1### 2### Untrusted_app_all. 3### 4### This file defines the rules shared by all untrusted app domains except 5### ephemeral_app for instant apps and isolated_app (which has a reduced 6### permission set). 7### Apps are labeled based on mac_permissions.xml (maps signer and 8### optionally package name to seinfo value) and seapp_contexts (maps UID 9### and optionally seinfo value to domain for process and type for data 10### directory). The untrusted_app_all attribute is assigned to all default 11### seapp_contexts for any app with UID between APP_AID (10000) 12### and AID_ISOLATED_START (99000) if the app has no specific seinfo 13### value as determined from mac_permissions.xml. In current AOSP, this 14### attribute is assigned to all non-system apps as well as to any system apps 15### that are not signed by the platform key. To move 16### a system app into a specific domain, add a signer entry for it to 17### mac_permissions.xml and assign it one of the pre-existing seinfo values 18### or define and use a new seinfo value in both mac_permissions.xml and 19### seapp_contexts. 20### 21### Note that rules that should apply to all untrusted apps must be in app.te or also 22### added to ephemeral_app.te. 23 24# Some apps ship with shared libraries and binaries that they write out 25# to their sandbox directory and then execute. 26allow untrusted_app_all privapp_data_file:file { r_file_perms execute }; 27allow untrusted_app_all app_data_file:file { r_file_perms execute }; 28auditallow untrusted_app_all app_data_file:file execute; 29 30# Chrome Crashpad uses the the dynamic linker to load native executables 31# from an APK (b/112050209, crbug.com/928422) 32allow untrusted_app_all system_linker_exec:file execute_no_trans; 33 34# Follow priv-app symlinks. This is used for dynamite functionality. 35allow untrusted_app_all privapp_data_file:lnk_file r_file_perms; 36 37# Allow handling of less common filesystem objects 38allow untrusted_app_all app_data_file:{ lnk_file sock_file fifo_file } create_file_perms; 39 40# Allow loading and deleting executable shared libraries 41# within an application home directory. Such shared libraries would be 42# created by things like renderscript or via other mechanisms. 43allow untrusted_app_all app_exec_data_file:file { r_file_perms execute unlink }; 44 45# ASEC 46allow untrusted_app_all asec_apk_file:file r_file_perms; 47allow untrusted_app_all asec_apk_file:dir r_dir_perms; 48# Execute libs in asec containers. 49allow untrusted_app_all asec_public_file:file { execute }; 50 51# Used by Finsky / Android "Verify Apps" functionality when 52# running "adb install foo.apk". 53# TODO: Long term, we don't want apps probing into shell data files. 54# Figure out a way to remove these rules. 55allow untrusted_app_all shell_data_file:file r_file_perms; 56allow untrusted_app_all shell_data_file:dir r_dir_perms; 57 58# Allow traceur to pass file descriptors through a content provider to untrusted apps 59# for the purpose of sharing files through e.g. gmail 60allow untrusted_app_all trace_data_file:file { getattr read }; 61 62# untrusted apps should not be able to open trace data files, they should depend 63# upon traceur to pass a file descriptor 64neverallow untrusted_app_all trace_data_file:dir *; 65neverallow untrusted_app_all trace_data_file:file { no_w_file_perms open }; 66 67# neverallow untrusted apps accessing debugfs_tracing 68neverallow untrusted_app_all debugfs_tracing:file no_rw_file_perms; 69 70# Allow to read staged apks. 71allow untrusted_app_all { apk_tmp_file apk_private_tmp_file }:file {read getattr}; 72 73# Read and write system app data files passed over Binder. 74# Motivating case was /data/data/com.android.settings/cache/*.jpg for 75# cropping or taking user photos. 76allow untrusted_app_all system_app_data_file:file { read write getattr }; 77 78# 79# Rules migrated from old app domains coalesced into untrusted_app. 80# This includes what used to be media_app, shared_app, and release_app. 81# 82 83# Access to /data/media. 84allow untrusted_app_all media_rw_data_file:dir create_dir_perms; 85allow untrusted_app_all media_rw_data_file:file create_file_perms; 86 87# allow cts to query all services 88allow untrusted_app_all servicemanager:service_manager list; 89 90allow untrusted_app_all audioserver_service:service_manager find; 91allow untrusted_app_all cameraserver_service:service_manager find; 92allow untrusted_app_all drmserver_service:service_manager find; 93allow untrusted_app_all mediaserver_service:service_manager find; 94allow untrusted_app_all mediaextractor_service:service_manager find; 95allow untrusted_app_all mediametrics_service:service_manager find; 96allow untrusted_app_all mediadrmserver_service:service_manager find; 97allow untrusted_app_all nfc_service:service_manager find; 98allow untrusted_app_all radio_service:service_manager find; 99allow untrusted_app_all app_api_service:service_manager find; 100allow untrusted_app_all vr_manager_service:service_manager find; 101 102# gdbserver for ndk-gdb ptrace attaches to app process. 103allow untrusted_app_all self:process ptrace; 104 105# Android Studio Instant Run has the application connect to a 106# runas_app socket listening in the abstract namespace. 107# https://developer.android.com/studio/run/ 108# b/123297648 109allow untrusted_app_all runas_app:unix_stream_socket connectto; 110 111# Untrusted apps need to be able to send a SIGCHLD to runas_app 112# when running under a debugger (b/123612207) 113allow untrusted_app_all runas_app:process sigchld; 114 115# Cts: HwRngTest 116allow untrusted_app_all sysfs_hwrandom:dir search; 117allow untrusted_app_all sysfs_hwrandom:file r_file_perms; 118 119# Allow apps to view preloaded media content 120allow untrusted_app_all preloads_media_file:dir r_dir_perms; 121allow untrusted_app_all preloads_media_file:file r_file_perms; 122allow untrusted_app_all preloads_data_file:dir search; 123 124# Allow untrusted apps read / execute access to /vendor/app for there can 125# be pre-installed vendor apps that package a library within themselves. 126# TODO (b/37784178) Consider creating a special type for /vendor/app installed 127# apps. 128allow untrusted_app_all vendor_app_file:dir { open getattr read search }; 129allow untrusted_app_all vendor_app_file:file { r_file_perms execute }; 130allow untrusted_app_all vendor_app_file:lnk_file { open getattr read }; 131 132# Write app-specific trace data to the Perfetto traced damon. This requires 133# connecting to its producer socket and obtaining a (per-process) tmpfs fd. 134perfetto_producer(untrusted_app_all) 135 136# Allow profiling if the app opts in by being marked profileable/debuggable. 137can_profile_heap(untrusted_app_all) 138can_profile_perf(untrusted_app_all) 139 140# allow untrusted apps to use UDP sockets provided by the system server but not 141# modify them other than to connect 142allow untrusted_app_all system_server:udp_socket { 143 connect getattr read recvfrom sendto write getopt setopt }; 144 145# Allow the renderscript compiler to be run. 146domain_auto_trans(untrusted_app_all, rs_exec, rs) 147 148# suppress denials caused by debugfs_tracing 149dontaudit untrusted_app_all debugfs_tracing:file rw_file_perms; 150 151# This is allowed for targetSdkVersion <= 25 but disallowed on newer versions. 152dontaudit untrusted_app_all net_dns_prop:file read; 153 154# These have been disallowed since Android O. 155# For P, we assume that apps are safely handling the denial. 156dontaudit untrusted_app_all proc_stat:file read; 157dontaudit untrusted_app_all proc_vmstat:file read; 158dontaudit untrusted_app_all proc_uptime:file read; 159 160# Allow the allocation and use of ptys 161# Used by: https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=jackpal.androidterm 162create_pty(untrusted_app_all) 163 164# Allow access to kcov via its ioctl interface for coverage 165# guided kernel fuzzing. 166userdebug_or_eng(` 167 allow untrusted_app_all debugfs_kcov:file rw_file_perms; 168 allowxperm untrusted_app_all debugfs_kcov:file ioctl { KCOV_INIT_TRACE KCOV_ENABLE KCOV_DISABLE }; 169 # The use of debugfs kcov is considered a breach of the kernel integrity 170 # according to the heuristic of lockdown. 171 allow untrusted_app_all self:lockdown integrity; 172') 173 174# Allow signalling simpleperf domain, which is the domain that the simpleperf 175# profiler runs as when executed by the app. The signals are used to control 176# the profiler (which would be profiling the app that is sending the signal). 177allow untrusted_app_all simpleperf:process signal; 178