1 /* crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */
57
58 #include <string.h>
59
60 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
61 #include <openssl/buf.h>
62 #include <openssl/digest.h>
63 #include <openssl/err.h>
64 #include <openssl/mem.h>
65 #include <openssl/obj.h>
66 #include <openssl/stack.h>
67 #include <openssl/x509.h>
68 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
69
70
X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(const X509 * a,const X509 * b)71 int X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
72 {
73 int i;
74 X509_CINF *ai,*bi;
75
76 ai=a->cert_info;
77 bi=b->cert_info;
78 i=M_ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(ai->serialNumber,bi->serialNumber);
79 if (i) return(i);
80 return(X509_NAME_cmp(ai->issuer,bi->issuer));
81 }
82
X509_issuer_and_serial_hash(X509 * a)83 unsigned long X509_issuer_and_serial_hash(X509 *a)
84 {
85 unsigned long ret=0;
86 EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
87 unsigned char md[16];
88 char *f;
89
90 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
91 f=X509_NAME_oneline(a->cert_info->issuer,NULL,0);
92 if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL))
93 goto err;
94 if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,(unsigned char *)f,strlen(f)))
95 goto err;
96 OPENSSL_free(f);
97 if(!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,(unsigned char *)a->cert_info->serialNumber->data,
98 (unsigned long)a->cert_info->serialNumber->length))
99 goto err;
100 if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx,&(md[0]),NULL))
101 goto err;
102 ret=( ((unsigned long)md[0] )|((unsigned long)md[1]<<8L)|
103 ((unsigned long)md[2]<<16L)|((unsigned long)md[3]<<24L)
104 )&0xffffffffL;
105 err:
106 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
107 return(ret);
108 }
109
X509_issuer_name_cmp(const X509 * a,const X509 * b)110 int X509_issuer_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
111 {
112 return(X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->issuer,b->cert_info->issuer));
113 }
114
X509_subject_name_cmp(const X509 * a,const X509 * b)115 int X509_subject_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
116 {
117 return(X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->subject,b->cert_info->subject));
118 }
119
X509_CRL_cmp(const X509_CRL * a,const X509_CRL * b)120 int X509_CRL_cmp(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b)
121 {
122 return(X509_NAME_cmp(a->crl->issuer,b->crl->issuer));
123 }
124
X509_CRL_match(const X509_CRL * a,const X509_CRL * b)125 int X509_CRL_match(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b)
126 {
127 return memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, 20);
128 }
129
X509_get_issuer_name(X509 * a)130 X509_NAME *X509_get_issuer_name(X509 *a)
131 {
132 return(a->cert_info->issuer);
133 }
134
X509_issuer_name_hash(X509 * x)135 unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash(X509 *x)
136 {
137 return(X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->issuer));
138 }
139
X509_issuer_name_hash_old(X509 * x)140 unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash_old(X509 *x)
141 {
142 return(X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->issuer));
143 }
144
X509_get_subject_name(X509 * a)145 X509_NAME *X509_get_subject_name(X509 *a)
146 {
147 return(a->cert_info->subject);
148 }
149
X509_get_serialNumber(X509 * a)150 ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get_serialNumber(X509 *a)
151 {
152 return(a->cert_info->serialNumber);
153 }
154
X509_subject_name_hash(X509 * x)155 unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash(X509 *x)
156 {
157 return(X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->subject));
158 }
159
X509_subject_name_hash_old(X509 * x)160 unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash_old(X509 *x)
161 {
162 return(X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->subject));
163 }
164
165 /* Compare two certificates: they must be identical for
166 * this to work. NB: Although "cmp" operations are generally
167 * prototyped to take "const" arguments (eg. for use in
168 * STACKs), the way X509 handling is - these operations may
169 * involve ensuring the hashes are up-to-date and ensuring
170 * certain cert information is cached. So this is the point
171 * where the "depth-first" constification tree has to halt
172 * with an evil cast.
173 */
X509_cmp(const X509 * a,const X509 * b)174 int X509_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
175 {
176 int rv;
177 /* ensure hash is valid */
178 X509_check_purpose((X509 *)a, -1, 0);
179 X509_check_purpose((X509 *)b, -1, 0);
180
181 rv = memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
182 if (rv)
183 return rv;
184 /* Check for match against stored encoding too */
185 if (!a->cert_info->enc.modified && !b->cert_info->enc.modified)
186 {
187 rv = (int)(a->cert_info->enc.len - b->cert_info->enc.len);
188 if (rv)
189 return rv;
190 return memcmp(a->cert_info->enc.enc, b->cert_info->enc.enc,
191 a->cert_info->enc.len);
192 }
193 return rv;
194 }
195
196
X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME * a,const X509_NAME * b)197 int X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b)
198 {
199 int ret;
200
201 /* Ensure canonical encoding is present and up to date */
202
203 if (!a->canon_enc || a->modified)
204 {
205 ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)a, NULL);
206 if (ret < 0)
207 return -2;
208 }
209
210 if (!b->canon_enc || b->modified)
211 {
212 ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)b, NULL);
213 if (ret < 0)
214 return -2;
215 }
216
217 ret = a->canon_enclen - b->canon_enclen;
218
219 if (ret)
220 return ret;
221
222 return memcmp(a->canon_enc, b->canon_enc, a->canon_enclen);
223
224 }
225
X509_NAME_hash(X509_NAME * x)226 unsigned long X509_NAME_hash(X509_NAME *x)
227 {
228 unsigned long ret=0;
229 unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
230
231 /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
232 i2d_X509_NAME(x,NULL);
233 if (!EVP_Digest(x->canon_enc, x->canon_enclen, md, NULL, EVP_sha1(),
234 NULL))
235 return 0;
236
237 ret=( ((unsigned long)md[0] )|((unsigned long)md[1]<<8L)|
238 ((unsigned long)md[2]<<16L)|((unsigned long)md[3]<<24L)
239 )&0xffffffffL;
240 return(ret);
241 }
242
243
244 /* I now DER encode the name and hash it. Since I cache the DER encoding,
245 * this is reasonably efficient. */
246
X509_NAME_hash_old(X509_NAME * x)247 unsigned long X509_NAME_hash_old(X509_NAME *x)
248 {
249 EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
250 unsigned long ret=0;
251 unsigned char md[16];
252
253 /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
254 i2d_X509_NAME(x,NULL);
255 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
256 /* EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW); */
257 if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL)
258 && EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, x->bytes->data, x->bytes->length)
259 && EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,md,NULL))
260 ret=(((unsigned long)md[0] )|((unsigned long)md[1]<<8L)|
261 ((unsigned long)md[2]<<16L)|((unsigned long)md[3]<<24L)
262 )&0xffffffffL;
263 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
264
265 return(ret);
266 }
267
268 /* Search a stack of X509 for a match */
X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(STACK_OF (X509)* sk,X509_NAME * name,ASN1_INTEGER * serial)269 X509 *X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name,
270 ASN1_INTEGER *serial)
271 {
272 size_t i;
273 X509_CINF cinf;
274 X509 x,*x509=NULL;
275
276 if(!sk) return NULL;
277
278 x.cert_info= &cinf;
279 cinf.serialNumber=serial;
280 cinf.issuer=name;
281
282 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
283 {
284 x509=sk_X509_value(sk,i);
285 if (X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(x509,&x) == 0)
286 return(x509);
287 }
288 return(NULL);
289 }
290
X509_find_by_subject(STACK_OF (X509)* sk,X509_NAME * name)291 X509 *X509_find_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name)
292 {
293 X509 *x509;
294 size_t i;
295
296 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
297 {
298 x509=sk_X509_value(sk,i);
299 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x509),name) == 0)
300 return(x509);
301 }
302 return(NULL);
303 }
304
X509_get_pubkey(X509 * x)305 EVP_PKEY *X509_get_pubkey(X509 *x)
306 {
307 if ((x == NULL) || (x->cert_info == NULL))
308 return(NULL);
309 return(X509_PUBKEY_get(x->cert_info->key));
310 }
311
X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(const X509 * x)312 ASN1_BIT_STRING *X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(const X509 *x)
313 {
314 if(!x) return NULL;
315 return x->cert_info->key->public_key;
316 }
317
318
X509_check_private_key(X509 * x,EVP_PKEY * k)319 int X509_check_private_key(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *k)
320 {
321 EVP_PKEY *xk;
322 int ret;
323
324 xk=X509_get_pubkey(x);
325
326 if (xk)
327 ret = EVP_PKEY_cmp(xk, k);
328 else
329 ret = -2;
330
331 switch (ret)
332 {
333 case 1:
334 break;
335 case 0:
336 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_check_private_key, X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH);
337 break;
338 case -1:
339 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_check_private_key, X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH);
340 break;
341 case -2:
342 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_check_private_key, X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE);
343 }
344 if (xk)
345 EVP_PKEY_free(xk);
346 if (ret > 0)
347 return 1;
348 return 0;
349 }
350
351 /* Check a suite B algorithm is permitted: pass in a public key and
352 * the NID of its signature (or 0 if no signature). The pflags is
353 * a pointer to a flags field which must contain the suite B verification
354 * flags.
355 */
356
357
check_suite_b(EVP_PKEY * pkey,int sign_nid,unsigned long * pflags)358 static int check_suite_b(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int sign_nid, unsigned long *pflags)
359 {
360 const EC_GROUP *grp = NULL;
361 int curve_nid;
362 if (pkey && pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
363 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(pkey->pkey.ec);
364 if (!grp)
365 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_ALGORITHM;
366 curve_nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
367 /* Check curve is consistent with LOS */
368 if (curve_nid == NID_secp384r1) /* P-384 */
369 {
370 /* Check signature algorithm is consistent with
371 * curve.
372 */
373 if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384)
374 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM;
375 if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS))
376 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED;
377 /* If we encounter P-384 we cannot use P-256 later */
378 *pflags &= ~X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY;
379 }
380 else if (curve_nid == NID_X9_62_prime256v1) /* P-256 */
381 {
382 if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
383 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM;
384 if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY))
385 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED;
386 }
387 else
388 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_CURVE;
389
390 return X509_V_OK;
391 }
392
X509_chain_check_suiteb(int * perror_depth,X509 * x,STACK_OF (X509)* chain,unsigned long flags)393 int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
394 unsigned long flags)
395 {
396 int rv, sign_nid;
397 size_t i;
398 EVP_PKEY *pk = NULL;
399 unsigned long tflags;
400 if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS))
401 return X509_V_OK;
402 tflags = flags;
403 /* If no EE certificate passed in must be first in chain */
404 if (x == NULL)
405 {
406 x = sk_X509_value(chain, 0);
407 i = 1;
408 }
409 else
410 i = 0;
411
412 if (X509_get_version(x) != 2)
413 {
414 rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION;
415 /* Correct error depth */
416 i = 0;
417 goto end;
418 }
419
420 pk = X509_get_pubkey(x);
421 /* Check EE key only */
422 rv = check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags);
423 if (rv != X509_V_OK)
424 {
425 /* Correct error depth */
426 i = 0;
427 goto end;
428 }
429 for(; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
430 {
431 sign_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
432 x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
433 if (X509_get_version(x) != 2)
434 {
435 rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION;
436 goto end;
437 }
438 EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
439 pk = X509_get_pubkey(x);
440 rv = check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &tflags);
441 if (rv != X509_V_OK)
442 goto end;
443 }
444
445 /* Final check: root CA signature */
446 rv = check_suite_b(pk, X509_get_signature_nid(x), &tflags);
447 end:
448 if (pk)
449 EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
450 if (rv != X509_V_OK)
451 {
452 /* Invalid signature or LOS errors are for previous cert */
453 if ((rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
454 || rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED) && i)
455 i--;
456 /* If we have LOS error and flags changed then we are signing
457 * P-384 with P-256. Use more meaninggul error.
458 */
459 if (rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED && flags != tflags)
460 rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_CANNOT_SIGN_P_384_WITH_P_256;
461 if (perror_depth)
462 *perror_depth = i;
463 }
464 return rv;
465 }
466
X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL * crl,EVP_PKEY * pk,unsigned long flags)467 int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags)
468 {
469 int sign_nid;
470 if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS))
471 return X509_V_OK;
472 sign_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(crl->crl->sig_alg->algorithm);
473 return check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &flags);
474 }
475
476 /* Not strictly speaking an "up_ref" as a STACK doesn't have a reference
477 * count but it has the same effect by duping the STACK and upping the ref
478 * of each X509 structure.
479 */
STACK_OF(X509)480 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_chain_up_ref(STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
481 {
482 STACK_OF(X509) *ret;
483 size_t i;
484 ret = sk_X509_dup(chain);
485 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ret); i++)
486 {
487 X509_up_ref(sk_X509_value(ret, i));
488 }
489 return ret;
490 }
491