| /system/keymaster/ |
| D | hkdf.h | 35 bool Init(Buffer& secret, Buffer& salt) { in Init() argument
36 return Init(secret.peek_read(), secret.available_read(), salt.peek_read(), in Init()
40 bool Init(const uint8_t* secret, size_t secret_len, const uint8_t* salt, size_t salt_len) { in Init() argument
41 return Kdf::Init(KM_DIGEST_SHA_2_256, secret, secret_len, salt, salt_len); in Init()
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| D | kdf.cpp | 23 bool Kdf::Init(keymaster_digest_t digest_type, const uint8_t* secret, size_t secret_len, in Init() argument
40 if (!secret || secret_len == 0) in Init()
44 secret_key_.reset(dup_buffer(secret, secret_len)); in Init()
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| D | iso18033kdf.h | 38 bool Init(keymaster_digest_t digest_type, const uint8_t* secret, size_t secret_len) { in Init() argument
39 return Kdf::Init(digest_type, secret, secret_len, nullptr /* salt */, 0 /* salt_len */); in Init()
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| D | kdf.h | 35 bool Init(keymaster_digest_t digest_type, const uint8_t* secret, size_t secret_len,
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| /system/vold/ |
| D | KeyStorage.h | 34 KeyAuthentication(std::string t, std::string s) : token{t}, secret{s} {}; in KeyAuthentication()
36 bool usesKeymaster() const { return !token.empty() || secret.empty(); }; in usesKeymaster()
39 const std::string secret; variable
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| D | Ext4Crypt.h | 32 const char* secret);
35 bool e4crypt_unlock_user_key(userid_t user_id, int serial, const char* token, const char* secret);
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| D | KeyStorage.cpp | 258 } else if (auth.secret.empty()) { in getStretching()
272 static bool stretchSecret(const std::string& stretching, const std::string& secret, in stretchSecret() argument
275 if (!secret.empty()) { in stretchSecret()
281 *stretched = secret; in stretchSecret()
291 if (crypto_scrypt(reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(secret.data()), secret.size(), in stretchSecret()
309 if (!stretchSecret(stretching, auth.secret, salt, &stretched)) return false; in generateAppId()
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| D | Ext4Crypt.cpp | 503 std::string token, secret; in e4crypt_add_user_key_auth() local
505 if (!parse_hex(secret_hex, &secret)) return false; in e4crypt_add_user_key_auth()
506 auto auth = secret.empty() ? kEmptyAuthentication in e4crypt_add_user_key_auth()
507 : android::vold::KeyAuthentication(token, secret); in e4crypt_add_user_key_auth()
546 std::string token, secret; in e4crypt_unlock_user_key() local
548 if (!parse_hex(secret_hex, &secret)) return false; in e4crypt_unlock_user_key()
549 android::vold::KeyAuthentication auth(token, secret); in e4crypt_unlock_user_key()
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| /system/netd/server/ |
| D | InterfaceController.cpp | 210 std::string secret = oldSecret; in enableStablePrivacyAddresses() local
214 ASSIGN_OR_RETURN(secret, randomIPv6Address()); in enableStablePrivacyAddresses()
218 RETURN_IF_NOT_OK(sys.write(procFd.value(), makeSlice(secret))); in enableStablePrivacyAddresses()
225 return setProperty(kStableSecretProperty, secret); in enableStablePrivacyAddresses()
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| /system/tpm/attestation/common/ |
| D | database.proto | 55 // The authorization secret.
56 optional bytes secret = 2; field
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| /system/sepolicy/public/ |
| D | netd.te | 123 # persist.netd.stable_secret contains RFC 7217 secret key which should never be
128 # the RFC 7217 secret key managed by netd. Doing so could compromise user privacy.
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| /system/tpm/attestation/server/ |
| D | attestation_service.cc | 320 database_pb.delegate().blob(), database_pb.delegate().secret(), in ActivateAttestationKeyTask()
528 database_pb.delegate().blob(), database_pb.delegate().secret(), in FinishEnroll()
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| /system/tpm/trunks/ |
| D | mock_tpm.h | 205 const TPM2B_ENCRYPTED_SECRET& secret,
214 const TPM2B_ENCRYPTED_SECRET& secret,
230 TPM2B_ENCRYPTED_SECRET* secret,
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| D | tpm_generated.h | 1499 BYTE secret[sizeof(TPMU_ENCRYPTED_SECRET)]; member
3627 const TPM2B_ENCRYPTED_SECRET& secret,
3639 const TPM2B_ENCRYPTED_SECRET& secret,
3648 const TPM2B_ENCRYPTED_SECRET& secret,
3653 const TPM2B_ENCRYPTED_SECRET& secret)>
3665 TPM2B_ENCRYPTED_SECRET* secret,
3679 TPM2B_ENCRYPTED_SECRET* secret,
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| D | tpm_generated.cc | 6695 if (arraysize(value.secret) < value.size) { in Serialize_TPM2B_ENCRYPTED_SECRET()
6699 result = Serialize_BYTE(value.secret[i], buffer); in Serialize_TPM2B_ENCRYPTED_SECRET()
6718 if (arraysize(value->secret) < value->size) { in Parse_TPM2B_ENCRYPTED_SECRET()
6722 result = Parse_BYTE(buffer, &value->secret[i], value_bytes); in Parse_TPM2B_ENCRYPTED_SECRET()
6732 CHECK(bytes.size() <= sizeof(tpm2b.secret)); in Make_TPM2B_ENCRYPTED_SECRET()
6735 memcpy(tpm2b.secret, bytes.data(), bytes.size()); in Make_TPM2B_ENCRYPTED_SECRET()
6741 const char* char_buffer = reinterpret_cast<const char*>(tpm2b.secret); in StringFrom_TPM2B_ENCRYPTED_SECRET()
10640 const TPM2B_ENCRYPTED_SECRET& secret, in SerializeCommand_ActivateCredential() argument
10673 rc = Serialize_TPM2B_ENCRYPTED_SECRET(secret, &secret_bytes); in SerializeCommand_ActivateCredential()
10858 const TPM2B_ENCRYPTED_SECRET& secret, in ActivateCredential() argument
[all …]
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| /system/tpm/trunks/generator/ |
| D | raw_commands_fixed.txt | 1520 associated with the handle and/or the session secret (TPM_RC_AUTH_FAIL or
1525 authValue will not be required but proof of knowledge of the session secret is necessary.
3497 This command allows injection of a secret into the TPM using either asymmetric or symmetric encrypt…
3498 The type of tpmKey determines how the value in encryptedSalt is encrypted. The decrypted secret val…
3505 recovery of the secret value.
3506 The TPM generates the sessionKey from the recovered secret value.
3578 produce the final secret value. The size of the secret value is an input parameter to the KDF
3847 secret size does not match decrypt key type; or the recovered secret
3888 // secret size cannot be 0
3978 // secret size must be 0
[all …]
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| D | raw_commands.txt | 1520 associated with the handle and/or the session secret (TPM_RC_AUTH_FAIL or
1525 authValue will not be required but proof of knowledge of the session secret is necessary.
3497 This command allows injection of a secret into the TPM using either asymmetric or symmetric encrypt…
3498 The type of tpmKey determines how the value in encryptedSalt is encrypted. The decrypted secret val…
3505 recovery of the secret value.
3506 The TPM generates the sessionKey from the recovered secret value.
3578 produce the final secret value. The size of the secret value is an input parameter to the KDF
3845 secret size does not match decrypt key type; or the recovered secret
3886 // secret size cannot be 0
3976 // secret size must be 0
[all …]
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| D | raw_structures.txt | 2942 ECC secret sharing using ECC from SP800-56A
10817 the data using a secret key known only to the TPM. A ticket is a way to expand the state memory of …
10835 a TPM secret value (depends on hierarchy)
10955 a TPM secret value associated with the hierarchy associated with name
11032 a TPM secret value associated with the hierarchy associated with
11109 a TPM secret value associated with the hierarchy of the key associated
11198 a TPM secret value associated with the hierarchy indicated by the
12764 This buffer holds the secret data of a data object. It can hold as much as 128 octets of data.
12823 the USER auth secret value
13261 These structures are used to define the key derivation for symmetric secret sharing using asymmetric
[all …]
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| D | raw_structures_fixed.txt | 2936 ECC secret sharing using ECC from SP800-56A
10845 the data using a secret key known only to the TPM. A ticket is a way to expand the state memory of …
10863 a TPM secret value (depends on hierarchy)
10983 a TPM secret value associated with the hierarchy associated with name
11060 a TPM secret value associated with the hierarchy associated with
11137 a TPM secret value associated with the hierarchy of the key associated
11226 a TPM secret value associated with the hierarchy indicated by the
12776 This buffer holds the secret data of a data object. It can hold as much as 128 octets of data.
12835 the USER auth secret value
13278 These structures are used to define the key derivation for symmetric secret sharing using asymmetric
[all …]
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