1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
2 /*
3 * Copyright (c) 2021 SUSE LLC <rpalethorpe@suse.com>
4 * Based on reproducer by Nicolai Stange based on PoC Andy Nguyen
5 */
6 /*\
7 * [Description]
8 *
9 * This will reproduce the bug on x86_64 in 32bit compatibility
10 * mode. It is most reliable with KASAN enabled. Otherwise it relies
11 * on the out-of-bounds write corrupting something which leads to a
12 * crash. It will run in other scenarious, but is not a test for the
13 * CVE.
14 *
15 * See https://google.github.io/security-research/pocs/linux/cve-2021-22555/writeup.html
16 *
17 * Also below is Nicolai's detailed description of the bug itself.
18 *
19 * The problem underlying CVE-2021-22555 fixed by upstream commit
20 * b29c457a6511 ("netfilter: x_tables: fix compat match/target pad
21 * out-of-bound write") is that the (now removed) padding zeroing code
22 * in xt_compat_target_from_user() had been based on the premise that
23 * the user specified ->u.user.target_size, which will be considered
24 * for the target buffer allocation size, is greater or equal than
25 * what's needed to fit the corresponding xt_target instance's
26 * ->targetsize: if OTOH the user specified ->u.user.target_size is
27 * too small, then the memset() destination address calculated by
28 * adding ->targetsize to the payload start will not point at, but
29 * into or even past the padding. For the table's last entry's target
30 * record, this will result in an out-of-bounds write past the
31 * destination buffer allocated for the converted table. The code
32 * below will create a (compat) table such that the converted table's
33 * calculated size will fit exactly into a slab size of 1024 bytes and
34 * that the memset() in xt_compat_target_from_user() will write past
35 * this slab.
36 *
37 * The table will consist of
38 * - the mandatory struct compat_ipt_replace header,
39 * - a single entry consisting of
40 * - the mandatory compat_ipt_entry header
41 * - a single 'state' match entry of appropriate size for
42 * controlling the out-of-bounds write when converting
43 * the target entry following next,
44 * - a single 'REJECT' target entry.
45 * The kernel will transform this into a buffer containing (in
46 * this order)
47 * - a xt_table_info
48 * - a single entry consisting of
49 * - its ipt_entry header
50 * - a single 'state' match entry
51 * - followed by a single 'REJECT' target entry.
52 *
53 * The expected sizes for the 'state' match entries as well as the
54 * 'REJECT' target are the size of the base header struct (32 bytes)
55 * plus the size of an unsigned int (4 bytes) each. In the course of
56 * the compat => non-compat conversion, the kernel will insert four
57 * bytes of padding after the unsigned int payload (c.f. 'off'
58 * adjustments via xt_compat_match_offset() and
59 * xt_compat_target_offset() in xt_compat_match_from_user() and
60 * xt_compat_target_from_user() resp.). This code is based on the
61 * premise that the user sets the given ->u.user.match_size or
62 * ->u.user.target_size consistent to the COMPAT_XT_ALIGN()ed payload
63 * size as specified by the corresponding xt_match instance's
64 * ->matchsize or xt_target instance's ->targetsize. That is, the
65 * padding gets inserted unconditionally during the transformation,
66 * independent of the actual values of ->u.user.match_size or
67 * ->u.user.target_size and the result ends up getting layed out with
68 * proper alignment only if said values match the expectations. That's
69 * not a problem in itself, but this unconditional insertion of
70 * padding must be taken into account in the match_size calculation
71 * below.
72 *
73 * For the match_size calculation below, note that the chosen
74 * target slab size is 1024 and that
75 * - sizeof(xt_table_info) = 64
76 * - sizeof(ipt_entry) = 112
77 * - the kernel will insert four bytes of padding
78 * after the match and target entries each.
79 * - sizeof(struct xt_entry_target) = 32
80 */
81
82 #include <netinet/in.h>
83
84 #include "tst_test.h"
85 #include "tst_safe_net.h"
86 #include "lapi/ip_tables.h"
87
88 static void *buffer;
89
setup(void)90 void setup(void)
91 {
92 if (tst_kernel_bits() == 32 || sizeof(long) > 4) {
93 tst_res(TINFO,
94 "The vulnerability was only present in 32-bit compat mode");
95 }
96
97 tst_setup_netns();
98 }
99
run(void)100 void run(void)
101 {
102 const char *const res_fmt_str =
103 "setsockopt(%d, IPPROTO_IP, IPT_SO_SET_REPLACE, %p, 1)";
104 struct ipt_replace *ipt_replace = buffer;
105 struct ipt_entry *ipt_entry = &ipt_replace->entries[0];
106 struct xt_entry_match *xt_entry_match =
107 (struct xt_entry_match *)&ipt_entry->elems[0];
108 const size_t tgt_size = 32;
109 const size_t match_size = 1024 - 64 - 112 - 4 - tgt_size - 4;
110 struct xt_entry_target *xt_entry_tgt =
111 ((struct xt_entry_target *) (&ipt_entry->elems[0] + match_size));
112 int fd = SAFE_SOCKET(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
113 int result;
114
115 xt_entry_match->u.user.match_size = (u_int16_t)match_size;
116 strcpy(xt_entry_match->u.user.name, "state");
117
118 xt_entry_tgt->u.user.target_size = (u_int16_t)tgt_size;
119 strcpy(xt_entry_tgt->u.user.name, "REJECT");
120
121 ipt_entry->target_offset =
122 (__builtin_offsetof(struct ipt_entry, elems) + match_size);
123 ipt_entry->next_offset = ipt_entry->target_offset + tgt_size;
124
125 strcpy(ipt_replace->name, "filter");
126 ipt_replace->num_entries = 1;
127 ipt_replace->num_counters = 1;
128 ipt_replace->size = ipt_entry->next_offset;
129
130 TEST(setsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_IP, IPT_SO_SET_REPLACE, buffer, 1));
131
132 if (TST_RET == -1 && TST_ERR == ENOPROTOOPT)
133 tst_brk(TCONF | TTERRNO, res_fmt_str, fd, buffer);
134
135 result = (TST_RET == -1 && TST_ERR == EINVAL) ? TPASS : TFAIL;
136 tst_res(result | TTERRNO, res_fmt_str, fd, buffer);
137
138 SAFE_CLOSE(fd);
139 }
140
141 static struct tst_test test = {
142 .setup = setup,
143 .test_all = run,
144 .taint_check = TST_TAINT_W | TST_TAINT_D,
145 .forks_child = 1,
146 .bufs = (struct tst_buffers []) {
147 {&buffer, .size = 2048},
148 {},
149 },
150 .needs_kconfigs = (const char *[]) {
151 "CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_MATCH_STATE",
152 "CONFIG_IP_NF_TARGET_REJECT",
153 "CONFIG_USER_NS=y",
154 "CONFIG_NET_NS=y",
155 NULL
156 },
157 .save_restore = (const struct tst_path_val[]) {
158 {"/proc/sys/user/max_user_namespaces", "1024", TST_SR_SKIP},
159 {}
160 },
161 .tags = (const struct tst_tag[]) {
162 {"linux-git", "b29c457a6511"},
163 {"CVE", "2021-22555"},
164 {}
165 }
166 };
167