1 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
2 * All rights reserved.
3 *
4 * This package is an SSL implementation written
5 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
6 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
7 *
8 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
9 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
10 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
11 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
12 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
13 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
14 *
15 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
16 * the code are not to be removed.
17 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
18 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
19 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
20 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
21 *
22 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
23 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
24 * are met:
25 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
26 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
27 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
28 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
29 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
30 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
31 * must display the following acknowledgement:
32 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
33 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
34 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
35 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
36 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
37 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
38 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
39 *
40 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
41 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
42 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
43 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
44 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
45 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
46 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
47 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
48 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
49 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
50 * SUCH DAMAGE.
51 *
52 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
53 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
54 * copied and put under another distribution licence
55 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */
56
57 #include <string.h>
58 #include <time.h>
59
60 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
61 #include <openssl/buf.h>
62 #include <openssl/err.h>
63 #include <openssl/evp.h>
64 #include <openssl/lhash.h>
65 #include <openssl/mem.h>
66 #include <openssl/obj.h>
67 #include <openssl/thread.h>
68 #include <openssl/x509.h>
69 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
70
71 #include "vpm_int.h"
72 #include "../internal.h"
73
74 static CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS g_ex_data_class =
75 CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS_INIT_WITH_APP_DATA;
76
77 /* CRL score values */
78
79 /* No unhandled critical extensions */
80
81 #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100
82
83 /* certificate is within CRL scope */
84
85 #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080
86
87 /* CRL times valid */
88
89 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040
90
91 /* Issuer name matches certificate */
92
93 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020
94
95 /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */
96
97 #define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
98
99 /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
100
101 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018
102
103 /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
104
105 #define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008
106
107 /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
108
109 #define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004
110
111 /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */
112
113 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002
114
115 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e);
116 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
117 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
118 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
119 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
120 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
121 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
122 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
123 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
124 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
125
126 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
127 unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x);
128 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
129 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x);
130 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl,
131 int *pcrl_score, X509_CRL *base,
132 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls);
133 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 **pissuer,
134 int *pcrl_score);
135 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
136 unsigned int *preasons);
137 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
138 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
139 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
140 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path);
141
142 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
143
null_callback(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX * e)144 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
145 {
146 return ok;
147 }
148
149 /* Return 1 is a certificate is self signed */
cert_self_signed(X509 * x)150 static int cert_self_signed(X509 *x)
151 {
152 X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
153 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS)
154 return 1;
155 else
156 return 0;
157 }
158
159 /* Given a certificate try and find an exact match in the store */
160
lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509 * x)161 static X509 *lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
162 {
163 STACK_OF(X509) *certs;
164 X509 *xtmp = NULL;
165 size_t i;
166 /* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */
167 certs = ctx->lookup_certs(ctx, X509_get_subject_name(x));
168 if (certs == NULL)
169 return NULL;
170 /* Look for exact match */
171 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) {
172 xtmp = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
173 if (!X509_cmp(xtmp, x))
174 break;
175 }
176 if (i < sk_X509_num(certs))
177 X509_up_ref(xtmp);
178 else
179 xtmp = NULL;
180 sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free);
181 return xtmp;
182 }
183
X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)184 int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
185 {
186 X509 *x, *xtmp, *xtmp2, *chain_ss = NULL;
187 int bad_chain = 0;
188 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;
189 int depth, i, ok = 0;
190 int num, j, retry, trust;
191 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
192 STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp = NULL;
193 if (ctx->cert == NULL) {
194 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
195 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
196 return -1;
197 }
198 if (ctx->chain != NULL) {
199 /*
200 * This X509_STORE_CTX has already been used to verify a cert. We
201 * cannot do another one.
202 */
203 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
204 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
205 return -1;
206 }
207
208 cb = ctx->verify_cb;
209
210 /*
211 * first we make sure the chain we are going to build is present and that
212 * the first entry is in place
213 */
214 ctx->chain = sk_X509_new_null();
215 if (ctx->chain == NULL || !sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, ctx->cert)) {
216 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
217 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
218 goto end;
219 }
220 X509_up_ref(ctx->cert);
221 ctx->last_untrusted = 1;
222
223 /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it.
224 * sktmp = ctx->untrusted ++ ctx->ctx->additional_untrusted */
225 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL
226 && (sktmp = sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) {
227 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
228 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
229 goto end;
230 }
231
232 if (ctx->ctx->additional_untrusted != NULL) {
233 if (sktmp == NULL) {
234 sktmp = sk_X509_new_null();
235 if (sktmp == NULL) {
236 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
237 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
238 goto end;
239 }
240 }
241
242 for (size_t k = 0; k < sk_X509_num(ctx->ctx->additional_untrusted);
243 k++) {
244 if (!sk_X509_push(sktmp,
245 sk_X509_value(ctx->ctx->additional_untrusted,
246 k))) {
247 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
248 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
249 goto end;
250 }
251 }
252 }
253
254 num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
255 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
256 depth = param->depth;
257
258 for (;;) {
259 /* If we have enough, we break */
260 if (depth < num)
261 break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take
262 * note of it and, if appropriate, use the
263 * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error code
264 * later. */
265
266 /* If we are self signed, we break */
267 if (cert_self_signed(x))
268 break;
269 /*
270 * If asked see if we can find issuer in trusted store first
271 */
272 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST) {
273 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
274 if (ok < 0) {
275 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP;
276 goto end;
277 }
278 /*
279 * If successful for now free up cert so it will be picked up
280 * again later.
281 */
282 if (ok > 0) {
283 X509_free(xtmp);
284 break;
285 }
286 }
287
288 /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
289 if (sktmp != NULL) {
290 xtmp = find_issuer(ctx, sktmp, x);
291 if (xtmp != NULL) {
292 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, xtmp)) {
293 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
294 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
295 ok = 0;
296 goto end;
297 }
298 X509_up_ref(xtmp);
299 (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp, xtmp);
300 ctx->last_untrusted++;
301 x = xtmp;
302 num++;
303 /*
304 * reparse the full chain for the next one
305 */
306 continue;
307 }
308 }
309 break;
310 }
311
312 /* Remember how many untrusted certs we have */
313 j = num;
314 /*
315 * at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted certificates.
316 * We now need to add at least one trusted one, if possible, otherwise we
317 * complain.
318 */
319
320 do {
321 /*
322 * Examine last certificate in chain and see if it is self signed.
323 */
324 i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
325 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i - 1);
326 if (cert_self_signed(x)) {
327 /* we have a self signed certificate */
328 if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1) {
329 /*
330 * We have a single self signed certificate: see if we can
331 * find it in the store. We must have an exact match to avoid
332 * possible impersonation.
333 */
334 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
335 if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp)) {
336 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
337 ctx->current_cert = x;
338 ctx->error_depth = i - 1;
339 if (ok == 1)
340 X509_free(xtmp);
341 bad_chain = 1;
342 ok = cb(0, ctx);
343 if (!ok)
344 goto end;
345 } else {
346 /*
347 * We have a match: replace certificate with store
348 * version so we get any trust settings.
349 */
350 X509_free(x);
351 x = xtmp;
352 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
353 ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
354 }
355 } else {
356 /*
357 * extract and save self signed certificate for later use
358 */
359 chain_ss = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
360 ctx->last_untrusted--;
361 num--;
362 j--;
363 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
364 }
365 }
366 /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
367 for (;;) {
368 /* If we have enough, we break */
369 if (depth < num)
370 break;
371 /* If we are self signed, we break */
372 if (cert_self_signed(x))
373 break;
374 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
375
376 if (ok < 0) {
377 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP;
378 goto end;
379 }
380 if (ok == 0)
381 break;
382 x = xtmp;
383 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, x)) {
384 X509_free(xtmp);
385 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
386 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
387 ok = 0;
388 goto end;
389 }
390 num++;
391 }
392
393 /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
394 trust = check_trust(ctx);
395
396 /* If explicitly rejected error */
397 if (trust == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) {
398 ok = 0;
399 goto end;
400 }
401 /*
402 * If it's not explicitly trusted then check if there is an alternative
403 * chain that could be used. We only do this if we haven't already
404 * checked via TRUSTED_FIRST and the user hasn't switched off alternate
405 * chain checking
406 */
407 retry = 0;
408 if (trust != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
409 && !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST)
410 && !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS)) {
411 while (j-- > 1) {
412 xtmp2 = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j - 1);
413 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, xtmp2);
414 if (ok < 0)
415 goto end;
416 /* Check if we found an alternate chain */
417 if (ok > 0) {
418 /*
419 * Free up the found cert we'll add it again later
420 */
421 X509_free(xtmp);
422
423 /*
424 * Dump all the certs above this point - we've found an
425 * alternate chain
426 */
427 while (num > j) {
428 xtmp = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
429 X509_free(xtmp);
430 num--;
431 }
432 ctx->last_untrusted = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
433 retry = 1;
434 break;
435 }
436 }
437 }
438 } while (retry);
439
440 /*
441 * If not explicitly trusted then indicate error unless it's a single
442 * self signed certificate in which case we've indicated an error already
443 * and set bad_chain == 1
444 */
445 if (trust != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED && !bad_chain) {
446 if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss)) {
447 if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num)
448 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
449 else
450 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;
451 ctx->current_cert = x;
452 } else {
453
454 sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, chain_ss);
455 num++;
456 ctx->last_untrusted = num;
457 ctx->current_cert = chain_ss;
458 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN;
459 chain_ss = NULL;
460 }
461
462 ctx->error_depth = num - 1;
463 bad_chain = 1;
464 ok = cb(0, ctx);
465 if (!ok)
466 goto end;
467 }
468
469 /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
470 ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx);
471
472 if (!ok)
473 goto end;
474
475 /* Check name constraints */
476
477 ok = check_name_constraints(ctx);
478
479 if (!ok)
480 goto end;
481
482 ok = check_id(ctx);
483
484 if (!ok)
485 goto end;
486
487 /*
488 * Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters because
489 * they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
490 */
491
492 ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx);
493 if (!ok)
494 goto end;
495
496 int err = X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx->error_depth, NULL, ctx->chain,
497 ctx->param->flags);
498 if (err != X509_V_OK) {
499 ctx->error = err;
500 ctx->current_cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, ctx->error_depth);
501 ok = cb(0, ctx);
502 if (!ok)
503 goto end;
504 }
505
506 /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */
507 if (ctx->verify != NULL)
508 ok = ctx->verify(ctx);
509 else
510 ok = internal_verify(ctx);
511 if (!ok)
512 goto end;
513
514 /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
515 if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK))
516 ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
517
518 end:
519 if (sktmp != NULL)
520 sk_X509_free(sktmp);
521 if (chain_ss != NULL)
522 X509_free(chain_ss);
523
524 /* Safety net, error returns must set ctx->error */
525 if (ok <= 0 && ctx->error == X509_V_OK)
526 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
527 return ok;
528 }
529
530 /*
531 * Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
532 */
533
find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,STACK_OF (X509)* sk,X509 * x)534 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
535 {
536 size_t i;
537 X509 *issuer;
538 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
539 issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
540 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer))
541 return issuer;
542 }
543 return NULL;
544 }
545
546 /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
547
check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509 * x,X509 * issuer)548 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
549 {
550 int ret;
551 ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
552 if (ret == X509_V_OK)
553 return 1;
554 /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
555 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK))
556 return 0;
557
558 ctx->error = ret;
559 ctx->current_cert = x;
560 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
561 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
562 }
563
564 /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
565
get_issuer_sk(X509 ** issuer,X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509 * x)566 static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
567 {
568 *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
569 if (*issuer) {
570 X509_up_ref(*issuer);
571 return 1;
572 } else
573 return 0;
574 }
575
576 /*
577 * Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency with the supplied
578 * purpose
579 */
580
check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)581 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
582 {
583 int i, ok = 0, must_be_ca, plen = 0;
584 X509 *x;
585 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
586 int proxy_path_length = 0;
587 int purpose;
588 int allow_proxy_certs;
589 cb = ctx->verify_cb;
590
591 /*
592 * must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values: -1: we accept both CA and non-CA
593 * certificates, to allow direct use of self-signed certificates (which
594 * are marked as CA). 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is
595 * currently not used, but the possibility is present for future
596 * extensions. 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used
597 * for all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
598 */
599 must_be_ca = -1;
600
601 /* CRL path validation */
602 if (ctx->parent) {
603 allow_proxy_certs = 0;
604 purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN;
605 } else {
606 allow_proxy_certs =
607 ! !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
608 purpose = ctx->param->purpose;
609 }
610
611 /* Check all untrusted certificates */
612 for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++) {
613 int ret;
614 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
615 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
616 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) {
617 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;
618 ctx->error_depth = i;
619 ctx->current_cert = x;
620 ok = cb(0, ctx);
621 if (!ok)
622 goto end;
623 }
624 if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)) {
625 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED;
626 ctx->error_depth = i;
627 ctx->current_cert = x;
628 ok = cb(0, ctx);
629 if (!ok)
630 goto end;
631 }
632 ret = X509_check_ca(x);
633 switch (must_be_ca) {
634 case -1:
635 if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
636 && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0)) {
637 ret = 0;
638 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
639 } else
640 ret = 1;
641 break;
642 case 0:
643 if (ret != 0) {
644 ret = 0;
645 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
646 } else
647 ret = 1;
648 break;
649 default:
650 if ((ret == 0)
651 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
652 && (ret != 1))) {
653 ret = 0;
654 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
655 } else
656 ret = 1;
657 break;
658 }
659 if (ret == 0) {
660 ctx->error_depth = i;
661 ctx->current_cert = x;
662 ok = cb(0, ctx);
663 if (!ok)
664 goto end;
665 }
666 if (ctx->param->purpose > 0) {
667 ret = X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0);
668 if ((ret == 0)
669 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
670 && (ret != 1))) {
671 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
672 ctx->error_depth = i;
673 ctx->current_cert = x;
674 ok = cb(0, ctx);
675 if (!ok)
676 goto end;
677 }
678 }
679 /* Check pathlen if not self issued */
680 if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)
681 && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
682 && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1))) {
683 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
684 ctx->error_depth = i;
685 ctx->current_cert = x;
686 ok = cb(0, ctx);
687 if (!ok)
688 goto end;
689 }
690 /* Increment path length if not self issued */
691 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
692 plen++;
693 /*
694 * If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next certificate
695 * must be another proxy certificate or a EE certificate. If not,
696 * the next certificate must be a CA certificate.
697 */
698 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) {
699 if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen) {
700 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
701 ctx->error_depth = i;
702 ctx->current_cert = x;
703 ok = cb(0, ctx);
704 if (!ok)
705 goto end;
706 }
707 proxy_path_length++;
708 must_be_ca = 0;
709 } else
710 must_be_ca = 1;
711 }
712 ok = 1;
713 end:
714 return ok;
715 }
716
check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)717 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
718 {
719 X509 *x;
720 int i, j, rv;
721 /* Check name constraints for all certificates */
722 for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
723 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
724 /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */
725 if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
726 continue;
727 /*
728 * Check against constraints for all certificates higher in chain
729 * including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly speaking needed
730 * but if it includes constraints it is to be assumed it expects them
731 * to be obeyed.
732 */
733 for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--) {
734 NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc;
735 if (nc) {
736 rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc);
737 switch (rv) {
738 case X509_V_OK:
739 continue;
740 case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM:
741 ctx->error = rv;
742 return 0;
743 default:
744 ctx->error = rv;
745 ctx->error_depth = i;
746 ctx->current_cert = x;
747 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
748 return 0;
749 break;
750 }
751 }
752 }
753 }
754 return 1;
755 }
756
check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,int errcode)757 static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int errcode)
758 {
759 ctx->error = errcode;
760 ctx->current_cert = ctx->cert;
761 ctx->error_depth = 0;
762 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
763 }
764
check_hosts(X509 * x,X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID * id)765 static int check_hosts(X509 *x, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID *id)
766 {
767 size_t i;
768 size_t n = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(id->hosts);
769 char *name;
770
771 if (id->peername != NULL) {
772 OPENSSL_free(id->peername);
773 id->peername = NULL;
774 }
775 for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
776 name = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(id->hosts, i);
777 if (X509_check_host(x, name, strlen(name), id->hostflags,
778 &id->peername) > 0)
779 return 1;
780 }
781 return n == 0;
782 }
783
check_id(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)784 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
785 {
786 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ctx->param;
787 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID *id = vpm->id;
788 X509 *x = ctx->cert;
789 if (id->hosts && check_hosts(x, id) <= 0) {
790 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH))
791 return 0;
792 }
793 if (id->email && X509_check_email(x, id->email, id->emaillen, 0) <= 0) {
794 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH))
795 return 0;
796 }
797 if (id->ip && X509_check_ip(x, id->ip, id->iplen, 0) <= 0) {
798 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH))
799 return 0;
800 }
801 return 1;
802 }
803
check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)804 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
805 {
806 size_t i;
807 int ok;
808 X509 *x = NULL;
809 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
810 cb = ctx->verify_cb;
811 /* Check all trusted certificates in chain */
812 for (i = ctx->last_untrusted; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
813 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
814 ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
815 /* If explicitly trusted return trusted */
816 if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
817 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
818 /*
819 * If explicitly rejected notify callback and reject if not
820 * overridden.
821 */
822 if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) {
823 ctx->error_depth = i;
824 ctx->current_cert = x;
825 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
826 ok = cb(0, ctx);
827 if (!ok)
828 return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
829 }
830 }
831 /*
832 * If we accept partial chains and have at least one trusted certificate
833 * return success.
834 */
835 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) {
836 X509 *mx;
837 if (ctx->last_untrusted < (int)sk_X509_num(ctx->chain))
838 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
839 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, 0);
840 mx = lookup_cert_match(ctx, x);
841 if (mx) {
842 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, 0, mx);
843 X509_free(x);
844 ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
845 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
846 }
847 }
848
849 /*
850 * If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and allow
851 * standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated.
852 */
853 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
854 }
855
check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)856 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
857 {
858 int i, last, ok;
859 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
860 return 1;
861 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
862 last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
863 else {
864 /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */
865 if (ctx->parent)
866 return 1;
867 last = 0;
868 }
869 for (i = 0; i <= last; i++) {
870 ctx->error_depth = i;
871 ok = check_cert(ctx);
872 if (!ok)
873 return ok;
874 }
875 return 1;
876 }
877
check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)878 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
879 {
880 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
881 X509 *x;
882 int ok = 0, cnum;
883 unsigned int last_reasons;
884 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
885 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
886 ctx->current_cert = x;
887 ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
888 ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
889 ctx->current_reasons = 0;
890 while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS) {
891 last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
892 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
893 if (ctx->get_crl)
894 ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
895 else
896 ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x);
897 /*
898 * If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except notify callback
899 */
900 if (!ok) {
901 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
902 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
903 goto err;
904 }
905 ctx->current_crl = crl;
906 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
907 if (!ok)
908 goto err;
909
910 if (dcrl) {
911 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl);
912 if (!ok)
913 goto err;
914 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x);
915 if (!ok)
916 goto err;
917 } else
918 ok = 1;
919
920 /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
921 if (ok != 2) {
922 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
923 if (!ok)
924 goto err;
925 }
926
927 X509_CRL_free(crl);
928 X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
929 crl = NULL;
930 dcrl = NULL;
931 /*
932 * If reasons not updated we wont get anywhere by another iteration,
933 * so exit loop.
934 */
935 if (last_reasons == ctx->current_reasons) {
936 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
937 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
938 goto err;
939 }
940 }
941 err:
942 X509_CRL_free(crl);
943 X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
944
945 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
946 return ok;
947
948 }
949
950 /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
951
check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509_CRL * crl,int notify)952 static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
953 {
954 time_t *ptime;
955 int i;
956 if (notify)
957 ctx->current_crl = crl;
958 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
959 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
960 else
961 ptime = NULL;
962
963 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
964 if (i == 0) {
965 if (!notify)
966 return 0;
967 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD;
968 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
969 return 0;
970 }
971
972 if (i > 0) {
973 if (!notify)
974 return 0;
975 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID;
976 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
977 return 0;
978 }
979
980 if (X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl)) {
981 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
982
983 if (i == 0) {
984 if (!notify)
985 return 0;
986 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD;
987 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
988 return 0;
989 }
990 /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */
991 if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA)) {
992 if (!notify)
993 return 0;
994 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED;
995 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
996 return 0;
997 }
998 }
999
1000 if (notify)
1001 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
1002
1003 return 1;
1004 }
1005
get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509_CRL ** pcrl,X509_CRL ** pdcrl,X509 ** pissuer,int * pscore,unsigned int * preasons,STACK_OF (X509_CRL)* crls)1006 static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl,
1007 X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons,
1008 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
1009 {
1010 int crl_score, best_score = *pscore;
1011 size_t i;
1012 unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0;
1013 X509 *x = ctx->current_cert;
1014 X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
1015 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL;
1016
1017 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
1018 crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
1019 reasons = *preasons;
1020 crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x);
1021 if (crl_score < best_score || crl_score == 0)
1022 continue;
1023 /* If current CRL is equivalent use it if it is newer */
1024 if (crl_score == best_score && best_crl != NULL) {
1025 int day, sec;
1026 if (ASN1_TIME_diff(&day, &sec, X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(best_crl),
1027 X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl)) == 0)
1028 continue;
1029 /*
1030 * ASN1_TIME_diff never returns inconsistent signs for |day|
1031 * and |sec|.
1032 */
1033 if (day <= 0 && sec <= 0)
1034 continue;
1035 }
1036 best_crl = crl;
1037 best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer;
1038 best_score = crl_score;
1039 best_reasons = reasons;
1040 }
1041
1042 if (best_crl) {
1043 if (*pcrl)
1044 X509_CRL_free(*pcrl);
1045 *pcrl = best_crl;
1046 *pissuer = best_crl_issuer;
1047 *pscore = best_score;
1048 *preasons = best_reasons;
1049 X509_CRL_up_ref(best_crl);
1050 if (*pdcrl) {
1051 X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl);
1052 *pdcrl = NULL;
1053 }
1054 get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls);
1055 }
1056
1057 if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID)
1058 return 1;
1059
1060 return 0;
1061 }
1062
1063 /*
1064 * Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
1065 * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical.
1066 */
1067
crl_extension_match(X509_CRL * a,X509_CRL * b,int nid)1068 static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid)
1069 {
1070 ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb;
1071 int i;
1072 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1);
1073 if (i >= 0) {
1074 /* Can't have multiple occurrences */
1075 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1)
1076 return 0;
1077 exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i));
1078 } else
1079 exta = NULL;
1080
1081 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1);
1082
1083 if (i >= 0) {
1084
1085 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1)
1086 return 0;
1087 extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i));
1088 } else
1089 extb = NULL;
1090
1091 if (!exta && !extb)
1092 return 1;
1093
1094 if (!exta || !extb)
1095 return 0;
1096
1097 if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb))
1098 return 0;
1099
1100 return 1;
1101 }
1102
1103 /* See if a base and delta are compatible */
1104
check_delta_base(X509_CRL * delta,X509_CRL * base)1105 static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base)
1106 {
1107 /* Delta CRL must be a delta */
1108 if (!delta->base_crl_number)
1109 return 0;
1110 /* Base must have a CRL number */
1111 if (!base->crl_number)
1112 return 0;
1113 /* Issuer names must match */
1114 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta)))
1115 return 0;
1116 /* AKID and IDP must match */
1117 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier))
1118 return 0;
1119 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point))
1120 return 0;
1121 /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */
1122 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
1123 return 0;
1124 /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
1125 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
1126 return 1;
1127 return 0;
1128 }
1129
1130 /*
1131 * For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring or
1132 * retrieve a chain of deltas...
1133 */
1134
get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509_CRL ** dcrl,int * pscore,X509_CRL * base,STACK_OF (X509_CRL)* crls)1135 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore,
1136 X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
1137 {
1138 X509_CRL *delta;
1139 size_t i;
1140 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS))
1141 return;
1142 if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST))
1143 return;
1144 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
1145 delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
1146 if (check_delta_base(delta, base)) {
1147 if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0))
1148 *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA;
1149 X509_CRL_up_ref(delta);
1150 *dcrl = delta;
1151 return;
1152 }
1153 }
1154 *dcrl = NULL;
1155 }
1156
1157 /*
1158 * For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate
1159 * 'x'. The return value is a mask of several criteria. If the issuer is not
1160 * the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer. The reasons mask is
1161 * also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if no new reasons the CRL
1162 * is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
1163 */
1164
get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509 ** pissuer,unsigned int * preasons,X509_CRL * crl,X509 * x)1165 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
1166 unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1167 {
1168
1169 int crl_score = 0;
1170 unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons;
1171
1172 /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
1173
1174 /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
1175 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
1176 return 0;
1177 /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
1178 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) {
1179 if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS))
1180 return 0;
1181 } else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS) {
1182 /* If no new reasons reject */
1183 if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1184 return 0;
1185 }
1186 /* Don't process deltas at this stage */
1187 else if (crl->base_crl_number)
1188 return 0;
1189 /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
1190 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))) {
1191 if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT))
1192 return 0;
1193 } else
1194 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME;
1195
1196 if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
1197 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL;
1198
1199 /* Check expiry */
1200 if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
1201 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME;
1202
1203 /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */
1204 crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score);
1205
1206 /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
1207
1208 if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID))
1209 return 0;
1210
1211 /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
1212
1213 if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons)) {
1214 /* If no new reasons reject */
1215 if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1216 return 0;
1217 tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons;
1218 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
1219 }
1220
1221 *preasons = tmp_reasons;
1222
1223 return crl_score;
1224
1225 }
1226
crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509_CRL * crl,X509 ** pissuer,int * pcrl_score)1227 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
1228 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score)
1229 {
1230 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL;
1231 X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1232 int cidx = ctx->error_depth;
1233 size_t i;
1234
1235 if ((size_t)cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1)
1236 cidx++;
1237
1238 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1239
1240 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1241 if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME) {
1242 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT;
1243 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1244 return;
1245 }
1246 }
1247
1248 for (cidx++; cidx < (int)sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++) {
1249 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1250 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1251 continue;
1252 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1253 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH;
1254 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1255 return;
1256 }
1257 }
1258
1259 /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
1260
1261 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
1262 return;
1263
1264 /*
1265 * Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the set of
1266 * untrusted certificates.
1267 */
1268 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++) {
1269 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i);
1270 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1271 continue;
1272 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1273 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1274 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
1275 return;
1276 }
1277 }
1278
1279 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->ctx->additional_untrusted); i++) {
1280 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->ctx->additional_untrusted, i);
1281 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1282 continue;
1283 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1284 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1285 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
1286 return;
1287 }
1288 }
1289 }
1290
1291 /*
1292 * Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new
1293 * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the
1294 * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking will
1295 * be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in practice.
1296 */
1297
check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509 * x)1298 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1299 {
1300 X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx;
1301 int ret;
1302 /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
1303 if (ctx->parent)
1304 return 0;
1305 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted))
1306 return -1;
1307
1308 crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls;
1309 /* Copy verify params across */
1310 X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param);
1311
1312 crl_ctx.parent = ctx;
1313 crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb;
1314
1315 /* Verify CRL issuer */
1316 ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx);
1317
1318 if (ret <= 0)
1319 goto err;
1320
1321 /* Check chain is acceptable */
1322
1323 ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain);
1324 err:
1325 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx);
1326 return ret;
1327 }
1328
1329 /*
1330 * RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path and
1331 * certificate path, which could lead to situations where a certificate could
1332 * be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised to do so. RFC5280 is more
1333 * strict and states that the two paths must end in the same trust anchor,
1334 * though some discussions remain... until this is resolved we use the
1335 * RFC5280 version
1336 */
1337
check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,STACK_OF (X509)* cert_path,STACK_OF (X509)* crl_path)1338 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1339 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
1340 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path)
1341 {
1342 X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta;
1343 cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1);
1344 crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1);
1345 if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta))
1346 return 1;
1347 return 0;
1348 }
1349
1350 /*
1351 * Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases. 1.
1352 * Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types. 2. One full, one
1353 * relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES. 3. Both are full names and
1354 * compare two GENERAL_NAMES. 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
1355 */
1356
idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME * a,DIST_POINT_NAME * b)1357 static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b)
1358 {
1359 X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
1360 GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
1361 GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb;
1362 size_t i, j;
1363 if (!a || !b)
1364 return 1;
1365 if (a->type == 1) {
1366 if (!a->dpname)
1367 return 0;
1368 /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
1369 if (b->type == 1) {
1370 if (!b->dpname)
1371 return 0;
1372 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname))
1373 return 1;
1374 else
1375 return 0;
1376 }
1377 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1378 nm = a->dpname;
1379 gens = b->name.fullname;
1380 } else if (b->type == 1) {
1381 if (!b->dpname)
1382 return 0;
1383 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1384 gens = a->name.fullname;
1385 nm = b->dpname;
1386 }
1387
1388 /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
1389 if (nm) {
1390 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) {
1391 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
1392 if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1393 continue;
1394 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName))
1395 return 1;
1396 }
1397 return 0;
1398 }
1399
1400 /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */
1401
1402 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++) {
1403 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i);
1404 for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++) {
1405 genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j);
1406 if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb))
1407 return 1;
1408 }
1409 }
1410
1411 return 0;
1412
1413 }
1414
crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT * dp,X509_CRL * crl,int crl_score)1415 static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score)
1416 {
1417 size_t i;
1418 X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1419 /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
1420 if (!dp->CRLissuer)
1421 return ! !(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME);
1422 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) {
1423 GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
1424 if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1425 continue;
1426 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm))
1427 return 1;
1428 }
1429 return 0;
1430 }
1431
1432 /* Check CRLDP and IDP */
1433
crl_crldp_check(X509 * x,X509_CRL * crl,int crl_score,unsigned int * preasons)1434 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
1435 unsigned int *preasons)
1436 {
1437 size_t i;
1438 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR)
1439 return 0;
1440 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) {
1441 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER)
1442 return 0;
1443 } else {
1444 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA)
1445 return 0;
1446 }
1447 *preasons = crl->idp_reasons;
1448 for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) {
1449 DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i);
1450 if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score)) {
1451 if (!crl->idp || idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint)) {
1452 *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons;
1453 return 1;
1454 }
1455 }
1456 }
1457 if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint)
1458 && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME))
1459 return 1;
1460 return 0;
1461 }
1462
1463 /*
1464 * Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. If deltas enabled try
1465 * to find a delta CRL too
1466 */
1467
get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509_CRL ** pcrl,X509_CRL ** pdcrl,X509 * x)1468 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1469 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x)
1470 {
1471 int ok;
1472 X509 *issuer = NULL;
1473 int crl_score = 0;
1474 unsigned int reasons;
1475 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
1476 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl;
1477 X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
1478 reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
1479 ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl,
1480 &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls);
1481
1482 if (ok)
1483 goto done;
1484
1485 /* Lookup CRLs from store */
1486
1487 skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm);
1488
1489 /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
1490 if (!skcrl && crl)
1491 goto done;
1492
1493 get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl);
1494
1495 sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free);
1496
1497 done:
1498
1499 /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
1500 if (crl) {
1501 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
1502 ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score;
1503 ctx->current_reasons = reasons;
1504 *pcrl = crl;
1505 *pdcrl = dcrl;
1506 return 1;
1507 }
1508
1509 return 0;
1510 }
1511
1512 /* Check CRL validity */
check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509_CRL * crl)1513 static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
1514 {
1515 X509 *issuer = NULL;
1516 EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
1517 int ok = 0, chnum, cnum;
1518 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
1519 chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
1520 /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
1521 if (ctx->current_issuer)
1522 issuer = ctx->current_issuer;
1523
1524 /*
1525 * Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer is next
1526 * certificate in chain.
1527 */
1528 else if (cnum < chnum)
1529 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
1530 else {
1531 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
1532 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
1533 if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer)) {
1534 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER;
1535 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1536 if (!ok)
1537 goto err;
1538 }
1539 }
1540
1541 if (issuer) {
1542 /*
1543 * Skip most tests for deltas because they have already been done
1544 */
1545 if (!crl->base_crl_number) {
1546 /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
1547 if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
1548 !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN)) {
1549 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN;
1550 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1551 if (!ok)
1552 goto err;
1553 }
1554
1555 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)) {
1556 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE;
1557 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1558 if (!ok)
1559 goto err;
1560 }
1561
1562 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH)) {
1563 if (check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0) {
1564 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR;
1565 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1566 if (!ok)
1567 goto err;
1568 }
1569 }
1570
1571 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) {
1572 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
1573 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1574 if (!ok)
1575 goto err;
1576 }
1577
1578 }
1579
1580 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME)) {
1581 ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1);
1582 if (!ok)
1583 goto err;
1584 }
1585
1586 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
1587 ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer);
1588
1589 if (!ikey) {
1590 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1591 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1592 if (!ok)
1593 goto err;
1594 } else {
1595 int rv;
1596 rv = X509_CRL_check_suiteb(crl, ikey, ctx->param->flags);
1597 if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
1598 ctx->error = rv;
1599 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1600 if (!ok)
1601 goto err;
1602 }
1603 /* Verify CRL signature */
1604 if (X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0) {
1605 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1606 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1607 if (!ok)
1608 goto err;
1609 }
1610 }
1611 }
1612
1613 ok = 1;
1614
1615 err:
1616 EVP_PKEY_free(ikey);
1617 return ok;
1618 }
1619
1620 /* Check certificate against CRL */
cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509_CRL * crl,X509 * x)1621 static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1622 {
1623 int ok;
1624 X509_REVOKED *rev;
1625 /*
1626 * The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained unhandled
1627 * critical extensions it could still be used to indicate a certificate
1628 * was revoked. This has since been changed since critical extension can
1629 * change the meaning of CRL entries.
1630 */
1631 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
1632 && (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) {
1633 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
1634 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1635 if (!ok)
1636 return 0;
1637 }
1638 /*
1639 * Look for serial number of certificate in CRL If found make sure reason
1640 * is not removeFromCRL.
1641 */
1642 if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x)) {
1643 if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL)
1644 return 2;
1645 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
1646 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1647 if (!ok)
1648 return 0;
1649 }
1650
1651 return 1;
1652 }
1653
check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)1654 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1655 {
1656 int ret;
1657 if (ctx->parent)
1658 return 1;
1659 ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain,
1660 ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
1661 if (ret == 0) {
1662 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1663 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
1664 return 0;
1665 }
1666 /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
1667 if (ret == -1) {
1668 /*
1669 * Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback.
1670 */
1671 X509 *x;
1672 size_t i;
1673 for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
1674 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
1675 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
1676 continue;
1677 ctx->current_cert = x;
1678 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION;
1679 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1680 return 0;
1681 }
1682 return 1;
1683 }
1684 if (ret == -2) {
1685 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1686 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
1687 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1688 }
1689
1690 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY) {
1691 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1692 /*
1693 * Verification errors need to be "sticky", a callback may have allowed
1694 * an SSL handshake to continue despite an error, and we must then
1695 * remain in an error state. Therefore, we MUST NOT clear earlier
1696 * verification errors by setting the error to X509_V_OK.
1697 */
1698 if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx))
1699 return 0;
1700 }
1701
1702 return 1;
1703 }
1704
check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509 * x)1705 static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1706 {
1707 time_t *ptime;
1708 int i;
1709
1710 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
1711 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
1712 else
1713 ptime = NULL;
1714
1715 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime);
1716 if (i == 0) {
1717 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
1718 ctx->current_cert = x;
1719 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1720 return 0;
1721 }
1722
1723 if (i > 0) {
1724 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;
1725 ctx->current_cert = x;
1726 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1727 return 0;
1728 }
1729
1730 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime);
1731 if (i == 0) {
1732 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
1733 ctx->current_cert = x;
1734 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1735 return 0;
1736 }
1737
1738 if (i < 0) {
1739 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED;
1740 ctx->current_cert = x;
1741 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1742 return 0;
1743 }
1744
1745 return 1;
1746 }
1747
internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)1748 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1749 {
1750 int ok = 0, n;
1751 X509 *xs, *xi;
1752 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1753 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
1754
1755 cb = ctx->verify_cb;
1756
1757 n = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
1758 ctx->error_depth = n - 1;
1759 n--;
1760 xi = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
1761
1762 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
1763 xs = xi;
1764 else {
1765 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) {
1766 xs = xi;
1767 goto check_cert;
1768 }
1769 if (n <= 0) {
1770 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
1771 ctx->current_cert = xi;
1772 ok = cb(0, ctx);
1773 goto end;
1774 } else {
1775 n--;
1776 ctx->error_depth = n;
1777 xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
1778 }
1779 }
1780
1781 /* ctx->error=0; not needed */
1782 while (n >= 0) {
1783 ctx->error_depth = n;
1784
1785 /*
1786 * Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless
1787 * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and just wastes
1788 * time.
1789 */
1790 if (xs != xi || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE)) {
1791 if ((pkey = X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) {
1792 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1793 ctx->current_cert = xi;
1794 ok = (*cb) (0, ctx);
1795 if (!ok)
1796 goto end;
1797 } else if (X509_verify(xs, pkey) <= 0) {
1798 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1799 ctx->current_cert = xs;
1800 ok = (*cb) (0, ctx);
1801 if (!ok) {
1802 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1803 goto end;
1804 }
1805 }
1806 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1807 pkey = NULL;
1808 }
1809
1810 check_cert:
1811 ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs);
1812 if (!ok)
1813 goto end;
1814
1815 /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
1816 ctx->current_issuer = xi;
1817 ctx->current_cert = xs;
1818 ok = (*cb) (1, ctx);
1819 if (!ok)
1820 goto end;
1821
1822 n--;
1823 if (n >= 0) {
1824 xi = xs;
1825 xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
1826 }
1827 }
1828 ok = 1;
1829 end:
1830 return ok;
1831 }
1832
X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME * ctm)1833 int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm)
1834 {
1835 return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
1836 }
1837
X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME * ctm,time_t * cmp_time)1838 int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
1839 {
1840 char *str;
1841 ASN1_TIME atm;
1842 long offset;
1843 char buff1[24], buff2[24], *p;
1844 int i, j, remaining;
1845
1846 p = buff1;
1847 remaining = ctm->length;
1848 str = (char *)ctm->data;
1849 /*
1850 * Note that the following (historical) code allows much more slack in
1851 * the time format than RFC5280. In RFC5280, the representation is fixed:
1852 * UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ GeneralizedTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ
1853 */
1854 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) {
1855 /* YYMMDDHHMM[SS]Z or YYMMDDHHMM[SS](+-)hhmm */
1856 int min_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1;
1857 int max_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMSS+hhmm") - 1;
1858 if (remaining < min_length || remaining > max_length)
1859 return 0;
1860 OPENSSL_memcpy(p, str, 10);
1861 p += 10;
1862 str += 10;
1863 remaining -= 10;
1864 } else {
1865 /*
1866 * YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.fff]]Z or YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.f[f[f]]]](+-)hhmm
1867 */
1868 int min_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1;
1869 int max_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMSS.fff+hhmm") - 1;
1870 if (remaining < min_length || remaining > max_length)
1871 return 0;
1872 OPENSSL_memcpy(p, str, 12);
1873 p += 12;
1874 str += 12;
1875 remaining -= 12;
1876 }
1877
1878 if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+')) {
1879 *(p++) = '0';
1880 *(p++) = '0';
1881 } else {
1882 /* SS (seconds) */
1883 if (remaining < 2)
1884 return 0;
1885 *(p++) = *(str++);
1886 *(p++) = *(str++);
1887 remaining -= 2;
1888 /*
1889 * Skip any (up to three) fractional seconds... TODO(emilia): in
1890 * RFC5280, fractional seconds are forbidden. Can we just kill them
1891 * altogether?
1892 */
1893 if (remaining && *str == '.') {
1894 str++;
1895 remaining--;
1896 for (i = 0; i < 3 && remaining; i++, str++, remaining--) {
1897 if (*str < '0' || *str > '9')
1898 break;
1899 }
1900 }
1901
1902 }
1903 *(p++) = 'Z';
1904 *(p++) = '\0';
1905
1906 /* We now need either a terminating 'Z' or an offset. */
1907 if (!remaining)
1908 return 0;
1909 if (*str == 'Z') {
1910 if (remaining != 1)
1911 return 0;
1912 offset = 0;
1913 } else {
1914 /* (+-)HHMM */
1915 if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-'))
1916 return 0;
1917 /*
1918 * Historical behaviour: the (+-)hhmm offset is forbidden in RFC5280.
1919 */
1920 if (remaining != 5)
1921 return 0;
1922 if (str[1] < '0' || str[1] > '9' || str[2] < '0' || str[2] > '9' ||
1923 str[3] < '0' || str[3] > '9' || str[4] < '0' || str[4] > '9')
1924 return 0;
1925 offset = ((str[1] - '0') * 10 + (str[2] - '0')) * 60;
1926 offset += (str[3] - '0') * 10 + (str[4] - '0');
1927 if (*str == '-')
1928 offset = -offset;
1929 }
1930 atm.type = ctm->type;
1931 atm.flags = 0;
1932 atm.length = sizeof(buff2);
1933 atm.data = (unsigned char *)buff2;
1934
1935 if (X509_time_adj(&atm, offset * 60, cmp_time) == NULL)
1936 return 0;
1937
1938 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) {
1939 i = (buff1[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff1[1] - '0');
1940 if (i < 50)
1941 i += 100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */
1942 j = (buff2[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff2[1] - '0');
1943 if (j < 50)
1944 j += 100;
1945
1946 if (i < j)
1947 return -1;
1948 if (i > j)
1949 return 1;
1950 }
1951 i = strcmp(buff1, buff2);
1952 if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
1953 return -1;
1954 else
1955 return i;
1956 }
1957
X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME * s,long adj)1958 ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
1959 {
1960 return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL);
1961 }
1962
X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME * s,long offset_sec,time_t * in_tm)1963 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1964 {
1965 return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm);
1966 }
1967
X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME * s,int offset_day,long offset_sec,time_t * in_tm)1968 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s,
1969 int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1970 {
1971 time_t t = 0;
1972
1973 if (in_tm)
1974 t = *in_tm;
1975 else
1976 time(&t);
1977
1978 if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING)) {
1979 if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1980 return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1981 if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)
1982 return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1983 }
1984 return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1985 }
1986
1987 /* Make a delta CRL as the diff between two full CRLs */
1988
X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL * base,X509_CRL * newer,EVP_PKEY * skey,const EVP_MD * md,unsigned int flags)1989 X509_CRL *X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL *base, X509_CRL *newer,
1990 EVP_PKEY *skey, const EVP_MD *md, unsigned int flags)
1991 {
1992 X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
1993 int i;
1994 size_t j;
1995 STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *revs = NULL;
1996 /* CRLs can't be delta already */
1997 if (base->base_crl_number || newer->base_crl_number) {
1998 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA);
1999 return NULL;
2000 }
2001 /* Base and new CRL must have a CRL number */
2002 if (!base->crl_number || !newer->crl_number) {
2003 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER);
2004 return NULL;
2005 }
2006 /* Issuer names must match */
2007 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer))) {
2008 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH);
2009 return NULL;
2010 }
2011 /* AKID and IDP must match */
2012 if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_authority_key_identifier)) {
2013 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH);
2014 return NULL;
2015 }
2016 if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_issuing_distribution_point)) {
2017 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH);
2018 return NULL;
2019 }
2020 /* Newer CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
2021 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(newer->crl_number, base->crl_number) <= 0) {
2022 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER);
2023 return NULL;
2024 }
2025 /* CRLs must verify */
2026 if (skey && (X509_CRL_verify(base, skey) <= 0 ||
2027 X509_CRL_verify(newer, skey) <= 0)) {
2028 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE);
2029 return NULL;
2030 }
2031 /* Create new CRL */
2032 crl = X509_CRL_new();
2033 if (!crl || !X509_CRL_set_version(crl, 1))
2034 goto memerr;
2035 /* Set issuer name */
2036 if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl, X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer)))
2037 goto memerr;
2038
2039 if (!X509_CRL_set_lastUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(newer)))
2040 goto memerr;
2041 if (!X509_CRL_set_nextUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(newer)))
2042 goto memerr;
2043
2044 /* Set base CRL number: must be critical */
2045
2046 if (!X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl, NID_delta_crl, base->crl_number, 1, 0))
2047 goto memerr;
2048
2049 /*
2050 * Copy extensions across from newest CRL to delta: this will set CRL
2051 * number to correct value too.
2052 */
2053
2054 for (i = 0; i < X509_CRL_get_ext_count(newer); i++) {
2055 X509_EXTENSION *ext;
2056 ext = X509_CRL_get_ext(newer, i);
2057 if (!X509_CRL_add_ext(crl, ext, -1))
2058 goto memerr;
2059 }
2060
2061 /* Go through revoked entries, copying as needed */
2062
2063 revs = X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(newer);
2064
2065 for (j = 0; j < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revs); j++) {
2066 X509_REVOKED *rvn, *rvtmp;
2067 rvn = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revs, j);
2068 /*
2069 * Add only if not also in base. TODO: need something cleverer here
2070 * for some more complex CRLs covering multiple CAs.
2071 */
2072 if (!X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(base, &rvtmp, rvn->serialNumber)) {
2073 rvtmp = X509_REVOKED_dup(rvn);
2074 if (!rvtmp)
2075 goto memerr;
2076 if (!X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl, rvtmp)) {
2077 X509_REVOKED_free(rvtmp);
2078 goto memerr;
2079 }
2080 }
2081 }
2082 /* TODO: optionally prune deleted entries */
2083
2084 if (skey && md && !X509_CRL_sign(crl, skey, md))
2085 goto memerr;
2086
2087 return crl;
2088
2089 memerr:
2090 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2091 if (crl)
2092 X509_CRL_free(crl);
2093 return NULL;
2094 }
2095
X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl,void * argp,CRYPTO_EX_unused * unused,CRYPTO_EX_dup * dup_unused,CRYPTO_EX_free * free_func)2096 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp,
2097 CRYPTO_EX_unused * unused,
2098 CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_unused,
2099 CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
2100 {
2101 /*
2102 * This function is (usually) called only once, by
2103 * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c).
2104 */
2105 int index;
2106 if (!CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(&g_ex_data_class, &index, argl, argp,
2107 free_func)) {
2108 return -1;
2109 }
2110 return index;
2111 }
2112
X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,int idx,void * data)2113 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
2114 {
2115 return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx, data);
2116 }
2117
X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,int idx)2118 void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
2119 {
2120 return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx);
2121 }
2122
X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)2123 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2124 {
2125 return ctx->error;
2126 }
2127
X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,int err)2128 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
2129 {
2130 ctx->error = err;
2131 }
2132
X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)2133 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2134 {
2135 return ctx->error_depth;
2136 }
2137
X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)2138 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2139 {
2140 return ctx->current_cert;
2141 }
2142
STACK_OF(X509)2143 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2144 {
2145 return ctx->chain;
2146 }
2147
STACK_OF(X509)2148 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2149 {
2150 if (!ctx->chain)
2151 return NULL;
2152 return X509_chain_up_ref(ctx->chain);
2153 }
2154
X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)2155 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2156 {
2157 return ctx->current_issuer;
2158 }
2159
X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)2160 X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2161 {
2162 return ctx->current_crl;
2163 }
2164
X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)2165 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2166 {
2167 return ctx->parent;
2168 }
2169
X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509 * x)2170 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
2171 {
2172 ctx->cert = x;
2173 }
2174
X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,STACK_OF (X509)* sk)2175 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2176 {
2177 ctx->untrusted = sk;
2178 }
2179
X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,STACK_OF (X509_CRL)* sk)2180 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk)
2181 {
2182 ctx->crls = sk;
2183 }
2184
X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,int purpose)2185 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
2186 {
2187 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
2188 }
2189
X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,int trust)2190 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)
2191 {
2192 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
2193 }
2194
2195 /*
2196 * This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust values.
2197 * This is intended to be used when another structure has its own trust and
2198 * purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by the ctx. If they aren't
2199 * set then we will usually have a default purpose in mind which should then
2200 * be used to set the trust value. An example of this is SSL use: an SSL
2201 * structure will have its own purpose and trust settings which the
2202 * application can set: if they aren't set then we use the default of SSL
2203 * client/server.
2204 */
2205
X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,int def_purpose,int purpose,int trust)2206 int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
2207 int purpose, int trust)
2208 {
2209 int idx;
2210 /* If purpose not set use default */
2211 if (!purpose)
2212 purpose = def_purpose;
2213 /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
2214 if (purpose) {
2215 X509_PURPOSE *ptmp;
2216 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
2217 if (idx == -1) {
2218 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
2219 return 0;
2220 }
2221 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2222 if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) {
2223 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
2224 if (idx == -1) {
2225 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
2226 return 0;
2227 }
2228 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2229 }
2230 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
2231 if (!trust)
2232 trust = ptmp->trust;
2233 }
2234 if (trust) {
2235 idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
2236 if (idx == -1) {
2237 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
2238 return 0;
2239 }
2240 }
2241
2242 if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose)
2243 ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
2244 if (trust && !ctx->param->trust)
2245 ctx->param->trust = trust;
2246 return 1;
2247 }
2248
X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)2249 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
2250 {
2251 X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
2252 ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
2253 if (!ctx) {
2254 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2255 return NULL;
2256 }
2257 OPENSSL_memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
2258 return ctx;
2259 }
2260
X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)2261 void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2262 {
2263 if (ctx == NULL) {
2264 return;
2265 }
2266 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
2267 OPENSSL_free(ctx);
2268 }
2269
X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509_STORE * store,X509 * x509,STACK_OF (X509)* chain)2270 int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
2271 STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2272 {
2273 int ret = 1;
2274
2275 OPENSSL_memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
2276 ctx->ctx = store;
2277 ctx->cert = x509;
2278 ctx->untrusted = chain;
2279
2280 CRYPTO_new_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data);
2281
2282 ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
2283 if (!ctx->param)
2284 goto err;
2285
2286 /*
2287 * Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set use defaults.
2288 */
2289
2290 if (store)
2291 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param);
2292 else
2293 ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT | X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE;
2294
2295 if (store) {
2296 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2297 ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
2298 } else
2299 ctx->cleanup = 0;
2300
2301 if (ret)
2302 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
2303 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
2304
2305 if (ret == 0)
2306 goto err;
2307
2308 if (store && store->check_issued)
2309 ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
2310 else
2311 ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
2312
2313 if (store && store->get_issuer)
2314 ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
2315 else
2316 ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
2317
2318 if (store && store->verify_cb)
2319 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2320 else
2321 ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
2322
2323 if (store && store->verify)
2324 ctx->verify = store->verify;
2325 else
2326 ctx->verify = internal_verify;
2327
2328 if (store && store->check_revocation)
2329 ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
2330 else
2331 ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
2332
2333 if (store && store->get_crl)
2334 ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
2335 else
2336 ctx->get_crl = NULL;
2337
2338 if (store && store->check_crl)
2339 ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
2340 else
2341 ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
2342
2343 if (store && store->cert_crl)
2344 ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
2345 else
2346 ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
2347
2348 if (store && store->lookup_certs)
2349 ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs;
2350 else
2351 ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs;
2352
2353 if (store && store->lookup_crls)
2354 ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls;
2355 else
2356 ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls;
2357
2358 ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
2359
2360 return 1;
2361
2362 err:
2363 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, ctx, &ctx->ex_data);
2364 if (ctx->param != NULL) {
2365 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2366 }
2367
2368 OPENSSL_memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
2369 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2370 return 0;
2371 }
2372
2373 /*
2374 * Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. This
2375 * avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
2376 */
2377
X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,STACK_OF (X509)* sk)2378 void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2379 {
2380 ctx->other_ctx = sk;
2381 ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
2382 }
2383
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)2384 void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2385 {
2386 /* We need to be idempotent because, unfortunately, |X509_STORE_CTX_free|
2387 * also calls this function. */
2388 if (ctx->cleanup != NULL) {
2389 ctx->cleanup(ctx);
2390 ctx->cleanup = NULL;
2391 }
2392 if (ctx->param != NULL) {
2393 if (ctx->parent == NULL)
2394 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2395 ctx->param = NULL;
2396 }
2397 if (ctx->tree != NULL) {
2398 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
2399 ctx->tree = NULL;
2400 }
2401 if (ctx->chain != NULL) {
2402 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free);
2403 ctx->chain = NULL;
2404 }
2405 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
2406 OPENSSL_memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA));
2407 }
2408
X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,int depth)2409 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
2410 {
2411 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
2412 }
2413
X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,unsigned long flags)2414 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
2415 {
2416 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
2417 }
2418
X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,unsigned long flags,time_t t)2419 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags,
2420 time_t t)
2421 {
2422 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t);
2423 }
2424
X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,int (* verify_cb)(int,X509_STORE_CTX *))2425 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
2426 int (*verify_cb) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
2427 {
2428 ctx->verify_cb = verify_cb;
2429 }
2430
X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)2431 X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2432 {
2433 return ctx->tree;
2434 }
2435
X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)2436 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2437 {
2438 return ctx->explicit_policy;
2439 }
2440
X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,const char * name)2441 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
2442 {
2443 const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
2444 param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
2445 if (!param)
2446 return 0;
2447 return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
2448 }
2449
X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)2450 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2451 {
2452 return ctx->param;
2453 }
2454
X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509_VERIFY_PARAM * param)2455 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
2456 {
2457 if (ctx->param)
2458 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2459 ctx->param = param;
2460 }
2461
2462 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509)
2463
2464 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
2465