1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
2 //
3 // Security related flags and so on.
4 //
5 // Copyright 2018, Michael Ellerman, IBM Corporation.
6
7 #include <linux/cpu.h>
8 #include <linux/kernel.h>
9 #include <linux/device.h>
10 #include <linux/nospec.h>
11 #include <linux/prctl.h>
12 #include <linux/seq_buf.h>
13
14 #include <asm/asm-prototypes.h>
15 #include <asm/code-patching.h>
16 #include <asm/debugfs.h>
17 #include <asm/security_features.h>
18 #include <asm/setup.h>
19 #include <asm/inst.h>
20
21
22 u64 powerpc_security_features __read_mostly = SEC_FTR_DEFAULT;
23
24 enum branch_cache_flush_type {
25 BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_NONE = 0x1,
26 BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_SW = 0x2,
27 BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_HW = 0x4,
28 };
29 static enum branch_cache_flush_type count_cache_flush_type = BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_NONE;
30 static enum branch_cache_flush_type link_stack_flush_type = BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_NONE;
31
32 bool barrier_nospec_enabled;
33 static bool no_nospec;
34 static bool btb_flush_enabled;
35 #if defined(CONFIG_PPC_FSL_BOOK3E) || defined(CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64)
36 static bool no_spectrev2;
37 #endif
38
enable_barrier_nospec(bool enable)39 static void enable_barrier_nospec(bool enable)
40 {
41 barrier_nospec_enabled = enable;
42 do_barrier_nospec_fixups(enable);
43 }
44
setup_barrier_nospec(void)45 void setup_barrier_nospec(void)
46 {
47 bool enable;
48
49 /*
50 * It would make sense to check SEC_FTR_SPEC_BAR_ORI31 below as well.
51 * But there's a good reason not to. The two flags we check below are
52 * both are enabled by default in the kernel, so if the hcall is not
53 * functional they will be enabled.
54 * On a system where the host firmware has been updated (so the ori
55 * functions as a barrier), but on which the hypervisor (KVM/Qemu) has
56 * not been updated, we would like to enable the barrier. Dropping the
57 * check for SEC_FTR_SPEC_BAR_ORI31 achieves that. The only downside is
58 * we potentially enable the barrier on systems where the host firmware
59 * is not updated, but that's harmless as it's a no-op.
60 */
61 enable = security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_FAVOUR_SECURITY) &&
62 security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_BNDS_CHK_SPEC_BAR);
63
64 if (!no_nospec && !cpu_mitigations_off())
65 enable_barrier_nospec(enable);
66 }
67
handle_nospectre_v1(char * p)68 static int __init handle_nospectre_v1(char *p)
69 {
70 no_nospec = true;
71
72 return 0;
73 }
74 early_param("nospectre_v1", handle_nospectre_v1);
75
76 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_FS
barrier_nospec_set(void * data,u64 val)77 static int barrier_nospec_set(void *data, u64 val)
78 {
79 switch (val) {
80 case 0:
81 case 1:
82 break;
83 default:
84 return -EINVAL;
85 }
86
87 if (!!val == !!barrier_nospec_enabled)
88 return 0;
89
90 enable_barrier_nospec(!!val);
91
92 return 0;
93 }
94
barrier_nospec_get(void * data,u64 * val)95 static int barrier_nospec_get(void *data, u64 *val)
96 {
97 *val = barrier_nospec_enabled ? 1 : 0;
98 return 0;
99 }
100
101 DEFINE_DEBUGFS_ATTRIBUTE(fops_barrier_nospec, barrier_nospec_get,
102 barrier_nospec_set, "%llu\n");
103
barrier_nospec_debugfs_init(void)104 static __init int barrier_nospec_debugfs_init(void)
105 {
106 debugfs_create_file_unsafe("barrier_nospec", 0600,
107 powerpc_debugfs_root, NULL,
108 &fops_barrier_nospec);
109 return 0;
110 }
111 device_initcall(barrier_nospec_debugfs_init);
112
security_feature_debugfs_init(void)113 static __init int security_feature_debugfs_init(void)
114 {
115 debugfs_create_x64("security_features", 0400, powerpc_debugfs_root,
116 &powerpc_security_features);
117 return 0;
118 }
119 device_initcall(security_feature_debugfs_init);
120 #endif /* CONFIG_DEBUG_FS */
121
122 #if defined(CONFIG_PPC_FSL_BOOK3E) || defined(CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64)
handle_nospectre_v2(char * p)123 static int __init handle_nospectre_v2(char *p)
124 {
125 no_spectrev2 = true;
126
127 return 0;
128 }
129 early_param("nospectre_v2", handle_nospectre_v2);
130 #endif /* CONFIG_PPC_FSL_BOOK3E || CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64 */
131
132 #ifdef CONFIG_PPC_FSL_BOOK3E
setup_spectre_v2(void)133 void setup_spectre_v2(void)
134 {
135 if (no_spectrev2 || cpu_mitigations_off())
136 do_btb_flush_fixups();
137 else
138 btb_flush_enabled = true;
139 }
140 #endif /* CONFIG_PPC_FSL_BOOK3E */
141
142 #ifdef CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64
cpu_show_meltdown(struct device * dev,struct device_attribute * attr,char * buf)143 ssize_t cpu_show_meltdown(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
144 {
145 bool thread_priv;
146
147 thread_priv = security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_L1D_THREAD_PRIV);
148
149 if (rfi_flush) {
150 struct seq_buf s;
151 seq_buf_init(&s, buf, PAGE_SIZE - 1);
152
153 seq_buf_printf(&s, "Mitigation: RFI Flush");
154 if (thread_priv)
155 seq_buf_printf(&s, ", L1D private per thread");
156
157 seq_buf_printf(&s, "\n");
158
159 return s.len;
160 }
161
162 if (thread_priv)
163 return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable: L1D private per thread\n");
164
165 if (!security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_HV) &&
166 !security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_PR))
167 return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
168
169 return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
170 }
171
cpu_show_l1tf(struct device * dev,struct device_attribute * attr,char * buf)172 ssize_t cpu_show_l1tf(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
173 {
174 return cpu_show_meltdown(dev, attr, buf);
175 }
176 #endif
177
cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct device * dev,struct device_attribute * attr,char * buf)178 ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
179 {
180 struct seq_buf s;
181
182 seq_buf_init(&s, buf, PAGE_SIZE - 1);
183
184 if (security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_BNDS_CHK_SPEC_BAR)) {
185 if (barrier_nospec_enabled)
186 seq_buf_printf(&s, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization");
187 else
188 seq_buf_printf(&s, "Vulnerable");
189
190 if (security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_SPEC_BAR_ORI31))
191 seq_buf_printf(&s, ", ori31 speculation barrier enabled");
192
193 seq_buf_printf(&s, "\n");
194 } else
195 seq_buf_printf(&s, "Not affected\n");
196
197 return s.len;
198 }
199
cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device * dev,struct device_attribute * attr,char * buf)200 ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
201 {
202 struct seq_buf s;
203 bool bcs, ccd;
204
205 seq_buf_init(&s, buf, PAGE_SIZE - 1);
206
207 bcs = security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_BCCTRL_SERIALISED);
208 ccd = security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_COUNT_CACHE_DISABLED);
209
210 if (bcs || ccd) {
211 seq_buf_printf(&s, "Mitigation: ");
212
213 if (bcs)
214 seq_buf_printf(&s, "Indirect branch serialisation (kernel only)");
215
216 if (bcs && ccd)
217 seq_buf_printf(&s, ", ");
218
219 if (ccd)
220 seq_buf_printf(&s, "Indirect branch cache disabled");
221
222 } else if (count_cache_flush_type != BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_NONE) {
223 seq_buf_printf(&s, "Mitigation: Software count cache flush");
224
225 if (count_cache_flush_type == BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_HW)
226 seq_buf_printf(&s, " (hardware accelerated)");
227
228 } else if (btb_flush_enabled) {
229 seq_buf_printf(&s, "Mitigation: Branch predictor state flush");
230 } else {
231 seq_buf_printf(&s, "Vulnerable");
232 }
233
234 if (bcs || ccd || count_cache_flush_type != BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_NONE) {
235 if (link_stack_flush_type != BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_NONE)
236 seq_buf_printf(&s, ", Software link stack flush");
237 if (link_stack_flush_type == BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_HW)
238 seq_buf_printf(&s, " (hardware accelerated)");
239 }
240
241 seq_buf_printf(&s, "\n");
242
243 return s.len;
244 }
245
246 #ifdef CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64
247 /*
248 * Store-forwarding barrier support.
249 */
250
251 static enum stf_barrier_type stf_enabled_flush_types;
252 static bool no_stf_barrier;
253 bool stf_barrier;
254
handle_no_stf_barrier(char * p)255 static int __init handle_no_stf_barrier(char *p)
256 {
257 pr_info("stf-barrier: disabled on command line.");
258 no_stf_barrier = true;
259 return 0;
260 }
261
262 early_param("no_stf_barrier", handle_no_stf_barrier);
263
stf_barrier_type_get(void)264 enum stf_barrier_type stf_barrier_type_get(void)
265 {
266 return stf_enabled_flush_types;
267 }
268
269 /* This is the generic flag used by other architectures */
handle_ssbd(char * p)270 static int __init handle_ssbd(char *p)
271 {
272 if (!p || strncmp(p, "auto", 5) == 0 || strncmp(p, "on", 2) == 0 ) {
273 /* Until firmware tells us, we have the barrier with auto */
274 return 0;
275 } else if (strncmp(p, "off", 3) == 0) {
276 handle_no_stf_barrier(NULL);
277 return 0;
278 } else
279 return 1;
280
281 return 0;
282 }
283 early_param("spec_store_bypass_disable", handle_ssbd);
284
285 /* This is the generic flag used by other architectures */
handle_no_ssbd(char * p)286 static int __init handle_no_ssbd(char *p)
287 {
288 handle_no_stf_barrier(NULL);
289 return 0;
290 }
291 early_param("nospec_store_bypass_disable", handle_no_ssbd);
292
stf_barrier_enable(bool enable)293 static void stf_barrier_enable(bool enable)
294 {
295 if (enable)
296 do_stf_barrier_fixups(stf_enabled_flush_types);
297 else
298 do_stf_barrier_fixups(STF_BARRIER_NONE);
299
300 stf_barrier = enable;
301 }
302
setup_stf_barrier(void)303 void setup_stf_barrier(void)
304 {
305 enum stf_barrier_type type;
306 bool enable, hv;
307
308 hv = cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_HVMODE);
309
310 /* Default to fallback in case fw-features are not available */
311 if (cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_ARCH_300))
312 type = STF_BARRIER_EIEIO;
313 else if (cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_ARCH_207S))
314 type = STF_BARRIER_SYNC_ORI;
315 else if (cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_ARCH_206))
316 type = STF_BARRIER_FALLBACK;
317 else
318 type = STF_BARRIER_NONE;
319
320 enable = security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_FAVOUR_SECURITY) &&
321 (security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_PR) ||
322 (security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_HV) && hv));
323
324 if (type == STF_BARRIER_FALLBACK) {
325 pr_info("stf-barrier: fallback barrier available\n");
326 } else if (type == STF_BARRIER_SYNC_ORI) {
327 pr_info("stf-barrier: hwsync barrier available\n");
328 } else if (type == STF_BARRIER_EIEIO) {
329 pr_info("stf-barrier: eieio barrier available\n");
330 }
331
332 stf_enabled_flush_types = type;
333
334 if (!no_stf_barrier && !cpu_mitigations_off())
335 stf_barrier_enable(enable);
336 }
337
cpu_show_spec_store_bypass(struct device * dev,struct device_attribute * attr,char * buf)338 ssize_t cpu_show_spec_store_bypass(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
339 {
340 if (stf_barrier && stf_enabled_flush_types != STF_BARRIER_NONE) {
341 const char *type;
342 switch (stf_enabled_flush_types) {
343 case STF_BARRIER_EIEIO:
344 type = "eieio";
345 break;
346 case STF_BARRIER_SYNC_ORI:
347 type = "hwsync";
348 break;
349 case STF_BARRIER_FALLBACK:
350 type = "fallback";
351 break;
352 default:
353 type = "unknown";
354 }
355 return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: Kernel entry/exit barrier (%s)\n", type);
356 }
357
358 if (!security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_HV) &&
359 !security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_PR))
360 return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
361
362 return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
363 }
364
ssb_prctl_get(struct task_struct * task)365 static int ssb_prctl_get(struct task_struct *task)
366 {
367 if (stf_enabled_flush_types == STF_BARRIER_NONE)
368 /*
369 * We don't have an explicit signal from firmware that we're
370 * vulnerable or not, we only have certain CPU revisions that
371 * are known to be vulnerable.
372 *
373 * We assume that if we're on another CPU, where the barrier is
374 * NONE, then we are not vulnerable.
375 */
376 return PR_SPEC_NOT_AFFECTED;
377 else
378 /*
379 * If we do have a barrier type then we are vulnerable. The
380 * barrier is not a global or per-process mitigation, so the
381 * only value we can report here is PR_SPEC_ENABLE, which
382 * appears as "vulnerable" in /proc.
383 */
384 return PR_SPEC_ENABLE;
385
386 return -EINVAL;
387 }
388
arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(struct task_struct * task,unsigned long which)389 int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long which)
390 {
391 switch (which) {
392 case PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS:
393 return ssb_prctl_get(task);
394 default:
395 return -ENODEV;
396 }
397 }
398
399 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_FS
stf_barrier_set(void * data,u64 val)400 static int stf_barrier_set(void *data, u64 val)
401 {
402 bool enable;
403
404 if (val == 1)
405 enable = true;
406 else if (val == 0)
407 enable = false;
408 else
409 return -EINVAL;
410
411 /* Only do anything if we're changing state */
412 if (enable != stf_barrier)
413 stf_barrier_enable(enable);
414
415 return 0;
416 }
417
stf_barrier_get(void * data,u64 * val)418 static int stf_barrier_get(void *data, u64 *val)
419 {
420 *val = stf_barrier ? 1 : 0;
421 return 0;
422 }
423
424 DEFINE_DEBUGFS_ATTRIBUTE(fops_stf_barrier, stf_barrier_get, stf_barrier_set,
425 "%llu\n");
426
stf_barrier_debugfs_init(void)427 static __init int stf_barrier_debugfs_init(void)
428 {
429 debugfs_create_file_unsafe("stf_barrier", 0600, powerpc_debugfs_root,
430 NULL, &fops_stf_barrier);
431 return 0;
432 }
433 device_initcall(stf_barrier_debugfs_init);
434 #endif /* CONFIG_DEBUG_FS */
435
update_branch_cache_flush(void)436 static void update_branch_cache_flush(void)
437 {
438 u32 *site;
439
440 #ifdef CONFIG_KVM_BOOK3S_HV_POSSIBLE
441 site = &patch__call_kvm_flush_link_stack;
442 // This controls the branch from guest_exit_cont to kvm_flush_link_stack
443 if (link_stack_flush_type == BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_NONE) {
444 patch_instruction_site(site, ppc_inst(PPC_INST_NOP));
445 } else {
446 // Could use HW flush, but that could also flush count cache
447 patch_branch_site(site, (u64)&kvm_flush_link_stack, BRANCH_SET_LINK);
448 }
449 #endif
450
451 // Patch out the bcctr first, then nop the rest
452 site = &patch__call_flush_branch_caches3;
453 patch_instruction_site(site, ppc_inst(PPC_INST_NOP));
454 site = &patch__call_flush_branch_caches2;
455 patch_instruction_site(site, ppc_inst(PPC_INST_NOP));
456 site = &patch__call_flush_branch_caches1;
457 patch_instruction_site(site, ppc_inst(PPC_INST_NOP));
458
459 // This controls the branch from _switch to flush_branch_caches
460 if (count_cache_flush_type == BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_NONE &&
461 link_stack_flush_type == BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_NONE) {
462 // Nothing to be done
463
464 } else if (count_cache_flush_type == BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_HW &&
465 link_stack_flush_type == BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_HW) {
466 // Patch in the bcctr last
467 site = &patch__call_flush_branch_caches1;
468 patch_instruction_site(site, ppc_inst(0x39207fff)); // li r9,0x7fff
469 site = &patch__call_flush_branch_caches2;
470 patch_instruction_site(site, ppc_inst(0x7d2903a6)); // mtctr r9
471 site = &patch__call_flush_branch_caches3;
472 patch_instruction_site(site, ppc_inst(PPC_INST_BCCTR_FLUSH));
473
474 } else {
475 patch_branch_site(site, (u64)&flush_branch_caches, BRANCH_SET_LINK);
476
477 // If we just need to flush the link stack, early return
478 if (count_cache_flush_type == BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_NONE) {
479 patch_instruction_site(&patch__flush_link_stack_return,
480 ppc_inst(PPC_INST_BLR));
481
482 // If we have flush instruction, early return
483 } else if (count_cache_flush_type == BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_HW) {
484 patch_instruction_site(&patch__flush_count_cache_return,
485 ppc_inst(PPC_INST_BLR));
486 }
487 }
488 }
489
toggle_branch_cache_flush(bool enable)490 static void toggle_branch_cache_flush(bool enable)
491 {
492 if (!enable || !security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_FLUSH_COUNT_CACHE)) {
493 if (count_cache_flush_type != BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_NONE)
494 count_cache_flush_type = BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_NONE;
495
496 pr_info("count-cache-flush: flush disabled.\n");
497 } else {
498 if (security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_BCCTR_FLUSH_ASSIST)) {
499 count_cache_flush_type = BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_HW;
500 pr_info("count-cache-flush: hardware flush enabled.\n");
501 } else {
502 count_cache_flush_type = BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_SW;
503 pr_info("count-cache-flush: software flush enabled.\n");
504 }
505 }
506
507 if (!enable || !security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_FLUSH_LINK_STACK)) {
508 if (link_stack_flush_type != BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_NONE)
509 link_stack_flush_type = BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_NONE;
510
511 pr_info("link-stack-flush: flush disabled.\n");
512 } else {
513 if (security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_BCCTR_LINK_FLUSH_ASSIST)) {
514 link_stack_flush_type = BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_HW;
515 pr_info("link-stack-flush: hardware flush enabled.\n");
516 } else {
517 link_stack_flush_type = BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_SW;
518 pr_info("link-stack-flush: software flush enabled.\n");
519 }
520 }
521
522 update_branch_cache_flush();
523 }
524
setup_count_cache_flush(void)525 void setup_count_cache_flush(void)
526 {
527 bool enable = true;
528
529 if (no_spectrev2 || cpu_mitigations_off()) {
530 if (security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_BCCTRL_SERIALISED) ||
531 security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_COUNT_CACHE_DISABLED))
532 pr_warn("Spectre v2 mitigations not fully under software control, can't disable\n");
533
534 enable = false;
535 }
536
537 /*
538 * There's no firmware feature flag/hypervisor bit to tell us we need to
539 * flush the link stack on context switch. So we set it here if we see
540 * either of the Spectre v2 mitigations that aim to protect userspace.
541 */
542 if (security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_COUNT_CACHE_DISABLED) ||
543 security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_FLUSH_COUNT_CACHE))
544 security_ftr_set(SEC_FTR_FLUSH_LINK_STACK);
545
546 toggle_branch_cache_flush(enable);
547 }
548
549 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_FS
count_cache_flush_set(void * data,u64 val)550 static int count_cache_flush_set(void *data, u64 val)
551 {
552 bool enable;
553
554 if (val == 1)
555 enable = true;
556 else if (val == 0)
557 enable = false;
558 else
559 return -EINVAL;
560
561 toggle_branch_cache_flush(enable);
562
563 return 0;
564 }
565
count_cache_flush_get(void * data,u64 * val)566 static int count_cache_flush_get(void *data, u64 *val)
567 {
568 if (count_cache_flush_type == BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_NONE)
569 *val = 0;
570 else
571 *val = 1;
572
573 return 0;
574 }
575
576 DEFINE_DEBUGFS_ATTRIBUTE(fops_count_cache_flush, count_cache_flush_get,
577 count_cache_flush_set, "%llu\n");
578
count_cache_flush_debugfs_init(void)579 static __init int count_cache_flush_debugfs_init(void)
580 {
581 debugfs_create_file_unsafe("count_cache_flush", 0600,
582 powerpc_debugfs_root, NULL,
583 &fops_count_cache_flush);
584 return 0;
585 }
586 device_initcall(count_cache_flush_debugfs_init);
587 #endif /* CONFIG_DEBUG_FS */
588 #endif /* CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64 */
589