * s)3212 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3213 {
3214 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
3215 {
3216 unsigned char *p;
3217 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3218 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3219 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3220 * + (ocsp response)
3221 */
3222 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
3223 return -1;
3224
3225 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3226
3227 /* do the header */
3228 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3229 /* message length */
3230 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3231 /* status type */
3232 *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
3233 /* length of OCSP response */
3234 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3235 /* actual response */
3236 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3237 /* number of bytes to write */
3238 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3239 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3240 s->init_off = 0;
3241 }
3242
3243 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3244 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3245 }
3246
3247 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NPN
3248 /* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It
3249 * sets the next_proto member in s if found */
ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL * s)3250 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
3251 {
3252 int ok;
3253 unsigned proto_len, padding_len;
3254 long n;
3255 const unsigned char *p;
3256
3257 /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3258 * extension in their ClientHello */
3259 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
3260 {
3261 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
3262 return -1;
3263 }
3264
3265 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3266 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
3267 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
3268 SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO,
3269 514, /* See the payload format below */
3270 &ok);
3271
3272 if (!ok)
3273 return((int)n);
3274
3275 /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received
3276 * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset
3277 * by ssl3_get_finished). */
3278 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
3279 {
3280 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
3281 return -1;
3282 }
3283
3284 if (n < 2)
3285 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3286
3287 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3288
3289 /* The payload looks like:
3290 * uint8 proto_len;
3291 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3292 * uint8 padding_len;
3293 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3294 */
3295 proto_len = p[0];
3296 if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num)
3297 return 0;
3298 padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
3299 if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num)
3300 return 0;
3301
3302 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
3303 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
3304 {
3305 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3306 return 0;
3307 }
3308 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
3309 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;
3310
3311 return 1;
3312 }
3313 # endif
3314 #endif
3315