/security/selinux/ss/ |
D | context.h | 45 dst->range.level[0].sens = src->range.level[0].sens; in mls_context_cpy() 46 rc = ebitmap_cpy(&dst->range.level[0].cat, &src->range.level[0].cat); in mls_context_cpy() 50 dst->range.level[1].sens = src->range.level[1].sens; in mls_context_cpy() 51 rc = ebitmap_cpy(&dst->range.level[1].cat, &src->range.level[1].cat); in mls_context_cpy() 53 ebitmap_destroy(&dst->range.level[0].cat); in mls_context_cpy() 65 dst->range.level[0].sens = src->range.level[0].sens; in mls_context_cpy_low() 66 rc = ebitmap_cpy(&dst->range.level[0].cat, &src->range.level[0].cat); in mls_context_cpy_low() 70 dst->range.level[1].sens = src->range.level[0].sens; in mls_context_cpy_low() 71 rc = ebitmap_cpy(&dst->range.level[1].cat, &src->range.level[0].cat); in mls_context_cpy_low() 73 ebitmap_destroy(&dst->range.level[0].cat); in mls_context_cpy_low() [all …]
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D | mls.c | 48 int index_sens = context->range.level[l].sens; in mls_compute_context_len() 54 e = &context->range.level[l].cat; in mls_compute_context_len() 73 if (mls_level_eq(&context->range.level[0], in mls_compute_context_len() 74 &context->range.level[1])) in mls_compute_context_len() 108 context->range.level[l].sens - 1)); in mls_sid_to_context() 114 e = &context->range.level[l].cat; in mls_sid_to_context() 150 if (mls_level_eq(&context->range.level[0], in mls_sid_to_context() 151 &context->range.level[1])) in mls_sid_to_context() 178 return ebitmap_contains(&levdatum->level->cat, &l->cat, in mls_level_isvalid() 184 return (mls_level_isvalid(p, &r->level[0]) && in mls_range_isvalid() [all …]
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D | sidtab.c | 150 u32 level = 0; in sidtab_level_from_count() local 154 ++level; in sidtab_level_from_count() 156 return level; in sidtab_level_from_count() 159 static int sidtab_alloc_roots(struct sidtab *s, u32 level) in sidtab_alloc_roots() argument 169 for (l = 1; l <= level; ++l) in sidtab_alloc_roots() 184 u32 level, capacity_shift, leaf_index = index / SIDTAB_LEAF_ENTRIES; in sidtab_do_lookup() local 187 level = sidtab_level_from_count(index + 1); in sidtab_do_lookup() 188 capacity_shift = level * SIDTAB_INNER_SHIFT; in sidtab_do_lookup() 191 if (alloc && sidtab_alloc_roots(s, level) != 0) in sidtab_do_lookup() 195 entry = &s->roots[level]; in sidtab_do_lookup() [all …]
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D | mls_types.h | 27 struct mls_level level[2]; /* low == level[0], high == level[1] */ member 49 (mls_level_dom(&(r2).level[0], &(r1).level[0]) && \ 50 mls_level_dom(&(r1).level[1], &(r2).level[1]))
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D | mls.h | 109 hash = jhash_2words(r->level[0].sens, r->level[1].sens, hash); in mls_range_hash() 110 hash = ebitmap_hash(&r->level[0].cat, hash); in mls_range_hash() 111 hash = ebitmap_hash(&r->level[1].cat, hash); in mls_range_hash()
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D | services.c | 339 l1 = &(scontext->range.level[0]); in constraint_expr_eval() 340 l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[0]); in constraint_expr_eval() 343 l1 = &(scontext->range.level[0]); in constraint_expr_eval() 344 l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[1]); in constraint_expr_eval() 347 l1 = &(scontext->range.level[1]); in constraint_expr_eval() 348 l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[0]); in constraint_expr_eval() 351 l1 = &(scontext->range.level[1]); in constraint_expr_eval() 352 l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[1]); in constraint_expr_eval() 355 l1 = &(scontext->range.level[0]); in constraint_expr_eval() 356 l2 = &(scontext->range.level[1]); in constraint_expr_eval() [all …]
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D | policydb.c | 289 ebitmap_destroy(&usrdatum->range.level[0].cat); in user_destroy() 290 ebitmap_destroy(&usrdatum->range.level[1].cat); in user_destroy() 304 if (levdatum->level) in sens_destroy() 305 ebitmap_destroy(&levdatum->level->cat); in sens_destroy() 306 kfree(levdatum->level); in sens_destroy() 353 ebitmap_destroy(&rt->level[0].cat); in range_tr_destroy() 354 ebitmap_destroy(&rt->level[1].cat); in range_tr_destroy() 647 if (!levdatum->level->sens || in sens_index() 648 levdatum->level->sens > p->p_levels.nprim) in sens_index() 651 p->sym_val_to_name[SYM_LEVELS][levdatum->level->sens - 1] = key; in sens_index() [all …]
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D | policydb.h | 132 struct mls_level *level; /* sensitivity and associated categories */ member
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/security/lockdown/ |
D | lockdown.c | 26 static int lock_kernel_down(const char *where, enum lockdown_reason level) in lock_kernel_down() argument 28 if (kernel_locked_down >= level) in lock_kernel_down() 31 kernel_locked_down = level; in lock_kernel_down() 37 static int __init lockdown_param(char *level) in lockdown_param() argument 39 if (!level) in lockdown_param() 42 if (strcmp(level, "integrity") == 0) in lockdown_param() 44 else if (strcmp(level, "confidentiality") == 0) in lockdown_param() 97 enum lockdown_reason level = lockdown_levels[i]; in lockdown_read() local 99 if (lockdown_reasons[level]) { in lockdown_read() 100 const char *label = lockdown_reasons[level]; in lockdown_read() [all …]
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/security/landlock/ |
D | ruleset.c | 177 if ((*layers)[0].level == 0) { in insert_rule() 184 if (WARN_ON_ONCE(this->layers[0].level != 0)) in insert_rule() 190 if (WARN_ON_ONCE(this->layers[0].level == 0)) in insert_rule() 222 .level = ~0, in build_check_layer() 226 BUILD_BUG_ON(layer.level < LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS); in build_check_layer() 238 .level = 0, in landlock_insert_rule() 290 .level = dst->num_layers, in merge_ruleset() 297 if (WARN_ON_ONCE(walker_rule->layers[0].level != 0)) { in merge_ruleset()
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D | ruleset.h | 39 u16 level; member
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D | fs.c | 242 const layer_mask_t layer_bit = BIT_ULL(layer->level - 1); in unmask_layers()
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/security/apparmor/ |
D | policy_ns.c | 255 ns->level = parent->level + 1; in __aa_create_ns() 256 mutex_lock_nested(&ns->lock, ns->level); in __aa_create_ns() 312 mutex_lock_nested(&parent->lock, parent->level); in aa_prepare_ns() 335 mutex_lock_nested(&ns->lock, ns->level); in destroy_ns()
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D | policy.c | 551 mutex_lock_nested(&profile->ns->lock, profile->ns->level); in aa_new_null_profile() 656 user_ns->level == view_ns->level))) in policy_view_capable() 913 mutex_lock_nested(&ns->lock, ns->level); in aa_replace_profiles() 1128 mutex_lock_nested(&ns->parent->lock, ns->parent->level); in aa_remove_profiles() 1134 mutex_lock_nested(&ns->lock, ns->level); in aa_remove_profiles()
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D | apparmorfs.c | 539 mutex_lock_nested(&rev->ns->lock, rev->ns->level); in ns_revision_read() 549 mutex_lock_nested(&rev->ns->lock, rev->ns->level); in ns_revision_read() 583 mutex_lock_nested(&rev->ns->lock, rev->ns->level); in ns_revision_poll() 1185 seq_printf(seq, "%d\n", labels_ns(label)->level); in seq_ns_level_show() 1202 SEQ_NS_FOPS(level); 1800 mutex_lock_nested(&parent->lock, parent->level); in ns_mkdir_op() 1849 mutex_lock_nested(&parent->lock, parent->level); in ns_rmdir_op() 1904 mutex_lock_nested(&sub->lock, sub->level); in __aafs_ns_rmdir() 2034 mutex_lock_nested(&sub->lock, sub->level); in __aafs_ns_mkdir() 2075 mutex_lock_nested(&next->lock, next->level); in __next_ns() [all …]
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D | lsm.c | 1005 int level, int optname) in aa_sock_opt_perm() argument 1012 opt_perm(op, request, sock, level, optname), in aa_sock_opt_perm() 1019 static int apparmor_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, in apparmor_socket_getsockopt() argument 1023 level, optname); in apparmor_socket_getsockopt() 1029 static int apparmor_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, in apparmor_socket_setsockopt() argument 1033 level, optname); in apparmor_socket_setsockopt()
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/security/selinux/ |
D | netlabel.c | 482 static inline int selinux_netlbl_option(int level, int optname) in selinux_netlbl_option() argument 484 return (level == IPPROTO_IP && optname == IP_OPTIONS) || in selinux_netlbl_option() 485 (level == IPPROTO_IPV6 && optname == IPV6_HOPOPTS); in selinux_netlbl_option() 502 int level, in selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt() argument 510 if (selinux_netlbl_option(level, optname) && in selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt()
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/security/keys/ |
D | keyring.c | 268 static unsigned long keyring_get_key_chunk(const void *data, int level) in keyring_get_key_chunk() argument 275 level /= ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_SIZE; in keyring_get_key_chunk() 276 switch (level) { in keyring_get_key_chunk() 286 level -= 4; in keyring_get_key_chunk() 291 d += level * sizeof(long); in keyring_get_key_chunk() 303 static unsigned long keyring_get_object_key_chunk(const void *object, int level) in keyring_get_object_key_chunk() argument 306 return keyring_get_key_chunk(&key->index_key, level); in keyring_get_object_key_chunk() 331 int level, i; in keyring_diff_objects() local 333 level = 0; in keyring_diff_objects() 338 level += ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_SIZE / 8; in keyring_diff_objects() [all …]
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D | Kconfig | 53 LSMs gets to rule on which admin-level processes get to access the
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/security/selinux/include/ |
D | netlabel.h | 53 int level, 133 int level, in selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt() argument
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/security/apparmor/include/ |
D | policy_ns.h | 67 int level; member
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/security/smack/ |
D | smack_access.c | 487 int smk_netlbl_mls(int level, char *catset, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap, in smk_netlbl_mls() argument 497 sap->attr.mls.lvl = level; in smk_netlbl_mls()
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/security/integrity/ |
D | Kconfig | 91 controls the level of integrity auditing messages.
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/security/ |
D | Kconfig.hardening | 13 such variables, depending on the chosen level of coverage. 51 This chooses the level of coverage over classes of potentially
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D | commoncap.c | 84 if (ns->level <= cred->user_ns->level) in cap_capable()
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