1 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
2 * All rights reserved.
3 *
4 * This package is an SSL implementation written
5 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
6 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
7 *
8 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
9 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
10 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
11 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
12 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
13 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
14 *
15 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
16 * the code are not to be removed.
17 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
18 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
19 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
20 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
21 *
22 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
23 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
24 * are met:
25 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
26 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
27 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
28 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
29 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
30 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
31 * must display the following acknowledgement:
32 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
33 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
34 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
35 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
36 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
37 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
38 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
39 *
40 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
41 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
42 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
43 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
44 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
45 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
46 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
47 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
48 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
49 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
50 * SUCH DAMAGE.
51 *
52 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
53 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
54 * copied and put under another distribution licence
55 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */
56
57 #include <string.h>
58 #include <time.h>
59
60 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
61 #include <openssl/buf.h>
62 #include <openssl/err.h>
63 #include <openssl/evp.h>
64 #include <openssl/lhash.h>
65 #include <openssl/mem.h>
66 #include <openssl/obj.h>
67 #include <openssl/thread.h>
68 #include <openssl/x509.h>
69 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
70
71 #include "vpm_int.h"
72 #include "../internal.h"
73
74
75 static CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS g_ex_data_class = CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS_INIT;
76
77 /* CRL score values */
78
79 /* No unhandled critical extensions */
80
81 #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100
82
83 /* certificate is within CRL scope */
84
85 #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080
86
87 /* CRL times valid */
88
89 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040
90
91 /* Issuer name matches certificate */
92
93 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020
94
95 /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */
96
97 #define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
98
99 /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
100
101 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018
102
103 /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
104
105 #define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008
106
107 /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
108
109 #define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004
110
111 /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */
112
113 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002
114
115 static int null_callback(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *e);
116 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
117 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
118 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
119 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
120 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
121 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
122 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
123 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
124 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
125
126 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
127 unsigned int *preasons,
128 X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x);
129 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
130 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x);
131 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pcrl_score,
132 X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls);
133 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
134 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score);
135 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
136 unsigned int *preasons);
137 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
138 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
139 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
140 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path);
141
142 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
143 const char X509_version[]="X.509";
144
145
null_callback(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX * e)146 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
147 {
148 return ok;
149 }
150
151 #if 0
152 static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b)
153 {
154 return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a,*b);
155 }
156 #endif
157 /* Return 1 is a certificate is self signed */
cert_self_signed(X509 * x)158 static int cert_self_signed(X509 *x)
159 {
160 X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
161 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS)
162 return 1;
163 else
164 return 0;
165 }
166
167 /* Given a certificate try and find an exact match in the store */
168
lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509 * x)169 static X509 *lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
170 {
171 STACK_OF(X509) *certs;
172 X509 *xtmp = NULL;
173 size_t i;
174 /* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */
175 certs = ctx->lookup_certs(ctx, X509_get_subject_name(x));
176 if (certs == NULL)
177 return NULL;
178 /* Look for exact match */
179 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++)
180 {
181 xtmp = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
182 if (!X509_cmp(xtmp, x))
183 break;
184 }
185 if (i < sk_X509_num(certs))
186 X509_up_ref(xtmp);
187 else
188 xtmp = NULL;
189 sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free);
190 return xtmp;
191 }
192
X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)193 int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
194 {
195 X509 *x,*xtmp,*chain_ss=NULL;
196 int bad_chain = 0;
197 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;
198 int depth,i,ok=0;
199 int num;
200 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
201 STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp=NULL;
202 if (ctx->cert == NULL)
203 {
204 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_verify_cert, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
205 return -1;
206 }
207
208 cb=ctx->verify_cb;
209
210 /* first we make sure the chain we are going to build is
211 * present and that the first entry is in place */
212 if (ctx->chain == NULL)
213 {
214 if ( ((ctx->chain=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
215 (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,ctx->cert)))
216 {
217 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_verify_cert, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
218 goto end;
219 }
220 X509_up_ref(ctx->cert);
221 ctx->last_untrusted=1;
222 }
223
224 /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */
225 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL
226 && (sktmp=sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL)
227 {
228 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_verify_cert, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
229 goto end;
230 }
231
232 num=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
233 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
234 depth=param->depth;
235
236
237 for (;;)
238 {
239 /* If we have enough, we break */
240 if (depth < num) break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take
241 * note of it and, if appropriate, use the
242 * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error
243 * code later.
244 */
245
246 /* If we are self signed, we break */
247 if (cert_self_signed(x))
248 break;
249 /* If asked see if we can find issuer in trusted store first */
250 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST)
251 {
252 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
253 if (ok < 0)
254 return ok;
255 /* If successful for now free up cert so it
256 * will be picked up again later.
257 */
258 if (ok > 0)
259 {
260 X509_free(xtmp);
261 break;
262 }
263 }
264
265 /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
266 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL)
267 {
268 xtmp=find_issuer(ctx, sktmp,x);
269 if (xtmp != NULL)
270 {
271 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,xtmp))
272 {
273 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_verify_cert, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
274 goto end;
275 }
276 CRYPTO_refcount_inc(&xtmp->references);
277 (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp,xtmp);
278 ctx->last_untrusted++;
279 x=xtmp;
280 num++;
281 /* reparse the full chain for
282 * the next one */
283 continue;
284 }
285 }
286 break;
287 }
288
289 /* at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted
290 * certificates. We now need to add at least one trusted one,
291 * if possible, otherwise we complain. */
292
293 /* Examine last certificate in chain and see if it
294 * is self signed.
295 */
296
297 i=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
298 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,i-1);
299 if (cert_self_signed(x))
300 {
301 /* we have a self signed certificate */
302 if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
303 {
304 /* We have a single self signed certificate: see if
305 * we can find it in the store. We must have an exact
306 * match to avoid possible impersonation.
307 */
308 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
309 if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp))
310 {
311 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
312 ctx->current_cert=x;
313 ctx->error_depth=i-1;
314 if (ok == 1) X509_free(xtmp);
315 bad_chain = 1;
316 ok=cb(0,ctx);
317 if (!ok) goto end;
318 }
319 else
320 {
321 /* We have a match: replace certificate with store version
322 * so we get any trust settings.
323 */
324 X509_free(x);
325 x = xtmp;
326 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
327 ctx->last_untrusted=0;
328 }
329 }
330 else
331 {
332 /* extract and save self signed certificate for later use */
333 chain_ss=sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
334 ctx->last_untrusted--;
335 num--;
336 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
337 }
338 }
339
340 /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
341 for (;;)
342 {
343 /* If we have enough, we break */
344 if (depth < num) break;
345
346 /* If we are self signed, we break */
347 if (cert_self_signed(x))
348 break;
349
350 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
351
352 if (ok < 0) return ok;
353 if (ok == 0) break;
354
355 x = xtmp;
356 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,x))
357 {
358 X509_free(xtmp);
359 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_verify_cert, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
360 return 0;
361 }
362 num++;
363 }
364
365 /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
366
367 i = check_trust(ctx);
368
369 /* If explicitly rejected error */
370 if (i == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
371 goto end;
372 /* If not explicitly trusted then indicate error unless it's
373 * a single self signed certificate in which case we've indicated
374 * an error already and set bad_chain == 1
375 */
376 if (i != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED && !bad_chain)
377 {
378 if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss))
379 {
380 if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num)
381 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
382 else
383 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;
384 ctx->current_cert=x;
385 }
386 else
387 {
388
389 sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,chain_ss);
390 num++;
391 ctx->last_untrusted=num;
392 ctx->current_cert=chain_ss;
393 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN;
394 chain_ss=NULL;
395 }
396
397 ctx->error_depth=num-1;
398 bad_chain = 1;
399 ok=cb(0,ctx);
400 if (!ok) goto end;
401 }
402
403 /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
404 ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx);
405
406 if (!ok) goto end;
407
408 /* Check name constraints */
409
410 ok = check_name_constraints(ctx);
411
412 if (!ok) goto end;
413
414 ok = check_id(ctx);
415
416 if (!ok) goto end;
417
418 /* Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters
419 * because they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
420 */
421
422 ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx);
423 if(!ok) goto end;
424
425 i = X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx->error_depth, NULL, ctx->chain,
426 ctx->param->flags);
427 if (i != X509_V_OK)
428 {
429 ctx->error = i;
430 ctx->current_cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, ctx->error_depth);
431 ok = cb(0, ctx);
432 if (!ok)
433 goto end;
434 }
435
436 /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */
437 if (ctx->verify != NULL)
438 ok=ctx->verify(ctx);
439 else
440 ok=internal_verify(ctx);
441 if(!ok) goto end;
442
443 /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
444 if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK))
445 ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
446
447 end:
448 if (sktmp != NULL) sk_X509_free(sktmp);
449 if (chain_ss != NULL) X509_free(chain_ss);
450 return ok;
451 }
452
453
454 /* Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
455 */
456
find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,STACK_OF (X509)* sk,X509 * x)457 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
458 {
459 size_t i;
460 X509 *issuer;
461 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
462 {
463 issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
464 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer))
465 return issuer;
466 }
467 return NULL;
468 }
469
470 /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
471
check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509 * x,X509 * issuer)472 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
473 {
474 int ret;
475 ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
476 if (ret == X509_V_OK)
477 return 1;
478 /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
479 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK))
480 return 0;
481
482 ctx->error = ret;
483 ctx->current_cert = x;
484 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
485 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
486 }
487
488 /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
489
get_issuer_sk(X509 ** issuer,X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509 * x)490 static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
491 {
492 *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
493 if (*issuer)
494 {
495 X509_up_ref(*issuer);
496 return 1;
497 }
498 else
499 return 0;
500 }
501
502
503 /* Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency
504 * with the supplied purpose
505 */
506
check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)507 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
508 {
509 int i, ok=0, must_be_ca, plen = 0;
510 X509 *x;
511 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
512 int proxy_path_length = 0;
513 int purpose;
514 int allow_proxy_certs;
515 cb=ctx->verify_cb;
516
517 /* must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
518 -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
519 use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
520 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not
521 used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
522 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for
523 all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
524 */
525 must_be_ca = -1;
526
527 /* CRL path validation */
528 if (ctx->parent)
529 {
530 allow_proxy_certs = 0;
531 purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN;
532 }
533 else
534 {
535 allow_proxy_certs =
536 !!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
537 /* A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their
538 software happy */
539 if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS"))
540 allow_proxy_certs = 1;
541 purpose = ctx->param->purpose;
542 }
543
544 /* Check all untrusted certificates */
545 for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++)
546 {
547 int ret;
548 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
549 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
550 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
551 {
552 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;
553 ctx->error_depth = i;
554 ctx->current_cert = x;
555 ok=cb(0,ctx);
556 if (!ok) goto end;
557 }
558 if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY))
559 {
560 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED;
561 ctx->error_depth = i;
562 ctx->current_cert = x;
563 ok=cb(0,ctx);
564 if (!ok) goto end;
565 }
566 ret = X509_check_ca(x);
567 switch(must_be_ca)
568 {
569 case -1:
570 if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
571 && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0))
572 {
573 ret = 0;
574 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
575 }
576 else
577 ret = 1;
578 break;
579 case 0:
580 if (ret != 0)
581 {
582 ret = 0;
583 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
584 }
585 else
586 ret = 1;
587 break;
588 default:
589 if ((ret == 0)
590 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
591 && (ret != 1)))
592 {
593 ret = 0;
594 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
595 }
596 else
597 ret = 1;
598 break;
599 }
600 if (ret == 0)
601 {
602 ctx->error_depth = i;
603 ctx->current_cert = x;
604 ok=cb(0,ctx);
605 if (!ok) goto end;
606 }
607 if (ctx->param->purpose > 0)
608 {
609 ret = X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0);
610 if ((ret == 0)
611 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
612 && (ret != 1)))
613 {
614 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
615 ctx->error_depth = i;
616 ctx->current_cert = x;
617 ok=cb(0,ctx);
618 if (!ok) goto end;
619 }
620 }
621 /* Check pathlen if not self issued */
622 if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)
623 && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
624 && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1)))
625 {
626 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
627 ctx->error_depth = i;
628 ctx->current_cert = x;
629 ok=cb(0,ctx);
630 if (!ok) goto end;
631 }
632 /* Increment path length if not self issued */
633 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
634 plen++;
635 /* If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next
636 certificate must be another proxy certificate or a EE
637 certificate. If not, the next certificate must be a
638 CA certificate. */
639 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)
640 {
641 if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen)
642 {
643 ctx->error =
644 X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
645 ctx->error_depth = i;
646 ctx->current_cert = x;
647 ok=cb(0,ctx);
648 if (!ok) goto end;
649 }
650 proxy_path_length++;
651 must_be_ca = 0;
652 }
653 else
654 must_be_ca = 1;
655 }
656 ok = 1;
657 end:
658 return ok;
659 }
660
check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)661 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
662 {
663 X509 *x;
664 int i, j, rv;
665 /* Check name constraints for all certificates */
666 for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--)
667 {
668 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
669 /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */
670 if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
671 continue;
672 /* Check against constraints for all certificates higher in
673 * chain including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly
674 * speaking needed but if it includes constraints it is to be
675 * assumed it expects them to be obeyed.
676 */
677 for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--)
678 {
679 NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc;
680 if (nc)
681 {
682 rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc);
683 if (rv != X509_V_OK)
684 {
685 ctx->error = rv;
686 ctx->error_depth = i;
687 ctx->current_cert = x;
688 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0,ctx))
689 return 0;
690 }
691 }
692 }
693 }
694 return 1;
695 }
696
check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,int errcode)697 static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int errcode)
698 {
699 ctx->error = errcode;
700 ctx->current_cert = ctx->cert;
701 ctx->error_depth = 0;
702 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
703 }
704
check_hosts(X509 * x,X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID * id)705 static int check_hosts(X509 *x, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID *id)
706 {
707 size_t i;
708 size_t n = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(id->hosts);
709 char *name;
710
711 for (i = 0; i < n; ++i)
712 {
713 name = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(id->hosts, i);
714 if (X509_check_host(x, name, strlen(name), id->hostflags,
715 &id->peername) > 0)
716 return 1;
717 }
718 return n == 0;
719 }
720
check_id(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)721 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
722 {
723 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ctx->param;
724 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID *id = vpm->id;
725 X509 *x = ctx->cert;
726 if (id->hosts && check_hosts(x, id) <= 0)
727 {
728 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH))
729 return 0;
730 }
731 if (id->email && X509_check_email(x, id->email, id->emaillen, 0) <= 0)
732 {
733 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH))
734 return 0;
735 }
736 if (id->ip && X509_check_ip(x, id->ip, id->iplen, 0) <= 0)
737 {
738 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH))
739 return 0;
740 }
741 return 1;
742 }
743
check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)744 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
745 {
746 size_t i;
747 int ok;
748 X509 *x = NULL;
749 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
750 cb=ctx->verify_cb;
751 /* Check all trusted certificates in chain */
752 for (i = ctx->last_untrusted; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++)
753 {
754 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
755 ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
756 /* If explicitly trusted return trusted */
757 if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
758 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
759 /* If explicitly rejected notify callback and reject if
760 * not overridden.
761 */
762 if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
763 {
764 ctx->error_depth = i;
765 ctx->current_cert = x;
766 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
767 ok = cb(0, ctx);
768 if (!ok)
769 return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
770 }
771 }
772 /* If we accept partial chains and have at least one trusted
773 * certificate return success.
774 */
775 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN)
776 {
777 X509 *mx;
778 if (ctx->last_untrusted < (int) sk_X509_num(ctx->chain))
779 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
780 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, 0);
781 mx = lookup_cert_match(ctx, x);
782 if (mx)
783 {
784 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, 0, mx);
785 X509_free(x);
786 ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
787 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
788 }
789 }
790
791 /* If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and
792 * allow standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated.
793 */
794 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
795 }
796
check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)797 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
798 {
799 int i, last, ok;
800 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
801 return 1;
802 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
803 last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
804 else
805 {
806 /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */
807 if (ctx->parent)
808 return 1;
809 last = 0;
810 }
811 for(i = 0; i <= last; i++)
812 {
813 ctx->error_depth = i;
814 ok = check_cert(ctx);
815 if (!ok) return ok;
816 }
817 return 1;
818 }
819
check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)820 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
821 OPENSSL_SUPPRESS_POTENTIALLY_UNINITIALIZED_WARNINGS
822 {
823 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
824 X509 *x;
825 int ok, cnum;
826 unsigned int last_reasons;
827 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
828 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
829 ctx->current_cert = x;
830 ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
831 ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
832 ctx->current_reasons = 0;
833 while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS)
834 {
835 last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
836 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
837 if (ctx->get_crl)
838 ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
839 else
840 ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x);
841 /* If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except
842 * notify callback
843 */
844 if(!ok)
845 {
846 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
847 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
848 goto err;
849 }
850 ctx->current_crl = crl;
851 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
852 if (!ok)
853 goto err;
854
855 if (dcrl)
856 {
857 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl);
858 if (!ok)
859 goto err;
860 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x);
861 if (!ok)
862 goto err;
863 }
864 else
865 ok = 1;
866
867 /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
868 if (ok != 2)
869 {
870 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
871 if (!ok)
872 goto err;
873 }
874
875 X509_CRL_free(crl);
876 X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
877 crl = NULL;
878 dcrl = NULL;
879 /* If reasons not updated we wont get anywhere by
880 * another iteration, so exit loop.
881 */
882 if (last_reasons == ctx->current_reasons)
883 {
884 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
885 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
886 goto err;
887 }
888 }
889 err:
890 X509_CRL_free(crl);
891 X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
892
893 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
894 return ok;
895
896 }
897
898 /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
899
check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509_CRL * crl,int notify)900 static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
901 {
902 time_t *ptime;
903 int i;
904 if (notify)
905 ctx->current_crl = crl;
906 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
907 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
908 else
909 ptime = NULL;
910
911 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
912 if (i == 0)
913 {
914 if (!notify)
915 return 0;
916 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD;
917 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
918 return 0;
919 }
920
921 if (i > 0)
922 {
923 if (!notify)
924 return 0;
925 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID;
926 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
927 return 0;
928 }
929
930 if(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl))
931 {
932 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
933
934 if (i == 0)
935 {
936 if (!notify)
937 return 0;
938 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD;
939 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
940 return 0;
941 }
942 /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */
943 if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA))
944 {
945 if (!notify)
946 return 0;
947 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED;
948 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
949 return 0;
950 }
951 }
952
953 if (notify)
954 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
955
956 return 1;
957 }
958
get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509_CRL ** pcrl,X509_CRL ** pdcrl,X509 ** pissuer,int * pscore,unsigned int * preasons,STACK_OF (X509_CRL)* crls)959 static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl,
960 X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons,
961 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
962 {
963 int crl_score, best_score = *pscore;
964 size_t i;
965 unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0;
966 X509 *x = ctx->current_cert;
967 X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
968 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL;
969
970 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++)
971 {
972 crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
973 reasons = *preasons;
974 crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x);
975
976 if (crl_score > best_score)
977 {
978 best_crl = crl;
979 best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer;
980 best_score = crl_score;
981 best_reasons = reasons;
982 }
983 }
984
985 if (best_crl)
986 {
987 if (*pcrl)
988 X509_CRL_free(*pcrl);
989 *pcrl = best_crl;
990 *pissuer = best_crl_issuer;
991 *pscore = best_score;
992 *preasons = best_reasons;
993 CRYPTO_refcount_inc(&best_crl->references);
994 if (*pdcrl)
995 {
996 X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl);
997 *pdcrl = NULL;
998 }
999 get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls);
1000 }
1001
1002 if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID)
1003 return 1;
1004
1005 return 0;
1006 }
1007
1008 /* Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
1009 * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical.
1010 */
1011
crl_extension_match(X509_CRL * a,X509_CRL * b,int nid)1012 static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid)
1013 {
1014 ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb;
1015 int i;
1016 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1);
1017 if (i >= 0)
1018 {
1019 /* Can't have multiple occurrences */
1020 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1)
1021 return 0;
1022 exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i));
1023 }
1024 else
1025 exta = NULL;
1026
1027 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1);
1028
1029 if (i >= 0)
1030 {
1031
1032 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1)
1033 return 0;
1034 extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i));
1035 }
1036 else
1037 extb = NULL;
1038
1039 if (!exta && !extb)
1040 return 1;
1041
1042 if (!exta || !extb)
1043 return 0;
1044
1045
1046 if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb))
1047 return 0;
1048
1049 return 1;
1050 }
1051
1052 /* See if a base and delta are compatible */
1053
check_delta_base(X509_CRL * delta,X509_CRL * base)1054 static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base)
1055 {
1056 /* Delta CRL must be a delta */
1057 if (!delta->base_crl_number)
1058 return 0;
1059 /* Base must have a CRL number */
1060 if (!base->crl_number)
1061 return 0;
1062 /* Issuer names must match */
1063 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base),
1064 X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta)))
1065 return 0;
1066 /* AKID and IDP must match */
1067 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier))
1068 return 0;
1069 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point))
1070 return 0;
1071 /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */
1072 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
1073 return 0;
1074 /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
1075 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
1076 return 1;
1077 return 0;
1078 }
1079
1080 /* For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring
1081 * or retrieve a chain of deltas...
1082 */
1083
get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509_CRL ** dcrl,int * pscore,X509_CRL * base,STACK_OF (X509_CRL)* crls)1084 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore,
1085 X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
1086 {
1087 X509_CRL *delta;
1088 size_t i;
1089 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS))
1090 return;
1091 if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST))
1092 return;
1093 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++)
1094 {
1095 delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
1096 if (check_delta_base(delta, base))
1097 {
1098 if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0))
1099 *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA;
1100 CRYPTO_refcount_inc(&delta->references);
1101 *dcrl = delta;
1102 return;
1103 }
1104 }
1105 *dcrl = NULL;
1106 }
1107
1108 /* For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate 'x'.
1109 * The return value is a mask of several criteria.
1110 * If the issuer is not the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer.
1111 * The reasons mask is also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if
1112 * no new reasons the CRL is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
1113 */
1114
get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509 ** pissuer,unsigned int * preasons,X509_CRL * crl,X509 * x)1115 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
1116 unsigned int *preasons,
1117 X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1118 {
1119
1120 int crl_score = 0;
1121 unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons;
1122
1123 /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
1124
1125 /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
1126 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
1127 return 0;
1128 /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
1129 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
1130 {
1131 if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS))
1132 return 0;
1133 }
1134 else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS)
1135 {
1136 /* If no new reasons reject */
1137 if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1138 return 0;
1139 }
1140 /* Don't process deltas at this stage */
1141 else if (crl->base_crl_number)
1142 return 0;
1143 /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
1144 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl)))
1145 {
1146 if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT))
1147 return 0;
1148 }
1149 else
1150 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME;
1151
1152 if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
1153 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL;
1154
1155 /* Check expiry */
1156 if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
1157 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME;
1158
1159 /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */
1160 crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score);
1161
1162 /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
1163
1164 if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID))
1165 return 0;
1166
1167 /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
1168
1169 if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons))
1170 {
1171 /* If no new reasons reject */
1172 if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1173 return 0;
1174 tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons;
1175 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
1176 }
1177
1178 *preasons = tmp_reasons;
1179
1180 return crl_score;
1181
1182 }
1183
crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509_CRL * crl,X509 ** pissuer,int * pcrl_score)1184 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
1185 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score)
1186 {
1187 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL;
1188 X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1189 int cidx = ctx->error_depth;
1190 size_t i;
1191
1192 if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1)
1193 cidx++;
1194
1195 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1196
1197 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
1198 {
1199 if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME)
1200 {
1201 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID|CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT;
1202 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1203 return;
1204 }
1205 }
1206
1207 for (cidx++; cidx < (int) sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++)
1208 {
1209 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1210 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1211 continue;
1212 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
1213 {
1214 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID|CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH;
1215 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1216 return;
1217 }
1218 }
1219
1220 /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
1221
1222 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
1223 return;
1224
1225 /* Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the
1226 * set of untrusted certificates.
1227 */
1228 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++)
1229 {
1230 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i);
1231 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1232 continue;
1233 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
1234 {
1235 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1236 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
1237 return;
1238 }
1239 }
1240 }
1241
1242 /* Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new
1243 * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the
1244 * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking
1245 * will be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in
1246 * practice.
1247 */
1248
check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509 * x)1249 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1250 {
1251 X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx;
1252 int ret;
1253 /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
1254 if (ctx->parent)
1255 return 0;
1256 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted))
1257 return -1;
1258
1259 crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls;
1260 /* Copy verify params across */
1261 X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param);
1262
1263 crl_ctx.parent = ctx;
1264 crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb;
1265
1266 /* Verify CRL issuer */
1267 ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx);
1268
1269 if (ret <= 0)
1270 goto err;
1271
1272 /* Check chain is acceptable */
1273
1274 ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain);
1275 err:
1276 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx);
1277 return ret;
1278 }
1279
1280 /* RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path
1281 * and certificate path, which could lead to situations where a
1282 * certificate could be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised
1283 * to do so. RFC5280 is more strict and states that the two paths must
1284 * end in the same trust anchor, though some discussions remain...
1285 * until this is resolved we use the RFC5280 version
1286 */
1287
check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,STACK_OF (X509)* cert_path,STACK_OF (X509)* crl_path)1288 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1289 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
1290 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path)
1291 {
1292 X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta;
1293 cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1);
1294 crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1);
1295 if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta))
1296 return 1;
1297 return 0;
1298 }
1299
1300 /* Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases.
1301 * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types.
1302 * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES.
1303 * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES.
1304 * 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
1305 */
1306
1307
idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME * a,DIST_POINT_NAME * b)1308 static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b)
1309 {
1310 X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
1311 GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
1312 GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb;
1313 size_t i, j;
1314 if (!a || !b)
1315 return 1;
1316 if (a->type == 1)
1317 {
1318 if (!a->dpname)
1319 return 0;
1320 /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
1321 if (b->type == 1)
1322 {
1323 if (!b->dpname)
1324 return 0;
1325 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname))
1326 return 1;
1327 else
1328 return 0;
1329 }
1330 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1331 nm = a->dpname;
1332 gens = b->name.fullname;
1333 }
1334 else if (b->type == 1)
1335 {
1336 if (!b->dpname)
1337 return 0;
1338 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1339 gens = a->name.fullname;
1340 nm = b->dpname;
1341 }
1342
1343 /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
1344 if (nm)
1345 {
1346 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++)
1347 {
1348 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
1349 if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1350 continue;
1351 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName))
1352 return 1;
1353 }
1354 return 0;
1355 }
1356
1357 /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */
1358
1359 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++)
1360 {
1361 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i);
1362 for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++)
1363 {
1364 genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j);
1365 if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb))
1366 return 1;
1367 }
1368 }
1369
1370 return 0;
1371
1372 }
1373
crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT * dp,X509_CRL * crl,int crl_score)1374 static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score)
1375 {
1376 size_t i;
1377 X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1378 /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
1379 if (!dp->CRLissuer)
1380 return !!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME);
1381 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++)
1382 {
1383 GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
1384 if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1385 continue;
1386 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm))
1387 return 1;
1388 }
1389 return 0;
1390 }
1391
1392 /* Check CRLDP and IDP */
1393
crl_crldp_check(X509 * x,X509_CRL * crl,int crl_score,unsigned int * preasons)1394 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
1395 unsigned int *preasons)
1396 {
1397 size_t i;
1398 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR)
1399 return 0;
1400 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA)
1401 {
1402 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER)
1403 return 0;
1404 }
1405 else
1406 {
1407 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA)
1408 return 0;
1409 }
1410 *preasons = crl->idp_reasons;
1411 for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++)
1412 {
1413 DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i);
1414 if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score))
1415 {
1416 if (!crl->idp ||
1417 idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint))
1418 {
1419 *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons;
1420 return 1;
1421 }
1422 }
1423 }
1424 if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint) && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME))
1425 return 1;
1426 return 0;
1427 }
1428
1429 /* Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate.
1430 * If deltas enabled try to find a delta CRL too
1431 */
1432
get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509_CRL ** pcrl,X509_CRL ** pdcrl,X509 * x)1433 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1434 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x)
1435 {
1436 int ok;
1437 X509 *issuer = NULL;
1438 int crl_score = 0;
1439 unsigned int reasons;
1440 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
1441 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl;
1442 X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
1443 reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
1444 ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl,
1445 &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls);
1446
1447 if (ok)
1448 goto done;
1449
1450 /* Lookup CRLs from store */
1451
1452 skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm);
1453
1454 /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
1455 if (!skcrl && crl)
1456 goto done;
1457
1458 get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl);
1459
1460 sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free);
1461
1462 done:
1463
1464 /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
1465 if (crl)
1466 {
1467 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
1468 ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score;
1469 ctx->current_reasons = reasons;
1470 *pcrl = crl;
1471 *pdcrl = dcrl;
1472 return 1;
1473 }
1474
1475 return 0;
1476 }
1477
1478 /* Check CRL validity */
check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509_CRL * crl)1479 static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
1480 {
1481 X509 *issuer = NULL;
1482 EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
1483 int ok = 0, chnum, cnum;
1484 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
1485 chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
1486 /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
1487 if (ctx->current_issuer)
1488 issuer = ctx->current_issuer;
1489
1490 /* Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer
1491 * is next certificate in chain.
1492 */
1493 else if (cnum < chnum)
1494 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
1495 else
1496 {
1497 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
1498 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
1499 if(!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer))
1500 {
1501 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER;
1502 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1503 if(!ok) goto err;
1504 }
1505 }
1506
1507 if(issuer)
1508 {
1509 /* Skip most tests for deltas because they have already
1510 * been done
1511 */
1512 if (!crl->base_crl_number)
1513 {
1514 /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
1515 if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
1516 !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN))
1517 {
1518 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN;
1519 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1520 if(!ok) goto err;
1521 }
1522
1523 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE))
1524 {
1525 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE;
1526 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1527 if(!ok) goto err;
1528 }
1529
1530 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH))
1531 {
1532 if (check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0)
1533 {
1534 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR;
1535 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1536 if(!ok) goto err;
1537 }
1538 }
1539
1540 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
1541 {
1542 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
1543 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1544 if(!ok) goto err;
1545 }
1546
1547
1548 }
1549
1550 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME))
1551 {
1552 ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1);
1553 if (!ok)
1554 goto err;
1555 }
1556
1557 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
1558 ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer);
1559
1560 if(!ikey)
1561 {
1562 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1563 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1564 if (!ok) goto err;
1565 }
1566 else
1567 {
1568 int rv;
1569 rv = X509_CRL_check_suiteb(crl, ikey, ctx->param->flags);
1570 if (rv != X509_V_OK)
1571 {
1572 ctx->error=rv;
1573 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1574 if (!ok)
1575 goto err;
1576 }
1577 /* Verify CRL signature */
1578 if(X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0)
1579 {
1580 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1581 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1582 if (!ok) goto err;
1583 }
1584 }
1585 }
1586
1587 ok = 1;
1588
1589 err:
1590 EVP_PKEY_free(ikey);
1591 return ok;
1592 }
1593
1594 /* Check certificate against CRL */
cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509_CRL * crl,X509 * x)1595 static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1596 {
1597 int ok;
1598 X509_REVOKED *rev;
1599 /* The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained
1600 * unhandled critical extensions it could still be used to indicate
1601 * a certificate was revoked. This has since been changed since
1602 * critical extension can change the meaning of CRL entries.
1603 */
1604 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
1605 && (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
1606 {
1607 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
1608 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1609 if(!ok)
1610 return 0;
1611 }
1612 /* Look for serial number of certificate in CRL
1613 * If found make sure reason is not removeFromCRL.
1614 */
1615 if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x))
1616 {
1617 if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL)
1618 return 2;
1619 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
1620 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1621 if (!ok)
1622 return 0;
1623 }
1624
1625 return 1;
1626 }
1627
check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)1628 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1629 {
1630 int ret;
1631 if (ctx->parent)
1632 return 1;
1633 ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain,
1634 ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
1635 if (ret == 0)
1636 {
1637 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, check_policy, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1638 return 0;
1639 }
1640 /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
1641 if (ret == -1)
1642 {
1643 /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify
1644 * callback.
1645 */
1646 X509 *x;
1647 size_t i;
1648 for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++)
1649 {
1650 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
1651 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
1652 continue;
1653 ctx->current_cert = x;
1654 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION;
1655 if(!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1656 return 0;
1657 }
1658 return 1;
1659 }
1660 if (ret == -2)
1661 {
1662 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1663 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
1664 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1665 }
1666
1667 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY)
1668 {
1669 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1670 ctx->error = X509_V_OK;
1671 if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx))
1672 return 0;
1673 }
1674
1675 return 1;
1676 }
1677
check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509 * x)1678 static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1679 {
1680 time_t *ptime;
1681 int i;
1682
1683 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
1684 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
1685 else
1686 ptime = NULL;
1687
1688 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime);
1689 if (i == 0)
1690 {
1691 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
1692 ctx->current_cert=x;
1693 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1694 return 0;
1695 }
1696
1697 if (i > 0)
1698 {
1699 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;
1700 ctx->current_cert=x;
1701 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1702 return 0;
1703 }
1704
1705 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime);
1706 if (i == 0)
1707 {
1708 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
1709 ctx->current_cert=x;
1710 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1711 return 0;
1712 }
1713
1714 if (i < 0)
1715 {
1716 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED;
1717 ctx->current_cert=x;
1718 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1719 return 0;
1720 }
1721
1722 return 1;
1723 }
1724
internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)1725 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1726 {
1727 int ok=0,n;
1728 X509 *xs,*xi;
1729 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
1730 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
1731
1732 cb=ctx->verify_cb;
1733
1734 n=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
1735 ctx->error_depth=n-1;
1736 n--;
1737 xi=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1738
1739 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
1740 xs=xi;
1741 else
1742 {
1743 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN)
1744 {
1745 xs = xi;
1746 goto check_cert;
1747 }
1748 if (n <= 0)
1749 {
1750 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
1751 ctx->current_cert=xi;
1752 ok=cb(0,ctx);
1753 goto end;
1754 }
1755 else
1756 {
1757 n--;
1758 ctx->error_depth=n;
1759 xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1760 }
1761 }
1762
1763 /* ctx->error=0; not needed */
1764 while (n >= 0)
1765 {
1766 ctx->error_depth=n;
1767
1768 /* Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless
1769 * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and
1770 * just wastes time.
1771 */
1772 if (!xs->valid && (xs != xi || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE)))
1773 {
1774 if ((pkey=X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL)
1775 {
1776 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1777 ctx->current_cert=xi;
1778 ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
1779 if (!ok) goto end;
1780 }
1781 else if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0)
1782 {
1783 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1784 ctx->current_cert=xs;
1785 ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
1786 if (!ok)
1787 {
1788 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1789 goto end;
1790 }
1791 }
1792 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1793 pkey=NULL;
1794 }
1795
1796 xs->valid = 1;
1797
1798 check_cert:
1799 ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs);
1800 if (!ok)
1801 goto end;
1802
1803 /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
1804 ctx->current_issuer=xi;
1805 ctx->current_cert=xs;
1806 ok=(*cb)(1,ctx);
1807 if (!ok) goto end;
1808
1809 n--;
1810 if (n >= 0)
1811 {
1812 xi=xs;
1813 xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1814 }
1815 }
1816 ok=1;
1817 end:
1818 return ok;
1819 }
1820
X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME * ctm)1821 int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm)
1822 {
1823 return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
1824 }
1825
X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME * ctm,time_t * cmp_time)1826 int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
1827 {
1828 char *str;
1829 ASN1_TIME atm;
1830 long offset;
1831 char buff1[24],buff2[24],*p;
1832 int i,j;
1833
1834 p=buff1;
1835 i=ctm->length;
1836 str=(char *)ctm->data;
1837 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1838 {
1839 if ((i < 11) || (i > 17)) return 0;
1840 memcpy(p,str,10);
1841 p+=10;
1842 str+=10;
1843 }
1844 else
1845 {
1846 if (i < 13) return 0;
1847 memcpy(p,str,12);
1848 p+=12;
1849 str+=12;
1850 }
1851
1852 if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+'))
1853 { *(p++)='0'; *(p++)='0'; }
1854 else
1855 {
1856 *(p++)= *(str++);
1857 *(p++)= *(str++);
1858 /* Skip any fractional seconds... */
1859 if (*str == '.')
1860 {
1861 str++;
1862 while ((*str >= '0') && (*str <= '9')) str++;
1863 }
1864
1865 }
1866 *(p++)='Z';
1867 *(p++)='\0';
1868
1869 if (*str == 'Z')
1870 offset=0;
1871 else
1872 {
1873 if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-'))
1874 return 0;
1875 offset=((str[1]-'0')*10+(str[2]-'0'))*60;
1876 offset+=(str[3]-'0')*10+(str[4]-'0');
1877 if (*str == '-')
1878 offset= -offset;
1879 }
1880 atm.type=ctm->type;
1881 atm.flags = 0;
1882 atm.length=sizeof(buff2);
1883 atm.data=(unsigned char *)buff2;
1884
1885 if (X509_time_adj(&atm, offset*60, cmp_time) == NULL)
1886 return 0;
1887
1888 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1889 {
1890 i=(buff1[0]-'0')*10+(buff1[1]-'0');
1891 if (i < 50) i+=100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */
1892 j=(buff2[0]-'0')*10+(buff2[1]-'0');
1893 if (j < 50) j+=100;
1894
1895 if (i < j) return -1;
1896 if (i > j) return 1;
1897 }
1898 i=strcmp(buff1,buff2);
1899 if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
1900 return -1;
1901 else
1902 return i;
1903 }
1904
X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME * s,long adj)1905 ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
1906 {
1907 return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL);
1908 }
1909
X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME * s,long offset_sec,time_t * in_tm)1910 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1911 {
1912 return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm);
1913 }
1914
X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME * s,int offset_day,long offset_sec,time_t * in_tm)1915 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s,
1916 int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1917 {
1918 time_t t = 0;
1919
1920 if (in_tm) t = *in_tm;
1921 else time(&t);
1922
1923 if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING))
1924 {
1925 if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1926 return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s,t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1927 if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)
1928 return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day,
1929 offset_sec);
1930 }
1931 return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1932 }
1933
1934 /* Make a delta CRL as the diff between two full CRLs */
1935
X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL * base,X509_CRL * newer,EVP_PKEY * skey,const EVP_MD * md,unsigned int flags)1936 X509_CRL *X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL *base, X509_CRL *newer,
1937 EVP_PKEY *skey, const EVP_MD *md, unsigned int flags)
1938 {
1939 X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
1940 int i;
1941 size_t j;
1942 STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *revs = NULL;
1943 /* CRLs can't be delta already */
1944 if (base->base_crl_number || newer->base_crl_number)
1945 {
1946 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_CRL_diff, X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA);
1947 return NULL;
1948 }
1949 /* Base and new CRL must have a CRL number */
1950 if (!base->crl_number || !newer->crl_number)
1951 {
1952 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_CRL_diff, X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER);
1953 return NULL;
1954 }
1955 /* Issuer names must match */
1956 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base),
1957 X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer)))
1958 {
1959 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_CRL_diff, X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH);
1960 return NULL;
1961 }
1962 /* AKID and IDP must match */
1963 if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_authority_key_identifier))
1964 {
1965 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_CRL_diff, X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH);
1966 return NULL;
1967 }
1968 if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_issuing_distribution_point))
1969 {
1970 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_CRL_diff, X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH);
1971 return NULL;
1972 }
1973 /* Newer CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
1974 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(newer->crl_number, base->crl_number) <= 0)
1975 {
1976 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_CRL_diff, X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER);
1977 return NULL;
1978 }
1979 /* CRLs must verify */
1980 if (skey && (X509_CRL_verify(base, skey) <= 0 ||
1981 X509_CRL_verify(newer, skey) <= 0))
1982 {
1983 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_CRL_diff, X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE);
1984 return NULL;
1985 }
1986 /* Create new CRL */
1987 crl = X509_CRL_new();
1988 if (!crl || !X509_CRL_set_version(crl, 1))
1989 goto memerr;
1990 /* Set issuer name */
1991 if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl, X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer)))
1992 goto memerr;
1993
1994 if (!X509_CRL_set_lastUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(newer)))
1995 goto memerr;
1996 if (!X509_CRL_set_nextUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(newer)))
1997 goto memerr;
1998
1999 /* Set base CRL number: must be critical */
2000
2001 if (!X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl, NID_delta_crl, base->crl_number, 1, 0))
2002 goto memerr;
2003
2004 /* Copy extensions across from newest CRL to delta: this will set
2005 * CRL number to correct value too.
2006 */
2007
2008 for (i = 0; i < X509_CRL_get_ext_count(newer); i++)
2009 {
2010 X509_EXTENSION *ext;
2011 ext = X509_CRL_get_ext(newer, i);
2012 if (!X509_CRL_add_ext(crl, ext, -1))
2013 goto memerr;
2014 }
2015
2016 /* Go through revoked entries, copying as needed */
2017
2018 revs = X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(newer);
2019
2020 for (j = 0; j < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revs); j++)
2021 {
2022 X509_REVOKED *rvn, *rvtmp;
2023 rvn = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revs, j);
2024 /* Add only if not also in base.
2025 * TODO: need something cleverer here for some more complex
2026 * CRLs covering multiple CAs.
2027 */
2028 if (!X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(base, &rvtmp, rvn->serialNumber))
2029 {
2030 rvtmp = X509_REVOKED_dup(rvn);
2031 if (!rvtmp)
2032 goto memerr;
2033 if (!X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl, rvtmp))
2034 {
2035 X509_REVOKED_free(rvtmp);
2036 goto memerr;
2037 }
2038 }
2039 }
2040 /* TODO: optionally prune deleted entries */
2041
2042 if (skey && md && !X509_CRL_sign(crl, skey, md))
2043 goto memerr;
2044
2045 return crl;
2046
2047 memerr:
2048 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_CRL_diff, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2049 if (crl)
2050 X509_CRL_free(crl);
2051 return NULL;
2052 }
2053
X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl,void * argp,CRYPTO_EX_new * new_func,CRYPTO_EX_dup * dup_func,CRYPTO_EX_free * free_func)2054 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
2055 CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
2056 {
2057 /* This function is (usually) called only once, by
2058 * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c). */
2059 int index;
2060 if (!CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(&g_ex_data_class, &index, argl, argp,
2061 new_func, dup_func, free_func))
2062 {
2063 return -1;
2064 }
2065 return index;
2066 }
2067
X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,int idx,void * data)2068 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
2069 {
2070 return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx,data);
2071 }
2072
X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,int idx)2073 void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
2074 {
2075 return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx);
2076 }
2077
X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)2078 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2079 {
2080 return ctx->error;
2081 }
2082
X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,int err)2083 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
2084 {
2085 ctx->error=err;
2086 }
2087
X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)2088 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2089 {
2090 return ctx->error_depth;
2091 }
2092
X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)2093 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2094 {
2095 return ctx->current_cert;
2096 }
2097
STACK_OF(X509)2098 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2099 {
2100 return ctx->chain;
2101 }
2102
STACK_OF(X509)2103 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2104 {
2105 if (!ctx->chain)
2106 return NULL;
2107 return X509_chain_up_ref(ctx->chain);
2108 }
2109
X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)2110 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2111 {
2112 return ctx->current_issuer;
2113 }
2114
X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)2115 X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2116 {
2117 return ctx->current_crl;
2118 }
2119
X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)2120 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2121 {
2122 return ctx->parent;
2123 }
2124
X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509 * x)2125 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
2126 {
2127 ctx->cert=x;
2128 }
2129
X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,STACK_OF (X509)* sk)2130 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2131 {
2132 ctx->untrusted=sk;
2133 }
2134
X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,STACK_OF (X509_CRL)* sk)2135 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk)
2136 {
2137 ctx->crls=sk;
2138 }
2139
X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,int purpose)2140 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
2141 {
2142 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
2143 }
2144
X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,int trust)2145 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)
2146 {
2147 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
2148 }
2149
2150 /* This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust
2151 * values. This is intended to be used when another structure has its
2152 * own trust and purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by
2153 * the ctx. If they aren't set then we will usually have a default
2154 * purpose in mind which should then be used to set the trust value.
2155 * An example of this is SSL use: an SSL structure will have its own
2156 * purpose and trust settings which the application can set: if they
2157 * aren't set then we use the default of SSL client/server.
2158 */
2159
X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,int def_purpose,int purpose,int trust)2160 int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
2161 int purpose, int trust)
2162 {
2163 int idx;
2164 /* If purpose not set use default */
2165 if (!purpose) purpose = def_purpose;
2166 /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
2167 if (purpose)
2168 {
2169 X509_PURPOSE *ptmp;
2170 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
2171 if (idx == -1)
2172 {
2173 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit, X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
2174 return 0;
2175 }
2176 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2177 if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT)
2178 {
2179 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
2180 if (idx == -1)
2181 {
2182 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit, X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
2183 return 0;
2184 }
2185 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2186 }
2187 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
2188 if (!trust) trust = ptmp->trust;
2189 }
2190 if (trust)
2191 {
2192 idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
2193 if (idx == -1)
2194 {
2195 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit, X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
2196 return 0;
2197 }
2198 }
2199
2200 if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose) ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
2201 if (trust && !ctx->param->trust) ctx->param->trust = trust;
2202 return 1;
2203 }
2204
X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)2205 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
2206 {
2207 X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
2208 ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
2209 if (!ctx)
2210 {
2211 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_STORE_CTX_new, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2212 return NULL;
2213 }
2214 memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
2215 return ctx;
2216 }
2217
X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)2218 void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2219 {
2220 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
2221 OPENSSL_free(ctx);
2222 }
2223
X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509_STORE * store,X509 * x509,STACK_OF (X509)* chain)2224 int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
2225 STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2226 {
2227 int ret = 1;
2228 int ex_data_allocated = 0;
2229
2230 memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
2231 ctx->ctx=store;
2232 ctx->cert=x509;
2233 ctx->untrusted=chain;
2234
2235 if(!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, ctx,
2236 &ctx->ex_data))
2237 {
2238 goto err;
2239 }
2240 ex_data_allocated = 1;
2241
2242 ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
2243 if (!ctx->param)
2244 goto err;
2245
2246 /* Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set
2247 * use defaults. */
2248
2249 if (store)
2250 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param);
2251 else
2252 ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT|X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE;
2253
2254 if (store)
2255 {
2256 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2257 ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
2258 }
2259 else
2260 ctx->cleanup = 0;
2261
2262 if (ret)
2263 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
2264 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
2265
2266 if (ret == 0)
2267 goto err;
2268
2269 if (store && store->check_issued)
2270 ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
2271 else
2272 ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
2273
2274 if (store && store->get_issuer)
2275 ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
2276 else
2277 ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
2278
2279 if (store && store->verify_cb)
2280 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2281 else
2282 ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
2283
2284 if (store && store->verify)
2285 ctx->verify = store->verify;
2286 else
2287 ctx->verify = internal_verify;
2288
2289 if (store && store->check_revocation)
2290 ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
2291 else
2292 ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
2293
2294 if (store && store->get_crl)
2295 ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
2296 else
2297 ctx->get_crl = NULL;
2298
2299 if (store && store->check_crl)
2300 ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
2301 else
2302 ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
2303
2304 if (store && store->cert_crl)
2305 ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
2306 else
2307 ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
2308
2309 if (store && store->lookup_certs)
2310 ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs;
2311 else
2312 ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs;
2313
2314 if (store && store->lookup_crls)
2315 ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls;
2316 else
2317 ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls;
2318
2319 ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
2320
2321 return 1;
2322
2323 err:
2324 if (ex_data_allocated)
2325 {
2326 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, ctx, &ctx->ex_data);
2327 }
2328 if (ctx->param != NULL)
2329 {
2330 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2331 }
2332
2333 memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
2334 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_STORE_CTX_init, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2335 return 0;
2336 }
2337
2338 /* Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates.
2339 * This avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
2340 */
2341
X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,STACK_OF (X509)* sk)2342 void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2343 {
2344 ctx->other_ctx = sk;
2345 ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
2346 }
2347
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)2348 void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2349 {
2350 if (ctx->cleanup) ctx->cleanup(ctx);
2351 if (ctx->param != NULL)
2352 {
2353 if (ctx->parent == NULL)
2354 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2355 ctx->param=NULL;
2356 }
2357 if (ctx->tree != NULL)
2358 {
2359 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
2360 ctx->tree=NULL;
2361 }
2362 if (ctx->chain != NULL)
2363 {
2364 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain,X509_free);
2365 ctx->chain=NULL;
2366 }
2367 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
2368 memset(&ctx->ex_data,0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA));
2369 }
2370
X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,int depth)2371 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
2372 {
2373 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
2374 }
2375
X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,unsigned long flags)2376 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
2377 {
2378 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
2379 }
2380
X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,unsigned long flags,time_t t)2381 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags, time_t t)
2382 {
2383 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t);
2384 }
2385
X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,int (* verify_cb)(int,X509_STORE_CTX *))2386 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
2387 int (*verify_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
2388 {
2389 ctx->verify_cb=verify_cb;
2390 }
2391
X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)2392 X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2393 {
2394 return ctx->tree;
2395 }
2396
X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)2397 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2398 {
2399 return ctx->explicit_policy;
2400 }
2401
X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,const char * name)2402 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
2403 {
2404 const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
2405 param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
2406 if (!param)
2407 return 0;
2408 return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
2409 }
2410
X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)2411 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2412 {
2413 return ctx->param;
2414 }
2415
X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509_VERIFY_PARAM * param)2416 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
2417 {
2418 if (ctx->param)
2419 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2420 ctx->param = param;
2421 }
2422
2423 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509)
2424 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
2425