1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
113 *
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
116 *
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
119 *
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
122 *
123 */
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
126 *
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
129 * license.
130 *
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
134 *
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
138 *
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
143 *
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
148 * OTHERWISE.
149 */
150
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
153
154 #include <stdio.h>
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h"
158 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
159 #include <openssl/rand.h>
160 #include <openssl/objects.h>
161 #include <openssl/ec.h>
162 #include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
163 #include <openssl/evp.h>
164 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
165 #include <openssl/sha.h>
166 #include <openssl/x509.h>
167 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
168 #include <openssl/dh.h>
169 #endif
170 #include <openssl/bn.h>
171 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
172 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
173 #endif
174 #include <openssl/md5.h>
175
176 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
177
ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)178 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
179 {
180 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
181 return(SSLv3_server_method());
182 else
183 return(NULL);
184 }
185
186 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL * s,int * al)187 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
188 {
189 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
190
191 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
192
193 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
194 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL))
195 {
196 if(s->srp_ctx.login == NULL)
197 {
198 /* RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject,
199 we do so if There is no srp login name */
200 ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
201 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
202 }
203 else
204 {
205 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s,al);
206 }
207 }
208 return ret;
209 }
210 #endif
211
IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,ssl3_accept,ssl_undefined_function,ssl3_get_server_method)212 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
213 ssl3_accept,
214 ssl_undefined_function,
215 ssl3_get_server_method)
216
217 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
218 {
219 BUF_MEM *buf;
220 unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
221 unsigned long alg_a;
222 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
223 int ret= -1;
224 int new_state,state,skip=0;
225
226 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
227 ERR_clear_error();
228 clear_sys_error();
229
230 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
231 cb=s->info_callback;
232 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
233 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
234
235 /* init things to blank */
236 s->in_handshake++;
237 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
238
239 if (s->cert == NULL)
240 {
241 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
242 return(-1);
243 }
244
245 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
246 /* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we
247 * already got and don't await it anymore, because
248 * Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway.
249 */
250 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
251 {
252 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
253 s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
254 }
255 #endif
256
257 for (;;)
258 {
259 state=s->state;
260
261 switch (s->state)
262 {
263 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
264 s->renegotiate=1;
265 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
266
267 case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
268 case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
269 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
270 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
271
272 s->server=1;
273 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
274
275 if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
276 {
277 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
278 return -1;
279 }
280 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
281
282 if (s->init_buf == NULL)
283 {
284 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
285 {
286 ret= -1;
287 goto end;
288 }
289 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
290 {
291 ret= -1;
292 goto end;
293 }
294 s->init_buf=buf;
295 }
296
297 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
298 {
299 ret= -1;
300 goto end;
301 }
302
303 s->init_num=0;
304 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
305
306 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
307 {
308 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
309 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
310 */
311 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
312
313 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
314 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
315 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
316 }
317 else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
318 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
319 {
320 /* Server attempting to renegotiate with
321 * client that doesn't support secure
322 * renegotiation.
323 */
324 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
325 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
326 ret = -1;
327 goto end;
328 }
329 else
330 {
331 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
332 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
333 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
334 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
335 }
336 break;
337
338 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
339 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
340
341 s->shutdown=0;
342 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
343 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
344 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
345 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
346 s->init_num=0;
347
348 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
349 break;
350
351 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
352 s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
353 break;
354
355 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
356 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
357 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
358
359 s->shutdown=0;
360 if (s->rwstate != SSL_X509_LOOKUP)
361 {
362 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
363 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
364 }
365 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
366 {
367 int al;
368 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s,&al)) < 0)
369 {
370 /* callback indicates firther work to be done */
371 s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
372 goto end;
373 }
374 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE)
375 {
376 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
377 /* This is not really an error but the only means to
378 for a client to detect whether srp is supported. */
379 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
380 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
381 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
382 ret= -1;
383 goto end;
384 }
385 }
386 #endif
387
388 s->renegotiate = 2;
389 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
390 s->init_num=0;
391 break;
392
393 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
394 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
395 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
396 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
397 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
398 if (s->hit)
399 {
400 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
401 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
402 else
403 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
404 }
405 #else
406 if (s->hit)
407 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
408 #endif
409 else
410 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
411 s->init_num=0;
412 break;
413
414 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
415 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
416 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
417 /* non-RSA PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
418 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aKRB5|SSL_aSRP))
419 /* Among PSK ciphersuites only RSA_PSK uses server certificate */
420 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK &&
421 !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kRSA)))
422 {
423 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
424 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
425 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
426 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
427 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
428 else
429 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
430 }
431 else
432 {
433 skip = 1;
434 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
435 }
436 #else
437 }
438 else
439 skip=1;
440
441 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
442 #endif
443 s->init_num=0;
444 break;
445
446 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
447 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
448 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
449 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
450
451 /* clear this, it may get reset by
452 * send_server_key_exchange */
453 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
454 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
455 && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
456 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
457 )
458 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
459 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
460 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
461 * be able to handle this) */
462 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
463 else
464 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
465
466
467 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
468 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
469 *
470 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints
471 *
472 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
473 * message only if the cipher suite is either
474 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
475 * server certificate contains the server's
476 * public key for key exchange.
477 */
478 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
479 /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if either:
480 * - PSK identity hint is provided, or
481 * - the key exchange is kEECDH.
482 */
483 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
484 || ((alg_a & SSL_aPSK) && ((alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) || s->session->psk_identity_hint))
485 #endif
486 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
487 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
488 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
489 #endif
490 || (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd|SSL_kEDH))
491 || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
492 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
493 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
494 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
495 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
496 )
497 )
498 )
499 )
500 {
501 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
502 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
503 }
504 else
505 skip=1;
506
507 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
508 s->init_num=0;
509 break;
510
511 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
512 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
513 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
514 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
515 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
516 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
517 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
518 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
519 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
520 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
521 * and in RFC 2246): */
522 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
523 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
524 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
525 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
526 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
527 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) ||
528 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
529 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
530 /* With normal PSK Certificates and
531 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
532 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
533 {
534 /* no cert request */
535 skip=1;
536 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
537 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
538 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
539 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
540 return -1;
541 }
542 else
543 {
544 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
545 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
546 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
547 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
548 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
549 #else
550 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
551 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
552 #endif
553 s->init_num=0;
554 }
555 break;
556
557 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
558 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
559 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
560 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
561 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
562 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
563 s->init_num=0;
564 break;
565
566 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
567
568 /* This code originally checked to see if
569 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
570 * and then flushed. This caused problems
571 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
572 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
573 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
574 * still exist. So instead we just flush
575 * unconditionally.
576 */
577
578 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
579 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
580 {
581 ret= -1;
582 goto end;
583 }
584 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
585
586 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
587 break;
588
589 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
590 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
591 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
592 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
593 if (ret <= 0)
594 goto end;
595 if (ret == 2)
596 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
597 else {
598 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
599 {
600 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
601 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
602 }
603 s->init_num=0;
604 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
605 }
606 break;
607
608 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
609 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
610 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
611 if (ret <= 0)
612 goto end;
613 if (ret == 2)
614 {
615 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
616 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
617 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
618 * message is not sent.
619 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when
620 * the client uses its key from the certificate
621 * for key exchange.
622 */
623 s->init_num = 0;
624 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_POST_CLIENT_CERT;
625 }
626 else if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
627 {
628 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
629 s->init_num=0;
630 if (!s->session->peer)
631 break;
632 /* For TLS v1.2 freeze the handshake buffer
633 * at this point and digest cached records.
634 */
635 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer)
636 {
637 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
638 return -1;
639 }
640 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
641 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
642 return -1;
643 }
644 else
645 {
646 int offset=0;
647 int dgst_num;
648
649 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
650 s->init_num=0;
651
652 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
653 * a client cert, it can be verified
654 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
655 * should be generalized. But it is next step
656 */
657 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
658 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
659 return -1;
660 for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_num++)
661 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num])
662 {
663 int dgst_size;
664
665 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset]));
666 dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
667 if (dgst_size < 0)
668 {
669 ret = -1;
670 goto end;
671 }
672 offset+=dgst_size;
673 }
674 }
675 break;
676
677 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
678 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
679
680 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
681 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
682 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
683 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
684
685 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_POST_CLIENT_CERT;
686 s->init_num=0;
687 break;
688
689 case SSL3_ST_SR_POST_CLIENT_CERT: {
690 char next_proto_neg = 0;
691 char channel_id = 0;
692 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT)
693 # if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
694 next_proto_neg = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
695 # endif
696 channel_id = s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid;
697 #endif
698
699 if (next_proto_neg)
700 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
701 else if (channel_id)
702 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A;
703 else
704 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
705 break;
706 }
707
708 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
709 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
710 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
711 ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
712 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
713 s->init_num = 0;
714 if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid)
715 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A;
716 else
717 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
718 break;
719 #endif
720
721 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT)
722 case SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A:
723 case SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_B:
724 ret=ssl3_get_channel_id(s);
725 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
726 s->init_num = 0;
727 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
728 break;
729 #endif
730
731 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
732 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
733 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
734 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
735 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
736 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
737 if (s->hit)
738 s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
739 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
740 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
741 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
742 #endif
743 else
744 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
745 /* If this is a full handshake with ChannelID then
746 * record the hashshake hashes in |s->session| in case
747 * we need them to verify a ChannelID signature on a
748 * resumption of this session in the future. */
749 if (!s->hit && s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new)
750 {
751 ret = tls1_record_handshake_hashes_for_channel_id(s);
752 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
753 }
754 s->init_num=0;
755 break;
756
757 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
758 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
759 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
760 ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
761 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
762 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
763 s->init_num=0;
764 break;
765
766 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
767 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
768 ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
769 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
770 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
771 s->init_num=0;
772 break;
773
774 #endif
775
776 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
777 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
778
779 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
780 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
781 { ret= -1; goto end; }
782
783 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
784 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
785
786 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
787 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
788 s->init_num=0;
789
790 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
791 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
792 {
793 ret= -1;
794 goto end;
795 }
796
797 break;
798
799 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
800 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
801 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
802 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
803 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
804 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
805 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
806 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
807 if (s->hit)
808 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_POST_CLIENT_CERT;
809 else
810 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
811 s->init_num=0;
812 break;
813
814 case SSL_ST_OK:
815 /* clean a few things up */
816 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
817
818 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
819 s->init_buf=NULL;
820
821 /* remove buffering on output */
822 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
823
824 s->init_num=0;
825
826 if (s->renegotiate == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
827 {
828 s->renegotiate=0;
829 s->new_session=0;
830
831 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
832
833 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
834 /* s->server=1; */
835 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
836
837 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
838 }
839
840 ret = 1;
841 goto end;
842 /* break; */
843
844 default:
845 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
846 ret= -1;
847 goto end;
848 /* break; */
849 }
850
851 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
852 {
853 if (s->debug)
854 {
855 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
856 goto end;
857 }
858
859
860 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
861 {
862 new_state=s->state;
863 s->state=state;
864 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
865 s->state=new_state;
866 }
867 }
868 skip=0;
869 }
870 end:
871 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
872
873 s->in_handshake--;
874 if (cb != NULL)
875 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
876 return(ret);
877 }
878
ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL * s)879 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
880 {
881 unsigned char *p;
882
883 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
884 {
885 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
886 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
887 *(p++)=0;
888 *(p++)=0;
889 *(p++)=0;
890
891 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
892 /* number of bytes to write */
893 s->init_num=4;
894 s->init_off=0;
895 }
896
897 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
898 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
899 }
900
ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL * s)901 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
902 {
903 int ok;
904 long n;
905
906 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
907 * so permit appropriate message length */
908 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
909 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
910 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
911 -1,
912 s->max_cert_list,
913 &ok);
914 if (!ok) return((int)n);
915 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
916 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
917 {
918 /* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per
919 * negotiation. */
920 if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE)
921 {
922 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS);
923 return -1;
924 }
925 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
926 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) */
927 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
928 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
929 {
930 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
931 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
932 }
933 #endif
934 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
935 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
936 {
937 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
938 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
939 }
940 #endif
941 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
942 return 2;
943 }
944 return 1;
945 }
946
ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL * s)947 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
948 {
949 int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1;
950 unsigned int cookie_len;
951 long n;
952 unsigned long id;
953 unsigned char *p,*d,*q;
954 SSL_CIPHER *c;
955 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
956 SSL_COMP *comp=NULL;
957 #endif
958 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
959
960 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
961 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
962 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
963 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
964 * TLSv1.
965 */
966 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
967 )
968 {
969 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
970 }
971 s->first_packet=1;
972 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
973 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
974 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
975 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
976 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
977 &ok);
978
979 if (!ok) return((int)n);
980 s->first_packet=0;
981 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
982
983 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
984 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
985 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
986 p+=2;
987
988 if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) ||
989 (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version))
990 {
991 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
992 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR &&
993 !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)
994 {
995 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
996 s->version = s->client_version;
997 }
998 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
999 goto f_err;
1000 }
1001
1002 /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
1003 * contain one, just return since we do not want to
1004 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
1005 */
1006 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)
1007 {
1008 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
1009
1010 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1011 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
1012
1013 if (cookie_length == 0)
1014 return 1;
1015 }
1016
1017 /* load the client random */
1018 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1019 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1020
1021 /* get the session-id */
1022 j= *(p++);
1023
1024 s->hit=0;
1025 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in renegotiation.
1026 * 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally ignore resumption requests
1027 * with flag SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1028 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this for security
1029 * won't even compile against older library versions).
1030 *
1031 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to request
1032 * renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains unset): for servers,
1033 * this essentially just means that the SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1034 * setting will be ignored.
1035 */
1036 if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
1037 {
1038 if (!s->session_creation_enabled)
1039 {
1040 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1041 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_SESSION_MAY_NOT_BE_CREATED);
1042 goto err;
1043 }
1044 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1045 goto err;
1046 }
1047 else
1048 {
1049 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
1050 if (i == 1)
1051 { /* previous session */
1052 s->hit=1;
1053 }
1054 else if (i == -1)
1055 goto err;
1056 else /* i == 0 */
1057 {
1058 if (!s->session_creation_enabled)
1059 {
1060 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1061 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_SESSION_MAY_NOT_BE_CREATED);
1062 goto err;
1063 }
1064 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1065 goto err;
1066 }
1067 }
1068
1069 p+=j;
1070
1071 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1072 {
1073 /* cookie stuff */
1074 cookie_len = *(p++);
1075
1076 /*
1077 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
1078 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
1079 * does not cause an overflow.
1080 */
1081 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
1082 {
1083 /* too much data */
1084 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1085 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1086 goto f_err;
1087 }
1088
1089 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
1090 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
1091 cookie_len > 0)
1092 {
1093 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
1094
1095 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
1096 {
1097 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
1098 cookie_len) == 0)
1099 {
1100 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1101 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1102 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1103 goto f_err;
1104 }
1105 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1106 }
1107 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1108 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
1109 {
1110 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1111 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1112 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1113 goto f_err;
1114 }
1115
1116 ret = 2;
1117 }
1118
1119 p += cookie_len;
1120 }
1121
1122 n2s(p,i);
1123 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
1124 {
1125 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
1126 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1127 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
1128 goto f_err;
1129 }
1130 if ((p+i) >= (d+n))
1131 {
1132 /* not enough data */
1133 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1134 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1135 goto f_err;
1136 }
1137 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
1138 == NULL))
1139 {
1140 goto err;
1141 }
1142 p+=i;
1143
1144 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1145 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
1146 {
1147 j=0;
1148 id=s->session->cipher->id;
1149
1150 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
1151 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
1152 #endif
1153 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
1154 {
1155 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
1156 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
1157 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1158 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1159 #endif
1160 if (c->id == id)
1161 {
1162 j=1;
1163 break;
1164 }
1165 }
1166 /* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade
1167 * attack: CVE-2010-4180.
1168 */
1169 #if 0
1170 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
1171 {
1172 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
1173 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
1174 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
1175 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
1176 * enabled, though. */
1177 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
1178 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0)
1179 {
1180 s->session->cipher = c;
1181 j = 1;
1182 }
1183 }
1184 #endif
1185 if (j == 0)
1186 {
1187 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
1188 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
1189 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1190 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1191 goto f_err;
1192 }
1193 }
1194
1195 /* compression */
1196 i= *(p++);
1197 if ((p+i) > (d+n))
1198 {
1199 /* not enough data */
1200 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1201 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1202 goto f_err;
1203 }
1204 q=p;
1205 for (j=0; j<i; j++)
1206 {
1207 if (p[j] == 0) break;
1208 }
1209
1210 p+=i;
1211 if (j >= i)
1212 {
1213 /* no compress */
1214 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1215 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1216 goto f_err;
1217 }
1218
1219 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1220 /* TLS extensions*/
1221 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1222 {
1223 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al))
1224 {
1225 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
1226 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1227 goto f_err;
1228 }
1229 }
1230 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
1231 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1232 goto err;
1233 }
1234
1235 /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
1236 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
1237 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
1238 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
1239 {
1240 unsigned char *pos;
1241 pos=s->s3->server_random;
1242 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
1243 {
1244 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1245 goto f_err;
1246 }
1247 }
1248
1249 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb)
1250 {
1251 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL;
1252
1253 s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1254 if(s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length,
1255 ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg))
1256 {
1257 s->hit=1;
1258 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1259 s->session->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
1260
1261 ciphers=NULL;
1262
1263 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1264 pref_cipher=pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1265 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1266 {
1267 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1268 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1269 goto f_err;
1270 }
1271
1272 s->session->cipher=pref_cipher;
1273
1274 if (s->cipher_list)
1275 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1276
1277 if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
1278 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1279
1280 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1281 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1282 }
1283 }
1284 #endif
1285
1286 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1287 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1288 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
1289 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
1290 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1291 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1292 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1293 {
1294 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1295 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1296 /* Can't disable compression */
1297 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
1298 {
1299 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1300 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1301 goto f_err;
1302 }
1303 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1304 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++)
1305 {
1306 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1307 if (comp_id == comp->id)
1308 {
1309 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1310 break;
1311 }
1312 }
1313 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1314 {
1315 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1316 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1317 goto f_err;
1318 }
1319 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1320 for (m = 0; m < i; m++)
1321 {
1322 if (q[m] == comp_id)
1323 break;
1324 }
1325 if (m >= i)
1326 {
1327 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1328 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1329 goto f_err;
1330 }
1331 }
1332 else if (s->hit)
1333 comp = NULL;
1334 else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods)
1335 { /* See if we have a match */
1336 int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
1337
1338 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1339 for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
1340 {
1341 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1342 v=comp->id;
1343 for (o=0; o<i; o++)
1344 {
1345 if (v == q[o])
1346 {
1347 done=1;
1348 break;
1349 }
1350 }
1351 if (done) break;
1352 }
1353 if (done)
1354 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1355 else
1356 comp=NULL;
1357 }
1358 #else
1359 /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1360 * using compression.
1361 */
1362 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1363 {
1364 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1365 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1366 goto f_err;
1367 }
1368 #endif
1369
1370 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1371 * pick a cipher */
1372
1373 if (!s->hit)
1374 {
1375 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1376 s->session->compress_meth=0;
1377 #else
1378 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
1379 #endif
1380 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1381 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1382 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1383 if (ciphers == NULL)
1384 {
1385 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1386 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
1387 goto f_err;
1388 }
1389 ciphers=NULL;
1390 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
1391 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1392
1393 if (c == NULL)
1394 {
1395 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1396 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1397 goto f_err;
1398 }
1399 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
1400 }
1401 else
1402 {
1403 /* Session-id reuse */
1404 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1405 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1406 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
1407 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
1408
1409 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1410 {
1411 sk=s->session->ciphers;
1412 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
1413 {
1414 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
1415 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
1416 nc=c;
1417 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1418 ec=c;
1419 }
1420 if (nc != NULL)
1421 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
1422 else if (ec != NULL)
1423 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
1424 else
1425 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1426 }
1427 else
1428 #endif
1429 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1430 }
1431
1432 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER))
1433 {
1434 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
1435 {
1436 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1437 goto f_err;
1438 }
1439 }
1440
1441 /* we now have the following setup.
1442 * client_random
1443 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1444 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1445 * compression - basically ignored right now
1446 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1447 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1448 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1449 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1450 */
1451
1452 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1453 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1454 {
1455 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0)
1456 {
1457 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1458 goto err;
1459 }
1460 }
1461
1462 if (ret < 0) ret=1;
1463 if (0)
1464 {
1465 f_err:
1466 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1467 }
1468 err:
1469 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1470 return(ret);
1471 }
1472
ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL * s)1473 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1474 {
1475 unsigned char *buf;
1476 unsigned char *p,*d;
1477 int i,sl;
1478 unsigned long l;
1479
1480 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1481 {
1482 /* We only accept ChannelIDs on connections with ECDHE in order
1483 * to avoid a known attack while we fix ChannelID itself. */
1484 if (s->s3 &&
1485 s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid &&
1486 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kEECDH) == 0)
1487 s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 0;
1488
1489 /* If this is a resumption and the original handshake didn't
1490 * support ChannelID then we didn't record the original
1491 * handshake hashes in the session and so cannot resume with
1492 * ChannelIDs. */
1493 if (s->hit &&
1494 s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new &&
1495 s->session->original_handshake_hash_len == 0)
1496 s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 0;
1497
1498 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1499 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1500 p=s->s3->server_random;
1501 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
1502 return -1;
1503 #endif
1504 /* Do the message type and length last */
1505 d=p= &(buf[4]);
1506
1507 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1508 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1509
1510 /* Random stuff */
1511 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1512 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1513
1514 /* There are several cases for the session ID to send
1515 * back in the server hello:
1516 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1517 * we send back the old session ID.
1518 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1519 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1520 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1521 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1522 * session ID.
1523 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1524 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1525 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1526 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1527 * to send back.
1528 */
1529 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1530 && !s->hit)
1531 s->session->session_id_length=0;
1532
1533 sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1534 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
1535 {
1536 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1537 return -1;
1538 }
1539 *(p++)=sl;
1540 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1541 p+=sl;
1542
1543 /* put the cipher */
1544 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1545 p+=i;
1546
1547 /* put the compression method */
1548 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1549 *(p++)=0;
1550 #else
1551 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1552 *(p++)=0;
1553 else
1554 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1555 #endif
1556 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1557 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
1558 {
1559 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1560 return -1;
1561 }
1562 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
1563 {
1564 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1565 return -1;
1566 }
1567 #endif
1568 /* do the header */
1569 l=(p-d);
1570 d=buf;
1571 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
1572 l2n3(l,d);
1573
1574 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1575 /* number of bytes to write */
1576 s->init_num=p-buf;
1577 s->init_off=0;
1578 }
1579
1580 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1581 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1582 }
1583
ssl3_send_server_done(SSL * s)1584 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1585 {
1586 unsigned char *p;
1587
1588 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1589 {
1590 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1591
1592 /* do the header */
1593 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1594 *(p++)=0;
1595 *(p++)=0;
1596 *(p++)=0;
1597
1598 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1599 /* number of bytes to write */
1600 s->init_num=4;
1601 s->init_off=0;
1602 }
1603
1604 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1605 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1606 }
1607
ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL * s)1608 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1609 {
1610 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1611 unsigned char *q;
1612 int j,num;
1613 RSA *rsa;
1614 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1615 unsigned int u;
1616 #endif
1617 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1618 DH *dh=NULL,*dhp;
1619 #endif
1620 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1621 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1622 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1623 int encodedlen = 0;
1624 int curve_id = 0;
1625 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1626 #endif
1627 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1628 const char* psk_identity_hint;
1629 size_t psk_identity_hint_len;
1630 #endif
1631 EVP_PKEY *pkey;
1632 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1633 unsigned char *p,*d;
1634 int al,i;
1635 unsigned long alg_k;
1636 unsigned long alg_a;
1637 int n;
1638 CERT *cert;
1639 BIGNUM *r[4];
1640 int nr[4],kn;
1641 BUF_MEM *buf;
1642 EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
1643
1644 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1645 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1646 {
1647 alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1648 alg_a=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1649 cert=s->cert;
1650
1651 buf=s->init_buf;
1652
1653 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1654 n=0;
1655 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1656 if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK)
1657 {
1658 /* size for PSK identity hint */
1659 psk_identity_hint = s->session->psk_identity_hint;
1660 if (psk_identity_hint)
1661 psk_identity_hint_len = strlen(psk_identity_hint);
1662 else
1663 psk_identity_hint_len = 0;
1664 n+=2+psk_identity_hint_len;
1665 }
1666 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1667 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1668 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
1669 {
1670 rsa=cert->rsa_tmp;
1671 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1672 {
1673 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1674 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1675 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1676 if(rsa == NULL)
1677 {
1678 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1679 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1680 goto f_err;
1681 }
1682 RSA_up_ref(rsa);
1683 cert->rsa_tmp=rsa;
1684 }
1685 if (rsa == NULL)
1686 {
1687 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1688 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1689 goto f_err;
1690 }
1691 r[0]=rsa->n;
1692 r[1]=rsa->e;
1693 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1694 }
1695 #endif
1696 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1697 else if (alg_k & SSL_kEDH)
1698 {
1699 dhp=cert->dh_tmp;
1700 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1701 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1702 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1703 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1704 if (dhp == NULL)
1705 {
1706 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1707 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1708 goto f_err;
1709 }
1710
1711 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1712 {
1713 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1714 goto err;
1715 }
1716
1717 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1718 {
1719 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1720 goto err;
1721 }
1722
1723 s->s3->tmp.dh=dh;
1724 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1725 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1726 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1727 {
1728 if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1729 {
1730 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1731 ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1732 goto err;
1733 }
1734 }
1735 else
1736 {
1737 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1738 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1739 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1740 (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1741 {
1742 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1743 goto err;
1744 }
1745 }
1746 r[0]=dh->p;
1747 r[1]=dh->g;
1748 r[2]=dh->pub_key;
1749 }
1750 #endif
1751 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1752 else if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
1753 {
1754 const EC_GROUP *group;
1755
1756 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1757 if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1758 {
1759 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1760 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1761 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1762 }
1763 if (ecdhp == NULL)
1764 {
1765 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1766 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1767 goto f_err;
1768 }
1769
1770 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1771 {
1772 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1773 goto err;
1774 }
1775
1776 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1777 if (ecdhp == NULL)
1778 {
1779 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1780 goto err;
1781 }
1782 if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL)
1783 {
1784 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1785 goto err;
1786 }
1787
1788 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1789 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1790 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1791 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1792 {
1793 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1794 {
1795 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1796 goto err;
1797 }
1798 }
1799
1800 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1801 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1802 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
1803 {
1804 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1805 goto err;
1806 }
1807
1808 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1809 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
1810 {
1811 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1812 goto err;
1813 }
1814
1815 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1816 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1817 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1818 */
1819 if ((curve_id =
1820 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1821 == 0)
1822 {
1823 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1824 goto err;
1825 }
1826
1827 /* Encode the public key.
1828 * First check the size of encoding and
1829 * allocate memory accordingly.
1830 */
1831 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1832 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1833 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1834 NULL, 0, NULL);
1835
1836 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1837 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1838 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1839 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1840 {
1841 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1842 goto err;
1843 }
1844
1845
1846 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1847 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1848 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1849 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1850
1851 if (encodedlen == 0)
1852 {
1853 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1854 goto err;
1855 }
1856
1857 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1858
1859 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1860 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1861 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1862 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1863 * structure.
1864 */
1865 n += 4 + encodedlen;
1866
1867 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1868 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1869 */
1870 r[0]=NULL;
1871 r[1]=NULL;
1872 r[2]=NULL;
1873 r[3]=NULL;
1874 }
1875 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1876 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1877 else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
1878 {
1879 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1880 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1881 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) ||
1882 (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL))
1883 {
1884 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1885 goto err;
1886 }
1887 r[0]=s->srp_ctx.N;
1888 r[1]=s->srp_ctx.g;
1889 r[2]=s->srp_ctx.s;
1890 r[3]=s->srp_ctx.B;
1891 }
1892 #endif
1893 else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
1894 {
1895 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1896 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1897 goto f_err;
1898 }
1899 for (i=0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++)
1900 {
1901 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1902 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1903 if ((i == 2) && (alg_k & SSL_kSRP))
1904 n+=1+nr[i];
1905 else
1906 #endif
1907 n+=2+nr[i];
1908 }
1909
1910 if (!(alg_a & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aSRP))
1911 /* Among PSK ciphersuites only RSA uses a certificate */
1912 && !((alg_a & SSL_aPSK) && !(alg_k & SSL_kRSA)))
1913 {
1914 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,&md))
1915 == NULL)
1916 {
1917 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1918 goto f_err;
1919 }
1920 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1921 }
1922 else
1923 {
1924 pkey=NULL;
1925 kn=0;
1926 }
1927
1928 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn))
1929 {
1930 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1931 goto err;
1932 }
1933 d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1934 p= &(d[4]);
1935
1936 for (i=0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++)
1937 {
1938 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1939 if ((i == 2) && (alg_k & SSL_kSRP))
1940 {
1941 *p = nr[i];
1942 p++;
1943 }
1944 else
1945 #endif
1946 s2n(nr[i],p);
1947 BN_bn2bin(r[i],p);
1948 p+=nr[i];
1949 }
1950
1951 /* Note: ECDHE PSK ciphersuites use SSL_kEECDH and SSL_aPSK.
1952 * When one of them is used, the server key exchange record needs to have both
1953 * the psk_identity_hint and the ServerECDHParams. */
1954 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1955 if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK)
1956 {
1957 /* copy PSK identity hint (if provided) */
1958 s2n(psk_identity_hint_len, p);
1959 if (psk_identity_hint_len > 0)
1960 {
1961 memcpy(p, psk_identity_hint, psk_identity_hint_len);
1962 p+=psk_identity_hint_len;
1963 }
1964 }
1965 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1966
1967 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1968 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
1969 {
1970 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1971 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1972 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1973 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1974 * the actual encoded point itself
1975 */
1976 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1977 p += 1;
1978 *p = 0;
1979 p += 1;
1980 *p = curve_id;
1981 p += 1;
1982 *p = encodedlen;
1983 p += 1;
1984 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
1985 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
1986 encodedlen);
1987 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1988 encodedPoint = NULL;
1989 p += encodedlen;
1990 }
1991 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1992
1993 /* not anonymous */
1994 if (pkey != NULL)
1995 {
1996 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1997 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1998 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1999 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA
2000 && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
2001 {
2002 q=md_buf;
2003 j=0;
2004 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
2005 {
2006 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
2007 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
2008 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
2009 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
2010 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2011 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2012 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
2013 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
2014 (unsigned int *)&i);
2015 q+=i;
2016 j+=i;
2017 }
2018 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
2019 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
2020 {
2021 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
2022 goto err;
2023 }
2024 s2n(u,p);
2025 n+=u+2;
2026 }
2027 else
2028 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
2029 if (md)
2030 {
2031 /* For TLS1.2 and later send signature
2032 * algorithm */
2033 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2034 {
2035 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md))
2036 {
2037 /* Should never happen */
2038 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2039 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2040 goto f_err;
2041 }
2042 p+=2;
2043 }
2044 #ifdef SSL_DEBUG
2045 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n",
2046 EVP_MD_name(md));
2047 #endif
2048 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
2049 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2050 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2051 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
2052 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
2053 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
2054 {
2055 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_EVP);
2056 goto err;
2057 }
2058 s2n(i,p);
2059 n+=i+2;
2060 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2061 n+= 2;
2062 }
2063 else
2064 {
2065 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
2066 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2067 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
2068 goto f_err;
2069 }
2070 }
2071
2072 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
2073 l2n3(n,d);
2074
2075 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
2076 * it off */
2077 s->init_num=n+4;
2078 s->init_off=0;
2079 }
2080
2081 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
2082 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2083 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2084 f_err:
2085 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2086 err:
2087 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2088 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2089 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2090 #endif
2091 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2092 return(-1);
2093 }
2094
ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL * s)2095 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
2096 {
2097 unsigned char *p,*d;
2098 int i,j,nl,off,n;
2099 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
2100 X509_NAME *name;
2101 BUF_MEM *buf;
2102
2103 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
2104 {
2105 buf=s->init_buf;
2106
2107 d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
2108
2109 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2110 p++;
2111 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
2112 d[0]=n;
2113 p+=n;
2114 n++;
2115
2116 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2117 {
2118 nl = tls12_get_req_sig_algs(s, p + 2);
2119 s2n(nl, p);
2120 p += nl + 2;
2121 n += nl + 2;
2122 }
2123
2124 off=n;
2125 p+=2;
2126 n+=2;
2127
2128 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2129 nl=0;
2130 if (sk != NULL)
2131 {
2132 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
2133 {
2134 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
2135 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
2136 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2))
2137 {
2138 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2139 goto err;
2140 }
2141 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]);
2142 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
2143 {
2144 s2n(j,p);
2145 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2146 n+=2+j;
2147 nl+=2+j;
2148 }
2149 else
2150 {
2151 d=p;
2152 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2153 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
2154 n+=j;
2155 nl+=j;
2156 }
2157 }
2158 }
2159 /* else no CA names */
2160 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]);
2161 s2n(nl,p);
2162
2163 d=(unsigned char *)buf->data;
2164 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
2165 l2n3(n,d);
2166
2167 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
2168 * it off */
2169
2170 s->init_num=n+4;
2171 s->init_off=0;
2172 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
2173 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, s->init_num + 4))
2174 {
2175 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2176 goto err;
2177 }
2178 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
2179
2180 /* do the header */
2181 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
2182 *(p++)=0;
2183 *(p++)=0;
2184 *(p++)=0;
2185 s->init_num += 4;
2186 #endif
2187
2188 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
2189 }
2190
2191 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2192 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2193 err:
2194 return(-1);
2195 }
2196
ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL * s)2197 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2198 {
2199 int i,al,ok;
2200 long n;
2201 unsigned long alg_k;
2202 unsigned long alg_a;
2203 unsigned char *p;
2204 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2205 RSA *rsa=NULL;
2206 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2207 #endif
2208 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2209 BIGNUM *pub=NULL;
2210 DH *dh_srvr;
2211 #endif
2212 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2213 KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
2214 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2215
2216 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2217 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
2218 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
2219 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
2220 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2221 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2222 unsigned int psk_len = 0;
2223 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2224 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
2225 #endif
2226
2227 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2228 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
2229 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
2230 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2231 2048, /* ??? */
2232 &ok);
2233
2234 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2235 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2236
2237 alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2238 alg_a=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2239
2240 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2241 if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK)
2242 {
2243 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2244 unsigned char pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
2245 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0;
2246 int psk_err = 1;
2247 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
2248
2249 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2250
2251 n2s(p, i);
2252 if (n != i+2 && !(alg_k & SSL_kEECDH))
2253 {
2254 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2255 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2256 goto psk_err;
2257 }
2258 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
2259 {
2260 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2261 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2262 goto psk_err;
2263 }
2264 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL)
2265 {
2266 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2267 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2268 goto psk_err;
2269 }
2270
2271 /* Create guaranteed NUL-terminated identity
2272 * string for the callback */
2273 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2274 memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
2275 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id, psk, sizeof(psk));
2276
2277 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
2278 {
2279 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2280 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2281 goto psk_err;
2282 }
2283 else if (psk_len == 0)
2284 {
2285 /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
2286 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2287 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2288 al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2289 goto psk_err;
2290 }
2291 if (!(alg_k & SSL_kEECDH))
2292 {
2293 /* Create the shared secret now if we're not using ECDHE-PSK.*/
2294 pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
2295 t = pre_ms;
2296 s2n(psk_len, t);
2297 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2298 t+=psk_len;
2299 s2n(psk_len, t);
2300 memcpy(t, psk, psk_len);
2301
2302 s->session->master_key_length=
2303 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2304 s->session->master_key, pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
2305 }
2306 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2307 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2308 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup(tmp_id);
2309 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1);
2310 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
2311 {
2312 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2313 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2314 goto psk_err;
2315 }
2316
2317 p += i;
2318 n -= (i + 2);
2319 psk_err = 0;
2320 psk_err:
2321 OPENSSL_cleanse(pre_ms, sizeof(pre_ms));
2322 if (psk_err != 0)
2323 goto f_err;
2324 }
2325 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
2326 if (0) {}
2327 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2328 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
2329 {
2330 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2331 int decrypt_len;
2332 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
2333
2334 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2335 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
2336 {
2337 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
2338 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
2339 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
2340 * be sent already */
2341 if (rsa == NULL)
2342 {
2343 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2344 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
2345 goto f_err;
2346
2347 }
2348 }
2349 else
2350 {
2351 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
2352 if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
2353 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
2354 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
2355 {
2356 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2357 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2358 goto f_err;
2359 }
2360 rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa;
2361 }
2362
2363 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2364 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2365 {
2366 n2s(p,i);
2367 if (n != i+2)
2368 {
2369 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
2370 {
2371 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2372 goto err;
2373 }
2374 else
2375 p-=2;
2376 }
2377 else
2378 n=i;
2379 }
2380
2381 /* We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because
2382 * of Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see
2383 * RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of
2384 * the TLS RFC and generates a random premaster secret for the
2385 * case that the decrypt fails. See
2386 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1 */
2387
2388 /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure. */
2389 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
2390 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
2391 goto err;
2392 decrypt_len = RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2393 ERR_clear_error();
2394
2395 /* decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH.
2396 * decrypt_good will be 0xff if so and zero otherwise. */
2397 decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
2398
2399 /* If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct
2400 * then version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero.
2401 * The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2402 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
2403 * number check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks
2404 * are done in constant time and are treated like any other
2405 * decryption error. */
2406 version_good = constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->client_version>>8));
2407 version_good &= constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->client_version&0xff));
2408
2409 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as
2410 * the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks
2411 * (strangely, the protocol does not offer such protection for
2412 * DH ciphersuites). However, buggy clients exist that send the
2413 * negotiated protocol version instead if the server does not
2414 * support the requested protocol version. If
2415 * SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
2416 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)
2417 {
2418 unsigned char workaround_good;
2419 workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->version>>8));
2420 workaround_good &= constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->version&0xff));
2421 version_good |= workaround_good;
2422 }
2423
2424 /* Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good
2425 * to remain non-zero (0xff). */
2426 decrypt_good &= version_good;
2427
2428 /* Now copy rand_premaster_secret over p using
2429 * decrypt_good_mask. */
2430 for (i = 0; i < (int) sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); i++)
2431 {
2432 p[i] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, p[i],
2433 rand_premaster_secret[i]);
2434 }
2435
2436 s->session->master_key_length=
2437 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2438 s->session->master_key,
2439 p,i);
2440 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2441 }
2442 #endif
2443 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2444 else if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
2445 {
2446 n2s(p,i);
2447 if (n != i+2)
2448 {
2449 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
2450 {
2451 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2452 goto err;
2453 }
2454 else
2455 {
2456 p-=2;
2457 i=(int)n;
2458 }
2459 }
2460
2461 if (n == 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */
2462 {
2463 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2464 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS);
2465 goto f_err;
2466 }
2467 else
2468 {
2469 if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
2470 {
2471 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2472 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2473 goto f_err;
2474 }
2475 else
2476 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
2477 }
2478
2479 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
2480 if (pub == NULL)
2481 {
2482 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2483 goto err;
2484 }
2485
2486 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
2487
2488 if (i <= 0)
2489 {
2490 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2491 BN_clear_free(pub);
2492 goto err;
2493 }
2494
2495 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2496 s->s3->tmp.dh=NULL;
2497
2498 BN_clear_free(pub);
2499 pub=NULL;
2500 s->session->master_key_length=
2501 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2502 s->session->master_key,p,i);
2503 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2504 }
2505 #endif
2506 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2507 else if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
2508 {
2509 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2510 krb5_data enc_ticket;
2511 krb5_data authenticator;
2512 krb5_data enc_pms;
2513 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2514 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2515 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2516 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2517 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
2518 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
2519 int padl, outl;
2520 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
2521 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
2522
2523 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2524
2525 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
2526
2527 n2s(p,i);
2528 enc_ticket.length = i;
2529
2530 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6))
2531 {
2532 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2533 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2534 goto err;
2535 }
2536
2537 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2538 p+=enc_ticket.length;
2539
2540 n2s(p,i);
2541 authenticator.length = i;
2542
2543 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6))
2544 {
2545 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2546 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2547 goto err;
2548 }
2549
2550 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2551 p+=authenticator.length;
2552
2553 n2s(p,i);
2554 enc_pms.length = i;
2555 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2556 p+=enc_pms.length;
2557
2558 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
2559 ** after decryption
2560 */
2561 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
2562 {
2563 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2564 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2565 goto err;
2566 }
2567
2568 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2569 enc_pms.length + 6))
2570 {
2571 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2572 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2573 goto err;
2574 }
2575
2576 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2577 &kssl_err)) != 0)
2578 {
2579 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
2580 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2581 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2582 if (kssl_err.text)
2583 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2584 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2585 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2586 kssl_err.reason);
2587 goto err;
2588 }
2589
2590 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2591 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2592 */
2593 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2594 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
2595 {
2596 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
2597 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2598 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2599 if (kssl_err.text)
2600 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2601 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2602 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2603 kssl_err.reason);
2604 goto err;
2605 }
2606
2607 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
2608 {
2609 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2610 goto err;
2611 }
2612
2613 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
2614 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2615 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2616
2617 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2618 if (enc == NULL)
2619 goto err;
2620
2621 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2622
2623 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
2624 {
2625 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2626 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2627 goto err;
2628 }
2629 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
2630 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2631 {
2632 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2633 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2634 goto err;
2635 }
2636 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2637 {
2638 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2639 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2640 goto err;
2641 }
2642 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
2643 {
2644 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2645 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2646 goto err;
2647 }
2648 outl += padl;
2649 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2650 {
2651 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2652 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2653 goto err;
2654 }
2655 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2656 {
2657 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2658 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2659 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2660 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2661 * the protocol version.
2662 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2663 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2664 */
2665 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG))
2666 {
2667 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2668 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2669 goto err;
2670 }
2671 }
2672
2673 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2674
2675 s->session->master_key_length=
2676 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2677 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
2678
2679 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
2680 {
2681 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2682 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
2683 {
2684 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2685 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
2686 }
2687 }
2688
2689
2690 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2691 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2692 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2693 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2694 */
2695 }
2696 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2697 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2698 else if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2699 {
2700 int ret = 1;
2701 int field_size = 0;
2702 const EC_KEY *tkey;
2703 const EC_GROUP *group;
2704 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2705 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2706 unsigned char *pre_ms;
2707 unsigned int pre_ms_len;
2708 unsigned char *t;
2709 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
2710
2711 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2712 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
2713 {
2714 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2715 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2716 goto err;
2717 }
2718
2719 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2720 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2721 {
2722 /* use the certificate */
2723 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2724 }
2725 else
2726 {
2727 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2728 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2729 */
2730 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2731 }
2732
2733 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2734 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2735
2736 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2737 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
2738 {
2739 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2740 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2741 goto err;
2742 }
2743
2744 /* Let's get client's public key */
2745 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
2746 {
2747 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2748 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2749 goto err;
2750 }
2751
2752 if (n == 0L)
2753 {
2754 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2755
2756 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
2757 {
2758 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2759 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2760 goto f_err;
2761 }
2762 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2763 == NULL) ||
2764 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
2765 {
2766 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2767 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2768 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2769 * never executed. When that support is
2770 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2771 * received in the certificate is
2772 * authorized for key agreement.
2773 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2774 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2775 * group.
2776 */
2777 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2778 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2779 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2780 goto f_err;
2781 }
2782
2783 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2784 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
2785 {
2786 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2787 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2788 goto err;
2789 }
2790 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2791 }
2792 else
2793 {
2794 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2795 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2796 */
2797 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
2798 {
2799 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2800 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2801 goto err;
2802 }
2803
2804 /* Get encoded point length */
2805 i = *p;
2806 p += 1;
2807 if (n != 1 + i)
2808 {
2809 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2810 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2811 goto err;
2812 }
2813 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
2814 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
2815 {
2816 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2817 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2818 goto err;
2819 }
2820 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2821 * currently, so set it to the start
2822 */
2823 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2824 }
2825
2826 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2827 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2828 if (field_size <= 0)
2829 {
2830 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2831 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2832 goto err;
2833 }
2834 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
2835 if (i <= 0)
2836 {
2837 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2838 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2839 goto err;
2840 }
2841
2842 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2843 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2844 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2845 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2846 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2847 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2848
2849 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2850 /* ECDHE PSK ciphersuites from RFC 5489 */
2851 if ((alg_a & SSL_aPSK) && psk_len != 0)
2852 {
2853 pre_ms_len = 2+i+2+psk_len;
2854 pre_ms = OPENSSL_malloc(pre_ms_len);
2855 if (pre_ms == NULL)
2856 {
2857 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2858 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2859 goto err;
2860 }
2861 memset(pre_ms, 0, pre_ms_len);
2862 t = pre_ms;
2863 s2n(i, t);
2864 memcpy(t, p, i);
2865 t += i;
2866 s2n(psk_len, t);
2867 memcpy(t, psk, psk_len);
2868 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc \
2869 -> generate_master_secret(s,
2870 s->session->master_key, pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
2871 OPENSSL_cleanse(pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
2872 OPENSSL_free(pre_ms);
2873 }
2874 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
2875 if (!(alg_a & SSL_aPSK))
2876 {
2877 /* Compute the master secret */
2878 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc \
2879 -> generate_master_secret(s,
2880 s->session->master_key, p, i);
2881 }
2882
2883 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2884 }
2885 #endif
2886 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2887 else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
2888 {
2889 int param_len;
2890
2891 n2s(p,i);
2892 param_len=i+2;
2893 if (param_len > n)
2894 {
2895 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2896 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2897 goto f_err;
2898 }
2899 if (!(s->srp_ctx.A=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
2900 {
2901 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2902 goto err;
2903 }
2904 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
2905 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2906 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2907 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL)
2908 {
2909 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2910 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2911 goto err;
2912 }
2913
2914 if ((s->session->master_key_length = SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,s->session->master_key))<0)
2915 {
2916 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2917 goto err;
2918 }
2919
2920 p+=i;
2921 }
2922 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2923 else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)
2924 {
2925 int ret = 0;
2926 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2927 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2928 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2929 size_t outlen=32, inlen;
2930 unsigned long alg_a;
2931 int Ttag, Tclass;
2932 long Tlen;
2933
2934 /* Get our certificate private key*/
2935 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2936 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
2937 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
2938 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
2939 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2940
2941 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk,NULL);
2942 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2943 /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2944 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2945 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use
2946 * a client certificate for authorization only. */
2947 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2948 if (client_pub_pkey)
2949 {
2950 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2951 ERR_clear_error();
2952 }
2953 /* Decrypt session key */
2954 if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&p, &Tlen, &Ttag, &Tclass, n) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED ||
2955 Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE ||
2956 Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL)
2957 {
2958 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2959 goto gerr;
2960 }
2961 start = p;
2962 inlen = Tlen;
2963 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,start,inlen) <=0)
2964 {
2965 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2966 goto gerr;
2967 }
2968 /* Generate master secret */
2969 s->session->master_key_length=
2970 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2971 s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32);
2972 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2973 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2974 ret = 2;
2975 else
2976 ret = 1;
2977 gerr:
2978 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2979 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2980 if (ret)
2981 return ret;
2982 else
2983 goto err;
2984 }
2985 else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
2986 {
2987 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2988 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2989 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2990 goto f_err;
2991 }
2992
2993 return(1);
2994 f_err:
2995 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2996 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
2997 err:
2998 #endif
2999 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
3000 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
3001 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
3002 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
3003 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
3004 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
3005 #endif
3006 return(-1);
3007 }
3008
ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL * s)3009 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
3010 {
3011 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
3012 unsigned char *p;
3013 int al,ok,ret=0;
3014 long n;
3015 int type=0,i,j;
3016 X509 *peer;
3017 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
3018 EVP_MD_CTX mctx;
3019 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
3020
3021 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3022 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
3023 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
3024 -1,
3025 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
3026 &ok);
3027
3028 if (!ok) return((int)n);
3029
3030 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
3031 {
3032 peer=s->session->peer;
3033 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
3034 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
3035 }
3036 else
3037 {
3038 peer=NULL;
3039 pkey=NULL;
3040 }
3041
3042 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
3043 {
3044 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
3045 if ((peer != NULL) && (type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
3046 {
3047 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3048 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
3049 goto f_err;
3050 }
3051 ret=1;
3052 goto end;
3053 }
3054
3055 if (peer == NULL)
3056 {
3057 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
3058 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3059 goto f_err;
3060 }
3061
3062 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
3063 {
3064 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
3065 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3066 goto f_err;
3067 }
3068
3069 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
3070 {
3071 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
3072 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3073 goto f_err;
3074 }
3075
3076 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
3077 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3078 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
3079 /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare
3080 * signature without length field */
3081 if (n==64 && (pkey->type==NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
3082 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) )
3083 {
3084 i=64;
3085 }
3086 else
3087 {
3088 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3089 {
3090 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
3091 /* Should never happen */
3092 if (sigalg == -1)
3093 {
3094 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3095 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3096 goto f_err;
3097 }
3098 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
3099 if (sigalg != (int)p[1])
3100 {
3101 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
3102 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3103 goto f_err;
3104 }
3105 md = tls12_get_hash(p[0]);
3106 if (md == NULL)
3107 {
3108 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
3109 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3110 goto f_err;
3111 }
3112 #ifdef SSL_DEBUG
3113 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
3114 #endif
3115 p += 2;
3116 n -= 2;
3117 }
3118 n2s(p,i);
3119 n-=2;
3120 if (i > n)
3121 {
3122 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3123 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3124 goto f_err;
3125 }
3126 }
3127 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
3128 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
3129 {
3130 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
3131 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3132 goto f_err;
3133 }
3134
3135 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3136 {
3137 long hdatalen = 0;
3138 void *hdata;
3139 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
3140 if (hdatalen <= 0)
3141 {
3142 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3143 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3144 goto f_err;
3145 }
3146 #ifdef SSL_DEBUG
3147 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
3148 EVP_MD_name(md));
3149 #endif
3150 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
3151 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen))
3152 {
3153 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3154 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3155 goto f_err;
3156 }
3157
3158 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p , i, pkey) <= 0)
3159 {
3160 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3161 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
3162 goto f_err;
3163 }
3164 }
3165 else
3166 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3167 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
3168 {
3169 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3170 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
3171 pkey->pkey.rsa);
3172 if (i < 0)
3173 {
3174 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3175 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
3176 goto f_err;
3177 }
3178 if (i == 0)
3179 {
3180 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3181 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
3182 goto f_err;
3183 }
3184 }
3185 else
3186 #endif
3187 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3188 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
3189 {
3190 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3191 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3192 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
3193 if (j <= 0)
3194 {
3195 /* bad signature */
3196 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3197 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
3198 goto f_err;
3199 }
3200 }
3201 else
3202 #endif
3203 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3204 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
3205 {
3206 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3207 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3208 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
3209 if (j <= 0)
3210 {
3211 /* bad signature */
3212 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3213 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3214 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3215 goto f_err;
3216 }
3217 }
3218 else
3219 #endif
3220 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)
3221 { unsigned char signature[64];
3222 int idx;
3223 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL);
3224 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
3225 if (i!=64) {
3226 fprintf(stderr,"GOST signature length is %d",i);
3227 }
3228 for (idx=0;idx<64;idx++) {
3229 signature[63-idx]=p[idx];
3230 }
3231 j=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx,signature,64,s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,32);
3232 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3233 if (j<=0)
3234 {
3235 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3236 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3237 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3238 goto f_err;
3239 }
3240 }
3241 else
3242 {
3243 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3244 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
3245 goto f_err;
3246 }
3247
3248
3249 ret=1;
3250 if (0)
3251 {
3252 f_err:
3253 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3254 }
3255 end:
3256 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
3257 {
3258 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
3259 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
3260 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
3261 }
3262 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3263 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3264 return(ret);
3265 }
3266
ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL * s)3267 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3268 {
3269 int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
3270 X509 *x=NULL;
3271 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
3272 const unsigned char *p,*q;
3273 unsigned char *d;
3274 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
3275
3276 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3277 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
3278 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
3279 -1,
3280 s->max_cert_list,
3281 &ok);
3282
3283 if (!ok) return((int)n);
3284
3285 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
3286 {
3287 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3288 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3289 {
3290 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3291 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3292 goto f_err;
3293 }
3294 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
3295 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
3296 {
3297 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
3298 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3299 goto f_err;
3300 }
3301 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
3302 return(1);
3303 }
3304
3305 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
3306 {
3307 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3308 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
3309 goto f_err;
3310 }
3311 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3312
3313 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
3314 {
3315 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3316 goto err;
3317 }
3318
3319 n2l3(p,llen);
3320 if (llen+3 != n)
3321 {
3322 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3323 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3324 goto f_err;
3325 }
3326 for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
3327 {
3328 n2l3(p,l);
3329 if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
3330 {
3331 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3332 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3333 goto f_err;
3334 }
3335
3336 q=p;
3337 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
3338 if (x == NULL)
3339 {
3340 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3341 goto err;
3342 }
3343 if (p != (q+l))
3344 {
3345 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3346 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3347 goto f_err;
3348 }
3349 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
3350 {
3351 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3352 goto err;
3353 }
3354 x=NULL;
3355 nc+=l+3;
3356 }
3357
3358 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
3359 {
3360 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3361 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
3362 {
3363 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3364 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3365 goto f_err;
3366 }
3367 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3368 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3369 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3370 {
3371 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3372 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3373 goto f_err;
3374 }
3375 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3376 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
3377 {
3378 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3379 goto f_err;
3380 }
3381 }
3382 else
3383 {
3384 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
3385 if (i <= 0)
3386 {
3387 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3388 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
3389 goto f_err;
3390 }
3391 }
3392
3393 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
3394 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3395 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
3396 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3397
3398 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
3399 * when we arrive here. */
3400 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3401 {
3402 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
3403 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3404 {
3405 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3406 goto err;
3407 }
3408 }
3409 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
3410 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
3411 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
3412 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
3413 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
3414
3415 sk=NULL;
3416
3417 ret=1;
3418 if (0)
3419 {
3420 f_err:
3421 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3422 }
3423 err:
3424 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
3425 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
3426 return(ret);
3427 }
3428
ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL * s)3429 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3430 {
3431 unsigned long l;
3432 X509 *x;
3433
3434 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
3435 {
3436 x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
3437 if (x == NULL)
3438 {
3439 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3440 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
3441 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5))
3442 {
3443 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3444 return(0);
3445 }
3446 }
3447
3448 l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x);
3449 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
3450 s->init_num=(int)l;
3451 s->init_off=0;
3452 }
3453
3454 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3455 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3456 }
3457
3458 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3459 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL * s)3460 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
3461 {
3462 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
3463 {
3464 unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
3465 const unsigned char *const_p;
3466 int len, slen_full, slen;
3467 SSL_SESSION *sess;
3468 unsigned int hlen;
3469 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
3470 HMAC_CTX hctx;
3471 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3472 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3473 unsigned char key_name[16];
3474
3475 /* get session encoding length */
3476 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3477 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
3478 * too long
3479 */
3480 if (slen_full > 0xFF00)
3481 return -1;
3482 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3483 if (!senc)
3484 return -1;
3485 p = senc;
3486 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
3487
3488 /* create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up */
3489 const_p = senc;
3490 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3491 if (sess == NULL)
3492 {
3493 OPENSSL_free(senc);
3494 return -1;
3495 }
3496 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3497
3498 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3499 if (slen > slen_full) /* shouldn't ever happen */
3500 {
3501 OPENSSL_free(senc);
3502 return -1;
3503 }
3504 p = senc;
3505 i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p);
3506 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3507
3508 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3509 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
3510 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3511 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3512 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3513 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3514 */
3515 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3516 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
3517 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3518 return -1;
3519
3520 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3521 /* do the header */
3522 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
3523 /* Skip message length for now */
3524 p += 3;
3525 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3526 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3527 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
3528 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
3529 * from parent ctx.
3530 */
3531 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3532 {
3533 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
3534 &hctx, 1) < 0)
3535 {
3536 OPENSSL_free(senc);
3537 return -1;
3538 }
3539 }
3540 else
3541 {
3542 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
3543 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3544 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
3545 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3546 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3547 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3548 }
3549
3550 /* Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only):
3551 * We leave this unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity),
3552 * and guess that tickets for new sessions will live as long
3553 * as their sessions. */
3554 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
3555
3556 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3557 p += 2;
3558 /* Output key name */
3559 macstart = p;
3560 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3561 p += 16;
3562 /* output IV */
3563 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3564 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3565 /* Encrypt session data */
3566 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
3567 p += len;
3568 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
3569 p += len;
3570 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3571
3572 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
3573 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
3574 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3575
3576 p += hlen;
3577 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3578 /* Total length */
3579 len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3580 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1;
3581 l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */
3582 p += 4;
3583 s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */
3584
3585 /* number of bytes to write */
3586 s->init_num= len;
3587 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3588 s->init_off=0;
3589 OPENSSL_free(senc);
3590 }
3591
3592 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3593 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3594 }
3595
ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL * s)3596 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3597 {
3598 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
3599 {
3600 unsigned char *p;
3601 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3602 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3603 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3604 * + (ocsp response)
3605 */
3606 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
3607 return -1;
3608
3609 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3610
3611 /* do the header */
3612 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3613 /* message length */
3614 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3615 /* status type */
3616 *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
3617 /* length of OCSP response */
3618 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3619 /* actual response */
3620 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3621 /* number of bytes to write */
3622 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3623 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3624 s->init_off = 0;
3625 }
3626
3627 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3628 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3629 }
3630
3631 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3632 /* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It
3633 * sets the next_proto member in s if found */
ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL * s)3634 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
3635 {
3636 int ok;
3637 int proto_len, padding_len;
3638 long n;
3639 const unsigned char *p;
3640
3641 /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3642 * extension in their ClientHello */
3643 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
3644 {
3645 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
3646 return -1;
3647 }
3648
3649 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3650 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
3651 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
3652 SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO,
3653 514, /* See the payload format below */
3654 &ok);
3655
3656 if (!ok)
3657 return((int)n);
3658
3659 /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received
3660 * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset
3661 * by ssl3_get_finished). */
3662 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
3663 {
3664 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
3665 return -1;
3666 }
3667
3668 if (n < 2)
3669 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3670
3671 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3672
3673 /* The payload looks like:
3674 * uint8 proto_len;
3675 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3676 * uint8 padding_len;
3677 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3678 */
3679 proto_len = p[0];
3680 if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num)
3681 return 0;
3682 padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
3683 if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num)
3684 return 0;
3685
3686 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
3687 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
3688 {
3689 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3690 return 0;
3691 }
3692 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
3693 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;
3694
3695 return 1;
3696 }
3697 # endif
3698
3699 /* ssl3_get_channel_id reads and verifies a ClientID handshake message. */
ssl3_get_channel_id(SSL * s)3700 int ssl3_get_channel_id(SSL *s)
3701 {
3702 int ret = -1, ok;
3703 long n;
3704 const unsigned char *p;
3705 unsigned short extension_type, extension_len;
3706 EC_GROUP* p256 = NULL;
3707 EC_KEY* key = NULL;
3708 EC_POINT* point = NULL;
3709 ECDSA_SIG sig;
3710 BIGNUM x, y;
3711 unsigned short expected_extension_type;
3712
3713 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A && s->init_num == 0)
3714 {
3715 /* The first time that we're called we take the current
3716 * handshake hash and store it. */
3717 EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
3718 unsigned int len;
3719
3720 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
3721 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, EVP_sha256(), NULL);
3722 if (!tls1_channel_id_hash(&md_ctx, s))
3723 return -1;
3724 len = sizeof(s->s3->tlsext_channel_id);
3725 EVP_DigestFinal(&md_ctx, s->s3->tlsext_channel_id, &len);
3726 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
3727 }
3728
3729 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3730 SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A,
3731 SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_B,
3732 SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3733 2 + 2 + TLSEXT_CHANNEL_ID_SIZE,
3734 &ok);
3735
3736 if (!ok)
3737 return((int)n);
3738
3739 ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char*)s->init_buf->data, s->init_num + 4);
3740
3741 /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received
3742 * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset
3743 * by ssl3_get_finished). */
3744 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
3745 {
3746 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CHANNEL_ID,SSL_R_GOT_CHANNEL_ID_BEFORE_A_CCS);
3747 return -1;
3748 }
3749
3750 if (n != 2 + 2 + TLSEXT_CHANNEL_ID_SIZE)
3751 {
3752 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CHANNEL_ID,SSL_R_INVALID_MESSAGE);
3753 return -1;
3754 }
3755
3756 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3757
3758 /* The payload looks like:
3759 * uint16 extension_type
3760 * uint16 extension_len;
3761 * uint8 x[32];
3762 * uint8 y[32];
3763 * uint8 r[32];
3764 * uint8 s[32];
3765 */
3766 n2s(p, extension_type);
3767 n2s(p, extension_len);
3768
3769 expected_extension_type = TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id;
3770 if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new)
3771 expected_extension_type = TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id_new;
3772
3773 if (extension_type != expected_extension_type ||
3774 extension_len != TLSEXT_CHANNEL_ID_SIZE)
3775 {
3776 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CHANNEL_ID,SSL_R_INVALID_MESSAGE);
3777 return -1;
3778 }
3779
3780 p256 = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1);
3781 if (!p256)
3782 {
3783 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CHANNEL_ID,SSL_R_NO_P256_SUPPORT);
3784 return -1;
3785 }
3786
3787 BN_init(&x);
3788 BN_init(&y);
3789 sig.r = BN_new();
3790 sig.s = BN_new();
3791
3792 if (BN_bin2bn(p + 0, 32, &x) == NULL ||
3793 BN_bin2bn(p + 32, 32, &y) == NULL ||
3794 BN_bin2bn(p + 64, 32, sig.r) == NULL ||
3795 BN_bin2bn(p + 96, 32, sig.s) == NULL)
3796 goto err;
3797
3798 point = EC_POINT_new(p256);
3799 if (!point ||
3800 !EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(p256, point, &x, &y, NULL))
3801 goto err;
3802
3803 key = EC_KEY_new();
3804 if (!key ||
3805 !EC_KEY_set_group(key, p256) ||
3806 !EC_KEY_set_public_key(key, point))
3807 goto err;
3808
3809 /* We stored the handshake hash in |tlsext_channel_id| the first time
3810 * that we were called. */
3811 switch (ECDSA_do_verify(s->s3->tlsext_channel_id, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, &sig, key)) {
3812 case 1:
3813 break;
3814 case 0:
3815 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CHANNEL_ID,SSL_R_CHANNEL_ID_SIGNATURE_INVALID);
3816 s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 0;
3817 goto err;
3818 default:
3819 s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 0;
3820 goto err;
3821 }
3822
3823 memcpy(s->s3->tlsext_channel_id, p, 64);
3824 ret = 1;
3825
3826 err:
3827 BN_free(&x);
3828 BN_free(&y);
3829 BN_free(sig.r);
3830 BN_free(sig.s);
3831 if (key)
3832 EC_KEY_free(key);
3833 if (point)
3834 EC_POINT_free(point);
3835 if (p256)
3836 EC_GROUP_free(p256);
3837 return ret;
3838 }
3839 #endif
3840