1# Performance profiler, backed by perf_event_open(2). 2# See go/perfetto-perf-android. 3typeattribute traced_perf coredomain; 4typeattribute traced_perf mlstrustedsubject; 5 6type traced_perf_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type; 7 8init_daemon_domain(traced_perf) 9perfetto_producer(traced_perf) 10 11# Allow traced_perf full use of perf_event_open(2). It will perform cpu-wide 12# profiling, but retain samples only for profileable processes. 13# Thread-specific profiling is still disallowed due to a PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH 14# check (which would require a process:attach SELinux allow-rule). 15allow traced_perf self:perf_event { open cpu kernel read write tracepoint }; 16 17# Allow CAP_KILL for delivery of dedicated signal to obtain proc-fds from a 18# process. Allow CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH for stack unwinding and symbolization of 19# sampled stacks, which requires opening the backing libraries/executables (as 20# symbols are usually not mapped into the process space). Not all such files 21# are world-readable, e.g. odex files that included user profiles during 22# profile-guided optimization. 23allow traced_perf self:capability { kill dac_read_search }; 24 25# Allow reading /system/data/packages.list. 26allow traced_perf packages_list_file:file r_file_perms; 27 28# Allow reading files for stack unwinding and symbolization. 29r_dir_file(traced_perf, nativetest_data_file) 30r_dir_file(traced_perf, system_file_type) 31r_dir_file(traced_perf, apk_data_file) 32r_dir_file(traced_perf, dalvikcache_data_file) 33r_dir_file(traced_perf, vendor_file_type) 34 35# Do not audit the cases where traced_perf attempts to access /proc/[pid] for 36# domains that it cannot read. 37dontaudit traced_perf domain:dir { search getattr open }; 38 39# Do not audit failures to signal a process, as there are cases when this is 40# expected (native processes on debug builds use the policy for enforcing which 41# processes are profileable). 42dontaudit traced_perf domain:process signal; 43 44# Never allow access to app data files 45neverallow traced_perf { app_data_file privapp_data_file system_app_data_file }:file *; 46 47# Never allow profiling highly privileged processes. 48never_profile_heap(`{ 49 bpfloader 50 init 51 kernel 52 keystore 53 llkd 54 logd 55 ueventd 56 vendor_init 57 vold 58}') 59