1### 2### Untrusted_app_all. 3### 4### This file defines the rules shared by all untrusted app domains except 5### apps which target the v2 security sandbox (ephemeral_app for instant apps, 6### untrusted_v2_app for fully installed v2 apps). 7### Apps are labeled based on mac_permissions.xml (maps signer and 8### optionally package name to seinfo value) and seapp_contexts (maps UID 9### and optionally seinfo value to domain for process and type for data 10### directory). The untrusted_app_all attribute is assigned to all default 11### seapp_contexts for any app with UID between APP_AID (10000) 12### and AID_ISOLATED_START (99000) if the app has no specific seinfo 13### value as determined from mac_permissions.xml. In current AOSP, this 14### attribute is assigned to all non-system apps as well as to any system apps 15### that are not signed by the platform key. To move 16### a system app into a specific domain, add a signer entry for it to 17### mac_permissions.xml and assign it one of the pre-existing seinfo values 18### or define and use a new seinfo value in both mac_permissions.xml and 19### seapp_contexts. 20### 21### Note that rules that should apply to all untrusted apps must be in app.te or also 22### added to untrusted_v2_app.te and ephemeral_app.te. 23 24# Legacy text relocations 25allow untrusted_app_all apk_data_file:file execmod; 26 27# Some apps ship with shared libraries and binaries that they write out 28# to their sandbox directory and then execute. 29allow untrusted_app_all app_data_file:file { rx_file_perms execmod }; 30 31# ASEC 32allow untrusted_app_all asec_apk_file:file r_file_perms; 33allow untrusted_app_all asec_apk_file:dir r_dir_perms; 34# Execute libs in asec containers. 35allow untrusted_app_all asec_public_file:file { execute execmod }; 36 37# Used by Finsky / Android "Verify Apps" functionality when 38# running "adb install foo.apk". 39# TODO: Long term, we don't want apps probing into shell data files. 40# Figure out a way to remove these rules. 41allow untrusted_app_all shell_data_file:file r_file_perms; 42allow untrusted_app_all shell_data_file:dir r_dir_perms; 43 44# Allow to read staged apks. 45allow untrusted_app_all { apk_tmp_file apk_private_tmp_file }:file {read getattr}; 46 47# Read and write system app data files passed over Binder. 48# Motivating case was /data/data/com.android.settings/cache/*.jpg for 49# cropping or taking user photos. 50allow untrusted_app_all system_app_data_file:file { read write getattr }; 51 52# 53# Rules migrated from old app domains coalesced into untrusted_app. 54# This includes what used to be media_app, shared_app, and release_app. 55# 56 57# Access to /data/media. 58allow untrusted_app_all media_rw_data_file:dir create_dir_perms; 59allow untrusted_app_all media_rw_data_file:file create_file_perms; 60 61# Traverse into /mnt/media_rw for bypassing FUSE daemon 62# TODO: narrow this to just MediaProvider 63allow untrusted_app_all mnt_media_rw_file:dir search; 64 65# allow cts to query all services 66allow untrusted_app_all servicemanager:service_manager list; 67 68allow untrusted_app_all audioserver_service:service_manager find; 69allow untrusted_app_all cameraserver_service:service_manager find; 70allow untrusted_app_all drmserver_service:service_manager find; 71allow untrusted_app_all mediaserver_service:service_manager find; 72allow untrusted_app_all mediaextractor_service:service_manager find; 73allow untrusted_app_all mediacodec_service:service_manager find; 74allow untrusted_app_all mediametrics_service:service_manager find; 75allow untrusted_app_all mediadrmserver_service:service_manager find; 76allow untrusted_app_all nfc_service:service_manager find; 77allow untrusted_app_all radio_service:service_manager find; 78allow untrusted_app_all surfaceflinger_service:service_manager find; 79allow untrusted_app_all app_api_service:service_manager find; 80allow untrusted_app_all vr_manager_service:service_manager find; 81 82# Allow GMS core to access perfprofd output, which is stored 83# in /data/misc/perfprofd/. GMS core will need to list all 84# data stored in that directory to process them one by one. 85userdebug_or_eng(` 86 allow untrusted_app_all perfprofd_data_file:file r_file_perms; 87 allow untrusted_app_all perfprofd_data_file:dir r_dir_perms; 88') 89 90# gdbserver for ndk-gdb ptrace attaches to app process. 91allow untrusted_app_all self:process ptrace; 92 93# Cts: HwRngTest 94allow untrusted_app_all sysfs_hwrandom:dir search; 95allow untrusted_app_all sysfs_hwrandom:file r_file_perms; 96 97# Allow apps to view preloaded media content 98allow untrusted_app_all preloads_media_file:dir r_dir_perms; 99allow untrusted_app_all preloads_media_file:file r_file_perms; 100allow untrusted_app_all preloads_data_file:dir search; 101 102# Allow untrusted apps read / execute access to /vendor/app for there can 103# be pre-installed vendor apps that package a library within themselves. 104# TODO (b/37784178) Consider creating a special type for /vendor/app installed 105# apps. 106allow untrusted_app_all vendor_app_file:dir { open getattr read search }; 107allow untrusted_app_all vendor_app_file:file { open getattr read execute }; 108allow untrusted_app_all vendor_app_file:lnk_file { open getattr read }; 109