1 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
2 * All rights reserved.
3 *
4 * This package is an SSL implementation written
5 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
6 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
7 *
8 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
9 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
10 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
11 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
12 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
13 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
14 *
15 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
16 * the code are not to be removed.
17 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
18 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
19 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
20 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
21 *
22 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
23 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
24 * are met:
25 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
26 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
27 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
28 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
29 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
30 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
31 * must display the following acknowledgement:
32 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
33 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
34 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
35 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
36 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
37 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
38 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
39 *
40 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
41 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
42 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
43 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
44 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
45 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
46 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
47 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
48 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
49 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
50 * SUCH DAMAGE.
51 *
52 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
53 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
54 * copied and put under another distribution licence
55 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */
56
57 #include <string.h>
58 #include <time.h>
59
60 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
61 #include <openssl/buf.h>
62 #include <openssl/err.h>
63 #include <openssl/evp.h>
64 #include <openssl/mem.h>
65 #include <openssl/obj.h>
66 #include <openssl/thread.h>
67 #include <openssl/x509.h>
68 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
69
70 #include "vpm_int.h"
71 #include "../internal.h"
72
73 static CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS g_ex_data_class =
74 CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS_INIT_WITH_APP_DATA;
75
76 /* CRL score values */
77
78 /* No unhandled critical extensions */
79
80 #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100
81
82 /* certificate is within CRL scope */
83
84 #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080
85
86 /* CRL times valid */
87
88 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040
89
90 /* Issuer name matches certificate */
91
92 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020
93
94 /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */
95
96 #define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
97
98 /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
99
100 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018
101
102 /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
103
104 #define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008
105
106 /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
107
108 #define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004
109
110 /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */
111
112 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002
113
114 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e);
115 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
116 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
117 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
118 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
119 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
120 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
121 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
122 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
123 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
124
125 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
126 unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x);
127 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
128 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x);
129 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl,
130 int *pcrl_score, X509_CRL *base,
131 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls);
132 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 **pissuer,
133 int *pcrl_score);
134 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
135 unsigned int *preasons);
136 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
137 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
138 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
139 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path);
140
141 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
142
null_callback(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX * e)143 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
144 {
145 return ok;
146 }
147
148 /* Return 1 is a certificate is self signed */
cert_self_signed(X509 * x)149 static int cert_self_signed(X509 *x)
150 {
151 X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
152 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS)
153 return 1;
154 else
155 return 0;
156 }
157
158 /* Given a certificate try and find an exact match in the store */
159
lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509 * x)160 static X509 *lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
161 {
162 STACK_OF(X509) *certs;
163 X509 *xtmp = NULL;
164 size_t i;
165 /* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */
166 certs = ctx->lookup_certs(ctx, X509_get_subject_name(x));
167 if (certs == NULL)
168 return NULL;
169 /* Look for exact match */
170 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) {
171 xtmp = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
172 if (!X509_cmp(xtmp, x))
173 break;
174 }
175 if (i < sk_X509_num(certs))
176 X509_up_ref(xtmp);
177 else
178 xtmp = NULL;
179 sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free);
180 return xtmp;
181 }
182
X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)183 int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
184 {
185 X509 *x, *xtmp, *xtmp2, *chain_ss = NULL;
186 int bad_chain = 0;
187 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;
188 int depth, i, ok = 0;
189 int num, j, retry, trust;
190 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
191 STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp = NULL;
192 if (ctx->cert == NULL) {
193 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
194 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
195 return -1;
196 }
197 if (ctx->chain != NULL) {
198 /*
199 * This X509_STORE_CTX has already been used to verify a cert. We
200 * cannot do another one.
201 */
202 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
203 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
204 return -1;
205 }
206
207 cb = ctx->verify_cb;
208
209 /*
210 * first we make sure the chain we are going to build is present and that
211 * the first entry is in place
212 */
213 ctx->chain = sk_X509_new_null();
214 if (ctx->chain == NULL || !sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, ctx->cert)) {
215 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
216 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
217 goto end;
218 }
219 X509_up_ref(ctx->cert);
220 ctx->last_untrusted = 1;
221
222 /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it.
223 * sktmp = ctx->untrusted ++ ctx->ctx->additional_untrusted */
224 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL
225 && (sktmp = sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) {
226 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
227 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
228 goto end;
229 }
230
231 if (ctx->ctx->additional_untrusted != NULL) {
232 if (sktmp == NULL) {
233 sktmp = sk_X509_new_null();
234 if (sktmp == NULL) {
235 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
236 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
237 goto end;
238 }
239 }
240
241 for (size_t k = 0; k < sk_X509_num(ctx->ctx->additional_untrusted);
242 k++) {
243 if (!sk_X509_push(sktmp,
244 sk_X509_value(ctx->ctx->additional_untrusted,
245 k))) {
246 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
247 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
248 goto end;
249 }
250 }
251 }
252
253 num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
254 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
255 depth = param->depth;
256
257 for (;;) {
258 /* If we have enough, we break */
259 if (depth < num)
260 break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take
261 * note of it and, if appropriate, use the
262 * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error code
263 * later. */
264
265 /* If we are self signed, we break */
266 if (cert_self_signed(x))
267 break;
268 /*
269 * If asked see if we can find issuer in trusted store first
270 */
271 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST) {
272 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
273 if (ok < 0) {
274 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP;
275 goto end;
276 }
277 /*
278 * If successful for now free up cert so it will be picked up
279 * again later.
280 */
281 if (ok > 0) {
282 X509_free(xtmp);
283 break;
284 }
285 }
286
287 /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
288 if (sktmp != NULL) {
289 xtmp = find_issuer(ctx, sktmp, x);
290 if (xtmp != NULL) {
291 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, xtmp)) {
292 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
293 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
294 ok = 0;
295 goto end;
296 }
297 X509_up_ref(xtmp);
298 (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp, xtmp);
299 ctx->last_untrusted++;
300 x = xtmp;
301 num++;
302 /*
303 * reparse the full chain for the next one
304 */
305 continue;
306 }
307 }
308 break;
309 }
310
311 /* Remember how many untrusted certs we have */
312 j = num;
313 /*
314 * at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted certificates.
315 * We now need to add at least one trusted one, if possible, otherwise we
316 * complain.
317 */
318
319 do {
320 /*
321 * Examine last certificate in chain and see if it is self signed.
322 */
323 i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
324 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i - 1);
325 if (cert_self_signed(x)) {
326 /* we have a self signed certificate */
327 if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1) {
328 /*
329 * We have a single self signed certificate: see if we can
330 * find it in the store. We must have an exact match to avoid
331 * possible impersonation.
332 */
333 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
334 if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp)) {
335 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
336 ctx->current_cert = x;
337 ctx->error_depth = i - 1;
338 if (ok == 1)
339 X509_free(xtmp);
340 bad_chain = 1;
341 ok = cb(0, ctx);
342 if (!ok)
343 goto end;
344 } else {
345 /*
346 * We have a match: replace certificate with store
347 * version so we get any trust settings.
348 */
349 X509_free(x);
350 x = xtmp;
351 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
352 ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
353 }
354 } else {
355 /*
356 * extract and save self signed certificate for later use
357 */
358 chain_ss = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
359 ctx->last_untrusted--;
360 num--;
361 j--;
362 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
363 }
364 }
365 /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
366 for (;;) {
367 /* If we have enough, we break */
368 if (depth < num)
369 break;
370 /* If we are self signed, we break */
371 if (cert_self_signed(x))
372 break;
373 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
374
375 if (ok < 0) {
376 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP;
377 goto end;
378 }
379 if (ok == 0)
380 break;
381 x = xtmp;
382 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, x)) {
383 X509_free(xtmp);
384 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
385 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
386 ok = 0;
387 goto end;
388 }
389 num++;
390 }
391
392 /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
393 trust = check_trust(ctx);
394
395 /* If explicitly rejected error */
396 if (trust == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) {
397 ok = 0;
398 goto end;
399 }
400 /*
401 * If it's not explicitly trusted then check if there is an alternative
402 * chain that could be used. We only do this if we haven't already
403 * checked via TRUSTED_FIRST and the user hasn't switched off alternate
404 * chain checking
405 */
406 retry = 0;
407 if (trust != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
408 && !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST)
409 && !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS)) {
410 while (j-- > 1) {
411 xtmp2 = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j - 1);
412 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, xtmp2);
413 if (ok < 0)
414 goto end;
415 /* Check if we found an alternate chain */
416 if (ok > 0) {
417 /*
418 * Free up the found cert we'll add it again later
419 */
420 X509_free(xtmp);
421
422 /*
423 * Dump all the certs above this point - we've found an
424 * alternate chain
425 */
426 while (num > j) {
427 xtmp = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
428 X509_free(xtmp);
429 num--;
430 }
431 ctx->last_untrusted = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
432 retry = 1;
433 break;
434 }
435 }
436 }
437 } while (retry);
438
439 /*
440 * If not explicitly trusted then indicate error unless it's a single
441 * self signed certificate in which case we've indicated an error already
442 * and set bad_chain == 1
443 */
444 if (trust != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED && !bad_chain) {
445 if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss)) {
446 if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num)
447 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
448 else
449 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;
450 ctx->current_cert = x;
451 } else {
452
453 sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, chain_ss);
454 num++;
455 ctx->last_untrusted = num;
456 ctx->current_cert = chain_ss;
457 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN;
458 chain_ss = NULL;
459 }
460
461 ctx->error_depth = num - 1;
462 bad_chain = 1;
463 ok = cb(0, ctx);
464 if (!ok)
465 goto end;
466 }
467
468 /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
469 ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx);
470
471 if (!ok)
472 goto end;
473
474 ok = check_id(ctx);
475
476 if (!ok)
477 goto end;
478
479 /*
480 * Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters because
481 * they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
482 */
483
484 ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx);
485 if (!ok)
486 goto end;
487
488 int err = X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx->error_depth, NULL, ctx->chain,
489 ctx->param->flags);
490 if (err != X509_V_OK) {
491 ctx->error = err;
492 ctx->current_cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, ctx->error_depth);
493 ok = cb(0, ctx);
494 if (!ok)
495 goto end;
496 }
497
498 /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */
499 if (ctx->verify != NULL)
500 ok = ctx->verify(ctx);
501 else
502 ok = internal_verify(ctx);
503 if (!ok)
504 goto end;
505
506 /* Check name constraints */
507
508 ok = check_name_constraints(ctx);
509 if (!ok)
510 goto end;
511
512 /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
513 if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK))
514 ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
515
516 end:
517 if (sktmp != NULL)
518 sk_X509_free(sktmp);
519 if (chain_ss != NULL)
520 X509_free(chain_ss);
521
522 /* Safety net, error returns must set ctx->error */
523 if (ok <= 0 && ctx->error == X509_V_OK)
524 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
525 return ok;
526 }
527
528 /*
529 * Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
530 */
531
find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,STACK_OF (X509)* sk,X509 * x)532 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
533 {
534 size_t i;
535 X509 *issuer;
536 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
537 issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
538 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer))
539 return issuer;
540 }
541 return NULL;
542 }
543
544 /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
545
check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509 * x,X509 * issuer)546 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
547 {
548 int ret;
549 ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
550 if (ret == X509_V_OK)
551 return 1;
552 /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
553 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK))
554 return 0;
555
556 ctx->error = ret;
557 ctx->current_cert = x;
558 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
559 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
560 }
561
562 /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
563
get_issuer_sk(X509 ** issuer,X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509 * x)564 static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
565 {
566 *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
567 if (*issuer) {
568 X509_up_ref(*issuer);
569 return 1;
570 } else
571 return 0;
572 }
573
574 /*
575 * Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency with the supplied
576 * purpose
577 */
578
check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)579 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
580 {
581 int i, ok = 0, must_be_ca, plen = 0;
582 X509 *x;
583 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
584 int proxy_path_length = 0;
585 int purpose;
586 int allow_proxy_certs;
587 cb = ctx->verify_cb;
588
589 /*
590 * must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values: -1: we accept both CA and non-CA
591 * certificates, to allow direct use of self-signed certificates (which
592 * are marked as CA). 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is
593 * currently not used, but the possibility is present for future
594 * extensions. 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used
595 * for all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
596 */
597 must_be_ca = -1;
598
599 /* CRL path validation */
600 if (ctx->parent) {
601 allow_proxy_certs = 0;
602 purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN;
603 } else {
604 allow_proxy_certs =
605 ! !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
606 purpose = ctx->param->purpose;
607 }
608
609 /* Check all untrusted certificates */
610 for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++) {
611 int ret;
612 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
613 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
614 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) {
615 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;
616 ctx->error_depth = i;
617 ctx->current_cert = x;
618 ok = cb(0, ctx);
619 if (!ok)
620 goto end;
621 }
622 if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)) {
623 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED;
624 ctx->error_depth = i;
625 ctx->current_cert = x;
626 ok = cb(0, ctx);
627 if (!ok)
628 goto end;
629 }
630 ret = X509_check_ca(x);
631 switch (must_be_ca) {
632 case -1:
633 if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
634 && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0)) {
635 ret = 0;
636 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
637 } else
638 ret = 1;
639 break;
640 case 0:
641 if (ret != 0) {
642 ret = 0;
643 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
644 } else
645 ret = 1;
646 break;
647 default:
648 if ((ret == 0)
649 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
650 && (ret != 1))) {
651 ret = 0;
652 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
653 } else
654 ret = 1;
655 break;
656 }
657 if (ret == 0) {
658 ctx->error_depth = i;
659 ctx->current_cert = x;
660 ok = cb(0, ctx);
661 if (!ok)
662 goto end;
663 }
664 if (ctx->param->purpose > 0) {
665 ret = X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0);
666 if ((ret == 0)
667 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
668 && (ret != 1))) {
669 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
670 ctx->error_depth = i;
671 ctx->current_cert = x;
672 ok = cb(0, ctx);
673 if (!ok)
674 goto end;
675 }
676 }
677 /* Check pathlen if not self issued */
678 if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)
679 && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
680 && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1))) {
681 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
682 ctx->error_depth = i;
683 ctx->current_cert = x;
684 ok = cb(0, ctx);
685 if (!ok)
686 goto end;
687 }
688 /* Increment path length if not self issued */
689 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
690 plen++;
691 /*
692 * If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next certificate
693 * must be another proxy certificate or a EE certificate. If not,
694 * the next certificate must be a CA certificate.
695 */
696 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) {
697 if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen) {
698 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
699 ctx->error_depth = i;
700 ctx->current_cert = x;
701 ok = cb(0, ctx);
702 if (!ok)
703 goto end;
704 }
705 proxy_path_length++;
706 must_be_ca = 0;
707 } else
708 must_be_ca = 1;
709 }
710 ok = 1;
711 end:
712 return ok;
713 }
714
check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)715 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
716 {
717 X509 *x;
718 int i, j, rv;
719 /* Check name constraints for all certificates */
720 for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
721 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
722 /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */
723 if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
724 continue;
725 /*
726 * Check against constraints for all certificates higher in chain
727 * including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly speaking needed
728 * but if it includes constraints it is to be assumed it expects them
729 * to be obeyed.
730 */
731 for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--) {
732 NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc;
733 if (nc) {
734 rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc);
735 switch (rv) {
736 case X509_V_OK:
737 continue;
738 case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM:
739 ctx->error = rv;
740 return 0;
741 default:
742 ctx->error = rv;
743 ctx->error_depth = i;
744 ctx->current_cert = x;
745 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
746 return 0;
747 break;
748 }
749 }
750 }
751 }
752 return 1;
753 }
754
check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,int errcode)755 static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int errcode)
756 {
757 ctx->error = errcode;
758 ctx->current_cert = ctx->cert;
759 ctx->error_depth = 0;
760 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
761 }
762
check_hosts(X509 * x,X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID * id)763 static int check_hosts(X509 *x, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID *id)
764 {
765 size_t i;
766 size_t n = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(id->hosts);
767 char *name;
768
769 if (id->peername != NULL) {
770 OPENSSL_free(id->peername);
771 id->peername = NULL;
772 }
773 for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
774 name = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(id->hosts, i);
775 if (X509_check_host(x, name, strlen(name), id->hostflags,
776 &id->peername) > 0)
777 return 1;
778 }
779 return n == 0;
780 }
781
check_id(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)782 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
783 {
784 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ctx->param;
785 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID *id = vpm->id;
786 X509 *x = ctx->cert;
787 if (id->hosts && check_hosts(x, id) <= 0) {
788 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH))
789 return 0;
790 }
791 if (id->email && X509_check_email(x, id->email, id->emaillen, 0) <= 0) {
792 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH))
793 return 0;
794 }
795 if (id->ip && X509_check_ip(x, id->ip, id->iplen, 0) <= 0) {
796 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH))
797 return 0;
798 }
799 return 1;
800 }
801
check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)802 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
803 {
804 size_t i;
805 int ok;
806 X509 *x = NULL;
807 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
808 cb = ctx->verify_cb;
809 /* Check all trusted certificates in chain */
810 for (i = ctx->last_untrusted; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
811 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
812 ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
813 /* If explicitly trusted return trusted */
814 if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
815 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
816 /*
817 * If explicitly rejected notify callback and reject if not
818 * overridden.
819 */
820 if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) {
821 ctx->error_depth = i;
822 ctx->current_cert = x;
823 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
824 ok = cb(0, ctx);
825 if (!ok)
826 return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
827 }
828 }
829 /*
830 * If we accept partial chains and have at least one trusted certificate
831 * return success.
832 */
833 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) {
834 X509 *mx;
835 if (ctx->last_untrusted < (int)sk_X509_num(ctx->chain))
836 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
837 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, 0);
838 mx = lookup_cert_match(ctx, x);
839 if (mx) {
840 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, 0, mx);
841 X509_free(x);
842 ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
843 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
844 }
845 }
846
847 /*
848 * If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and allow
849 * standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated.
850 */
851 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
852 }
853
check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)854 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
855 {
856 int i, last, ok;
857 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
858 return 1;
859 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
860 last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
861 else {
862 /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */
863 if (ctx->parent)
864 return 1;
865 last = 0;
866 }
867 for (i = 0; i <= last; i++) {
868 ctx->error_depth = i;
869 ok = check_cert(ctx);
870 if (!ok)
871 return ok;
872 }
873 return 1;
874 }
875
check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)876 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
877 {
878 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
879 X509 *x;
880 int ok = 0, cnum;
881 unsigned int last_reasons;
882 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
883 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
884 ctx->current_cert = x;
885 ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
886 ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
887 ctx->current_reasons = 0;
888 while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS) {
889 last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
890 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
891 if (ctx->get_crl)
892 ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
893 else
894 ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x);
895 /*
896 * If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except notify callback
897 */
898 if (!ok) {
899 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
900 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
901 goto err;
902 }
903 ctx->current_crl = crl;
904 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
905 if (!ok)
906 goto err;
907
908 if (dcrl) {
909 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl);
910 if (!ok)
911 goto err;
912 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x);
913 if (!ok)
914 goto err;
915 } else
916 ok = 1;
917
918 /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
919 if (ok != 2) {
920 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
921 if (!ok)
922 goto err;
923 }
924
925 X509_CRL_free(crl);
926 X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
927 crl = NULL;
928 dcrl = NULL;
929 /*
930 * If reasons not updated we wont get anywhere by another iteration,
931 * so exit loop.
932 */
933 if (last_reasons == ctx->current_reasons) {
934 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
935 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
936 goto err;
937 }
938 }
939 err:
940 X509_CRL_free(crl);
941 X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
942
943 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
944 return ok;
945
946 }
947
948 /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
949
check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509_CRL * crl,int notify)950 static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
951 {
952 time_t *ptime;
953 int i;
954 if (notify)
955 ctx->current_crl = crl;
956 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
957 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
958 else
959 ptime = NULL;
960
961 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
962 if (i == 0) {
963 if (!notify)
964 return 0;
965 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD;
966 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
967 return 0;
968 }
969
970 if (i > 0) {
971 if (!notify)
972 return 0;
973 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID;
974 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
975 return 0;
976 }
977
978 if (X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl)) {
979 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
980
981 if (i == 0) {
982 if (!notify)
983 return 0;
984 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD;
985 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
986 return 0;
987 }
988 /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */
989 if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA)) {
990 if (!notify)
991 return 0;
992 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED;
993 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
994 return 0;
995 }
996 }
997
998 if (notify)
999 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
1000
1001 return 1;
1002 }
1003
get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509_CRL ** pcrl,X509_CRL ** pdcrl,X509 ** pissuer,int * pscore,unsigned int * preasons,STACK_OF (X509_CRL)* crls)1004 static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl,
1005 X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons,
1006 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
1007 {
1008 int crl_score, best_score = *pscore;
1009 size_t i;
1010 unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0;
1011 X509 *x = ctx->current_cert;
1012 X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
1013 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL;
1014
1015 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
1016 crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
1017 reasons = *preasons;
1018 crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x);
1019 if (crl_score < best_score || crl_score == 0)
1020 continue;
1021 /* If current CRL is equivalent use it if it is newer */
1022 if (crl_score == best_score && best_crl != NULL) {
1023 int day, sec;
1024 if (ASN1_TIME_diff(&day, &sec, X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(best_crl),
1025 X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl)) == 0)
1026 continue;
1027 /*
1028 * ASN1_TIME_diff never returns inconsistent signs for |day|
1029 * and |sec|.
1030 */
1031 if (day <= 0 && sec <= 0)
1032 continue;
1033 }
1034 best_crl = crl;
1035 best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer;
1036 best_score = crl_score;
1037 best_reasons = reasons;
1038 }
1039
1040 if (best_crl) {
1041 if (*pcrl)
1042 X509_CRL_free(*pcrl);
1043 *pcrl = best_crl;
1044 *pissuer = best_crl_issuer;
1045 *pscore = best_score;
1046 *preasons = best_reasons;
1047 X509_CRL_up_ref(best_crl);
1048 if (*pdcrl) {
1049 X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl);
1050 *pdcrl = NULL;
1051 }
1052 get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls);
1053 }
1054
1055 if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID)
1056 return 1;
1057
1058 return 0;
1059 }
1060
1061 /*
1062 * Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
1063 * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical.
1064 */
1065
crl_extension_match(X509_CRL * a,X509_CRL * b,int nid)1066 static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid)
1067 {
1068 ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb;
1069 int i;
1070 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1);
1071 if (i >= 0) {
1072 /* Can't have multiple occurrences */
1073 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1)
1074 return 0;
1075 exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i));
1076 } else
1077 exta = NULL;
1078
1079 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1);
1080
1081 if (i >= 0) {
1082
1083 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1)
1084 return 0;
1085 extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i));
1086 } else
1087 extb = NULL;
1088
1089 if (!exta && !extb)
1090 return 1;
1091
1092 if (!exta || !extb)
1093 return 0;
1094
1095 if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb))
1096 return 0;
1097
1098 return 1;
1099 }
1100
1101 /* See if a base and delta are compatible */
1102
check_delta_base(X509_CRL * delta,X509_CRL * base)1103 static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base)
1104 {
1105 /* Delta CRL must be a delta */
1106 if (!delta->base_crl_number)
1107 return 0;
1108 /* Base must have a CRL number */
1109 if (!base->crl_number)
1110 return 0;
1111 /* Issuer names must match */
1112 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta)))
1113 return 0;
1114 /* AKID and IDP must match */
1115 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier))
1116 return 0;
1117 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point))
1118 return 0;
1119 /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */
1120 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
1121 return 0;
1122 /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
1123 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
1124 return 1;
1125 return 0;
1126 }
1127
1128 /*
1129 * For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring or
1130 * retrieve a chain of deltas...
1131 */
1132
get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509_CRL ** dcrl,int * pscore,X509_CRL * base,STACK_OF (X509_CRL)* crls)1133 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore,
1134 X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
1135 {
1136 X509_CRL *delta;
1137 size_t i;
1138 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS))
1139 return;
1140 if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST))
1141 return;
1142 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
1143 delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
1144 if (check_delta_base(delta, base)) {
1145 if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0))
1146 *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA;
1147 X509_CRL_up_ref(delta);
1148 *dcrl = delta;
1149 return;
1150 }
1151 }
1152 *dcrl = NULL;
1153 }
1154
1155 /*
1156 * For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate
1157 * 'x'. The return value is a mask of several criteria. If the issuer is not
1158 * the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer. The reasons mask is
1159 * also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if no new reasons the CRL
1160 * is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
1161 */
1162
get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509 ** pissuer,unsigned int * preasons,X509_CRL * crl,X509 * x)1163 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
1164 unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1165 {
1166
1167 int crl_score = 0;
1168 unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons;
1169
1170 /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
1171
1172 /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
1173 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
1174 return 0;
1175 /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
1176 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) {
1177 if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS))
1178 return 0;
1179 } else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS) {
1180 /* If no new reasons reject */
1181 if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1182 return 0;
1183 }
1184 /* Don't process deltas at this stage */
1185 else if (crl->base_crl_number)
1186 return 0;
1187 /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
1188 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))) {
1189 if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT))
1190 return 0;
1191 } else
1192 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME;
1193
1194 if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
1195 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL;
1196
1197 /* Check expiry */
1198 if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
1199 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME;
1200
1201 /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */
1202 crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score);
1203
1204 /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
1205
1206 if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID))
1207 return 0;
1208
1209 /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
1210
1211 if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons)) {
1212 /* If no new reasons reject */
1213 if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1214 return 0;
1215 tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons;
1216 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
1217 }
1218
1219 *preasons = tmp_reasons;
1220
1221 return crl_score;
1222
1223 }
1224
crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509_CRL * crl,X509 ** pissuer,int * pcrl_score)1225 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
1226 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score)
1227 {
1228 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL;
1229 X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1230 int cidx = ctx->error_depth;
1231 size_t i;
1232
1233 if ((size_t)cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1)
1234 cidx++;
1235
1236 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1237
1238 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1239 if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME) {
1240 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT;
1241 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1242 return;
1243 }
1244 }
1245
1246 for (cidx++; cidx < (int)sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++) {
1247 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1248 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1249 continue;
1250 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1251 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH;
1252 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1253 return;
1254 }
1255 }
1256
1257 /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
1258
1259 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
1260 return;
1261
1262 /*
1263 * Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the set of
1264 * untrusted certificates.
1265 */
1266 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++) {
1267 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i);
1268 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1269 continue;
1270 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1271 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1272 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
1273 return;
1274 }
1275 }
1276
1277 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->ctx->additional_untrusted); i++) {
1278 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->ctx->additional_untrusted, i);
1279 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1280 continue;
1281 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1282 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1283 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
1284 return;
1285 }
1286 }
1287 }
1288
1289 /*
1290 * Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new
1291 * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the
1292 * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking will
1293 * be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in practice.
1294 */
1295
check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509 * x)1296 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1297 {
1298 X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx;
1299 int ret;
1300 /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
1301 if (ctx->parent)
1302 return 0;
1303 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted))
1304 return -1;
1305
1306 crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls;
1307 /* Copy verify params across */
1308 X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param);
1309
1310 crl_ctx.parent = ctx;
1311 crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb;
1312
1313 /* Verify CRL issuer */
1314 ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx);
1315
1316 if (ret <= 0)
1317 goto err;
1318
1319 /* Check chain is acceptable */
1320
1321 ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain);
1322 err:
1323 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx);
1324 return ret;
1325 }
1326
1327 /*
1328 * RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path and
1329 * certificate path, which could lead to situations where a certificate could
1330 * be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised to do so. RFC5280 is more
1331 * strict and states that the two paths must end in the same trust anchor,
1332 * though some discussions remain... until this is resolved we use the
1333 * RFC5280 version
1334 */
1335
check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,STACK_OF (X509)* cert_path,STACK_OF (X509)* crl_path)1336 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1337 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
1338 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path)
1339 {
1340 X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta;
1341 cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1);
1342 crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1);
1343 if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta))
1344 return 1;
1345 return 0;
1346 }
1347
1348 /*
1349 * Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases. 1.
1350 * Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types. 2. One full, one
1351 * relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES. 3. Both are full names and
1352 * compare two GENERAL_NAMES. 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
1353 */
1354
idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME * a,DIST_POINT_NAME * b)1355 static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b)
1356 {
1357 X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
1358 GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
1359 GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb;
1360 size_t i, j;
1361 if (!a || !b)
1362 return 1;
1363 if (a->type == 1) {
1364 if (!a->dpname)
1365 return 0;
1366 /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
1367 if (b->type == 1) {
1368 if (!b->dpname)
1369 return 0;
1370 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname))
1371 return 1;
1372 else
1373 return 0;
1374 }
1375 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1376 nm = a->dpname;
1377 gens = b->name.fullname;
1378 } else if (b->type == 1) {
1379 if (!b->dpname)
1380 return 0;
1381 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1382 gens = a->name.fullname;
1383 nm = b->dpname;
1384 }
1385
1386 /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
1387 if (nm) {
1388 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) {
1389 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
1390 if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1391 continue;
1392 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName))
1393 return 1;
1394 }
1395 return 0;
1396 }
1397
1398 /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */
1399
1400 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++) {
1401 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i);
1402 for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++) {
1403 genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j);
1404 if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb))
1405 return 1;
1406 }
1407 }
1408
1409 return 0;
1410
1411 }
1412
crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT * dp,X509_CRL * crl,int crl_score)1413 static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score)
1414 {
1415 size_t i;
1416 X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1417 /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
1418 if (!dp->CRLissuer)
1419 return ! !(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME);
1420 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) {
1421 GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
1422 if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1423 continue;
1424 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm))
1425 return 1;
1426 }
1427 return 0;
1428 }
1429
1430 /* Check CRLDP and IDP */
1431
crl_crldp_check(X509 * x,X509_CRL * crl,int crl_score,unsigned int * preasons)1432 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
1433 unsigned int *preasons)
1434 {
1435 size_t i;
1436 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR)
1437 return 0;
1438 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) {
1439 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER)
1440 return 0;
1441 } else {
1442 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA)
1443 return 0;
1444 }
1445 *preasons = crl->idp_reasons;
1446 for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) {
1447 DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i);
1448 if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score)) {
1449 if (!crl->idp || idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint)) {
1450 *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons;
1451 return 1;
1452 }
1453 }
1454 }
1455 if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint)
1456 && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME))
1457 return 1;
1458 return 0;
1459 }
1460
1461 /*
1462 * Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. If deltas enabled try
1463 * to find a delta CRL too
1464 */
1465
get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509_CRL ** pcrl,X509_CRL ** pdcrl,X509 * x)1466 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1467 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x)
1468 {
1469 int ok;
1470 X509 *issuer = NULL;
1471 int crl_score = 0;
1472 unsigned int reasons;
1473 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
1474 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl;
1475 X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
1476 reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
1477 ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl,
1478 &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls);
1479
1480 if (ok)
1481 goto done;
1482
1483 /* Lookup CRLs from store */
1484
1485 skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm);
1486
1487 /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
1488 if (!skcrl && crl)
1489 goto done;
1490
1491 get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl);
1492
1493 sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free);
1494
1495 done:
1496
1497 /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
1498 if (crl) {
1499 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
1500 ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score;
1501 ctx->current_reasons = reasons;
1502 *pcrl = crl;
1503 *pdcrl = dcrl;
1504 return 1;
1505 }
1506
1507 return 0;
1508 }
1509
1510 /* Check CRL validity */
check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509_CRL * crl)1511 static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
1512 {
1513 X509 *issuer = NULL;
1514 EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
1515 int ok = 0, chnum, cnum;
1516 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
1517 chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
1518 /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
1519 if (ctx->current_issuer)
1520 issuer = ctx->current_issuer;
1521
1522 /*
1523 * Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer is next
1524 * certificate in chain.
1525 */
1526 else if (cnum < chnum)
1527 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
1528 else {
1529 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
1530 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
1531 if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer)) {
1532 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER;
1533 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1534 if (!ok)
1535 goto err;
1536 }
1537 }
1538
1539 if (issuer) {
1540 /*
1541 * Skip most tests for deltas because they have already been done
1542 */
1543 if (!crl->base_crl_number) {
1544 /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
1545 if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
1546 !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN)) {
1547 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN;
1548 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1549 if (!ok)
1550 goto err;
1551 }
1552
1553 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)) {
1554 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE;
1555 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1556 if (!ok)
1557 goto err;
1558 }
1559
1560 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH)) {
1561 if (check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0) {
1562 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR;
1563 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1564 if (!ok)
1565 goto err;
1566 }
1567 }
1568
1569 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) {
1570 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
1571 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1572 if (!ok)
1573 goto err;
1574 }
1575
1576 }
1577
1578 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME)) {
1579 ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1);
1580 if (!ok)
1581 goto err;
1582 }
1583
1584 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
1585 ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer);
1586
1587 if (!ikey) {
1588 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1589 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1590 if (!ok)
1591 goto err;
1592 } else {
1593 int rv;
1594 rv = X509_CRL_check_suiteb(crl, ikey, ctx->param->flags);
1595 if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
1596 ctx->error = rv;
1597 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1598 if (!ok)
1599 goto err;
1600 }
1601 /* Verify CRL signature */
1602 if (X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0) {
1603 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1604 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1605 if (!ok)
1606 goto err;
1607 }
1608 }
1609 }
1610
1611 ok = 1;
1612
1613 err:
1614 EVP_PKEY_free(ikey);
1615 return ok;
1616 }
1617
1618 /* Check certificate against CRL */
cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509_CRL * crl,X509 * x)1619 static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1620 {
1621 int ok;
1622 X509_REVOKED *rev;
1623 /*
1624 * The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained unhandled
1625 * critical extensions it could still be used to indicate a certificate
1626 * was revoked. This has since been changed since critical extension can
1627 * change the meaning of CRL entries.
1628 */
1629 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
1630 && (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) {
1631 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
1632 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1633 if (!ok)
1634 return 0;
1635 }
1636 /*
1637 * Look for serial number of certificate in CRL If found make sure reason
1638 * is not removeFromCRL.
1639 */
1640 if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x)) {
1641 if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL)
1642 return 2;
1643 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
1644 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1645 if (!ok)
1646 return 0;
1647 }
1648
1649 return 1;
1650 }
1651
check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)1652 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1653 {
1654 int ret;
1655 if (ctx->parent)
1656 return 1;
1657 ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain,
1658 ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
1659 if (ret == 0) {
1660 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1661 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
1662 return 0;
1663 }
1664 /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
1665 if (ret == -1) {
1666 /*
1667 * Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback.
1668 */
1669 X509 *x;
1670 size_t i;
1671 for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
1672 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
1673 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
1674 continue;
1675 ctx->current_cert = x;
1676 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION;
1677 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1678 return 0;
1679 }
1680 return 1;
1681 }
1682 if (ret == -2) {
1683 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1684 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
1685 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1686 }
1687
1688 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY) {
1689 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1690 /*
1691 * Verification errors need to be "sticky", a callback may have allowed
1692 * an SSL handshake to continue despite an error, and we must then
1693 * remain in an error state. Therefore, we MUST NOT clear earlier
1694 * verification errors by setting the error to X509_V_OK.
1695 */
1696 if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx))
1697 return 0;
1698 }
1699
1700 return 1;
1701 }
1702
check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509 * x)1703 static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1704 {
1705 time_t *ptime;
1706 int i;
1707
1708 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
1709 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
1710 else
1711 ptime = NULL;
1712
1713 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime);
1714 if (i == 0) {
1715 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
1716 ctx->current_cert = x;
1717 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1718 return 0;
1719 }
1720
1721 if (i > 0) {
1722 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;
1723 ctx->current_cert = x;
1724 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1725 return 0;
1726 }
1727
1728 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime);
1729 if (i == 0) {
1730 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
1731 ctx->current_cert = x;
1732 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1733 return 0;
1734 }
1735
1736 if (i < 0) {
1737 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED;
1738 ctx->current_cert = x;
1739 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1740 return 0;
1741 }
1742
1743 return 1;
1744 }
1745
internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)1746 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1747 {
1748 int ok = 0, n;
1749 X509 *xs, *xi;
1750 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1751 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
1752
1753 cb = ctx->verify_cb;
1754
1755 n = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
1756 ctx->error_depth = n - 1;
1757 n--;
1758 xi = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
1759
1760 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
1761 xs = xi;
1762 else {
1763 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) {
1764 xs = xi;
1765 goto check_cert;
1766 }
1767 if (n <= 0) {
1768 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
1769 ctx->current_cert = xi;
1770 ok = cb(0, ctx);
1771 goto end;
1772 } else {
1773 n--;
1774 ctx->error_depth = n;
1775 xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
1776 }
1777 }
1778
1779 /* ctx->error=0; not needed */
1780 while (n >= 0) {
1781 ctx->error_depth = n;
1782
1783 /*
1784 * Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless
1785 * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and just wastes
1786 * time.
1787 */
1788 if (xs != xi || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE)) {
1789 if ((pkey = X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) {
1790 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1791 ctx->current_cert = xi;
1792 ok = (*cb) (0, ctx);
1793 if (!ok)
1794 goto end;
1795 } else if (X509_verify(xs, pkey) <= 0) {
1796 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1797 ctx->current_cert = xs;
1798 ok = (*cb) (0, ctx);
1799 if (!ok) {
1800 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1801 goto end;
1802 }
1803 }
1804 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1805 pkey = NULL;
1806 }
1807
1808 check_cert:
1809 ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs);
1810 if (!ok)
1811 goto end;
1812
1813 /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
1814 ctx->current_issuer = xi;
1815 ctx->current_cert = xs;
1816 ok = (*cb) (1, ctx);
1817 if (!ok)
1818 goto end;
1819
1820 n--;
1821 if (n >= 0) {
1822 xi = xs;
1823 xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
1824 }
1825 }
1826 ok = 1;
1827 end:
1828 return ok;
1829 }
1830
X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME * ctm)1831 int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm)
1832 {
1833 return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
1834 }
1835
X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME * ctm,time_t * cmp_time)1836 int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
1837 {
1838 char *str;
1839 ASN1_TIME atm;
1840 long offset;
1841 char buff1[24], buff2[24], *p;
1842 int i, j, remaining;
1843
1844 p = buff1;
1845 remaining = ctm->length;
1846 str = (char *)ctm->data;
1847 /*
1848 * Note that the following (historical) code allows much more slack in
1849 * the time format than RFC5280. In RFC5280, the representation is fixed:
1850 * UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ GeneralizedTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ
1851 */
1852 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) {
1853 /* YYMMDDHHMM[SS]Z or YYMMDDHHMM[SS](+-)hhmm */
1854 int min_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1;
1855 int max_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMSS+hhmm") - 1;
1856 if (remaining < min_length || remaining > max_length)
1857 return 0;
1858 OPENSSL_memcpy(p, str, 10);
1859 p += 10;
1860 str += 10;
1861 remaining -= 10;
1862 } else {
1863 /*
1864 * YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.fff]]Z or YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.f[f[f]]]](+-)hhmm
1865 */
1866 int min_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1;
1867 int max_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMSS.fff+hhmm") - 1;
1868 if (remaining < min_length || remaining > max_length)
1869 return 0;
1870 OPENSSL_memcpy(p, str, 12);
1871 p += 12;
1872 str += 12;
1873 remaining -= 12;
1874 }
1875
1876 if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+')) {
1877 *(p++) = '0';
1878 *(p++) = '0';
1879 } else {
1880 /* SS (seconds) */
1881 if (remaining < 2)
1882 return 0;
1883 *(p++) = *(str++);
1884 *(p++) = *(str++);
1885 remaining -= 2;
1886 /*
1887 * Skip any (up to three) fractional seconds... TODO(emilia): in
1888 * RFC5280, fractional seconds are forbidden. Can we just kill them
1889 * altogether?
1890 */
1891 if (remaining && *str == '.') {
1892 str++;
1893 remaining--;
1894 for (i = 0; i < 3 && remaining; i++, str++, remaining--) {
1895 if (*str < '0' || *str > '9')
1896 break;
1897 }
1898 }
1899
1900 }
1901 *(p++) = 'Z';
1902 *(p++) = '\0';
1903
1904 /* We now need either a terminating 'Z' or an offset. */
1905 if (!remaining)
1906 return 0;
1907 if (*str == 'Z') {
1908 if (remaining != 1)
1909 return 0;
1910 offset = 0;
1911 } else {
1912 /* (+-)HHMM */
1913 if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-'))
1914 return 0;
1915 /*
1916 * Historical behaviour: the (+-)hhmm offset is forbidden in RFC5280.
1917 */
1918 if (remaining != 5)
1919 return 0;
1920 if (str[1] < '0' || str[1] > '9' || str[2] < '0' || str[2] > '9' ||
1921 str[3] < '0' || str[3] > '9' || str[4] < '0' || str[4] > '9')
1922 return 0;
1923 offset = ((str[1] - '0') * 10 + (str[2] - '0')) * 60;
1924 offset += (str[3] - '0') * 10 + (str[4] - '0');
1925 if (*str == '-')
1926 offset = -offset;
1927 }
1928 atm.type = ctm->type;
1929 atm.flags = 0;
1930 atm.length = sizeof(buff2);
1931 atm.data = (unsigned char *)buff2;
1932
1933 if (X509_time_adj(&atm, offset * 60, cmp_time) == NULL)
1934 return 0;
1935
1936 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) {
1937 i = (buff1[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff1[1] - '0');
1938 if (i < 50)
1939 i += 100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */
1940 j = (buff2[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff2[1] - '0');
1941 if (j < 50)
1942 j += 100;
1943
1944 if (i < j)
1945 return -1;
1946 if (i > j)
1947 return 1;
1948 }
1949 i = strcmp(buff1, buff2);
1950 if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
1951 return -1;
1952 else
1953 return i;
1954 }
1955
X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME * s,long adj)1956 ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
1957 {
1958 return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL);
1959 }
1960
X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME * s,long offset_sec,time_t * in_tm)1961 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1962 {
1963 return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm);
1964 }
1965
X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME * s,int offset_day,long offset_sec,time_t * in_tm)1966 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s,
1967 int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1968 {
1969 time_t t = 0;
1970
1971 if (in_tm)
1972 t = *in_tm;
1973 else
1974 time(&t);
1975
1976 if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING)) {
1977 if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1978 return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1979 if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)
1980 return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1981 }
1982 return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1983 }
1984
1985 /* Make a delta CRL as the diff between two full CRLs */
1986
X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL * base,X509_CRL * newer,EVP_PKEY * skey,const EVP_MD * md,unsigned int flags)1987 X509_CRL *X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL *base, X509_CRL *newer,
1988 EVP_PKEY *skey, const EVP_MD *md, unsigned int flags)
1989 {
1990 X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
1991 int i;
1992 size_t j;
1993 STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *revs = NULL;
1994 /* CRLs can't be delta already */
1995 if (base->base_crl_number || newer->base_crl_number) {
1996 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA);
1997 return NULL;
1998 }
1999 /* Base and new CRL must have a CRL number */
2000 if (!base->crl_number || !newer->crl_number) {
2001 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER);
2002 return NULL;
2003 }
2004 /* Issuer names must match */
2005 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer))) {
2006 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH);
2007 return NULL;
2008 }
2009 /* AKID and IDP must match */
2010 if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_authority_key_identifier)) {
2011 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH);
2012 return NULL;
2013 }
2014 if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_issuing_distribution_point)) {
2015 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH);
2016 return NULL;
2017 }
2018 /* Newer CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
2019 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(newer->crl_number, base->crl_number) <= 0) {
2020 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER);
2021 return NULL;
2022 }
2023 /* CRLs must verify */
2024 if (skey && (X509_CRL_verify(base, skey) <= 0 ||
2025 X509_CRL_verify(newer, skey) <= 0)) {
2026 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE);
2027 return NULL;
2028 }
2029 /* Create new CRL */
2030 crl = X509_CRL_new();
2031 if (!crl || !X509_CRL_set_version(crl, 1))
2032 goto memerr;
2033 /* Set issuer name */
2034 if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl, X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer)))
2035 goto memerr;
2036
2037 if (!X509_CRL_set_lastUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(newer)))
2038 goto memerr;
2039 if (!X509_CRL_set_nextUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(newer)))
2040 goto memerr;
2041
2042 /* Set base CRL number: must be critical */
2043
2044 if (!X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl, NID_delta_crl, base->crl_number, 1, 0))
2045 goto memerr;
2046
2047 /*
2048 * Copy extensions across from newest CRL to delta: this will set CRL
2049 * number to correct value too.
2050 */
2051
2052 for (i = 0; i < X509_CRL_get_ext_count(newer); i++) {
2053 X509_EXTENSION *ext;
2054 ext = X509_CRL_get_ext(newer, i);
2055 if (!X509_CRL_add_ext(crl, ext, -1))
2056 goto memerr;
2057 }
2058
2059 /* Go through revoked entries, copying as needed */
2060
2061 revs = X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(newer);
2062
2063 for (j = 0; j < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revs); j++) {
2064 X509_REVOKED *rvn, *rvtmp;
2065 rvn = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revs, j);
2066 /*
2067 * Add only if not also in base. TODO: need something cleverer here
2068 * for some more complex CRLs covering multiple CAs.
2069 */
2070 if (!X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(base, &rvtmp, rvn->serialNumber)) {
2071 rvtmp = X509_REVOKED_dup(rvn);
2072 if (!rvtmp)
2073 goto memerr;
2074 if (!X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl, rvtmp)) {
2075 X509_REVOKED_free(rvtmp);
2076 goto memerr;
2077 }
2078 }
2079 }
2080 /* TODO: optionally prune deleted entries */
2081
2082 if (skey && md && !X509_CRL_sign(crl, skey, md))
2083 goto memerr;
2084
2085 return crl;
2086
2087 memerr:
2088 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2089 if (crl)
2090 X509_CRL_free(crl);
2091 return NULL;
2092 }
2093
X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl,void * argp,CRYPTO_EX_unused * unused,CRYPTO_EX_dup * dup_unused,CRYPTO_EX_free * free_func)2094 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp,
2095 CRYPTO_EX_unused * unused,
2096 CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_unused,
2097 CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
2098 {
2099 /*
2100 * This function is (usually) called only once, by
2101 * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c).
2102 */
2103 int index;
2104 if (!CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(&g_ex_data_class, &index, argl, argp,
2105 free_func)) {
2106 return -1;
2107 }
2108 return index;
2109 }
2110
X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,int idx,void * data)2111 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
2112 {
2113 return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx, data);
2114 }
2115
X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,int idx)2116 void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
2117 {
2118 return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx);
2119 }
2120
X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)2121 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2122 {
2123 return ctx->error;
2124 }
2125
X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,int err)2126 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
2127 {
2128 ctx->error = err;
2129 }
2130
X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)2131 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2132 {
2133 return ctx->error_depth;
2134 }
2135
X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)2136 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2137 {
2138 return ctx->current_cert;
2139 }
2140
STACK_OF(X509)2141 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2142 {
2143 return ctx->chain;
2144 }
2145
STACK_OF(X509)2146 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2147 {
2148 if (!ctx->chain)
2149 return NULL;
2150 return X509_chain_up_ref(ctx->chain);
2151 }
2152
X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)2153 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2154 {
2155 return ctx->current_issuer;
2156 }
2157
X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)2158 X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2159 {
2160 return ctx->current_crl;
2161 }
2162
X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)2163 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2164 {
2165 return ctx->parent;
2166 }
2167
X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509 * x)2168 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
2169 {
2170 ctx->cert = x;
2171 }
2172
X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,STACK_OF (X509)* sk)2173 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2174 {
2175 ctx->untrusted = sk;
2176 }
2177
STACK_OF(X509)2178 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2179 {
2180 return ctx->untrusted;
2181 }
2182
X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,STACK_OF (X509_CRL)* sk)2183 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk)
2184 {
2185 ctx->crls = sk;
2186 }
2187
X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,int purpose)2188 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
2189 {
2190 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
2191 }
2192
X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,int trust)2193 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)
2194 {
2195 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
2196 }
2197
2198 /*
2199 * This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust values.
2200 * This is intended to be used when another structure has its own trust and
2201 * purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by the ctx. If they aren't
2202 * set then we will usually have a default purpose in mind which should then
2203 * be used to set the trust value. An example of this is SSL use: an SSL
2204 * structure will have its own purpose and trust settings which the
2205 * application can set: if they aren't set then we use the default of SSL
2206 * client/server.
2207 */
2208
X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,int def_purpose,int purpose,int trust)2209 int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
2210 int purpose, int trust)
2211 {
2212 int idx;
2213 /* If purpose not set use default */
2214 if (!purpose)
2215 purpose = def_purpose;
2216 /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
2217 if (purpose) {
2218 X509_PURPOSE *ptmp;
2219 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
2220 if (idx == -1) {
2221 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
2222 return 0;
2223 }
2224 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2225 if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) {
2226 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
2227 if (idx == -1) {
2228 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
2229 return 0;
2230 }
2231 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2232 }
2233 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
2234 if (!trust)
2235 trust = ptmp->trust;
2236 }
2237 if (trust) {
2238 idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
2239 if (idx == -1) {
2240 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
2241 return 0;
2242 }
2243 }
2244
2245 if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose)
2246 ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
2247 if (trust && !ctx->param->trust)
2248 ctx->param->trust = trust;
2249 return 1;
2250 }
2251
X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)2252 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
2253 {
2254 X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
2255 ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
2256 if (!ctx) {
2257 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2258 return NULL;
2259 }
2260 X509_STORE_CTX_zero(ctx);
2261 return ctx;
2262 }
2263
X509_STORE_CTX_zero(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)2264 void X509_STORE_CTX_zero(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2265 {
2266 OPENSSL_memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
2267 }
2268
X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)2269 void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2270 {
2271 if (ctx == NULL) {
2272 return;
2273 }
2274 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
2275 OPENSSL_free(ctx);
2276 }
2277
X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509_STORE * store,X509 * x509,STACK_OF (X509)* chain)2278 int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
2279 STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2280 {
2281 int ret = 1;
2282
2283 X509_STORE_CTX_zero(ctx);
2284 ctx->ctx = store;
2285 ctx->cert = x509;
2286 ctx->untrusted = chain;
2287
2288 CRYPTO_new_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data);
2289
2290 ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
2291 if (!ctx->param)
2292 goto err;
2293
2294 /*
2295 * Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set use defaults.
2296 */
2297
2298 if (store)
2299 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param);
2300 else
2301 ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT | X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE;
2302
2303 if (store) {
2304 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2305 ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
2306 } else
2307 ctx->cleanup = 0;
2308
2309 if (ret)
2310 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
2311 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
2312
2313 if (ret == 0)
2314 goto err;
2315
2316 if (store && store->check_issued)
2317 ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
2318 else
2319 ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
2320
2321 if (store && store->get_issuer)
2322 ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
2323 else
2324 ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
2325
2326 if (store && store->verify_cb)
2327 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2328 else
2329 ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
2330
2331 if (store && store->verify)
2332 ctx->verify = store->verify;
2333 else
2334 ctx->verify = internal_verify;
2335
2336 if (store && store->check_revocation)
2337 ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
2338 else
2339 ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
2340
2341 if (store && store->get_crl)
2342 ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
2343 else
2344 ctx->get_crl = NULL;
2345
2346 if (store && store->check_crl)
2347 ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
2348 else
2349 ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
2350
2351 if (store && store->cert_crl)
2352 ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
2353 else
2354 ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
2355
2356 if (store && store->lookup_certs)
2357 ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs;
2358 else
2359 ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs;
2360
2361 if (store && store->lookup_crls)
2362 ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls;
2363 else
2364 ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls;
2365
2366 ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
2367
2368 return 1;
2369
2370 err:
2371 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, ctx, &ctx->ex_data);
2372 if (ctx->param != NULL) {
2373 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2374 }
2375
2376 OPENSSL_memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
2377 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2378 return 0;
2379 }
2380
2381 /*
2382 * Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. This
2383 * avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
2384 */
2385
X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,STACK_OF (X509)* sk)2386 void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2387 {
2388 ctx->other_ctx = sk;
2389 ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
2390 }
2391
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)2392 void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2393 {
2394 /* We need to be idempotent because, unfortunately, |X509_STORE_CTX_free|
2395 * also calls this function. */
2396 if (ctx->cleanup != NULL) {
2397 ctx->cleanup(ctx);
2398 ctx->cleanup = NULL;
2399 }
2400 if (ctx->param != NULL) {
2401 if (ctx->parent == NULL)
2402 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2403 ctx->param = NULL;
2404 }
2405 if (ctx->tree != NULL) {
2406 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
2407 ctx->tree = NULL;
2408 }
2409 if (ctx->chain != NULL) {
2410 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free);
2411 ctx->chain = NULL;
2412 }
2413 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
2414 OPENSSL_memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA));
2415 }
2416
X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,int depth)2417 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
2418 {
2419 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
2420 }
2421
X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,unsigned long flags)2422 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
2423 {
2424 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
2425 }
2426
X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,unsigned long flags,time_t t)2427 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags,
2428 time_t t)
2429 {
2430 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t);
2431 }
2432
X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,int (* verify_cb)(int,X509_STORE_CTX *))2433 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
2434 int (*verify_cb) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
2435 {
2436 ctx->verify_cb = verify_cb;
2437 }
2438
X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)2439 X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2440 {
2441 return ctx->tree;
2442 }
2443
X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)2444 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2445 {
2446 return ctx->explicit_policy;
2447 }
2448
X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,const char * name)2449 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
2450 {
2451 const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
2452 param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
2453 if (!param)
2454 return 0;
2455 return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
2456 }
2457
X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)2458 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2459 {
2460 return ctx->param;
2461 }
2462
X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX * ctx,X509_VERIFY_PARAM * param)2463 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
2464 {
2465 if (ctx->param)
2466 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2467 ctx->param = param;
2468 }
2469
2470 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509)
2471
2472 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
2473