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1 /* v3_purp.c */
2 /* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
3  * project 2001.
4  */
5 /* ====================================================================
6  * Copyright (c) 1999-2004 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
7  *
8  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
9  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
10  * are met:
11  *
12  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
13  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
14  *
15  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
16  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
17  *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
18  *    distribution.
19  *
20  * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
21  *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
22  *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
23  *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
24  *
25  * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
26  *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
27  *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
28  *    licensing@OpenSSL.org.
29  *
30  * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
31  *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
32  *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
33  *
34  * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
35  *    acknowledgment:
36  *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
37  *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
38  *
39  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
40  * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
41  * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
42  * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
43  * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
44  * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
45  * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
46  * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
47  * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
48  * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
49  * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
50  * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
51  * ====================================================================
52  *
53  * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
54  * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
55  * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */
56 
57 #include <stdio.h>
58 
59 #include <openssl/buf.h>
60 #include <openssl/err.h>
61 #include <openssl/digest.h>
62 #include <openssl/mem.h>
63 #include <openssl/obj.h>
64 #include <openssl/x509_vfy.h>
65 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
66 
67 
68 static void x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x);
69 
70 static int check_ssl_ca(const X509 *x);
71 static int check_purpose_ssl_client(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
72 static int check_purpose_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
73 static int check_purpose_ns_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
74 static int purpose_smime(const X509 *x, int ca);
75 static int check_purpose_smime_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
76 static int check_purpose_smime_encrypt(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
77 static int check_purpose_crl_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
78 static int check_purpose_timestamp_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
79 static int no_check(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
80 static int ocsp_helper(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
81 
82 static int xp_cmp(const X509_PURPOSE **a, const X509_PURPOSE **b);
83 static void xptable_free(X509_PURPOSE *p);
84 
85 static X509_PURPOSE xstandard[] = {
86 	{X509_PURPOSE_SSL_CLIENT, X509_TRUST_SSL_CLIENT, 0, check_purpose_ssl_client, (char *) "SSL client", (char *) "sslclient", NULL},
87 	{X509_PURPOSE_SSL_SERVER, X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER, 0, check_purpose_ssl_server, (char *) "SSL server", (char *) "sslserver", NULL},
88 	{X509_PURPOSE_NS_SSL_SERVER, X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER, 0, check_purpose_ns_ssl_server, (char *) "Netscape SSL server", (char *) "nssslserver", NULL},
89 	{X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_SIGN, X509_TRUST_EMAIL, 0, check_purpose_smime_sign, (char *) "S/MIME signing", (char *) "smimesign", NULL},
90 	{X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_ENCRYPT, X509_TRUST_EMAIL, 0, check_purpose_smime_encrypt, (char *) "S/MIME encryption", (char *) "smimeencrypt", NULL},
91 	{X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN, X509_TRUST_COMPAT, 0, check_purpose_crl_sign, (char *) "CRL signing", (char *) "crlsign", NULL},
92 	{X509_PURPOSE_ANY, X509_TRUST_DEFAULT, 0, no_check, (char *) "Any Purpose", (char *) "any", NULL},
93 	{X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER, X509_TRUST_COMPAT, 0, ocsp_helper, (char *) "OCSP helper", (char *) "ocsphelper", NULL},
94 	{X509_PURPOSE_TIMESTAMP_SIGN, X509_TRUST_TSA, 0, check_purpose_timestamp_sign, (char *) "Time Stamp signing", (char *) "timestampsign", NULL},
95 };
96 
97 #define X509_PURPOSE_COUNT (sizeof(xstandard)/sizeof(X509_PURPOSE))
98 
99 static STACK_OF(X509_PURPOSE) *xptable = NULL;
100 
xp_cmp(const X509_PURPOSE ** a,const X509_PURPOSE ** b)101 static int xp_cmp(const X509_PURPOSE **a, const X509_PURPOSE **b)
102 {
103 	return (*a)->purpose - (*b)->purpose;
104 }
105 
106 /* As much as I'd like to make X509_check_purpose use a "const" X509*
107  * I really can't because it does recalculate hashes and do other non-const
108  * things. */
X509_check_purpose(X509 * x,int id,int ca)109 int X509_check_purpose(X509 *x, int id, int ca)
110 {
111 	int idx;
112 	const X509_PURPOSE *pt;
113 	if(!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET)) {
114 		CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
115 		x509v3_cache_extensions(x);
116 		CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
117 	}
118 	if(id == -1) return 1;
119 	idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(id);
120 	if(idx == -1) return -1;
121 	pt = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
122 	return pt->check_purpose(pt, x, ca);
123 }
124 
X509_PURPOSE_set(int * p,int purpose)125 int X509_PURPOSE_set(int *p, int purpose)
126 {
127 	if(X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose) == -1) {
128 		OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509V3, X509_PURPOSE_set, X509V3_R_INVALID_PURPOSE);
129 		return 0;
130 	}
131 	*p = purpose;
132 	return 1;
133 }
134 
X509_PURPOSE_get_count(void)135 int X509_PURPOSE_get_count(void)
136 {
137 	if(!xptable) return X509_PURPOSE_COUNT;
138 	return sk_X509_PURPOSE_num(xptable) + X509_PURPOSE_COUNT;
139 }
140 
X509_PURPOSE_get0(int idx)141 X509_PURPOSE * X509_PURPOSE_get0(int idx)
142 {
143 	if(idx < 0) return NULL;
144 	if(idx < (int)X509_PURPOSE_COUNT) return xstandard + idx;
145 	return sk_X509_PURPOSE_value(xptable, idx - X509_PURPOSE_COUNT);
146 }
147 
X509_PURPOSE_get_by_sname(char * sname)148 int X509_PURPOSE_get_by_sname(char *sname)
149 {
150 	int i;
151 	X509_PURPOSE *xptmp;
152 	for(i = 0; i < X509_PURPOSE_get_count(); i++) {
153 		xptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(i);
154 		if(!strcmp(xptmp->sname, sname)) return i;
155 	}
156 	return -1;
157 }
158 
X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(int purpose)159 int X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(int purpose)
160 {
161 	X509_PURPOSE tmp;
162 	size_t idx;
163 
164 	if((purpose >= X509_PURPOSE_MIN) && (purpose <= X509_PURPOSE_MAX))
165 		return purpose - X509_PURPOSE_MIN;
166 	tmp.purpose = purpose;
167 	if(!xptable) return -1;
168 
169 	if (!sk_X509_PURPOSE_find(xptable, &idx, &tmp))
170 		return -1;
171 	return idx + X509_PURPOSE_COUNT;
172 }
173 
X509_PURPOSE_add(int id,int trust,int flags,int (* ck)(const X509_PURPOSE *,const X509 *,int),char * name,char * sname,void * arg)174 int X509_PURPOSE_add(int id, int trust, int flags,
175 			int (*ck)(const X509_PURPOSE *, const X509 *, int),
176 					char *name, char *sname, void *arg)
177 {
178 	int idx;
179 	X509_PURPOSE *ptmp;
180 	/* This is set according to what we change: application can't set it */
181 	flags &= ~X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC;
182 	/* This will always be set for application modified trust entries */
183 	flags |= X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME;
184 	/* Get existing entry if any */
185 	idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(id);
186 	/* Need a new entry */
187 	if(idx == -1) {
188 		if(!(ptmp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_PURPOSE)))) {
189 			OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509V3, X509_PURPOSE_add, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
190 			return 0;
191 		}
192 		ptmp->flags = X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC;
193 	} else ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
194 
195 	/* OPENSSL_free existing name if dynamic */
196 	if(ptmp->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME) {
197 		OPENSSL_free(ptmp->name);
198 		OPENSSL_free(ptmp->sname);
199 	}
200 	/* dup supplied name */
201 	ptmp->name = BUF_strdup(name);
202 	ptmp->sname = BUF_strdup(sname);
203 	if(!ptmp->name || !ptmp->sname) {
204 		OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509V3, X509_PURPOSE_add, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
205 		return 0;
206 	}
207 	/* Keep the dynamic flag of existing entry */
208 	ptmp->flags &= X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC;
209 	/* Set all other flags */
210 	ptmp->flags |= flags;
211 
212 	ptmp->purpose = id;
213 	ptmp->trust = trust;
214 	ptmp->check_purpose = ck;
215 	ptmp->usr_data = arg;
216 
217 	/* If its a new entry manage the dynamic table */
218 	if(idx == -1) {
219 		if(!xptable && !(xptable = sk_X509_PURPOSE_new(xp_cmp))) {
220 			OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509V3, X509_PURPOSE_add, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
221 			return 0;
222 		}
223 		if (!sk_X509_PURPOSE_push(xptable, ptmp)) {
224 			OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509V3, X509_PURPOSE_add, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
225 			return 0;
226 		}
227 	}
228 	return 1;
229 }
230 
xptable_free(X509_PURPOSE * p)231 static void xptable_free(X509_PURPOSE *p)
232 	{
233 	if(!p) return;
234 	if (p->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC)
235 		{
236 		if (p->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME) {
237 			OPENSSL_free(p->name);
238 			OPENSSL_free(p->sname);
239 		}
240 		OPENSSL_free(p);
241 		}
242 	}
243 
X509_PURPOSE_cleanup(void)244 void X509_PURPOSE_cleanup(void)
245 {
246 	unsigned int i;
247 	sk_X509_PURPOSE_pop_free(xptable, xptable_free);
248 	for(i = 0; i < X509_PURPOSE_COUNT; i++) xptable_free(xstandard + i);
249 	xptable = NULL;
250 }
251 
X509_PURPOSE_get_id(X509_PURPOSE * xp)252 int X509_PURPOSE_get_id(X509_PURPOSE *xp)
253 {
254 	return xp->purpose;
255 }
256 
X509_PURPOSE_get0_name(X509_PURPOSE * xp)257 char *X509_PURPOSE_get0_name(X509_PURPOSE *xp)
258 {
259 	return xp->name;
260 }
261 
X509_PURPOSE_get0_sname(X509_PURPOSE * xp)262 char *X509_PURPOSE_get0_sname(X509_PURPOSE *xp)
263 {
264 	return xp->sname;
265 }
266 
X509_PURPOSE_get_trust(X509_PURPOSE * xp)267 int X509_PURPOSE_get_trust(X509_PURPOSE *xp)
268 {
269 	return xp->trust;
270 }
271 
nid_cmp(const void * void_a,const void * void_b)272 static int nid_cmp(const void *void_a, const void *void_b)
273 	{
274 	const int *a = void_a, *b = void_b;
275 
276 	return *a - *b;
277 	}
278 
X509_supported_extension(X509_EXTENSION * ex)279 int X509_supported_extension(X509_EXTENSION *ex)
280 	{
281 	/* This table is a list of the NIDs of supported extensions:
282 	 * that is those which are used by the verify process. If
283 	 * an extension is critical and doesn't appear in this list
284 	 * then the verify process will normally reject the certificate.
285 	 * The list must be kept in numerical order because it will be
286 	 * searched using bsearch.
287 	 */
288 
289 	static const int supported_nids[] = {
290 		NID_netscape_cert_type, /* 71 */
291         	NID_key_usage,		/* 83 */
292 		NID_subject_alt_name,	/* 85 */
293 		NID_basic_constraints,	/* 87 */
294 		NID_certificate_policies, /* 89 */
295         	NID_ext_key_usage,	/* 126 */
296 		NID_policy_constraints,	/* 401 */
297 		NID_proxyCertInfo,	/* 663 */
298 		NID_name_constraints,	/* 666 */
299 		NID_policy_mappings,	/* 747 */
300 		NID_inhibit_any_policy	/* 748 */
301 	};
302 
303 	int ex_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ex));
304 
305 	if (ex_nid == NID_undef)
306 		return 0;
307 
308 	if (bsearch(&ex_nid, supported_nids, sizeof(supported_nids)/sizeof(int), sizeof(int), nid_cmp) != NULL)
309 		return 1;
310 	return 0;
311 	}
312 
setup_dp(X509 * x,DIST_POINT * dp)313 static void setup_dp(X509 *x, DIST_POINT *dp)
314 	{
315 	X509_NAME *iname = NULL;
316 	size_t i;
317 	if (dp->reasons)
318 		{
319 		if (dp->reasons->length > 0)
320 			dp->dp_reasons = dp->reasons->data[0];
321 		if (dp->reasons->length > 1)
322 			dp->dp_reasons |= (dp->reasons->data[1] << 8);
323 		dp->dp_reasons &= CRLDP_ALL_REASONS;
324 		}
325 	else
326 		dp->dp_reasons = CRLDP_ALL_REASONS;
327 	if (!dp->distpoint || (dp->distpoint->type != 1))
328 		return;
329 	for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++)
330 		{
331 		GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
332 		if (gen->type == GEN_DIRNAME)
333 			{
334 			iname = gen->d.directoryName;
335 			break;
336 			}
337 		}
338 	if (!iname)
339 		iname = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
340 
341 	DIST_POINT_set_dpname(dp->distpoint, iname);
342 
343 	}
344 
setup_crldp(X509 * x)345 static void setup_crldp(X509 *x)
346 	{
347 	size_t i;
348 	x->crldp = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_crl_distribution_points, NULL, NULL);
349 	for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++)
350 		setup_dp(x, sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i));
351 	}
352 
x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 * x)353 static void x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x)
354 {
355 	BASIC_CONSTRAINTS *bs;
356 	PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION *pci;
357 	ASN1_BIT_STRING *usage;
358 	ASN1_BIT_STRING *ns;
359 	EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE *extusage;
360 	X509_EXTENSION *ex;
361 	size_t i;
362 	int j;
363 	if(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET) return;
364 	X509_digest(x, EVP_sha1(), x->sha1_hash, NULL);
365 	/* V1 should mean no extensions ... */
366 	if(!X509_get_version(x)) x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_V1;
367 	/* Handle basic constraints */
368 	if((bs=X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_basic_constraints, NULL, NULL))) {
369 		if(bs->ca) x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_CA;
370 		if(bs->pathlen) {
371 			if((bs->pathlen->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER)
372 						|| !bs->ca) {
373 				x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
374 				x->ex_pathlen = 0;
375 			} else x->ex_pathlen = ASN1_INTEGER_get(bs->pathlen);
376 		} else x->ex_pathlen = -1;
377 		BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_free(bs);
378 		x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_BCONS;
379 	}
380 	/* Handle proxy certificates */
381 	if((pci=X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_proxyCertInfo, NULL, NULL))) {
382 		if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA
383 		    || X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_subject_alt_name, -1) >= 0
384 		    || X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_issuer_alt_name, -1) >= 0) {
385 			x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
386 		}
387 		if (pci->pcPathLengthConstraint) {
388 			x->ex_pcpathlen =
389 				ASN1_INTEGER_get(pci->pcPathLengthConstraint);
390 		} else x->ex_pcpathlen = -1;
391 		PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION_free(pci);
392 		x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_PROXY;
393 	}
394 	/* Handle key usage */
395 	if((usage=X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_key_usage, NULL, NULL))) {
396 		if(usage->length > 0) {
397 			x->ex_kusage = usage->data[0];
398 			if(usage->length > 1)
399 				x->ex_kusage |= usage->data[1] << 8;
400 		} else x->ex_kusage = 0;
401 		x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_KUSAGE;
402 		ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(usage);
403 	}
404 	x->ex_xkusage = 0;
405 	if((extusage=X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_ext_key_usage, NULL, NULL))) {
406 		x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_XKUSAGE;
407 		for(i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(extusage); i++) {
408 			switch(OBJ_obj2nid(sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(extusage,i))) {
409 				case NID_server_auth:
410 				x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SSL_SERVER;
411 				break;
412 
413 				case NID_client_auth:
414 				x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SSL_CLIENT;
415 				break;
416 
417 				case NID_email_protect:
418 				x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SMIME;
419 				break;
420 
421 				case NID_code_sign:
422 				x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_CODE_SIGN;
423 				break;
424 
425 				case NID_ms_sgc:
426 				case NID_ns_sgc:
427 				x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SGC;
428 				break;
429 
430 				case NID_OCSP_sign:
431 				x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_OCSP_SIGN;
432 				break;
433 
434 				case NID_time_stamp:
435 				x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_TIMESTAMP;
436 				break;
437 
438 				case NID_dvcs:
439 				x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_DVCS;
440 				break;
441 
442 				case NID_anyExtendedKeyUsage:
443 				x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_ANYEKU;
444 				break;
445 			}
446 		}
447 		sk_ASN1_OBJECT_pop_free(extusage, ASN1_OBJECT_free);
448 	}
449 
450 	if((ns=X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_netscape_cert_type, NULL, NULL))) {
451 		if(ns->length > 0) x->ex_nscert = ns->data[0];
452 		else x->ex_nscert = 0;
453 		x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_NSCERT;
454 		ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(ns);
455 	}
456 	x->skid =X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_key_identifier, NULL, NULL);
457 	x->akid =X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_authority_key_identifier, NULL, NULL);
458 	/* Does subject name match issuer ? */
459 	if(!X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x), X509_get_issuer_name(x)))
460 			{
461 			x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SI;
462 			/* If SKID matches AKID also indicate self signed */
463 			if (X509_check_akid(x, x->akid) == X509_V_OK)
464 				x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SS;
465 			}
466 	x->altname = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL);
467 	x->nc = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_name_constraints, &j, NULL);
468 	if (!x->nc && (j != -1))
469 		x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
470 	setup_crldp(x);
471 
472 	for (j = 0; j < X509_get_ext_count(x); j++)
473 		{
474 		ex = X509_get_ext(x, j);
475 		if (OBJ_obj2nid(X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ex))
476 					== NID_freshest_crl)
477 			x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_FRESHEST;
478 		if (!X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ex))
479 			continue;
480 		if (!X509_supported_extension(ex))
481 			{
482 			x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_CRITICAL;
483 			break;
484 			}
485 		}
486 	x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SET;
487 }
488 
489 /* CA checks common to all purposes
490  * return codes:
491  * 0 not a CA
492  * 1 is a CA
493  * 2 basicConstraints absent so "maybe" a CA
494  * 3 basicConstraints absent but self signed V1.
495  * 4 basicConstraints absent but keyUsage present and keyCertSign asserted.
496  */
497 
498 #define V1_ROOT (EXFLAG_V1|EXFLAG_SS)
499 #define ku_reject(x, usage) \
500 	(((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_kusage & (usage)))
501 #define xku_reject(x, usage) \
502 	(((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_xkusage & (usage)))
503 #define ns_reject(x, usage) \
504 	(((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) && !((x)->ex_nscert & (usage)))
505 
check_ca(const X509 * x)506 static int check_ca(const X509 *x)
507 {
508 	/* keyUsage if present should allow cert signing */
509 	if(ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN)) return 0;
510 	if(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_BCONS) {
511 		if(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) return 1;
512 		/* If basicConstraints says not a CA then say so */
513 		else return 0;
514 	} else {
515 		/* we support V1 roots for...  uh, I don't really know why. */
516 		if((x->ex_flags & V1_ROOT) == V1_ROOT) return 3;
517 		/* If key usage present it must have certSign so tolerate it */
518 		else if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) return 4;
519 		/* Older certificates could have Netscape-specific CA types */
520 		else if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT
521 			 && x->ex_nscert & NS_ANY_CA) return 5;
522 		/* can this still be regarded a CA certificate?  I doubt it */
523 		return 0;
524 	}
525 }
526 
X509_check_ca(X509 * x)527 int X509_check_ca(X509 *x)
528 {
529 	if(!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET)) {
530 		CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
531 		x509v3_cache_extensions(x);
532 		CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
533 	}
534 
535 	return check_ca(x);
536 }
537 
538 /* Check SSL CA: common checks for SSL client and server */
check_ssl_ca(const X509 * x)539 static int check_ssl_ca(const X509 *x)
540 {
541 	int ca_ret;
542 	ca_ret = check_ca(x);
543 	if(!ca_ret) return 0;
544 	/* check nsCertType if present */
545 	if(ca_ret != 5 || x->ex_nscert & NS_SSL_CA) return ca_ret;
546 	else return 0;
547 }
548 
549 
check_purpose_ssl_client(const X509_PURPOSE * xp,const X509 * x,int ca)550 static int check_purpose_ssl_client(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
551 {
552 	if(xku_reject(x,XKU_SSL_CLIENT)) return 0;
553 	if(ca) return check_ssl_ca(x);
554 	/* We need to do digital signatures or key agreement */
555 	if(ku_reject(x,KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE|KU_KEY_AGREEMENT)) return 0;
556 	/* nsCertType if present should allow SSL client use */
557 	if(ns_reject(x, NS_SSL_CLIENT)) return 0;
558 	return 1;
559 }
560 /* Key usage needed for TLS/SSL server: digital signature, encipherment or
561  * key agreement. The ssl code can check this more thoroughly for individual
562  * key types.
563  */
564 #define KU_TLS \
565 	KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE|KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT|KU_KEY_AGREEMENT
566 
check_purpose_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE * xp,const X509 * x,int ca)567 static int check_purpose_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
568 {
569 	if(xku_reject(x,XKU_SSL_SERVER|XKU_SGC)) return 0;
570 	if(ca) return check_ssl_ca(x);
571 
572 	if(ns_reject(x, NS_SSL_SERVER)) return 0;
573 	if(ku_reject(x, KU_TLS)) return 0;
574 
575 	return 1;
576 
577 }
578 
check_purpose_ns_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE * xp,const X509 * x,int ca)579 static int check_purpose_ns_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
580 {
581 	int ret;
582 	ret = check_purpose_ssl_server(xp, x, ca);
583 	if(!ret || ca) return ret;
584 	/* We need to encipher or Netscape complains */
585 	if(ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT)) return 0;
586 	return ret;
587 }
588 
589 /* common S/MIME checks */
purpose_smime(const X509 * x,int ca)590 static int purpose_smime(const X509 *x, int ca)
591 {
592 	if(xku_reject(x,XKU_SMIME)) return 0;
593 	if(ca) {
594 		int ca_ret;
595 		ca_ret = check_ca(x);
596 		if(!ca_ret) return 0;
597 		/* check nsCertType if present */
598 		if(ca_ret != 5 || x->ex_nscert & NS_SMIME_CA) return ca_ret;
599 		else return 0;
600 	}
601 	if(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) {
602 		if(x->ex_nscert & NS_SMIME) return 1;
603 		/* Workaround for some buggy certificates */
604 		if(x->ex_nscert & NS_SSL_CLIENT) return 2;
605 		return 0;
606 	}
607 	return 1;
608 }
609 
check_purpose_smime_sign(const X509_PURPOSE * xp,const X509 * x,int ca)610 static int check_purpose_smime_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
611 {
612 	int ret;
613 	ret = purpose_smime(x, ca);
614 	if(!ret || ca) return ret;
615 	if(ku_reject(x, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE|KU_NON_REPUDIATION)) return 0;
616 	return ret;
617 }
618 
check_purpose_smime_encrypt(const X509_PURPOSE * xp,const X509 * x,int ca)619 static int check_purpose_smime_encrypt(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
620 {
621 	int ret;
622 	ret = purpose_smime(x, ca);
623 	if(!ret || ca) return ret;
624 	if(ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT)) return 0;
625 	return ret;
626 }
627 
check_purpose_crl_sign(const X509_PURPOSE * xp,const X509 * x,int ca)628 static int check_purpose_crl_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
629 {
630 	if(ca) {
631 		int ca_ret;
632 		if((ca_ret = check_ca(x)) != 2) return ca_ret;
633 		else return 0;
634 	}
635 	if(ku_reject(x, KU_CRL_SIGN)) return 0;
636 	return 1;
637 }
638 
639 /* OCSP helper: this is *not* a full OCSP check. It just checks that
640  * each CA is valid. Additional checks must be made on the chain.
641  */
642 
ocsp_helper(const X509_PURPOSE * xp,const X509 * x,int ca)643 static int ocsp_helper(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
644 {
645 	/* Must be a valid CA.  Should we really support the "I don't know"
646 	   value (2)? */
647 	if(ca) return check_ca(x);
648 	/* leaf certificate is checked in OCSP_verify() */
649 	return 1;
650 }
651 
check_purpose_timestamp_sign(const X509_PURPOSE * xp,const X509 * x,int ca)652 static int check_purpose_timestamp_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
653 					int ca)
654 {
655 	int i_ext;
656 
657 	/* If ca is true we must return if this is a valid CA certificate. */
658 	if (ca) return check_ca(x);
659 
660 	/*
661 	 * Check the optional key usage field:
662 	 * if Key Usage is present, it must be one of digitalSignature
663 	 * and/or nonRepudiation (other values are not consistent and shall
664 	 * be rejected).
665 	 */
666 	if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE)
667 	    && ((x->ex_kusage & ~(KU_NON_REPUDIATION | KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) ||
668 		!(x->ex_kusage & (KU_NON_REPUDIATION | KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE))))
669 		return 0;
670 
671 	/* Only time stamp key usage is permitted and it's required. */
672 	if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) || x->ex_xkusage != XKU_TIMESTAMP)
673 		return 0;
674 
675 	/* Extended Key Usage MUST be critical */
676 	i_ext = X509_get_ext_by_NID((X509 *) x, NID_ext_key_usage, -1);
677 	if (i_ext >= 0)
678 		{
679 		X509_EXTENSION *ext = X509_get_ext((X509 *) x, i_ext);
680 		if (!X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ext))
681 			return 0;
682 		}
683 
684 	return 1;
685 }
686 
no_check(const X509_PURPOSE * xp,const X509 * x,int ca)687 static int no_check(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
688 {
689 	return 1;
690 }
691 
692 /* Various checks to see if one certificate issued the second.
693  * This can be used to prune a set of possible issuer certificates
694  * which have been looked up using some simple method such as by
695  * subject name.
696  * These are:
697  * 1. Check issuer_name(subject) == subject_name(issuer)
698  * 2. If akid(subject) exists check it matches issuer
699  * 3. If key_usage(issuer) exists check it supports certificate signing
700  * returns 0 for OK, positive for reason for mismatch, reasons match
701  * codes for X509_verify_cert()
702  */
703 
X509_check_issued(X509 * issuer,X509 * subject)704 int X509_check_issued(X509 *issuer, X509 *subject)
705 {
706 	if(X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(issuer),
707 			X509_get_issuer_name(subject)))
708 				return X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_ISSUER_MISMATCH;
709 	x509v3_cache_extensions(issuer);
710 	x509v3_cache_extensions(subject);
711 
712 	if(subject->akid)
713 		{
714 		int ret = X509_check_akid(issuer, subject->akid);
715 		if (ret != X509_V_OK)
716 			return ret;
717 		}
718 
719 	if(subject->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)
720 		{
721 		if(ku_reject(issuer, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE))
722 			return X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE;
723 		}
724 	else if(ku_reject(issuer, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN))
725 		return X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CERTSIGN;
726 	return X509_V_OK;
727 }
728 
X509_check_akid(X509 * issuer,AUTHORITY_KEYID * akid)729 int X509_check_akid(X509 *issuer, AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid)
730 	{
731 
732 	if(!akid)
733 		return X509_V_OK;
734 
735 	/* Check key ids (if present) */
736 	if(akid->keyid && issuer->skid &&
737 		 ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(akid->keyid, issuer->skid) )
738 				return X509_V_ERR_AKID_SKID_MISMATCH;
739 	/* Check serial number */
740 	if(akid->serial &&
741 		ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(X509_get_serialNumber(issuer), akid->serial))
742 				return X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH;
743 	/* Check issuer name */
744 	if(akid->issuer)
745 		{
746 		/* Ugh, for some peculiar reason AKID includes
747 		 * SEQUENCE OF GeneralName. So look for a DirName.
748 		 * There may be more than one but we only take any
749 		 * notice of the first.
750 		 */
751 		GENERAL_NAMES *gens;
752 		GENERAL_NAME *gen;
753 		X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
754 		size_t i;
755 		gens = akid->issuer;
756 		for(i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++)
757 			{
758 			gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
759 			if(gen->type == GEN_DIRNAME)
760 				{
761 				nm = gen->d.dirn;
762 				break;
763 				}
764 			}
765 		if(nm && X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_get_issuer_name(issuer)))
766 			return X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH;
767 		}
768 	return X509_V_OK;
769 	}
770 
771