diff -pu a/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c b/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c --- a/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c 2013-07-31 14:10:35.113325316 -0700 +++ b/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c 2013-07-31 14:12:00.254575103 -0700 @@ -2157,6 +2157,20 @@ ssl3_ComputeRecordMAC( return rv; } +/* This is a bodge to allow this code to be compiled against older NSS headers + * that don't contain the CBC constant-time changes. */ +#ifndef CKM_NSS_HMAC_CONSTANT_TIME +#define CKM_NSS_HMAC_CONSTANT_TIME (CKM_NSS + 19) +#define CKM_NSS_SSL3_MAC_CONSTANT_TIME (CKM_NSS + 20) + +typedef struct CK_NSS_MAC_CONSTANT_TIME_PARAMS { + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE macAlg; /* in */ + CK_ULONG ulBodyTotalLen; /* in */ + CK_BYTE * pHeader; /* in */ + CK_ULONG ulHeaderLen; /* in */ +} CK_NSS_MAC_CONSTANT_TIME_PARAMS; +#endif + /* Called from: ssl3_HandleRecord() * Caller must already hold the SpecReadLock. (wish we could assert that!) * @@ -2179,7 +2193,8 @@ ssl3_ComputeRecordMACConstantTime( { CK_MECHANISM_TYPE macType; CK_NSS_MAC_CONSTANT_TIME_PARAMS params; - SECItem param, inputItem, outputItem; + PK11Context * mac_context; + SECItem param; SECStatus rv; unsigned char header[13]; PK11SymKey * key; @@ -2240,34 +2255,27 @@ ssl3_ComputeRecordMACConstantTime( param.len = sizeof(params); param.type = 0; - inputItem.data = (unsigned char *) input; - inputItem.len = inputLen; - inputItem.type = 0; - - outputItem.data = outbuf; - outputItem.len = *outLen; - outputItem.type = 0; - key = spec->server.write_mac_key; if (!useServerMacKey) { key = spec->client.write_mac_key; } + mac_context = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(macType, CKA_SIGN, key, ¶m); + if (mac_context == NULL) { + /* Older versions of NSS may not support constant-time MAC. */ + goto fallback; + } - rv = PK11_SignWithSymKey(key, macType, ¶m, &outputItem, &inputItem); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - if (PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ALGORITHM) { - goto fallback; - } + rv = PK11_DigestBegin(mac_context); + rv |= PK11_DigestOp(mac_context, input, inputLen); + rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(mac_context, outbuf, outLen, spec->mac_size); + PK11_DestroyContext(mac_context, PR_TRUE); - *outLen = 0; + PORT_Assert(rv != SECSuccess || *outLen == (unsigned)spec->mac_size); + + if (rv != SECSuccess) { rv = SECFailure; ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MAC_COMPUTATION_FAILURE); - return rv; } - - PORT_Assert(outputItem.len == (unsigned)spec->mac_size); - *outLen = outputItem.len; - return rv; fallback: