Searched refs:capable (Results 1 – 15 of 15) sorted by relevance
| /security/ |
| D | min_addr.c | 37 if (write && !capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO)) in mmap_min_addr_handler()
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| D | commoncap.c | 114 if (!capable(CAP_SYS_TIME)) in cap_settime()
1452 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, cap_capable),
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| D | device_cgroup.c | 619 if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) in devcgroup_update_access()
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| D | security.c | 808 return call_int_hook(capable, 0, cred, ns, cap, opts); in security_capable()
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| /security/integrity/evm/ |
| D | evm_secfs.c | 72 if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || (evm_initialized & EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE)) in evm_write_key()
189 if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || evm_xattrs_locked) in evm_write_xattrs()
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| D | evm_main.c | 548 if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) in evm_protect_xattr()
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| /security/safesetid/ |
| D | lsm.c | 247 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, safesetid_security_capable)
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| /security/apparmor/ |
| D | policy.c | 666 bool capable = ns_capable(user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN); in policy_admin_capable() local
668 AA_DEBUG("cap_mac_admin? %d\n", capable); in policy_admin_capable()
671 return policy_view_capable(ns) && capable && !aa_g_lock_policy; in policy_admin_capable()
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| D | lsm.c | 1185 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, apparmor_capable),
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| /security/keys/ |
| D | keyctl.c | 433 if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) { in keyctl_invalidate_key()
478 if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) { in keyctl_keyring_clear()
995 if (is_privileged_op && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) in keyctl_chown_key()
1096 if (uid_eq(key->uid, current_fsuid()) || capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) { in keyctl_setperm_key()
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| /security/yama/ |
| D | yama_lsm.c | 437 if (write && !capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE)) in yama_dointvec_minmax()
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| /security/integrity/ima/ |
| D | ima_fs.c | 393 if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) in ima_open_policy()
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| D | ima_appraise.c | 556 if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) in ima_protect_xattr()
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| /security/keys/trusted-keys/ |
| D | trusted_tpm1.c | 382 if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) in pcrlock()
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| /security/selinux/ |
| D | hooks.c | 7176 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, selinux_capable),
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