1# Domain used when running /system/bin/simpleperf to profile a specific app. 2# Entered either by the app itself exec-ing the binary, or through 3# simpleperf_app_runner (with shell as its origin). Certain other domains 4# (runas_app, shell) can also exec this binary without a domain transition. 5typeattribute simpleperf coredomain; 6type simpleperf_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type; 7 8domain_auto_trans({ untrusted_app_all -runas_app }, simpleperf_exec, simpleperf) 9 10# When running in this domain, simpleperf is scoped to profiling an individual 11# app. The necessary MAC permissions for profiling are more maintainable and 12# consistent if simpleperf is marked as an app domain as well (as, for example, 13# it will then see the same set of system libraries as the app). 14app_domain(simpleperf) 15untrusted_app_domain(simpleperf) 16 17# Allow ptrace attach to the target app, for reading JIT debug info (using 18# process_vm_readv) during unwinding and symbolization. 19allow simpleperf untrusted_app_all:process ptrace; 20 21# Allow using perf_event_open syscall for profiling the target app. 22allow simpleperf self:perf_event { open read write kernel }; 23 24# Allow /proc/<pid> access for the target app (for example, when trying to 25# discover it by cmdline). 26r_dir_file(simpleperf, untrusted_app_all) 27 28# Suppress denial logspam when simpleperf is trying to find a matching process 29# by scanning /proc/<pid>/cmdline files. The /proc/<pid> directories are within 30# the same domain as their respective processes, most of which this domain is 31# not allowed to see. 32dontaudit simpleperf domain:dir search; 33 34# Neverallows: 35 36# Profiling must be confined to the scope of an individual app. 37neverallow simpleperf self:perf_event ~{ open read write kernel }; 38