1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
113 *
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
116 *
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
119 *
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
122 *
123 */
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
126 *
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
129 * license.
130 *
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
134 *
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
138 *
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
143 *
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
148 * OTHERWISE.
149 */
150
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
153
154 #include <stdio.h>
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
158 #include <openssl/rand.h>
159 #include <openssl/objects.h>
160 #include <openssl/evp.h>
161 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
162 #include <openssl/x509.h>
163 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
164 #include <openssl/dh.h>
165 #endif
166 #include <openssl/bn.h>
167 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
168 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
169 #endif
170 #include <openssl/md5.h>
171
172 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
173
ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)174 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
175 {
176 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
177 return(SSLv3_server_method());
178 else
179 return(NULL);
180 }
181
182 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL * s,int * al)183 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
184 {
185 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
186
187 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
188
189 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
190 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL))
191 {
192 if(s->srp_ctx.login == NULL)
193 {
194 /* There isn't any srp login extension !!! */
195 ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
196 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
197 }
198 else
199 {
200 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s,al);
201 }
202 }
203 return ret;
204 }
205 #endif
206
IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,ssl3_accept,ssl_undefined_function,ssl3_get_server_method)207 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
208 ssl3_accept,
209 ssl_undefined_function,
210 ssl3_get_server_method)
211
212 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
213 {
214 BUF_MEM *buf;
215 unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
216 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
217 int ret= -1;
218 int new_state,state,skip=0;
219
220 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
221 ERR_clear_error();
222 clear_sys_error();
223
224 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
225 cb=s->info_callback;
226 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
227 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
228
229 /* init things to blank */
230 s->in_handshake++;
231 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
232
233 if (s->cert == NULL)
234 {
235 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
236 return(-1);
237 }
238
239 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
240 /* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we
241 * already got and don't await it anymore, because
242 * Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway.
243 */
244 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
245 {
246 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
247 s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
248 }
249 #endif
250
251 for (;;)
252 {
253 state=s->state;
254
255 switch (s->state)
256 {
257 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
258 s->renegotiate=1;
259 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
260
261 case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
262 case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
263 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
264 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
265
266 s->server=1;
267 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
268
269 if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
270 {
271 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
272 return -1;
273 }
274 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
275
276 if (s->init_buf == NULL)
277 {
278 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
279 {
280 ret= -1;
281 goto end;
282 }
283 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
284 {
285 ret= -1;
286 goto end;
287 }
288 s->init_buf=buf;
289 }
290
291 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
292 {
293 ret= -1;
294 goto end;
295 }
296
297 s->init_num=0;
298 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
299
300 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
301 {
302 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
303 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
304 */
305 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
306
307 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
308 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
309 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
310 }
311 else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
312 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
313 {
314 /* Server attempting to renegotiate with
315 * client that doesn't support secure
316 * renegotiation.
317 */
318 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
319 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
320 ret = -1;
321 goto end;
322 }
323 else
324 {
325 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
326 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
327 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
328 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
329 }
330 break;
331
332 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
333 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
334
335 s->shutdown=0;
336 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
337 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
338 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
339 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
340 s->init_num=0;
341
342 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
343 break;
344
345 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
346 s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
347 break;
348
349 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
350 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
351 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
352
353 s->shutdown=0;
354 if (s->rwstate != SSL_X509_LOOKUP)
355 {
356 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
357 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
358 }
359 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
360 {
361 int al;
362 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s,&al)) < 0)
363 {
364 /* callback indicates firther work to be done */
365 s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
366 goto end;
367 }
368 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE)
369 {
370 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
371 /* This is not really an error but the only means to
372 for a client to detect whether srp is supported. */
373 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
374 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
375 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
376 ret= -1;
377 goto end;
378 }
379 }
380 #endif
381 s->renegotiate = 2;
382 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
383 s->init_num=0;
384 break;
385
386 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
387 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
388 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
389 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
390 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
391 if (s->hit)
392 {
393 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
394 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
395 else
396 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
397 }
398 #else
399 if (s->hit)
400 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
401 #endif
402 else
403 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
404 s->init_num=0;
405 break;
406
407 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
408 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
409 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
410 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
411 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
412 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)
413 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
414 {
415 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
416 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
417 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
418 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
419 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
420 else
421 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
422 }
423 else
424 {
425 skip = 1;
426 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
427 }
428 #else
429 }
430 else
431 skip=1;
432
433 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
434 #endif
435 s->init_num=0;
436 break;
437
438 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
439 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
440 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
441
442 /* clear this, it may get reset by
443 * send_server_key_exchange */
444 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
445 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
446 && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
447 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
448 )
449 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
450 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
451 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
452 * be able to handle this) */
453 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
454 else
455 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
456
457
458 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
459 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
460 *
461 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints
462 *
463 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
464 * message only if the cipher suite is either
465 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
466 * server certificate contains the server's
467 * public key for key exchange.
468 */
469 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
470 /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
471 * hint if provided */
472 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
473 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
474 #endif
475 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
476 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
477 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
478 #endif
479 || (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd|SSL_kEDH))
480 || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
481 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
482 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
483 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
484 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
485 )
486 )
487 )
488 )
489 {
490 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
491 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
492 }
493 else
494 skip=1;
495
496 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
497 s->init_num=0;
498 break;
499
500 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
501 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
502 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
503 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
504 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
505 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
506 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
507 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
508 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
509 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
510 * and in RFC 2246): */
511 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
512 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
513 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
514 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
515 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
516 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)
517 /* With normal PSK Certificates and
518 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
519 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
520 {
521 /* no cert request */
522 skip=1;
523 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
524 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
525 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
526 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
527 return -1;
528 }
529 else
530 {
531 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
532 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
533 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
534 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
535 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
536 #else
537 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
538 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
539 #endif
540 s->init_num=0;
541 }
542 break;
543
544 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
545 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
546 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
547 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
548 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
549 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
550 s->init_num=0;
551 break;
552
553 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
554
555 /* This code originally checked to see if
556 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
557 * and then flushed. This caused problems
558 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
559 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
560 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
561 * still exist. So instead we just flush
562 * unconditionally.
563 */
564
565 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
566 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
567 {
568 ret= -1;
569 goto end;
570 }
571 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
572
573 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
574 break;
575
576 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
577 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
578 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
579 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
580 if (ret <= 0)
581 goto end;
582 if (ret == 2)
583 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
584 else {
585 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
586 {
587 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
588 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
589 }
590 s->init_num=0;
591 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
592 }
593 break;
594
595 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
596 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
597 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
598 if (ret <= 0)
599 goto end;
600 if (ret == 2)
601 {
602 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
603 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
604 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
605 * message is not sent.
606 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when
607 * the client uses its key from the certificate
608 * for key exchange.
609 */
610 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
611 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
612 #else
613 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
614 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
615 else
616 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
617 #endif
618 s->init_num = 0;
619 }
620 else if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
621 {
622 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
623 s->init_num=0;
624 if (!s->session->peer)
625 break;
626 /* For TLS v1.2 freeze the handshake buffer
627 * at this point and digest cached records.
628 */
629 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer)
630 {
631 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
632 return -1;
633 }
634 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
635 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
636 return -1;
637 }
638 else
639 {
640 int offset=0;
641 int dgst_num;
642
643 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
644 s->init_num=0;
645
646 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
647 * a client cert, it can be verified
648 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
649 * should be generalized. But it is next step
650 */
651 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
652 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
653 return -1;
654 for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_num++)
655 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num])
656 {
657 int dgst_size;
658
659 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset]));
660 dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
661 if (dgst_size < 0)
662 {
663 ret = -1;
664 goto end;
665 }
666 offset+=dgst_size;
667 }
668 }
669 break;
670
671 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
672 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
673
674 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
675 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
676 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
677
678 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
679 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
680 #else
681 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
682 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
683 else
684 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
685 #endif
686 s->init_num=0;
687 break;
688
689 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
690 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
691 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
692 ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
693 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
694 s->init_num = 0;
695 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
696 break;
697 #endif
698
699 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
700 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
701 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
702 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
703 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
704 if (s->hit)
705 s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
706 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
707 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
708 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
709 #endif
710 else
711 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
712 s->init_num=0;
713 break;
714
715 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
716 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
717 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
718 ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
719 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
720 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
721 s->init_num=0;
722 break;
723
724 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
725 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
726 ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
727 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
728 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
729 s->init_num=0;
730 break;
731
732 #endif
733
734 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
735 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
736
737 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
738 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
739 { ret= -1; goto end; }
740
741 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
742 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
743
744 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
745 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
746 s->init_num=0;
747
748 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
749 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
750 {
751 ret= -1;
752 goto end;
753 }
754
755 break;
756
757 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
758 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
759 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
760 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
761 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
762 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
763 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
764 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
765 if (s->hit)
766 {
767 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
768 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
769 #else
770 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
771 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
772 else
773 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
774 #endif
775 }
776 else
777 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
778 s->init_num=0;
779 break;
780
781 case SSL_ST_OK:
782 /* clean a few things up */
783 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
784
785 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
786 s->init_buf=NULL;
787
788 /* remove buffering on output */
789 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
790
791 s->init_num=0;
792
793 if (s->renegotiate == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
794 {
795 s->renegotiate=0;
796 s->new_session=0;
797
798 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
799
800 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
801 /* s->server=1; */
802 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
803
804 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
805 }
806
807 ret = 1;
808 goto end;
809 /* break; */
810
811 default:
812 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
813 ret= -1;
814 goto end;
815 /* break; */
816 }
817
818 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
819 {
820 if (s->debug)
821 {
822 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
823 goto end;
824 }
825
826
827 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
828 {
829 new_state=s->state;
830 s->state=state;
831 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
832 s->state=new_state;
833 }
834 }
835 skip=0;
836 }
837 end:
838 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
839
840 s->in_handshake--;
841 if (cb != NULL)
842 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
843 return(ret);
844 }
845
ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL * s)846 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
847 {
848 unsigned char *p;
849
850 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
851 {
852 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
853 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
854 *(p++)=0;
855 *(p++)=0;
856 *(p++)=0;
857
858 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
859 /* number of bytes to write */
860 s->init_num=4;
861 s->init_off=0;
862 }
863
864 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
865 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
866 }
867
ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL * s)868 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
869 {
870 int ok;
871 long n;
872
873 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
874 * so permit appropriate message length */
875 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
876 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
877 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
878 -1,
879 s->max_cert_list,
880 &ok);
881 if (!ok) return((int)n);
882 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
883 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
884 {
885 /* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per
886 * negotiation. */
887 if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE)
888 {
889 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS);
890 return -1;
891 }
892 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
893 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) */
894 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
895 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
896 {
897 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
898 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
899 }
900 #endif
901 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
902 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
903 {
904 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
905 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
906 }
907 #endif
908 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
909 return 2;
910 }
911 return 1;
912 }
913
ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL * s)914 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
915 {
916 int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1;
917 unsigned int cookie_len;
918 long n;
919 unsigned long id;
920 unsigned char *p,*d,*q;
921 SSL_CIPHER *c;
922 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
923 SSL_COMP *comp=NULL;
924 #endif
925 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
926
927 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
928 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
929 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
930 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
931 * TLSv1.
932 */
933 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
934 )
935 {
936 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
937 }
938 s->first_packet=1;
939 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
940 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
941 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
942 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
943 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
944 &ok);
945
946 if (!ok) return((int)n);
947 s->first_packet=0;
948 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
949
950 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
951 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
952 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
953 p+=2;
954
955 if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) ||
956 (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version))
957 {
958 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
959 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
960 {
961 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
962 s->version = s->client_version;
963 }
964 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
965 goto f_err;
966 }
967
968 /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
969 * contain one, just return since we do not want to
970 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
971 */
972 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)
973 {
974 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
975
976 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
977 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
978
979 if (cookie_length == 0)
980 return 1;
981 }
982
983 /* load the client random */
984 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
985 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
986
987 /* get the session-id */
988 j= *(p++);
989
990 s->hit=0;
991 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in renegotiation.
992 * 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally ignore resumption requests
993 * with flag SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
994 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this for security
995 * won't even compile against older library versions).
996 *
997 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to request
998 * renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains unset): for servers,
999 * this essentially just means that the SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1000 * setting will be ignored.
1001 */
1002 if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
1003 {
1004 if (!s->session_creation_enabled)
1005 {
1006 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1007 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_SESSION_MAY_NOT_BE_CREATED);
1008 goto err;
1009 }
1010 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1011 goto err;
1012 }
1013 else
1014 {
1015 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
1016 if (i == 1)
1017 { /* previous session */
1018 s->hit=1;
1019 }
1020 else if (i == -1)
1021 goto err;
1022 else /* i == 0 */
1023 {
1024 if (!s->session_creation_enabled)
1025 {
1026 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1027 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_SESSION_MAY_NOT_BE_CREATED);
1028 goto err;
1029 }
1030 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1031 goto err;
1032 }
1033 }
1034
1035 p+=j;
1036
1037 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1038 {
1039 /* cookie stuff */
1040 cookie_len = *(p++);
1041
1042 /*
1043 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
1044 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
1045 * does not cause an overflow.
1046 */
1047 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
1048 {
1049 /* too much data */
1050 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1051 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1052 goto f_err;
1053 }
1054
1055 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
1056 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
1057 cookie_len > 0)
1058 {
1059 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
1060
1061 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
1062 {
1063 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
1064 cookie_len) == 0)
1065 {
1066 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1067 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1068 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1069 goto f_err;
1070 }
1071 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1072 }
1073 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1074 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
1075 {
1076 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1077 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1078 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1079 goto f_err;
1080 }
1081
1082 ret = 2;
1083 }
1084
1085 p += cookie_len;
1086 }
1087
1088 n2s(p,i);
1089 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
1090 {
1091 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
1092 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1093 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
1094 goto f_err;
1095 }
1096 if ((p+i) >= (d+n))
1097 {
1098 /* not enough data */
1099 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1100 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1101 goto f_err;
1102 }
1103 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
1104 == NULL))
1105 {
1106 goto err;
1107 }
1108 p+=i;
1109
1110 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1111 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
1112 {
1113 j=0;
1114 id=s->session->cipher->id;
1115
1116 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
1117 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
1118 #endif
1119 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
1120 {
1121 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
1122 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
1123 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1124 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1125 #endif
1126 if (c->id == id)
1127 {
1128 j=1;
1129 break;
1130 }
1131 }
1132 /* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade
1133 * attack: CVE-2010-4180.
1134 */
1135 #if 0
1136 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
1137 {
1138 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
1139 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
1140 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
1141 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
1142 * enabled, though. */
1143 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
1144 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0)
1145 {
1146 s->session->cipher = c;
1147 j = 1;
1148 }
1149 }
1150 #endif
1151 if (j == 0)
1152 {
1153 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
1154 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
1155 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1156 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1157 goto f_err;
1158 }
1159 }
1160
1161 /* compression */
1162 i= *(p++);
1163 if ((p+i) > (d+n))
1164 {
1165 /* not enough data */
1166 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1167 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1168 goto f_err;
1169 }
1170 q=p;
1171 for (j=0; j<i; j++)
1172 {
1173 if (p[j] == 0) break;
1174 }
1175
1176 p+=i;
1177 if (j >= i)
1178 {
1179 /* no compress */
1180 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1181 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1182 goto f_err;
1183 }
1184
1185 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1186 /* TLS extensions*/
1187 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1188 {
1189 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al))
1190 {
1191 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
1192 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1193 goto f_err;
1194 }
1195 }
1196 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
1197 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1198 goto err;
1199 }
1200
1201 /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
1202 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
1203 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
1204 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
1205 {
1206 unsigned long Time;
1207 unsigned char *pos;
1208 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
1209 pos=s->s3->server_random;
1210 l2n(Time,pos);
1211 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(pos,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1212 {
1213 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1214 goto f_err;
1215 }
1216 }
1217
1218 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb)
1219 {
1220 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL;
1221
1222 s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1223 if(s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length,
1224 ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg))
1225 {
1226 s->hit=1;
1227 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1228 s->session->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
1229
1230 ciphers=NULL;
1231
1232 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1233 pref_cipher=pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1234 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1235 {
1236 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1237 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1238 goto f_err;
1239 }
1240
1241 s->session->cipher=pref_cipher;
1242
1243 if (s->cipher_list)
1244 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1245
1246 if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
1247 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1248
1249 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1250 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1251 }
1252 }
1253 #endif
1254
1255 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1256 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1257 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
1258 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
1259 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1260 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1261 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1262 {
1263 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1264 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1265 /* Can't disable compression */
1266 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
1267 {
1268 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1269 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1270 goto f_err;
1271 }
1272 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1273 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++)
1274 {
1275 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1276 if (comp_id == comp->id)
1277 {
1278 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1279 break;
1280 }
1281 }
1282 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1283 {
1284 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1285 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1286 goto f_err;
1287 }
1288 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1289 for (m = 0; m < i; m++)
1290 {
1291 if (q[m] == comp_id)
1292 break;
1293 }
1294 if (m >= i)
1295 {
1296 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1297 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1298 goto f_err;
1299 }
1300 }
1301 else if (s->hit)
1302 comp = NULL;
1303 else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods)
1304 { /* See if we have a match */
1305 int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
1306
1307 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1308 for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
1309 {
1310 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1311 v=comp->id;
1312 for (o=0; o<i; o++)
1313 {
1314 if (v == q[o])
1315 {
1316 done=1;
1317 break;
1318 }
1319 }
1320 if (done) break;
1321 }
1322 if (done)
1323 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1324 else
1325 comp=NULL;
1326 }
1327 #else
1328 /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1329 * using compression.
1330 */
1331 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1332 {
1333 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1334 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1335 goto f_err;
1336 }
1337 #endif
1338
1339 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1340 * pick a cipher */
1341
1342 if (!s->hit)
1343 {
1344 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1345 s->session->compress_meth=0;
1346 #else
1347 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
1348 #endif
1349 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1350 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1351 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1352 if (ciphers == NULL)
1353 {
1354 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1355 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
1356 goto f_err;
1357 }
1358 ciphers=NULL;
1359 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
1360 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1361
1362 if (c == NULL)
1363 {
1364 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1365 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1366 goto f_err;
1367 }
1368 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
1369 }
1370 else
1371 {
1372 /* Session-id reuse */
1373 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1374 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1375 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
1376 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
1377
1378 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1379 {
1380 sk=s->session->ciphers;
1381 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
1382 {
1383 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
1384 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
1385 nc=c;
1386 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1387 ec=c;
1388 }
1389 if (nc != NULL)
1390 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
1391 else if (ec != NULL)
1392 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
1393 else
1394 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1395 }
1396 else
1397 #endif
1398 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1399 }
1400
1401 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER))
1402 {
1403 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
1404 goto f_err;
1405 }
1406
1407 /* we now have the following setup.
1408 * client_random
1409 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1410 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1411 * compression - basically ignored right now
1412 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1413 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1414 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1415 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1416 */
1417
1418 if (ret < 0) ret=1;
1419 if (0)
1420 {
1421 f_err:
1422 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1423 }
1424 err:
1425 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1426 return(ret);
1427 }
1428
ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL * s)1429 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1430 {
1431 unsigned char *buf;
1432 unsigned char *p,*d;
1433 int i,sl;
1434 unsigned long l;
1435 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1436 unsigned long Time;
1437 #endif
1438
1439 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1440 {
1441 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1442 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1443 p=s->s3->server_random;
1444 /* Generate server_random if it was not needed previously */
1445 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
1446 l2n(Time,p);
1447 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1448 return -1;
1449 #endif
1450 /* Do the message type and length last */
1451 d=p= &(buf[4]);
1452
1453 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1454 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1455
1456 /* Random stuff */
1457 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1458 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1459
1460 /* There are several cases for the session ID to send
1461 * back in the server hello:
1462 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1463 * we send back the old session ID.
1464 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1465 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1466 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1467 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1468 * session ID.
1469 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1470 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1471 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1472 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1473 * to send back.
1474 */
1475 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1476 && !s->hit)
1477 s->session->session_id_length=0;
1478
1479 sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1480 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
1481 {
1482 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1483 return -1;
1484 }
1485 *(p++)=sl;
1486 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1487 p+=sl;
1488
1489 /* put the cipher */
1490 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1491 p+=i;
1492
1493 /* put the compression method */
1494 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1495 *(p++)=0;
1496 #else
1497 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1498 *(p++)=0;
1499 else
1500 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1501 #endif
1502 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1503 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
1504 {
1505 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1506 return -1;
1507 }
1508 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
1509 {
1510 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1511 return -1;
1512 }
1513 #endif
1514 /* do the header */
1515 l=(p-d);
1516 d=buf;
1517 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
1518 l2n3(l,d);
1519
1520 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1521 /* number of bytes to write */
1522 s->init_num=p-buf;
1523 s->init_off=0;
1524 }
1525
1526 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1527 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1528 }
1529
ssl3_send_server_done(SSL * s)1530 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1531 {
1532 unsigned char *p;
1533
1534 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1535 {
1536 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1537
1538 /* do the header */
1539 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1540 *(p++)=0;
1541 *(p++)=0;
1542 *(p++)=0;
1543
1544 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1545 /* number of bytes to write */
1546 s->init_num=4;
1547 s->init_off=0;
1548 }
1549
1550 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1551 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1552 }
1553
ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL * s)1554 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1555 {
1556 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1557 unsigned char *q;
1558 int j,num;
1559 RSA *rsa;
1560 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1561 unsigned int u;
1562 #endif
1563 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1564 DH *dh=NULL,*dhp;
1565 #endif
1566 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1567 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1568 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1569 int encodedlen = 0;
1570 int curve_id = 0;
1571 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1572 #endif
1573 EVP_PKEY *pkey;
1574 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1575 unsigned char *p,*d;
1576 int al,i;
1577 unsigned long type;
1578 int n;
1579 CERT *cert;
1580 BIGNUM *r[4];
1581 int nr[4],kn;
1582 BUF_MEM *buf;
1583 EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
1584
1585 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1586 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1587 {
1588 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1589 cert=s->cert;
1590
1591 buf=s->init_buf;
1592
1593 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1594 n=0;
1595 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1596 if (type & SSL_kRSA)
1597 {
1598 rsa=cert->rsa_tmp;
1599 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1600 {
1601 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1602 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1603 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1604 if(rsa == NULL)
1605 {
1606 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1607 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1608 goto f_err;
1609 }
1610 RSA_up_ref(rsa);
1611 cert->rsa_tmp=rsa;
1612 }
1613 if (rsa == NULL)
1614 {
1615 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1616 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1617 goto f_err;
1618 }
1619 r[0]=rsa->n;
1620 r[1]=rsa->e;
1621 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1622 }
1623 else
1624 #endif
1625 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1626 if (type & SSL_kEDH)
1627 {
1628 dhp=cert->dh_tmp;
1629 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1630 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1631 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1632 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1633 if (dhp == NULL)
1634 {
1635 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1636 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1637 goto f_err;
1638 }
1639
1640 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1641 {
1642 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1643 goto err;
1644 }
1645
1646 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1647 {
1648 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1649 goto err;
1650 }
1651
1652 s->s3->tmp.dh=dh;
1653 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1654 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1655 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1656 {
1657 if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1658 {
1659 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1660 ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1661 goto err;
1662 }
1663 }
1664 else
1665 {
1666 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1667 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1668 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1669 (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1670 {
1671 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1672 goto err;
1673 }
1674 }
1675 r[0]=dh->p;
1676 r[1]=dh->g;
1677 r[2]=dh->pub_key;
1678 }
1679 else
1680 #endif
1681 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1682 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1683 {
1684 const EC_GROUP *group;
1685
1686 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1687 if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1688 {
1689 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1690 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1691 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1692 }
1693 if (ecdhp == NULL)
1694 {
1695 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1696 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1697 goto f_err;
1698 }
1699
1700 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1701 {
1702 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1703 goto err;
1704 }
1705
1706 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1707 if (ecdhp == NULL)
1708 {
1709 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1710 goto err;
1711 }
1712 if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL)
1713 {
1714 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1715 goto err;
1716 }
1717
1718 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1719 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1720 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1721 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1722 {
1723 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1724 {
1725 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1726 goto err;
1727 }
1728 }
1729
1730 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1731 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1732 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
1733 {
1734 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1735 goto err;
1736 }
1737
1738 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1739 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
1740 {
1741 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1742 goto err;
1743 }
1744
1745 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1746 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1747 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1748 */
1749 if ((curve_id =
1750 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1751 == 0)
1752 {
1753 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1754 goto err;
1755 }
1756
1757 /* Encode the public key.
1758 * First check the size of encoding and
1759 * allocate memory accordingly.
1760 */
1761 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1762 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1763 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1764 NULL, 0, NULL);
1765
1766 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1767 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1768 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1769 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1770 {
1771 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1772 goto err;
1773 }
1774
1775
1776 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1777 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1778 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1779 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1780
1781 if (encodedlen == 0)
1782 {
1783 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1784 goto err;
1785 }
1786
1787 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1788
1789 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1790 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1791 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1792 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1793 * structure.
1794 */
1795 n = 4 + encodedlen;
1796
1797 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1798 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1799 */
1800 r[0]=NULL;
1801 r[1]=NULL;
1802 r[2]=NULL;
1803 r[3]=NULL;
1804 }
1805 else
1806 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1807 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1808 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1809 {
1810 /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
1811 n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1812 }
1813 else
1814 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1815 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1816 if (type & SSL_kSRP)
1817 {
1818 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1819 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1820 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) ||
1821 (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL))
1822 {
1823 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1824 goto err;
1825 }
1826 r[0]=s->srp_ctx.N;
1827 r[1]=s->srp_ctx.g;
1828 r[2]=s->srp_ctx.s;
1829 r[3]=s->srp_ctx.B;
1830 }
1831 else
1832 #endif
1833 {
1834 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1835 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1836 goto f_err;
1837 }
1838 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL && i<4; i++)
1839 {
1840 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1841 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1842 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1843 n+=1+nr[i];
1844 else
1845 #endif
1846 n+=2+nr[i];
1847 }
1848
1849 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
1850 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
1851 {
1852 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,&md))
1853 == NULL)
1854 {
1855 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1856 goto f_err;
1857 }
1858 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1859 }
1860 else
1861 {
1862 pkey=NULL;
1863 kn=0;
1864 }
1865
1866 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn))
1867 {
1868 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1869 goto err;
1870 }
1871 d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1872 p= &(d[4]);
1873
1874 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL && i<4; i++)
1875 {
1876 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1877 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1878 {
1879 *p = nr[i];
1880 p++;
1881 }
1882 else
1883 #endif
1884 s2n(nr[i],p);
1885 BN_bn2bin(r[i],p);
1886 p+=nr[i];
1887 }
1888
1889 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1890 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1891 {
1892 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1893 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1894 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1895 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1896 * the actual encoded point itself
1897 */
1898 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1899 p += 1;
1900 *p = 0;
1901 p += 1;
1902 *p = curve_id;
1903 p += 1;
1904 *p = encodedlen;
1905 p += 1;
1906 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
1907 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
1908 encodedlen);
1909 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1910 encodedPoint = NULL;
1911 p += encodedlen;
1912 }
1913 #endif
1914
1915 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1916 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1917 {
1918 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1919 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
1920 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
1921 p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1922 }
1923 #endif
1924
1925 /* not anonymous */
1926 if (pkey != NULL)
1927 {
1928 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1929 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1930 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1931 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA
1932 && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
1933 {
1934 q=md_buf;
1935 j=0;
1936 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
1937 {
1938 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
1939 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
1940 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
1941 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1942 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1943 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1944 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1945 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
1946 (unsigned int *)&i);
1947 q+=i;
1948 j+=i;
1949 }
1950 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1951 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
1952 {
1953 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
1954 goto err;
1955 }
1956 s2n(u,p);
1957 n+=u+2;
1958 }
1959 else
1960 #endif
1961 if (md)
1962 {
1963 /* For TLS1.2 and later send signature
1964 * algorithm */
1965 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1966 {
1967 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md))
1968 {
1969 /* Should never happen */
1970 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1971 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1972 goto f_err;
1973 }
1974 p+=2;
1975 }
1976 #ifdef SSL_DEBUG
1977 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n",
1978 EVP_MD_name(md));
1979 #endif
1980 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
1981 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1982 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1983 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1984 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1985 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1986 {
1987 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_EVP);
1988 goto err;
1989 }
1990 s2n(i,p);
1991 n+=i+2;
1992 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1993 n+= 2;
1994 }
1995 else
1996 {
1997 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1998 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1999 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
2000 goto f_err;
2001 }
2002 }
2003
2004 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
2005 l2n3(n,d);
2006
2007 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
2008 * it off */
2009 s->init_num=n+4;
2010 s->init_off=0;
2011 }
2012
2013 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
2014 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2015 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2016 f_err:
2017 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2018 err:
2019 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2020 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2021 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2022 #endif
2023 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2024 return(-1);
2025 }
2026
ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL * s)2027 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
2028 {
2029 unsigned char *p,*d;
2030 int i,j,nl,off,n;
2031 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
2032 X509_NAME *name;
2033 BUF_MEM *buf;
2034
2035 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
2036 {
2037 buf=s->init_buf;
2038
2039 d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
2040
2041 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2042 p++;
2043 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
2044 d[0]=n;
2045 p+=n;
2046 n++;
2047
2048 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2049 {
2050 nl = tls12_get_req_sig_algs(s, p + 2);
2051 s2n(nl, p);
2052 p += nl + 2;
2053 n += nl + 2;
2054 }
2055
2056 off=n;
2057 p+=2;
2058 n+=2;
2059
2060 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2061 nl=0;
2062 if (sk != NULL)
2063 {
2064 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
2065 {
2066 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
2067 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
2068 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2))
2069 {
2070 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2071 goto err;
2072 }
2073 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]);
2074 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
2075 {
2076 s2n(j,p);
2077 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2078 n+=2+j;
2079 nl+=2+j;
2080 }
2081 else
2082 {
2083 d=p;
2084 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2085 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
2086 n+=j;
2087 nl+=j;
2088 }
2089 }
2090 }
2091 /* else no CA names */
2092 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]);
2093 s2n(nl,p);
2094
2095 d=(unsigned char *)buf->data;
2096 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
2097 l2n3(n,d);
2098
2099 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
2100 * it off */
2101
2102 s->init_num=n+4;
2103 s->init_off=0;
2104 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
2105 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
2106
2107 /* do the header */
2108 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
2109 *(p++)=0;
2110 *(p++)=0;
2111 *(p++)=0;
2112 s->init_num += 4;
2113 #endif
2114
2115 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
2116 }
2117
2118 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2119 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2120 err:
2121 return(-1);
2122 }
2123
ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL * s)2124 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2125 {
2126 int i,al,ok;
2127 long n;
2128 unsigned long alg_k;
2129 unsigned char *p;
2130 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2131 RSA *rsa=NULL;
2132 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2133 #endif
2134 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2135 BIGNUM *pub=NULL;
2136 DH *dh_srvr;
2137 #endif
2138 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2139 KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
2140 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2141
2142 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2143 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
2144 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
2145 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
2146 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2147 #endif
2148
2149 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2150 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
2151 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
2152 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2153 2048, /* ??? */
2154 &ok);
2155
2156 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2157 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2158
2159 alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2160
2161 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2162 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
2163 {
2164 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2165 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
2166 {
2167 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
2168 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
2169 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
2170 * be sent already */
2171 if (rsa == NULL)
2172 {
2173 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2174 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
2175 goto f_err;
2176
2177 }
2178 }
2179 else
2180 {
2181 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
2182 if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
2183 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
2184 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
2185 {
2186 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2187 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2188 goto f_err;
2189 }
2190 rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa;
2191 }
2192
2193 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2194 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2195 {
2196 n2s(p,i);
2197 if (n != i+2)
2198 {
2199 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
2200 {
2201 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2202 goto err;
2203 }
2204 else
2205 p-=2;
2206 }
2207 else
2208 n=i;
2209 }
2210
2211 i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2212
2213 al = -1;
2214
2215 if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2216 {
2217 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2218 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
2219 }
2220
2221 if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2222 {
2223 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2224 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2225 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2226 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2227 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2228 * protocol version.
2229 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
2230 if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
2231 (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
2232 {
2233 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2234 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
2235
2236 /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2237 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
2238 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
2239 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
2240 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
2241 * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
2242 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
2243 }
2244 }
2245
2246 if (al != -1)
2247 {
2248 /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
2249 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
2250 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
2251 ERR_clear_error();
2252 i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2253 p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2254 p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2255 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
2256 goto err;
2257 }
2258
2259 s->session->master_key_length=
2260 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2261 s->session->master_key,
2262 p,i);
2263 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2264 }
2265 else
2266 #endif
2267 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2268 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
2269 {
2270 n2s(p,i);
2271 if (n != i+2)
2272 {
2273 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
2274 {
2275 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2276 goto err;
2277 }
2278 else
2279 {
2280 p-=2;
2281 i=(int)n;
2282 }
2283 }
2284
2285 if (n == 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */
2286 {
2287 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2288 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS);
2289 goto f_err;
2290 }
2291 else
2292 {
2293 if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
2294 {
2295 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2296 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2297 goto f_err;
2298 }
2299 else
2300 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
2301 }
2302
2303 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
2304 if (pub == NULL)
2305 {
2306 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2307 goto err;
2308 }
2309
2310 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
2311
2312 if (i <= 0)
2313 {
2314 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2315 BN_clear_free(pub);
2316 goto err;
2317 }
2318
2319 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2320 s->s3->tmp.dh=NULL;
2321
2322 BN_clear_free(pub);
2323 pub=NULL;
2324 s->session->master_key_length=
2325 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2326 s->session->master_key,p,i);
2327 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2328 }
2329 else
2330 #endif
2331 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2332 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
2333 {
2334 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2335 krb5_data enc_ticket;
2336 krb5_data authenticator;
2337 krb5_data enc_pms;
2338 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2339 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2340 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2341 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2342 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
2343 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
2344 int padl, outl;
2345 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
2346 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
2347
2348 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2349
2350 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
2351
2352 n2s(p,i);
2353 enc_ticket.length = i;
2354
2355 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6))
2356 {
2357 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2358 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2359 goto err;
2360 }
2361
2362 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2363 p+=enc_ticket.length;
2364
2365 n2s(p,i);
2366 authenticator.length = i;
2367
2368 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6))
2369 {
2370 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2371 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2372 goto err;
2373 }
2374
2375 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2376 p+=authenticator.length;
2377
2378 n2s(p,i);
2379 enc_pms.length = i;
2380 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2381 p+=enc_pms.length;
2382
2383 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
2384 ** after decryption
2385 */
2386 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
2387 {
2388 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2389 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2390 goto err;
2391 }
2392
2393 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2394 enc_pms.length + 6))
2395 {
2396 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2397 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2398 goto err;
2399 }
2400
2401 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2402 &kssl_err)) != 0)
2403 {
2404 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
2405 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2406 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2407 if (kssl_err.text)
2408 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2409 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2410 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2411 kssl_err.reason);
2412 goto err;
2413 }
2414
2415 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2416 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2417 */
2418 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2419 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
2420 {
2421 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
2422 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2423 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2424 if (kssl_err.text)
2425 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2426 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2427 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2428 kssl_err.reason);
2429 goto err;
2430 }
2431
2432 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
2433 {
2434 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2435 goto err;
2436 }
2437
2438 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
2439 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2440 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2441
2442 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2443 if (enc == NULL)
2444 goto err;
2445
2446 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2447
2448 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
2449 {
2450 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2451 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2452 goto err;
2453 }
2454 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
2455 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2456 {
2457 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2458 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2459 goto err;
2460 }
2461 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2462 {
2463 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2464 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2465 goto err;
2466 }
2467 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
2468 {
2469 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2470 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2471 goto err;
2472 }
2473 outl += padl;
2474 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2475 {
2476 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2477 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2478 goto err;
2479 }
2480 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2481 {
2482 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2483 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2484 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2485 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2486 * the protocol version.
2487 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2488 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2489 */
2490 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG))
2491 {
2492 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2493 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2494 goto err;
2495 }
2496 }
2497
2498 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2499
2500 s->session->master_key_length=
2501 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2502 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
2503
2504 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
2505 {
2506 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2507 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
2508 {
2509 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2510 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
2511 }
2512 }
2513
2514
2515 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2516 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2517 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2518 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2519 */
2520 }
2521 else
2522 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2523
2524 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2525 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2526 {
2527 int ret = 1;
2528 int field_size = 0;
2529 const EC_KEY *tkey;
2530 const EC_GROUP *group;
2531 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2532
2533 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2534 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
2535 {
2536 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2537 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2538 goto err;
2539 }
2540
2541 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2542 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2543 {
2544 /* use the certificate */
2545 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2546 }
2547 else
2548 {
2549 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2550 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2551 */
2552 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2553 }
2554
2555 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2556 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2557
2558 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2559 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
2560 {
2561 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2562 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2563 goto err;
2564 }
2565
2566 /* Let's get client's public key */
2567 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
2568 {
2569 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2570 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2571 goto err;
2572 }
2573
2574 if (n == 0L)
2575 {
2576 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2577
2578 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
2579 {
2580 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2581 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2582 goto f_err;
2583 }
2584 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2585 == NULL) ||
2586 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
2587 {
2588 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2589 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2590 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2591 * never executed. When that support is
2592 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2593 * received in the certificate is
2594 * authorized for key agreement.
2595 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2596 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2597 * group.
2598 */
2599 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2600 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2601 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2602 goto f_err;
2603 }
2604
2605 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2606 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
2607 {
2608 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2609 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2610 goto err;
2611 }
2612 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2613 }
2614 else
2615 {
2616 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2617 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2618 */
2619 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
2620 {
2621 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2622 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2623 goto err;
2624 }
2625
2626 /* Get encoded point length */
2627 i = *p;
2628 p += 1;
2629 if (n != 1 + i)
2630 {
2631 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2632 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2633 goto err;
2634 }
2635 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
2636 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
2637 {
2638 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2639 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2640 goto err;
2641 }
2642 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2643 * currently, so set it to the start
2644 */
2645 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2646 }
2647
2648 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2649 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2650 if (field_size <= 0)
2651 {
2652 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2653 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2654 goto err;
2655 }
2656 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
2657 if (i <= 0)
2658 {
2659 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2660 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2661 goto err;
2662 }
2663
2664 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2665 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2666 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2667 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2668 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2669 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2670
2671 /* Compute the master secret */
2672 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
2673 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
2674
2675 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2676 return (ret);
2677 }
2678 else
2679 #endif
2680 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2681 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
2682 {
2683 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2684 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
2685 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2686 int psk_err = 1;
2687 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
2688
2689 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2690
2691 n2s(p,i);
2692 if (n != i+2)
2693 {
2694 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2695 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2696 goto psk_err;
2697 }
2698 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
2699 {
2700 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2701 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2702 goto psk_err;
2703 }
2704 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL)
2705 {
2706 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2707 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2708 goto psk_err;
2709 }
2710
2711 /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity
2712 * string for the callback */
2713 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2714 memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
2715 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2716 psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2717 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1);
2718
2719 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
2720 {
2721 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2722 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2723 goto psk_err;
2724 }
2725 else if (psk_len == 0)
2726 {
2727 /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
2728 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2729 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2730 al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2731 goto psk_err;
2732 }
2733
2734 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2735 pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
2736 t = psk_or_pre_ms;
2737 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
2738 s2n(psk_len, t);
2739 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2740 t+=psk_len;
2741 s2n(psk_len, t);
2742
2743 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2744 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2745 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
2746 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
2747 {
2748 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2749 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2750 goto psk_err;
2751 }
2752
2753 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2754 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2755 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2756 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2757 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2758 {
2759 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2760 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2761 goto psk_err;
2762 }
2763
2764 s->session->master_key_length=
2765 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2766 s->session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
2767 psk_err = 0;
2768 psk_err:
2769 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2770 if (psk_err != 0)
2771 goto f_err;
2772 }
2773 else
2774 #endif
2775 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2776 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
2777 {
2778 int param_len;
2779
2780 n2s(p,i);
2781 param_len=i+2;
2782 if (param_len > n)
2783 {
2784 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2785 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2786 goto f_err;
2787 }
2788 if (!(s->srp_ctx.A=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
2789 {
2790 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2791 goto err;
2792 }
2793 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
2794 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2795 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2796 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL)
2797 {
2798 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2799 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2800 goto err;
2801 }
2802
2803 if ((s->session->master_key_length = SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,s->session->master_key))<0)
2804 {
2805 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2806 goto err;
2807 }
2808
2809 p+=i;
2810 }
2811 else
2812 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2813 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)
2814 {
2815 int ret = 0;
2816 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2817 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2818 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2819 size_t outlen=32, inlen;
2820 unsigned long alg_a;
2821
2822 /* Get our certificate private key*/
2823 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2824 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
2825 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
2826 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
2827 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2828
2829 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk,NULL);
2830 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2831 /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2832 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2833 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use
2834 * a client certificate for authorization only. */
2835 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2836 if (client_pub_pkey)
2837 {
2838 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2839 ERR_clear_error();
2840 }
2841 /* Decrypt session key */
2842 if ((*p!=( V_ASN1_SEQUENCE| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)))
2843 {
2844 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2845 goto gerr;
2846 }
2847 if (p[1] == 0x81)
2848 {
2849 start = p+3;
2850 inlen = p[2];
2851 }
2852 else if (p[1] < 0x80)
2853 {
2854 start = p+2;
2855 inlen = p[1];
2856 }
2857 else
2858 {
2859 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2860 goto gerr;
2861 }
2862 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,start,inlen) <=0)
2863
2864 {
2865 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2866 goto gerr;
2867 }
2868 /* Generate master secret */
2869 s->session->master_key_length=
2870 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2871 s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32);
2872 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2873 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2874 ret = 2;
2875 else
2876 ret = 1;
2877 gerr:
2878 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2879 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2880 if (ret)
2881 return ret;
2882 else
2883 goto err;
2884 }
2885 else
2886 {
2887 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2888 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2889 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2890 goto f_err;
2891 }
2892
2893 return(1);
2894 f_err:
2895 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2896 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
2897 err:
2898 #endif
2899 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2900 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2901 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2902 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2903 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2904 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2905 #endif
2906 return(-1);
2907 }
2908
ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL * s)2909 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2910 {
2911 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2912 unsigned char *p;
2913 int al,ok,ret=0;
2914 long n;
2915 int type=0,i,j;
2916 X509 *peer;
2917 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2918 EVP_MD_CTX mctx;
2919 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
2920
2921 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2922 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2923 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2924 -1,
2925 516, /* Enough for 4096 bit RSA key with TLS v1.2 */
2926 &ok);
2927
2928 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2929
2930 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
2931 {
2932 peer=s->session->peer;
2933 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2934 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
2935 }
2936 else
2937 {
2938 peer=NULL;
2939 pkey=NULL;
2940 }
2941
2942 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
2943 {
2944 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2945 if ((peer != NULL) && (type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2946 {
2947 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2948 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
2949 goto f_err;
2950 }
2951 ret=1;
2952 goto end;
2953 }
2954
2955 if (peer == NULL)
2956 {
2957 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
2958 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2959 goto f_err;
2960 }
2961
2962 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2963 {
2964 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2965 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2966 goto f_err;
2967 }
2968
2969 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
2970 {
2971 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
2972 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2973 goto f_err;
2974 }
2975
2976 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
2977 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2978 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
2979 /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare
2980 * signature without length field */
2981 if (n==64 && (pkey->type==NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
2982 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) )
2983 {
2984 i=64;
2985 }
2986 else
2987 {
2988 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2989 {
2990 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
2991 /* Should never happen */
2992 if (sigalg == -1)
2993 {
2994 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2995 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2996 goto f_err;
2997 }
2998 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
2999 if (sigalg != (int)p[1])
3000 {
3001 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
3002 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3003 goto f_err;
3004 }
3005 md = tls12_get_hash(p[0]);
3006 if (md == NULL)
3007 {
3008 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
3009 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3010 goto f_err;
3011 }
3012 #ifdef SSL_DEBUG
3013 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
3014 #endif
3015 p += 2;
3016 n -= 2;
3017 }
3018 n2s(p,i);
3019 n-=2;
3020 if (i > n)
3021 {
3022 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3023 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3024 goto f_err;
3025 }
3026 }
3027 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
3028 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
3029 {
3030 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
3031 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3032 goto f_err;
3033 }
3034
3035 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3036 {
3037 long hdatalen = 0;
3038 void *hdata;
3039 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
3040 if (hdatalen <= 0)
3041 {
3042 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3043 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3044 goto f_err;
3045 }
3046 #ifdef SSL_DEBUG
3047 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
3048 EVP_MD_name(md));
3049 #endif
3050 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
3051 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen))
3052 {
3053 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3054 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3055 goto f_err;
3056 }
3057
3058 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p , i, pkey) <= 0)
3059 {
3060 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3061 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
3062 goto f_err;
3063 }
3064 }
3065 else
3066 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3067 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
3068 {
3069 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3070 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
3071 pkey->pkey.rsa);
3072 if (i < 0)
3073 {
3074 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3075 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
3076 goto f_err;
3077 }
3078 if (i == 0)
3079 {
3080 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3081 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
3082 goto f_err;
3083 }
3084 }
3085 else
3086 #endif
3087 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3088 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
3089 {
3090 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3091 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3092 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
3093 if (j <= 0)
3094 {
3095 /* bad signature */
3096 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3097 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
3098 goto f_err;
3099 }
3100 }
3101 else
3102 #endif
3103 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3104 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
3105 {
3106 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3107 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3108 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
3109 if (j <= 0)
3110 {
3111 /* bad signature */
3112 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3113 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3114 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3115 goto f_err;
3116 }
3117 }
3118 else
3119 #endif
3120 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)
3121 { unsigned char signature[64];
3122 int idx;
3123 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL);
3124 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
3125 if (i!=64) {
3126 fprintf(stderr,"GOST signature length is %d",i);
3127 }
3128 for (idx=0;idx<64;idx++) {
3129 signature[63-idx]=p[idx];
3130 }
3131 j=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx,signature,64,s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,32);
3132 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3133 if (j<=0)
3134 {
3135 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3136 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3137 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3138 goto f_err;
3139 }
3140 }
3141 else
3142 {
3143 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3144 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
3145 goto f_err;
3146 }
3147
3148
3149 ret=1;
3150 if (0)
3151 {
3152 f_err:
3153 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3154 }
3155 end:
3156 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
3157 {
3158 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
3159 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
3160 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
3161 }
3162 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3163 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3164 return(ret);
3165 }
3166
ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL * s)3167 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3168 {
3169 int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
3170 X509 *x=NULL;
3171 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
3172 const unsigned char *p,*q;
3173 unsigned char *d;
3174 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
3175
3176 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3177 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
3178 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
3179 -1,
3180 s->max_cert_list,
3181 &ok);
3182
3183 if (!ok) return((int)n);
3184
3185 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
3186 {
3187 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3188 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3189 {
3190 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3191 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3192 goto f_err;
3193 }
3194 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
3195 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
3196 {
3197 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
3198 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3199 goto f_err;
3200 }
3201 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
3202 return(1);
3203 }
3204
3205 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
3206 {
3207 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3208 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
3209 goto f_err;
3210 }
3211 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3212
3213 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
3214 {
3215 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3216 goto err;
3217 }
3218
3219 n2l3(p,llen);
3220 if (llen+3 != n)
3221 {
3222 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3223 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3224 goto f_err;
3225 }
3226 for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
3227 {
3228 n2l3(p,l);
3229 if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
3230 {
3231 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3232 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3233 goto f_err;
3234 }
3235
3236 q=p;
3237 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
3238 if (x == NULL)
3239 {
3240 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3241 goto err;
3242 }
3243 if (p != (q+l))
3244 {
3245 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3246 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3247 goto f_err;
3248 }
3249 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
3250 {
3251 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3252 goto err;
3253 }
3254 x=NULL;
3255 nc+=l+3;
3256 }
3257
3258 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
3259 {
3260 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3261 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
3262 {
3263 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3264 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3265 goto f_err;
3266 }
3267 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3268 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3269 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3270 {
3271 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3272 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3273 goto f_err;
3274 }
3275 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3276 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
3277 {
3278 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3279 goto f_err;
3280 }
3281 }
3282 else
3283 {
3284 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
3285 if (i <= 0)
3286 {
3287 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3288 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
3289 goto f_err;
3290 }
3291 }
3292
3293 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
3294 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3295 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
3296 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3297
3298 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
3299 * when we arrive here. */
3300 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3301 {
3302 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
3303 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3304 {
3305 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3306 goto err;
3307 }
3308 }
3309 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
3310 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
3311 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
3312 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
3313 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
3314
3315 sk=NULL;
3316
3317 ret=1;
3318 if (0)
3319 {
3320 f_err:
3321 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3322 }
3323 err:
3324 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
3325 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
3326 return(ret);
3327 }
3328
ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL * s)3329 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3330 {
3331 unsigned long l;
3332 X509 *x;
3333
3334 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
3335 {
3336 x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
3337 if (x == NULL)
3338 {
3339 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3340 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
3341 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5))
3342 {
3343 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3344 return(0);
3345 }
3346 }
3347
3348 l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x);
3349 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
3350 s->init_num=(int)l;
3351 s->init_off=0;
3352 }
3353
3354 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3355 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3356 }
3357
3358 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3359 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL * s)3360 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
3361 {
3362 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
3363 {
3364 unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
3365 const unsigned char *const_p;
3366 int len, slen_full, slen;
3367 SSL_SESSION *sess;
3368 unsigned int hlen;
3369 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
3370 HMAC_CTX hctx;
3371 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3372 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3373 unsigned char key_name[16];
3374
3375 /* get session encoding length */
3376 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3377 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
3378 * too long
3379 */
3380 if (slen_full > 0xFF00)
3381 return -1;
3382 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3383 if (!senc)
3384 return -1;
3385 p = senc;
3386 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
3387
3388 /* create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up */
3389 const_p = senc;
3390 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3391 if (sess == NULL)
3392 {
3393 OPENSSL_free(senc);
3394 return -1;
3395 }
3396 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3397
3398 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3399 if (slen > slen_full) /* shouldn't ever happen */
3400 {
3401 OPENSSL_free(senc);
3402 return -1;
3403 }
3404 p = senc;
3405 i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p);
3406 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3407
3408 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3409 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
3410 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3411 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3412 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3413 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3414 */
3415 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3416 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
3417 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3418 return -1;
3419
3420 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3421 /* do the header */
3422 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
3423 /* Skip message length for now */
3424 p += 3;
3425 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3426 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3427 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
3428 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
3429 * from parent ctx.
3430 */
3431 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3432 {
3433 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
3434 &hctx, 1) < 0)
3435 {
3436 OPENSSL_free(senc);
3437 return -1;
3438 }
3439 }
3440 else
3441 {
3442 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
3443 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3444 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
3445 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3446 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3447 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3448 }
3449
3450 /* Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only):
3451 * We leave this unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity),
3452 * and guess that tickets for new sessions will live as long
3453 * as their sessions. */
3454 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
3455
3456 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3457 p += 2;
3458 /* Output key name */
3459 macstart = p;
3460 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3461 p += 16;
3462 /* output IV */
3463 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3464 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3465 /* Encrypt session data */
3466 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
3467 p += len;
3468 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
3469 p += len;
3470 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3471
3472 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
3473 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
3474 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3475
3476 p += hlen;
3477 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3478 /* Total length */
3479 len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3480 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1;
3481 l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */
3482 p += 4;
3483 s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */
3484
3485 /* number of bytes to write */
3486 s->init_num= len;
3487 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3488 s->init_off=0;
3489 OPENSSL_free(senc);
3490 }
3491
3492 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3493 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3494 }
3495
ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL * s)3496 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3497 {
3498 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
3499 {
3500 unsigned char *p;
3501 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3502 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3503 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3504 * + (ocsp response)
3505 */
3506 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
3507 return -1;
3508
3509 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3510
3511 /* do the header */
3512 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3513 /* message length */
3514 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3515 /* status type */
3516 *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
3517 /* length of OCSP response */
3518 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3519 /* actual response */
3520 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3521 /* number of bytes to write */
3522 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3523 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3524 s->init_off = 0;
3525 }
3526
3527 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3528 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3529 }
3530
3531 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3532 /* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It
3533 * sets the next_proto member in s if found */
ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL * s)3534 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
3535 {
3536 int ok;
3537 int proto_len, padding_len;
3538 long n;
3539 const unsigned char *p;
3540
3541 /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3542 * extension in their ClientHello */
3543 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
3544 {
3545 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
3546 return -1;
3547 }
3548
3549 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3550 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
3551 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
3552 SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO,
3553 514, /* See the payload format below */
3554 &ok);
3555
3556 if (!ok)
3557 return((int)n);
3558
3559 /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received
3560 * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset
3561 * by ssl3_get_finished). */
3562 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
3563 {
3564 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
3565 return -1;
3566 }
3567
3568 if (n < 2)
3569 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3570
3571 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3572
3573 /* The payload looks like:
3574 * uint8 proto_len;
3575 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3576 * uint8 padding_len;
3577 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3578 */
3579 proto_len = p[0];
3580 if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num)
3581 return 0;
3582 padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
3583 if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num)
3584 return 0;
3585
3586 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
3587 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
3588 {
3589 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3590 return 0;
3591 }
3592 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
3593 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;
3594
3595 return 1;
3596 }
3597 # endif
3598 #endif
3599