1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
113 *
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
116 *
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
119 *
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
122 *
123 */
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
126 *
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
129 * license.
130 *
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
134 *
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
138 *
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
143 *
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
148 * OTHERWISE.
149 */
150
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
153
154 #include <stdio.h>
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
158 #include <openssl/rand.h>
159 #include <openssl/objects.h>
160 #include <openssl/ec.h>
161 #include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
162 #include <openssl/evp.h>
163 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
164 #include <openssl/sha.h>
165 #include <openssl/x509.h>
166 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
167 #include <openssl/dh.h>
168 #endif
169 #include <openssl/bn.h>
170 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
171 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
172 #endif
173 #include <openssl/md5.h>
174
175 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
176
ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)177 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
178 {
179 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
180 return(SSLv3_server_method());
181 else
182 return(NULL);
183 }
184
185 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL * s,int * al)186 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
187 {
188 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
189
190 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
191
192 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
193 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL))
194 {
195 if(s->srp_ctx.login == NULL)
196 {
197 /* RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject,
198 we do so if There is no srp login name */
199 ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
200 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
201 }
202 else
203 {
204 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s,al);
205 }
206 }
207 return ret;
208 }
209 #endif
210
IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,ssl3_accept,ssl_undefined_function,ssl3_get_server_method)211 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
212 ssl3_accept,
213 ssl_undefined_function,
214 ssl3_get_server_method)
215
216 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
217 {
218 BUF_MEM *buf;
219 unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
220 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
221 int ret= -1;
222 int new_state,state,skip=0;
223
224 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
225 ERR_clear_error();
226 clear_sys_error();
227
228 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
229 cb=s->info_callback;
230 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
231 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
232
233 /* init things to blank */
234 s->in_handshake++;
235 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
236
237 if (s->cert == NULL)
238 {
239 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
240 return(-1);
241 }
242
243 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
244 /* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we
245 * already got and don't await it anymore, because
246 * Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway.
247 */
248 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
249 {
250 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
251 s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
252 }
253 #endif
254
255 for (;;)
256 {
257 state=s->state;
258
259 switch (s->state)
260 {
261 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
262 s->renegotiate=1;
263 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
264
265 case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
266 case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
267 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
268 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
269
270 s->server=1;
271 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
272
273 if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
274 {
275 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
276 return -1;
277 }
278 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
279
280 if (s->init_buf == NULL)
281 {
282 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
283 {
284 ret= -1;
285 goto end;
286 }
287 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
288 {
289 ret= -1;
290 goto end;
291 }
292 s->init_buf=buf;
293 }
294
295 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
296 {
297 ret= -1;
298 goto end;
299 }
300
301 s->init_num=0;
302 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
303
304 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
305 {
306 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
307 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
308 */
309 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
310
311 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
312 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
313 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
314 }
315 else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
316 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
317 {
318 /* Server attempting to renegotiate with
319 * client that doesn't support secure
320 * renegotiation.
321 */
322 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
323 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
324 ret = -1;
325 goto end;
326 }
327 else
328 {
329 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
330 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
331 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
332 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
333 }
334 break;
335
336 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
337 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
338
339 s->shutdown=0;
340 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
341 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
342 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
343 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
344 s->init_num=0;
345
346 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
347 break;
348
349 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
350 s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
351 break;
352
353 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
354 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
355 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
356
357 s->shutdown=0;
358 if (s->rwstate != SSL_X509_LOOKUP)
359 {
360 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
361 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
362 }
363 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
364 {
365 int al;
366 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s,&al)) < 0)
367 {
368 /* callback indicates firther work to be done */
369 s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
370 goto end;
371 }
372 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE)
373 {
374 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
375 /* This is not really an error but the only means to
376 for a client to detect whether srp is supported. */
377 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
378 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
379 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
380 ret= -1;
381 goto end;
382 }
383 }
384 #endif
385
386 s->renegotiate = 2;
387 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
388 s->init_num=0;
389 break;
390
391 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
392 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
393 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
394 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
395 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
396 if (s->hit)
397 {
398 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
399 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
400 else
401 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
402 }
403 #else
404 if (s->hit)
405 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
406 #endif
407 else
408 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
409 s->init_num=0;
410 break;
411
412 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
413 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
414 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
415 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
416 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
417 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)
418 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
419 {
420 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
421 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
422 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
423 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
424 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
425 else
426 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
427 }
428 else
429 {
430 skip = 1;
431 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
432 }
433 #else
434 }
435 else
436 skip=1;
437
438 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
439 #endif
440 s->init_num=0;
441 break;
442
443 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
444 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
445 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
446
447 /* clear this, it may get reset by
448 * send_server_key_exchange */
449 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
450 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
451 && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
452 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
453 )
454 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
455 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
456 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
457 * be able to handle this) */
458 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
459 else
460 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
461
462
463 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
464 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
465 *
466 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints
467 *
468 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
469 * message only if the cipher suite is either
470 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
471 * server certificate contains the server's
472 * public key for key exchange.
473 */
474 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
475 /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
476 * hint if provided */
477 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
478 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
479 #endif
480 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
481 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
482 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
483 #endif
484 || (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd|SSL_kEDH))
485 || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
486 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
487 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
488 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
489 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
490 )
491 )
492 )
493 )
494 {
495 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
496 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
497 }
498 else
499 skip=1;
500
501 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
502 s->init_num=0;
503 break;
504
505 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
506 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
507 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
508 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
509 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
510 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
511 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
512 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
513 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
514 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
515 * and in RFC 2246): */
516 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
517 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
518 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
519 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
520 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
521 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)
522 /* With normal PSK Certificates and
523 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
524 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
525 {
526 /* no cert request */
527 skip=1;
528 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
529 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
530 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
531 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
532 return -1;
533 }
534 else
535 {
536 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
537 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
538 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
539 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
540 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
541 #else
542 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
543 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
544 #endif
545 s->init_num=0;
546 }
547 break;
548
549 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
550 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
551 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
552 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
553 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
554 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
555 s->init_num=0;
556 break;
557
558 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
559
560 /* This code originally checked to see if
561 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
562 * and then flushed. This caused problems
563 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
564 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
565 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
566 * still exist. So instead we just flush
567 * unconditionally.
568 */
569
570 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
571 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
572 {
573 ret= -1;
574 goto end;
575 }
576 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
577
578 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
579 break;
580
581 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
582 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
583 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
584 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
585 if (ret <= 0)
586 goto end;
587 if (ret == 2)
588 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
589 else {
590 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
591 {
592 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
593 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
594 }
595 s->init_num=0;
596 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
597 }
598 break;
599
600 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
601 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
602 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
603 if (ret <= 0)
604 goto end;
605 if (ret == 2)
606 {
607 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
608 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
609 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
610 * message is not sent.
611 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when
612 * the client uses its key from the certificate
613 * for key exchange.
614 */
615 s->init_num = 0;
616 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_POST_CLIENT_CERT;
617 }
618 else if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
619 {
620 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
621 s->init_num=0;
622 if (!s->session->peer)
623 break;
624 /* For TLS v1.2 freeze the handshake buffer
625 * at this point and digest cached records.
626 */
627 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer)
628 {
629 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
630 return -1;
631 }
632 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
633 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
634 return -1;
635 }
636 else
637 {
638 int offset=0;
639 int dgst_num;
640
641 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
642 s->init_num=0;
643
644 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
645 * a client cert, it can be verified
646 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
647 * should be generalized. But it is next step
648 */
649 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
650 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
651 return -1;
652 for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_num++)
653 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num])
654 {
655 int dgst_size;
656
657 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset]));
658 dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
659 if (dgst_size < 0)
660 {
661 ret = -1;
662 goto end;
663 }
664 offset+=dgst_size;
665 }
666 }
667 break;
668
669 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
670 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
671
672 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
673 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
674 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
675
676 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_POST_CLIENT_CERT;
677 s->init_num=0;
678 break;
679
680 case SSL3_ST_SR_POST_CLIENT_CERT: {
681 char next_proto_neg = 0;
682 char channel_id = 0;
683 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT)
684 # if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
685 next_proto_neg = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
686 # endif
687 channel_id = s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid;
688 #endif
689
690 if (next_proto_neg)
691 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
692 else if (channel_id)
693 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A;
694 else
695 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
696 break;
697 }
698
699 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
700 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
701 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
702 ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
703 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
704 s->init_num = 0;
705 if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid)
706 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A;
707 else
708 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
709 break;
710 #endif
711
712 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT)
713 case SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A:
714 case SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_B:
715 ret=ssl3_get_channel_id(s);
716 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
717 s->init_num = 0;
718 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
719 break;
720 #endif
721
722 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
723 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
724 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
725 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
726 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
727 if (s->hit)
728 s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
729 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
730 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
731 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
732 #endif
733 else
734 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
735 s->init_num=0;
736 break;
737
738 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
739 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
740 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
741 ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
742 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
743 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
744 s->init_num=0;
745 break;
746
747 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
748 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
749 ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
750 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
751 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
752 s->init_num=0;
753 break;
754
755 #endif
756
757 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
758 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
759
760 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
761 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
762 { ret= -1; goto end; }
763
764 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
765 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
766
767 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
768 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
769 s->init_num=0;
770
771 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
772 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
773 {
774 ret= -1;
775 goto end;
776 }
777
778 break;
779
780 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
781 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
782 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
783 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
784 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
785 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
786 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
787 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
788 if (s->hit)
789 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_POST_CLIENT_CERT;
790 else
791 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
792 s->init_num=0;
793 break;
794
795 case SSL_ST_OK:
796 /* clean a few things up */
797 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
798
799 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
800 s->init_buf=NULL;
801
802 /* remove buffering on output */
803 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
804
805 s->init_num=0;
806
807 if (s->renegotiate == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
808 {
809 s->renegotiate=0;
810 s->new_session=0;
811
812 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
813
814 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
815 /* s->server=1; */
816 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
817
818 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
819 }
820
821 ret = 1;
822 goto end;
823 /* break; */
824
825 default:
826 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
827 ret= -1;
828 goto end;
829 /* break; */
830 }
831
832 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
833 {
834 if (s->debug)
835 {
836 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
837 goto end;
838 }
839
840
841 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
842 {
843 new_state=s->state;
844 s->state=state;
845 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
846 s->state=new_state;
847 }
848 }
849 skip=0;
850 }
851 end:
852 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
853
854 s->in_handshake--;
855 if (cb != NULL)
856 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
857 return(ret);
858 }
859
ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL * s)860 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
861 {
862 unsigned char *p;
863
864 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
865 {
866 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
867 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
868 *(p++)=0;
869 *(p++)=0;
870 *(p++)=0;
871
872 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
873 /* number of bytes to write */
874 s->init_num=4;
875 s->init_off=0;
876 }
877
878 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
879 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
880 }
881
ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL * s)882 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
883 {
884 int ok;
885 long n;
886
887 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
888 * so permit appropriate message length */
889 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
890 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
891 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
892 -1,
893 s->max_cert_list,
894 &ok);
895 if (!ok) return((int)n);
896 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
897 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
898 {
899 /* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per
900 * negotiation. */
901 if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE)
902 {
903 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS);
904 return -1;
905 }
906 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
907 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) */
908 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
909 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
910 {
911 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
912 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
913 }
914 #endif
915 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
916 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
917 {
918 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
919 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
920 }
921 #endif
922 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
923 return 2;
924 }
925 return 1;
926 }
927
ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL * s)928 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
929 {
930 int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1;
931 unsigned int cookie_len;
932 long n;
933 unsigned long id;
934 unsigned char *p,*d,*q;
935 SSL_CIPHER *c;
936 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
937 SSL_COMP *comp=NULL;
938 #endif
939 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
940
941 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
942 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
943 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
944 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
945 * TLSv1.
946 */
947 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
948 )
949 {
950 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
951 }
952 s->first_packet=1;
953 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
954 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
955 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
956 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
957 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
958 &ok);
959
960 if (!ok) return((int)n);
961 s->first_packet=0;
962 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
963
964 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
965 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
966 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
967 p+=2;
968
969 if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) ||
970 (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version))
971 {
972 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
973 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
974 {
975 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
976 s->version = s->client_version;
977 }
978 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
979 goto f_err;
980 }
981
982 /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
983 * contain one, just return since we do not want to
984 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
985 */
986 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)
987 {
988 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
989
990 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
991 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
992
993 if (cookie_length == 0)
994 return 1;
995 }
996
997 /* load the client random */
998 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
999 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1000
1001 /* get the session-id */
1002 j= *(p++);
1003
1004 s->hit=0;
1005 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in renegotiation.
1006 * 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally ignore resumption requests
1007 * with flag SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1008 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this for security
1009 * won't even compile against older library versions).
1010 *
1011 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to request
1012 * renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains unset): for servers,
1013 * this essentially just means that the SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1014 * setting will be ignored.
1015 */
1016 if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
1017 {
1018 if (!s->session_creation_enabled)
1019 {
1020 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1021 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_SESSION_MAY_NOT_BE_CREATED);
1022 goto err;
1023 }
1024 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1025 goto err;
1026 }
1027 else
1028 {
1029 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
1030 if (i == 1)
1031 { /* previous session */
1032 s->hit=1;
1033 }
1034 else if (i == -1)
1035 goto err;
1036 else /* i == 0 */
1037 {
1038 if (!s->session_creation_enabled)
1039 {
1040 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1041 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_SESSION_MAY_NOT_BE_CREATED);
1042 goto err;
1043 }
1044 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1045 goto err;
1046 }
1047 }
1048
1049 p+=j;
1050
1051 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1052 {
1053 /* cookie stuff */
1054 cookie_len = *(p++);
1055
1056 /*
1057 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
1058 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
1059 * does not cause an overflow.
1060 */
1061 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
1062 {
1063 /* too much data */
1064 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1065 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1066 goto f_err;
1067 }
1068
1069 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
1070 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
1071 cookie_len > 0)
1072 {
1073 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
1074
1075 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
1076 {
1077 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
1078 cookie_len) == 0)
1079 {
1080 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1081 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1082 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1083 goto f_err;
1084 }
1085 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1086 }
1087 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1088 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
1089 {
1090 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1091 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1092 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1093 goto f_err;
1094 }
1095
1096 ret = 2;
1097 }
1098
1099 p += cookie_len;
1100 }
1101
1102 n2s(p,i);
1103 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
1104 {
1105 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
1106 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1107 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
1108 goto f_err;
1109 }
1110 if ((p+i) >= (d+n))
1111 {
1112 /* not enough data */
1113 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1114 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1115 goto f_err;
1116 }
1117 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
1118 == NULL))
1119 {
1120 goto err;
1121 }
1122 p+=i;
1123
1124 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1125 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
1126 {
1127 j=0;
1128 id=s->session->cipher->id;
1129
1130 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
1131 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
1132 #endif
1133 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
1134 {
1135 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
1136 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
1137 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1138 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1139 #endif
1140 if (c->id == id)
1141 {
1142 j=1;
1143 break;
1144 }
1145 }
1146 /* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade
1147 * attack: CVE-2010-4180.
1148 */
1149 #if 0
1150 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
1151 {
1152 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
1153 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
1154 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
1155 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
1156 * enabled, though. */
1157 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
1158 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0)
1159 {
1160 s->session->cipher = c;
1161 j = 1;
1162 }
1163 }
1164 #endif
1165 if (j == 0)
1166 {
1167 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
1168 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
1169 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1170 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1171 goto f_err;
1172 }
1173 }
1174
1175 /* compression */
1176 i= *(p++);
1177 if ((p+i) > (d+n))
1178 {
1179 /* not enough data */
1180 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1181 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1182 goto f_err;
1183 }
1184 q=p;
1185 for (j=0; j<i; j++)
1186 {
1187 if (p[j] == 0) break;
1188 }
1189
1190 p+=i;
1191 if (j >= i)
1192 {
1193 /* no compress */
1194 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1195 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1196 goto f_err;
1197 }
1198
1199 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1200 /* TLS extensions*/
1201 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1202 {
1203 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al))
1204 {
1205 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
1206 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1207 goto f_err;
1208 }
1209 }
1210 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
1211 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1212 goto err;
1213 }
1214
1215 /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
1216 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
1217 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
1218 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
1219 {
1220 unsigned long Time;
1221 unsigned char *pos;
1222 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
1223 pos=s->s3->server_random;
1224 l2n(Time,pos);
1225 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(pos,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1226 {
1227 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1228 goto f_err;
1229 }
1230 }
1231
1232 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb)
1233 {
1234 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL;
1235
1236 s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1237 if(s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length,
1238 ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg))
1239 {
1240 s->hit=1;
1241 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1242 s->session->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
1243
1244 ciphers=NULL;
1245
1246 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1247 pref_cipher=pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1248 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1249 {
1250 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1251 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1252 goto f_err;
1253 }
1254
1255 s->session->cipher=pref_cipher;
1256
1257 if (s->cipher_list)
1258 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1259
1260 if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
1261 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1262
1263 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1264 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1265 }
1266 }
1267 #endif
1268
1269 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1270 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1271 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
1272 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
1273 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1274 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1275 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1276 {
1277 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1278 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1279 /* Can't disable compression */
1280 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
1281 {
1282 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1283 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1284 goto f_err;
1285 }
1286 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1287 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++)
1288 {
1289 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1290 if (comp_id == comp->id)
1291 {
1292 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1293 break;
1294 }
1295 }
1296 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1297 {
1298 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1299 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1300 goto f_err;
1301 }
1302 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1303 for (m = 0; m < i; m++)
1304 {
1305 if (q[m] == comp_id)
1306 break;
1307 }
1308 if (m >= i)
1309 {
1310 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1311 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1312 goto f_err;
1313 }
1314 }
1315 else if (s->hit)
1316 comp = NULL;
1317 else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods)
1318 { /* See if we have a match */
1319 int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
1320
1321 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1322 for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
1323 {
1324 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1325 v=comp->id;
1326 for (o=0; o<i; o++)
1327 {
1328 if (v == q[o])
1329 {
1330 done=1;
1331 break;
1332 }
1333 }
1334 if (done) break;
1335 }
1336 if (done)
1337 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1338 else
1339 comp=NULL;
1340 }
1341 #else
1342 /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1343 * using compression.
1344 */
1345 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1346 {
1347 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1348 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1349 goto f_err;
1350 }
1351 #endif
1352
1353 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1354 * pick a cipher */
1355
1356 if (!s->hit)
1357 {
1358 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1359 s->session->compress_meth=0;
1360 #else
1361 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
1362 #endif
1363 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1364 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1365 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1366 if (ciphers == NULL)
1367 {
1368 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1369 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
1370 goto f_err;
1371 }
1372 ciphers=NULL;
1373 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
1374 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1375
1376 if (c == NULL)
1377 {
1378 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1379 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1380 goto f_err;
1381 }
1382 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
1383 }
1384 else
1385 {
1386 /* Session-id reuse */
1387 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1388 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1389 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
1390 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
1391
1392 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1393 {
1394 sk=s->session->ciphers;
1395 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
1396 {
1397 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
1398 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
1399 nc=c;
1400 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1401 ec=c;
1402 }
1403 if (nc != NULL)
1404 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
1405 else if (ec != NULL)
1406 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
1407 else
1408 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1409 }
1410 else
1411 #endif
1412 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1413 }
1414
1415 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER))
1416 {
1417 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
1418 {
1419 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1420 goto f_err;
1421 }
1422 }
1423
1424 /* we now have the following setup.
1425 * client_random
1426 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1427 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1428 * compression - basically ignored right now
1429 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1430 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1431 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1432 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1433 */
1434
1435 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1436 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1437 {
1438 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0)
1439 {
1440 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1441 goto err;
1442 }
1443 }
1444
1445 if (ret < 0) ret=1;
1446 if (0)
1447 {
1448 f_err:
1449 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1450 }
1451 err:
1452 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1453 return(ret);
1454 }
1455
ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL * s)1456 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1457 {
1458 unsigned char *buf;
1459 unsigned char *p,*d;
1460 int i,sl;
1461 unsigned long l;
1462 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1463 unsigned long Time;
1464 #endif
1465
1466 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1467 {
1468 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1469 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1470 p=s->s3->server_random;
1471 /* Generate server_random if it was not needed previously */
1472 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
1473 l2n(Time,p);
1474 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1475 return -1;
1476 #endif
1477 /* Do the message type and length last */
1478 d=p= &(buf[4]);
1479
1480 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1481 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1482
1483 /* Random stuff */
1484 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1485 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1486
1487 /* There are several cases for the session ID to send
1488 * back in the server hello:
1489 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1490 * we send back the old session ID.
1491 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1492 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1493 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1494 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1495 * session ID.
1496 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1497 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1498 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1499 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1500 * to send back.
1501 */
1502 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1503 && !s->hit)
1504 s->session->session_id_length=0;
1505
1506 sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1507 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
1508 {
1509 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1510 return -1;
1511 }
1512 *(p++)=sl;
1513 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1514 p+=sl;
1515
1516 /* put the cipher */
1517 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1518 p+=i;
1519
1520 /* put the compression method */
1521 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1522 *(p++)=0;
1523 #else
1524 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1525 *(p++)=0;
1526 else
1527 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1528 #endif
1529 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1530 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
1531 {
1532 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1533 return -1;
1534 }
1535 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
1536 {
1537 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1538 return -1;
1539 }
1540 #endif
1541 /* do the header */
1542 l=(p-d);
1543 d=buf;
1544 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
1545 l2n3(l,d);
1546
1547 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1548 /* number of bytes to write */
1549 s->init_num=p-buf;
1550 s->init_off=0;
1551 }
1552
1553 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1554 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1555 }
1556
ssl3_send_server_done(SSL * s)1557 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1558 {
1559 unsigned char *p;
1560
1561 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1562 {
1563 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1564
1565 /* do the header */
1566 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1567 *(p++)=0;
1568 *(p++)=0;
1569 *(p++)=0;
1570
1571 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1572 /* number of bytes to write */
1573 s->init_num=4;
1574 s->init_off=0;
1575 }
1576
1577 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1578 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1579 }
1580
ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL * s)1581 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1582 {
1583 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1584 unsigned char *q;
1585 int j,num;
1586 RSA *rsa;
1587 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1588 unsigned int u;
1589 #endif
1590 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1591 DH *dh=NULL,*dhp;
1592 #endif
1593 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1594 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1595 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1596 int encodedlen = 0;
1597 int curve_id = 0;
1598 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1599 #endif
1600 EVP_PKEY *pkey;
1601 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1602 unsigned char *p,*d;
1603 int al,i;
1604 unsigned long type;
1605 int n;
1606 CERT *cert;
1607 BIGNUM *r[4];
1608 int nr[4],kn;
1609 BUF_MEM *buf;
1610 EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
1611
1612 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1613 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1614 {
1615 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1616 cert=s->cert;
1617
1618 buf=s->init_buf;
1619
1620 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1621 n=0;
1622 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1623 if (type & SSL_kRSA)
1624 {
1625 rsa=cert->rsa_tmp;
1626 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1627 {
1628 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1629 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1630 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1631 if(rsa == NULL)
1632 {
1633 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1634 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1635 goto f_err;
1636 }
1637 RSA_up_ref(rsa);
1638 cert->rsa_tmp=rsa;
1639 }
1640 if (rsa == NULL)
1641 {
1642 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1643 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1644 goto f_err;
1645 }
1646 r[0]=rsa->n;
1647 r[1]=rsa->e;
1648 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1649 }
1650 else
1651 #endif
1652 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1653 if (type & SSL_kEDH)
1654 {
1655 dhp=cert->dh_tmp;
1656 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1657 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1658 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1659 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1660 if (dhp == NULL)
1661 {
1662 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1663 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1664 goto f_err;
1665 }
1666
1667 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1668 {
1669 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1670 goto err;
1671 }
1672
1673 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1674 {
1675 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1676 goto err;
1677 }
1678
1679 s->s3->tmp.dh=dh;
1680 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1681 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1682 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1683 {
1684 if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1685 {
1686 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1687 ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1688 goto err;
1689 }
1690 }
1691 else
1692 {
1693 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1694 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1695 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1696 (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1697 {
1698 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1699 goto err;
1700 }
1701 }
1702 r[0]=dh->p;
1703 r[1]=dh->g;
1704 r[2]=dh->pub_key;
1705 }
1706 else
1707 #endif
1708 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1709 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1710 {
1711 const EC_GROUP *group;
1712
1713 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1714 if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1715 {
1716 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1717 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1718 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1719 }
1720 if (ecdhp == NULL)
1721 {
1722 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1723 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1724 goto f_err;
1725 }
1726
1727 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1728 {
1729 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1730 goto err;
1731 }
1732
1733 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1734 if (ecdhp == NULL)
1735 {
1736 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1737 goto err;
1738 }
1739 if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL)
1740 {
1741 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1742 goto err;
1743 }
1744
1745 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1746 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1747 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1748 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1749 {
1750 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1751 {
1752 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1753 goto err;
1754 }
1755 }
1756
1757 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1758 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1759 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
1760 {
1761 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1762 goto err;
1763 }
1764
1765 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1766 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
1767 {
1768 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1769 goto err;
1770 }
1771
1772 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1773 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1774 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1775 */
1776 if ((curve_id =
1777 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1778 == 0)
1779 {
1780 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1781 goto err;
1782 }
1783
1784 /* Encode the public key.
1785 * First check the size of encoding and
1786 * allocate memory accordingly.
1787 */
1788 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1789 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1790 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1791 NULL, 0, NULL);
1792
1793 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1794 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1795 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1796 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1797 {
1798 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1799 goto err;
1800 }
1801
1802
1803 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1804 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1805 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1806 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1807
1808 if (encodedlen == 0)
1809 {
1810 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1811 goto err;
1812 }
1813
1814 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1815
1816 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1817 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1818 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1819 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1820 * structure.
1821 */
1822 n = 4 + encodedlen;
1823
1824 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1825 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1826 */
1827 r[0]=NULL;
1828 r[1]=NULL;
1829 r[2]=NULL;
1830 r[3]=NULL;
1831 }
1832 else
1833 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1834 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1835 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1836 {
1837 /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
1838 n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1839 }
1840 else
1841 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1842 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1843 if (type & SSL_kSRP)
1844 {
1845 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1846 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1847 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) ||
1848 (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL))
1849 {
1850 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1851 goto err;
1852 }
1853 r[0]=s->srp_ctx.N;
1854 r[1]=s->srp_ctx.g;
1855 r[2]=s->srp_ctx.s;
1856 r[3]=s->srp_ctx.B;
1857 }
1858 else
1859 #endif
1860 {
1861 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1862 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1863 goto f_err;
1864 }
1865 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL && i<4; i++)
1866 {
1867 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1868 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1869 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1870 n+=1+nr[i];
1871 else
1872 #endif
1873 n+=2+nr[i];
1874 }
1875
1876 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
1877 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
1878 {
1879 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,&md))
1880 == NULL)
1881 {
1882 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1883 goto f_err;
1884 }
1885 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1886 }
1887 else
1888 {
1889 pkey=NULL;
1890 kn=0;
1891 }
1892
1893 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn))
1894 {
1895 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1896 goto err;
1897 }
1898 d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1899 p= &(d[4]);
1900
1901 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL && i<4; i++)
1902 {
1903 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1904 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1905 {
1906 *p = nr[i];
1907 p++;
1908 }
1909 else
1910 #endif
1911 s2n(nr[i],p);
1912 BN_bn2bin(r[i],p);
1913 p+=nr[i];
1914 }
1915
1916 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1917 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1918 {
1919 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1920 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1921 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1922 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1923 * the actual encoded point itself
1924 */
1925 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1926 p += 1;
1927 *p = 0;
1928 p += 1;
1929 *p = curve_id;
1930 p += 1;
1931 *p = encodedlen;
1932 p += 1;
1933 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
1934 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
1935 encodedlen);
1936 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1937 encodedPoint = NULL;
1938 p += encodedlen;
1939 }
1940 #endif
1941
1942 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1943 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1944 {
1945 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1946 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
1947 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
1948 p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1949 }
1950 #endif
1951
1952 /* not anonymous */
1953 if (pkey != NULL)
1954 {
1955 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1956 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1957 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1958 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA
1959 && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
1960 {
1961 q=md_buf;
1962 j=0;
1963 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
1964 {
1965 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
1966 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
1967 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
1968 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1969 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1970 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1971 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1972 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
1973 (unsigned int *)&i);
1974 q+=i;
1975 j+=i;
1976 }
1977 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1978 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
1979 {
1980 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
1981 goto err;
1982 }
1983 s2n(u,p);
1984 n+=u+2;
1985 }
1986 else
1987 #endif
1988 if (md)
1989 {
1990 /* For TLS1.2 and later send signature
1991 * algorithm */
1992 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1993 {
1994 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md))
1995 {
1996 /* Should never happen */
1997 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1998 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1999 goto f_err;
2000 }
2001 p+=2;
2002 }
2003 #ifdef SSL_DEBUG
2004 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n",
2005 EVP_MD_name(md));
2006 #endif
2007 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
2008 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2009 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2010 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
2011 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
2012 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
2013 {
2014 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_EVP);
2015 goto err;
2016 }
2017 s2n(i,p);
2018 n+=i+2;
2019 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2020 n+= 2;
2021 }
2022 else
2023 {
2024 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
2025 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2026 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
2027 goto f_err;
2028 }
2029 }
2030
2031 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
2032 l2n3(n,d);
2033
2034 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
2035 * it off */
2036 s->init_num=n+4;
2037 s->init_off=0;
2038 }
2039
2040 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
2041 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2042 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2043 f_err:
2044 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2045 err:
2046 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2047 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2048 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2049 #endif
2050 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2051 return(-1);
2052 }
2053
ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL * s)2054 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
2055 {
2056 unsigned char *p,*d;
2057 int i,j,nl,off,n;
2058 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
2059 X509_NAME *name;
2060 BUF_MEM *buf;
2061
2062 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
2063 {
2064 buf=s->init_buf;
2065
2066 d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
2067
2068 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2069 p++;
2070 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
2071 d[0]=n;
2072 p+=n;
2073 n++;
2074
2075 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2076 {
2077 nl = tls12_get_req_sig_algs(s, p + 2);
2078 s2n(nl, p);
2079 p += nl + 2;
2080 n += nl + 2;
2081 }
2082
2083 off=n;
2084 p+=2;
2085 n+=2;
2086
2087 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2088 nl=0;
2089 if (sk != NULL)
2090 {
2091 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
2092 {
2093 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
2094 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
2095 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2))
2096 {
2097 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2098 goto err;
2099 }
2100 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]);
2101 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
2102 {
2103 s2n(j,p);
2104 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2105 n+=2+j;
2106 nl+=2+j;
2107 }
2108 else
2109 {
2110 d=p;
2111 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2112 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
2113 n+=j;
2114 nl+=j;
2115 }
2116 }
2117 }
2118 /* else no CA names */
2119 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]);
2120 s2n(nl,p);
2121
2122 d=(unsigned char *)buf->data;
2123 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
2124 l2n3(n,d);
2125
2126 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
2127 * it off */
2128
2129 s->init_num=n+4;
2130 s->init_off=0;
2131 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
2132 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
2133
2134 /* do the header */
2135 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
2136 *(p++)=0;
2137 *(p++)=0;
2138 *(p++)=0;
2139 s->init_num += 4;
2140 #endif
2141
2142 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
2143 }
2144
2145 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2146 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2147 err:
2148 return(-1);
2149 }
2150
ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL * s)2151 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2152 {
2153 int i,al,ok;
2154 long n;
2155 unsigned long alg_k;
2156 unsigned char *p;
2157 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2158 RSA *rsa=NULL;
2159 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2160 #endif
2161 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2162 BIGNUM *pub=NULL;
2163 DH *dh_srvr;
2164 #endif
2165 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2166 KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
2167 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2168
2169 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2170 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
2171 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
2172 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
2173 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2174 #endif
2175
2176 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2177 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
2178 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
2179 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2180 2048, /* ??? */
2181 &ok);
2182
2183 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2184 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2185
2186 alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2187
2188 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2189 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
2190 {
2191 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2192 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
2193 {
2194 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
2195 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
2196 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
2197 * be sent already */
2198 if (rsa == NULL)
2199 {
2200 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2201 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
2202 goto f_err;
2203
2204 }
2205 }
2206 else
2207 {
2208 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
2209 if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
2210 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
2211 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
2212 {
2213 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2214 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2215 goto f_err;
2216 }
2217 rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa;
2218 }
2219
2220 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2221 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2222 {
2223 n2s(p,i);
2224 if (n != i+2)
2225 {
2226 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
2227 {
2228 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2229 goto err;
2230 }
2231 else
2232 p-=2;
2233 }
2234 else
2235 n=i;
2236 }
2237
2238 i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2239
2240 al = -1;
2241
2242 if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2243 {
2244 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2245 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
2246 }
2247
2248 if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2249 {
2250 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2251 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2252 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2253 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2254 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2255 * protocol version.
2256 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
2257 if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
2258 (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
2259 {
2260 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2261 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
2262
2263 /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2264 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
2265 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
2266 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
2267 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
2268 * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
2269 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
2270 }
2271 }
2272
2273 if (al != -1)
2274 {
2275 /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
2276 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
2277 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
2278 ERR_clear_error();
2279 i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2280 p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2281 p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2282 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
2283 goto err;
2284 }
2285
2286 s->session->master_key_length=
2287 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2288 s->session->master_key,
2289 p,i);
2290 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2291 }
2292 else
2293 #endif
2294 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2295 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
2296 {
2297 n2s(p,i);
2298 if (n != i+2)
2299 {
2300 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
2301 {
2302 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2303 goto err;
2304 }
2305 else
2306 {
2307 p-=2;
2308 i=(int)n;
2309 }
2310 }
2311
2312 if (n == 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */
2313 {
2314 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2315 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS);
2316 goto f_err;
2317 }
2318 else
2319 {
2320 if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
2321 {
2322 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2323 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2324 goto f_err;
2325 }
2326 else
2327 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
2328 }
2329
2330 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
2331 if (pub == NULL)
2332 {
2333 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2334 goto err;
2335 }
2336
2337 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
2338
2339 if (i <= 0)
2340 {
2341 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2342 BN_clear_free(pub);
2343 goto err;
2344 }
2345
2346 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2347 s->s3->tmp.dh=NULL;
2348
2349 BN_clear_free(pub);
2350 pub=NULL;
2351 s->session->master_key_length=
2352 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2353 s->session->master_key,p,i);
2354 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2355 }
2356 else
2357 #endif
2358 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2359 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
2360 {
2361 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2362 krb5_data enc_ticket;
2363 krb5_data authenticator;
2364 krb5_data enc_pms;
2365 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2366 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2367 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2368 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2369 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
2370 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
2371 int padl, outl;
2372 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
2373 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
2374
2375 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2376
2377 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
2378
2379 n2s(p,i);
2380 enc_ticket.length = i;
2381
2382 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6))
2383 {
2384 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2385 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2386 goto err;
2387 }
2388
2389 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2390 p+=enc_ticket.length;
2391
2392 n2s(p,i);
2393 authenticator.length = i;
2394
2395 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6))
2396 {
2397 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2398 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2399 goto err;
2400 }
2401
2402 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2403 p+=authenticator.length;
2404
2405 n2s(p,i);
2406 enc_pms.length = i;
2407 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2408 p+=enc_pms.length;
2409
2410 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
2411 ** after decryption
2412 */
2413 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
2414 {
2415 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2416 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2417 goto err;
2418 }
2419
2420 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2421 enc_pms.length + 6))
2422 {
2423 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2424 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2425 goto err;
2426 }
2427
2428 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2429 &kssl_err)) != 0)
2430 {
2431 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
2432 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2433 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2434 if (kssl_err.text)
2435 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2436 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2437 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2438 kssl_err.reason);
2439 goto err;
2440 }
2441
2442 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2443 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2444 */
2445 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2446 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
2447 {
2448 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
2449 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2450 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2451 if (kssl_err.text)
2452 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2453 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2454 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2455 kssl_err.reason);
2456 goto err;
2457 }
2458
2459 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
2460 {
2461 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2462 goto err;
2463 }
2464
2465 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
2466 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2467 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2468
2469 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2470 if (enc == NULL)
2471 goto err;
2472
2473 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2474
2475 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
2476 {
2477 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2478 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2479 goto err;
2480 }
2481 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
2482 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2483 {
2484 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2485 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2486 goto err;
2487 }
2488 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2489 {
2490 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2491 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2492 goto err;
2493 }
2494 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
2495 {
2496 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2497 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2498 goto err;
2499 }
2500 outl += padl;
2501 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2502 {
2503 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2504 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2505 goto err;
2506 }
2507 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2508 {
2509 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2510 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2511 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2512 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2513 * the protocol version.
2514 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2515 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2516 */
2517 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG))
2518 {
2519 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2520 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2521 goto err;
2522 }
2523 }
2524
2525 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2526
2527 s->session->master_key_length=
2528 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2529 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
2530
2531 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
2532 {
2533 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2534 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
2535 {
2536 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2537 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
2538 }
2539 }
2540
2541
2542 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2543 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2544 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2545 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2546 */
2547 }
2548 else
2549 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2550
2551 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2552 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2553 {
2554 int ret = 1;
2555 int field_size = 0;
2556 const EC_KEY *tkey;
2557 const EC_GROUP *group;
2558 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2559
2560 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2561 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
2562 {
2563 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2564 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2565 goto err;
2566 }
2567
2568 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2569 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2570 {
2571 /* use the certificate */
2572 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2573 }
2574 else
2575 {
2576 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2577 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2578 */
2579 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2580 }
2581
2582 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2583 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2584
2585 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2586 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
2587 {
2588 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2589 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2590 goto err;
2591 }
2592
2593 /* Let's get client's public key */
2594 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
2595 {
2596 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2597 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2598 goto err;
2599 }
2600
2601 if (n == 0L)
2602 {
2603 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2604
2605 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
2606 {
2607 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2608 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2609 goto f_err;
2610 }
2611 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2612 == NULL) ||
2613 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
2614 {
2615 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2616 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2617 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2618 * never executed. When that support is
2619 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2620 * received in the certificate is
2621 * authorized for key agreement.
2622 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2623 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2624 * group.
2625 */
2626 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2627 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2628 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2629 goto f_err;
2630 }
2631
2632 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2633 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
2634 {
2635 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2636 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2637 goto err;
2638 }
2639 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2640 }
2641 else
2642 {
2643 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2644 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2645 */
2646 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
2647 {
2648 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2649 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2650 goto err;
2651 }
2652
2653 /* Get encoded point length */
2654 i = *p;
2655 p += 1;
2656 if (n != 1 + i)
2657 {
2658 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2659 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2660 goto err;
2661 }
2662 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
2663 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
2664 {
2665 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2666 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2667 goto err;
2668 }
2669 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2670 * currently, so set it to the start
2671 */
2672 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2673 }
2674
2675 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2676 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2677 if (field_size <= 0)
2678 {
2679 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2680 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2681 goto err;
2682 }
2683 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
2684 if (i <= 0)
2685 {
2686 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2687 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2688 goto err;
2689 }
2690
2691 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2692 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2693 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2694 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2695 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2696 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2697
2698 /* Compute the master secret */
2699 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
2700 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
2701
2702 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2703 return (ret);
2704 }
2705 else
2706 #endif
2707 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2708 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
2709 {
2710 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2711 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
2712 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2713 int psk_err = 1;
2714 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
2715
2716 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2717
2718 n2s(p,i);
2719 if (n != i+2)
2720 {
2721 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2722 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2723 goto psk_err;
2724 }
2725 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
2726 {
2727 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2728 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2729 goto psk_err;
2730 }
2731 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL)
2732 {
2733 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2734 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2735 goto psk_err;
2736 }
2737
2738 /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity
2739 * string for the callback */
2740 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2741 memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
2742 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2743 psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2744 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1);
2745
2746 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
2747 {
2748 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2749 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2750 goto psk_err;
2751 }
2752 else if (psk_len == 0)
2753 {
2754 /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
2755 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2756 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2757 al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2758 goto psk_err;
2759 }
2760
2761 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2762 pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
2763 t = psk_or_pre_ms;
2764 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
2765 s2n(psk_len, t);
2766 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2767 t+=psk_len;
2768 s2n(psk_len, t);
2769
2770 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2771 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2772 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
2773 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
2774 {
2775 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2776 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2777 goto psk_err;
2778 }
2779
2780 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2781 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2782 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2783 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2784 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2785 {
2786 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2787 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2788 goto psk_err;
2789 }
2790
2791 s->session->master_key_length=
2792 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2793 s->session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
2794 psk_err = 0;
2795 psk_err:
2796 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2797 if (psk_err != 0)
2798 goto f_err;
2799 }
2800 else
2801 #endif
2802 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2803 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
2804 {
2805 int param_len;
2806
2807 n2s(p,i);
2808 param_len=i+2;
2809 if (param_len > n)
2810 {
2811 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2812 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2813 goto f_err;
2814 }
2815 if (!(s->srp_ctx.A=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
2816 {
2817 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2818 goto err;
2819 }
2820 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
2821 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2822 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2823 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL)
2824 {
2825 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2826 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2827 goto err;
2828 }
2829
2830 if ((s->session->master_key_length = SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,s->session->master_key))<0)
2831 {
2832 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2833 goto err;
2834 }
2835
2836 p+=i;
2837 }
2838 else
2839 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2840 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)
2841 {
2842 int ret = 0;
2843 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2844 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2845 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2846 size_t outlen=32, inlen;
2847 unsigned long alg_a;
2848
2849 /* Get our certificate private key*/
2850 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2851 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
2852 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
2853 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
2854 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2855
2856 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk,NULL);
2857 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2858 /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2859 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2860 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use
2861 * a client certificate for authorization only. */
2862 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2863 if (client_pub_pkey)
2864 {
2865 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2866 ERR_clear_error();
2867 }
2868 /* Decrypt session key */
2869 if ((*p!=( V_ASN1_SEQUENCE| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)))
2870 {
2871 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2872 goto gerr;
2873 }
2874 if (p[1] == 0x81)
2875 {
2876 start = p+3;
2877 inlen = p[2];
2878 }
2879 else if (p[1] < 0x80)
2880 {
2881 start = p+2;
2882 inlen = p[1];
2883 }
2884 else
2885 {
2886 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2887 goto gerr;
2888 }
2889 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,start,inlen) <=0)
2890
2891 {
2892 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2893 goto gerr;
2894 }
2895 /* Generate master secret */
2896 s->session->master_key_length=
2897 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2898 s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32);
2899 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2900 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2901 ret = 2;
2902 else
2903 ret = 1;
2904 gerr:
2905 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2906 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2907 if (ret)
2908 return ret;
2909 else
2910 goto err;
2911 }
2912 else
2913 {
2914 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2915 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2916 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2917 goto f_err;
2918 }
2919
2920 return(1);
2921 f_err:
2922 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2923 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
2924 err:
2925 #endif
2926 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2927 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2928 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2929 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2930 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2931 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2932 #endif
2933 return(-1);
2934 }
2935
ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL * s)2936 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2937 {
2938 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2939 unsigned char *p;
2940 int al,ok,ret=0;
2941 long n;
2942 int type=0,i,j;
2943 X509 *peer;
2944 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2945 EVP_MD_CTX mctx;
2946 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
2947
2948 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2949 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2950 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2951 -1,
2952 516, /* Enough for 4096 bit RSA key with TLS v1.2 */
2953 &ok);
2954
2955 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2956
2957 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
2958 {
2959 peer=s->session->peer;
2960 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2961 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
2962 }
2963 else
2964 {
2965 peer=NULL;
2966 pkey=NULL;
2967 }
2968
2969 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
2970 {
2971 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2972 if ((peer != NULL) && (type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2973 {
2974 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2975 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
2976 goto f_err;
2977 }
2978 ret=1;
2979 goto end;
2980 }
2981
2982 if (peer == NULL)
2983 {
2984 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
2985 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2986 goto f_err;
2987 }
2988
2989 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2990 {
2991 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2992 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2993 goto f_err;
2994 }
2995
2996 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
2997 {
2998 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
2999 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3000 goto f_err;
3001 }
3002
3003 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
3004 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3005 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
3006 /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare
3007 * signature without length field */
3008 if (n==64 && (pkey->type==NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
3009 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) )
3010 {
3011 i=64;
3012 }
3013 else
3014 {
3015 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3016 {
3017 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
3018 /* Should never happen */
3019 if (sigalg == -1)
3020 {
3021 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3022 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3023 goto f_err;
3024 }
3025 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
3026 if (sigalg != (int)p[1])
3027 {
3028 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
3029 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3030 goto f_err;
3031 }
3032 md = tls12_get_hash(p[0]);
3033 if (md == NULL)
3034 {
3035 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
3036 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3037 goto f_err;
3038 }
3039 #ifdef SSL_DEBUG
3040 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
3041 #endif
3042 p += 2;
3043 n -= 2;
3044 }
3045 n2s(p,i);
3046 n-=2;
3047 if (i > n)
3048 {
3049 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3050 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3051 goto f_err;
3052 }
3053 }
3054 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
3055 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
3056 {
3057 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
3058 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3059 goto f_err;
3060 }
3061
3062 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3063 {
3064 long hdatalen = 0;
3065 void *hdata;
3066 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
3067 if (hdatalen <= 0)
3068 {
3069 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3070 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3071 goto f_err;
3072 }
3073 #ifdef SSL_DEBUG
3074 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
3075 EVP_MD_name(md));
3076 #endif
3077 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
3078 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen))
3079 {
3080 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3081 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3082 goto f_err;
3083 }
3084
3085 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p , i, pkey) <= 0)
3086 {
3087 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3088 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
3089 goto f_err;
3090 }
3091 }
3092 else
3093 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3094 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
3095 {
3096 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3097 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
3098 pkey->pkey.rsa);
3099 if (i < 0)
3100 {
3101 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3102 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
3103 goto f_err;
3104 }
3105 if (i == 0)
3106 {
3107 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3108 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
3109 goto f_err;
3110 }
3111 }
3112 else
3113 #endif
3114 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3115 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
3116 {
3117 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3118 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3119 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
3120 if (j <= 0)
3121 {
3122 /* bad signature */
3123 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3124 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
3125 goto f_err;
3126 }
3127 }
3128 else
3129 #endif
3130 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3131 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
3132 {
3133 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3134 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3135 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
3136 if (j <= 0)
3137 {
3138 /* bad signature */
3139 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3140 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3141 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3142 goto f_err;
3143 }
3144 }
3145 else
3146 #endif
3147 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)
3148 { unsigned char signature[64];
3149 int idx;
3150 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL);
3151 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
3152 if (i!=64) {
3153 fprintf(stderr,"GOST signature length is %d",i);
3154 }
3155 for (idx=0;idx<64;idx++) {
3156 signature[63-idx]=p[idx];
3157 }
3158 j=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx,signature,64,s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,32);
3159 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3160 if (j<=0)
3161 {
3162 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3163 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3164 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3165 goto f_err;
3166 }
3167 }
3168 else
3169 {
3170 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3171 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
3172 goto f_err;
3173 }
3174
3175
3176 ret=1;
3177 if (0)
3178 {
3179 f_err:
3180 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3181 }
3182 end:
3183 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
3184 {
3185 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
3186 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
3187 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
3188 }
3189 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3190 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3191 return(ret);
3192 }
3193
ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL * s)3194 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3195 {
3196 int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
3197 X509 *x=NULL;
3198 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
3199 const unsigned char *p,*q;
3200 unsigned char *d;
3201 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
3202
3203 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3204 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
3205 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
3206 -1,
3207 s->max_cert_list,
3208 &ok);
3209
3210 if (!ok) return((int)n);
3211
3212 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
3213 {
3214 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3215 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3216 {
3217 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3218 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3219 goto f_err;
3220 }
3221 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
3222 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
3223 {
3224 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
3225 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3226 goto f_err;
3227 }
3228 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
3229 return(1);
3230 }
3231
3232 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
3233 {
3234 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3235 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
3236 goto f_err;
3237 }
3238 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3239
3240 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
3241 {
3242 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3243 goto err;
3244 }
3245
3246 n2l3(p,llen);
3247 if (llen+3 != n)
3248 {
3249 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3250 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3251 goto f_err;
3252 }
3253 for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
3254 {
3255 n2l3(p,l);
3256 if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
3257 {
3258 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3259 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3260 goto f_err;
3261 }
3262
3263 q=p;
3264 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
3265 if (x == NULL)
3266 {
3267 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3268 goto err;
3269 }
3270 if (p != (q+l))
3271 {
3272 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3273 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3274 goto f_err;
3275 }
3276 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
3277 {
3278 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3279 goto err;
3280 }
3281 x=NULL;
3282 nc+=l+3;
3283 }
3284
3285 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
3286 {
3287 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3288 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
3289 {
3290 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3291 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3292 goto f_err;
3293 }
3294 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3295 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3296 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3297 {
3298 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3299 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3300 goto f_err;
3301 }
3302 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3303 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
3304 {
3305 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3306 goto f_err;
3307 }
3308 }
3309 else
3310 {
3311 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
3312 if (i <= 0)
3313 {
3314 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3315 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
3316 goto f_err;
3317 }
3318 }
3319
3320 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
3321 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3322 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
3323 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3324
3325 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
3326 * when we arrive here. */
3327 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3328 {
3329 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
3330 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3331 {
3332 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3333 goto err;
3334 }
3335 }
3336 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
3337 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
3338 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
3339 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
3340 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
3341
3342 sk=NULL;
3343
3344 ret=1;
3345 if (0)
3346 {
3347 f_err:
3348 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3349 }
3350 err:
3351 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
3352 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
3353 return(ret);
3354 }
3355
ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL * s)3356 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3357 {
3358 unsigned long l;
3359 X509 *x;
3360
3361 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
3362 {
3363 x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
3364 if (x == NULL)
3365 {
3366 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3367 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
3368 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5))
3369 {
3370 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3371 return(0);
3372 }
3373 }
3374
3375 l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x);
3376 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
3377 s->init_num=(int)l;
3378 s->init_off=0;
3379 }
3380
3381 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3382 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3383 }
3384
3385 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3386 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL * s)3387 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
3388 {
3389 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
3390 {
3391 unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
3392 const unsigned char *const_p;
3393 int len, slen_full, slen;
3394 SSL_SESSION *sess;
3395 unsigned int hlen;
3396 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
3397 HMAC_CTX hctx;
3398 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3399 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3400 unsigned char key_name[16];
3401
3402 /* get session encoding length */
3403 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3404 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
3405 * too long
3406 */
3407 if (slen_full > 0xFF00)
3408 return -1;
3409 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3410 if (!senc)
3411 return -1;
3412 p = senc;
3413 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
3414
3415 /* create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up */
3416 const_p = senc;
3417 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3418 if (sess == NULL)
3419 {
3420 OPENSSL_free(senc);
3421 return -1;
3422 }
3423 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3424
3425 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3426 if (slen > slen_full) /* shouldn't ever happen */
3427 {
3428 OPENSSL_free(senc);
3429 return -1;
3430 }
3431 p = senc;
3432 i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p);
3433 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3434
3435 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3436 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
3437 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3438 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3439 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3440 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3441 */
3442 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3443 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
3444 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3445 return -1;
3446
3447 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3448 /* do the header */
3449 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
3450 /* Skip message length for now */
3451 p += 3;
3452 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3453 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3454 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
3455 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
3456 * from parent ctx.
3457 */
3458 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3459 {
3460 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
3461 &hctx, 1) < 0)
3462 {
3463 OPENSSL_free(senc);
3464 return -1;
3465 }
3466 }
3467 else
3468 {
3469 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
3470 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3471 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
3472 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3473 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3474 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3475 }
3476
3477 /* Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only):
3478 * We leave this unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity),
3479 * and guess that tickets for new sessions will live as long
3480 * as their sessions. */
3481 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
3482
3483 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3484 p += 2;
3485 /* Output key name */
3486 macstart = p;
3487 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3488 p += 16;
3489 /* output IV */
3490 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3491 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3492 /* Encrypt session data */
3493 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
3494 p += len;
3495 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
3496 p += len;
3497 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3498
3499 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
3500 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
3501 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3502
3503 p += hlen;
3504 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3505 /* Total length */
3506 len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3507 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1;
3508 l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */
3509 p += 4;
3510 s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */
3511
3512 /* number of bytes to write */
3513 s->init_num= len;
3514 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3515 s->init_off=0;
3516 OPENSSL_free(senc);
3517 }
3518
3519 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3520 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3521 }
3522
ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL * s)3523 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3524 {
3525 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
3526 {
3527 unsigned char *p;
3528 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3529 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3530 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3531 * + (ocsp response)
3532 */
3533 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
3534 return -1;
3535
3536 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3537
3538 /* do the header */
3539 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3540 /* message length */
3541 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3542 /* status type */
3543 *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
3544 /* length of OCSP response */
3545 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3546 /* actual response */
3547 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3548 /* number of bytes to write */
3549 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3550 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3551 s->init_off = 0;
3552 }
3553
3554 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3555 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3556 }
3557
3558 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3559 /* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It
3560 * sets the next_proto member in s if found */
ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL * s)3561 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
3562 {
3563 int ok;
3564 int proto_len, padding_len;
3565 long n;
3566 const unsigned char *p;
3567
3568 /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3569 * extension in their ClientHello */
3570 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
3571 {
3572 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
3573 return -1;
3574 }
3575
3576 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3577 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
3578 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
3579 SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO,
3580 514, /* See the payload format below */
3581 &ok);
3582
3583 if (!ok)
3584 return((int)n);
3585
3586 /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received
3587 * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset
3588 * by ssl3_get_finished). */
3589 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
3590 {
3591 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
3592 return -1;
3593 }
3594
3595 if (n < 2)
3596 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3597
3598 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3599
3600 /* The payload looks like:
3601 * uint8 proto_len;
3602 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3603 * uint8 padding_len;
3604 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3605 */
3606 proto_len = p[0];
3607 if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num)
3608 return 0;
3609 padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
3610 if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num)
3611 return 0;
3612
3613 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
3614 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
3615 {
3616 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3617 return 0;
3618 }
3619 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
3620 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;
3621
3622 return 1;
3623 }
3624 # endif
3625
3626 /* ssl3_get_channel_id reads and verifies a ClientID handshake message. */
ssl3_get_channel_id(SSL * s)3627 int ssl3_get_channel_id(SSL *s)
3628 {
3629 int ret = -1, ok;
3630 long n;
3631 const unsigned char *p;
3632 unsigned short extension_type, extension_len;
3633 EC_GROUP* p256 = NULL;
3634 EC_KEY* key = NULL;
3635 EC_POINT* point = NULL;
3636 ECDSA_SIG sig;
3637 BIGNUM x, y;
3638
3639 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A && s->init_num == 0)
3640 {
3641 /* The first time that we're called we take the current
3642 * handshake hash and store it. */
3643 EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
3644 unsigned int len;
3645
3646 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
3647 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, EVP_sha256(), NULL);
3648 if (!tls1_channel_id_hash(&md_ctx, s))
3649 return -1;
3650 len = sizeof(s->s3->tlsext_channel_id);
3651 EVP_DigestFinal(&md_ctx, s->s3->tlsext_channel_id, &len);
3652 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
3653 }
3654
3655 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3656 SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A,
3657 SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_B,
3658 SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3659 2 + 2 + TLSEXT_CHANNEL_ID_SIZE,
3660 &ok);
3661
3662 if (!ok)
3663 return((int)n);
3664
3665 ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char*)s->init_buf->data, s->init_num + 4);
3666
3667 /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received
3668 * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset
3669 * by ssl3_get_finished). */
3670 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
3671 {
3672 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CHANNEL_ID,SSL_R_GOT_CHANNEL_ID_BEFORE_A_CCS);
3673 return -1;
3674 }
3675
3676 if (n != 2 + 2 + TLSEXT_CHANNEL_ID_SIZE)
3677 {
3678 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CHANNEL_ID,SSL_R_INVALID_MESSAGE);
3679 return -1;
3680 }
3681
3682 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3683
3684 /* The payload looks like:
3685 * uint16 extension_type
3686 * uint16 extension_len;
3687 * uint8 x[32];
3688 * uint8 y[32];
3689 * uint8 r[32];
3690 * uint8 s[32];
3691 */
3692 n2s(p, extension_type);
3693 n2s(p, extension_len);
3694
3695 if (extension_type != TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id ||
3696 extension_len != TLSEXT_CHANNEL_ID_SIZE)
3697 {
3698 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CHANNEL_ID,SSL_R_INVALID_MESSAGE);
3699 return -1;
3700 }
3701
3702 p256 = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1);
3703 if (!p256)
3704 {
3705 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CHANNEL_ID,SSL_R_NO_P256_SUPPORT);
3706 return -1;
3707 }
3708
3709 BN_init(&x);
3710 BN_init(&y);
3711 sig.r = BN_new();
3712 sig.s = BN_new();
3713
3714 if (BN_bin2bn(p + 0, 32, &x) == NULL ||
3715 BN_bin2bn(p + 32, 32, &y) == NULL ||
3716 BN_bin2bn(p + 64, 32, sig.r) == NULL ||
3717 BN_bin2bn(p + 96, 32, sig.s) == NULL)
3718 goto err;
3719
3720 point = EC_POINT_new(p256);
3721 if (!point ||
3722 !EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(p256, point, &x, &y, NULL))
3723 goto err;
3724
3725 key = EC_KEY_new();
3726 if (!key ||
3727 !EC_KEY_set_group(key, p256) ||
3728 !EC_KEY_set_public_key(key, point))
3729 goto err;
3730
3731 /* We stored the handshake hash in |tlsext_channel_id| the first time
3732 * that we were called. */
3733 switch (ECDSA_do_verify(s->s3->tlsext_channel_id, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, &sig, key)) {
3734 case 1:
3735 break;
3736 case 0:
3737 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CHANNEL_ID,SSL_R_CHANNEL_ID_SIGNATURE_INVALID);
3738 s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 0;
3739 goto err;
3740 default:
3741 s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 0;
3742 goto err;
3743 }
3744
3745 memcpy(s->s3->tlsext_channel_id, p, 64);
3746 ret = 1;
3747
3748 err:
3749 BN_free(&x);
3750 BN_free(&y);
3751 BN_free(sig.r);
3752 BN_free(sig.s);
3753 if (key)
3754 EC_KEY_free(key);
3755 if (point)
3756 EC_POINT_free(point);
3757 if (p256)
3758 EC_GROUP_free(p256);
3759 return ret;
3760 }
3761 #endif
3762