1# applies all permissions to hal_omx NOT hal_omx_server 2# since OMX must always be in its own process. 3 4binder_call(hal_omx_server, binderservicedomain) 5binder_call(hal_omx_server, { appdomain -isolated_app }) 6 7# Allow hal_omx_server access to composer sync fences 8allow hal_omx_server hal_graphics_composer:fd use; 9 10allow hal_omx_server ion_device:chr_file rw_file_perms; 11allow hal_omx_server hal_camera:fd use; 12 13crash_dump_fallback(hal_omx_server) 14 15# Recieve gralloc buffer FDs from bufferhubd. Note that hal_omx_server never 16# directly connects to bufferhubd via PDX. Instead, a VR app acts as a bridge 17# between those two: it talks to hal_omx_server via Binder and talks to bufferhubd 18# via PDX. Thus, there is no need to use pdx_client macro. 19allow hal_omx_server bufferhubd:fd use; 20 21hal_attribute_hwservice(hal_omx, hal_omx_hwservice) 22 23allow hal_omx_client hidl_token_hwservice:hwservice_manager find; 24 25get_prop(hal_omx_client, media_variant_prop) 26get_prop(hal_omx_server, media_variant_prop) 27 28binder_call(hal_omx_client, hal_omx_server) 29binder_call(hal_omx_server, hal_omx_client) 30 31### 32### neverallow rules 33### 34 35# hal_omx_server should never execute any executable without a 36# domain transition 37neverallow hal_omx_server { file_type fs_type }:file execute_no_trans; 38 39# The goal of the mediaserver split is to place media processing code into 40# restrictive sandboxes with limited responsibilities and thus limited 41# permissions. Example: Audioserver is only responsible for controlling audio 42# hardware and processing audio content. Cameraserver does the same for camera 43# hardware/content. Etc. 44# 45# Media processing code is inherently risky and thus should have limited 46# permissions and be isolated from the rest of the system and network. 47# Lengthier explanation here: 48# https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2016/05/hardening-media-stack.html 49neverallow hal_omx_server domain:{ tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket } *; 50