1Started by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> 2 3Background 4---------- 5 6what are robust futexes? To answer that, we first need to understand 7what futexes are: normal futexes are special types of locks that in the 8noncontended case can be acquired/released from userspace without having 9to enter the kernel. 10 11A futex is in essence a user-space address, e.g. a 32-bit lock variable 12field. If userspace notices contention (the lock is already owned and 13someone else wants to grab it too) then the lock is marked with a value 14that says "there's a waiter pending", and the sys_futex(FUTEX_WAIT) 15syscall is used to wait for the other guy to release it. The kernel 16creates a 'futex queue' internally, so that it can later on match up the 17waiter with the waker - without them having to know about each other. 18When the owner thread releases the futex, it notices (via the variable 19value) that there were waiter(s) pending, and does the 20sys_futex(FUTEX_WAKE) syscall to wake them up. Once all waiters have 21taken and released the lock, the futex is again back to 'uncontended' 22state, and there's no in-kernel state associated with it. The kernel 23completely forgets that there ever was a futex at that address. This 24method makes futexes very lightweight and scalable. 25 26"Robustness" is about dealing with crashes while holding a lock: if a 27process exits prematurely while holding a pthread_mutex_t lock that is 28also shared with some other process (e.g. yum segfaults while holding a 29pthread_mutex_t, or yum is kill -9-ed), then waiters for that lock need 30to be notified that the last owner of the lock exited in some irregular 31way. 32 33To solve such types of problems, "robust mutex" userspace APIs were 34created: pthread_mutex_lock() returns an error value if the owner exits 35prematurely - and the new owner can decide whether the data protected by 36the lock can be recovered safely. 37 38There is a big conceptual problem with futex based mutexes though: it is 39the kernel that destroys the owner task (e.g. due to a SEGFAULT), but 40the kernel cannot help with the cleanup: if there is no 'futex queue' 41(and in most cases there is none, futexes being fast lightweight locks) 42then the kernel has no information to clean up after the held lock! 43Userspace has no chance to clean up after the lock either - userspace is 44the one that crashes, so it has no opportunity to clean up. Catch-22. 45 46In practice, when e.g. yum is kill -9-ed (or segfaults), a system reboot 47is needed to release that futex based lock. This is one of the leading 48bugreports against yum. 49 50To solve this problem, the traditional approach was to extend the vma 51(virtual memory area descriptor) concept to have a notion of 'pending 52robust futexes attached to this area'. This approach requires 3 new 53syscall variants to sys_futex(): FUTEX_REGISTER, FUTEX_DEREGISTER and 54FUTEX_RECOVER. At do_exit() time, all vmas are searched to see whether 55they have a robust_head set. This approach has two fundamental problems 56left: 57 58 - it has quite complex locking and race scenarios. The vma-based 59 approach had been pending for years, but they are still not completely 60 reliable. 61 62 - they have to scan _every_ vma at sys_exit() time, per thread! 63 64The second disadvantage is a real killer: pthread_exit() takes around 1 65microsecond on Linux, but with thousands (or tens of thousands) of vmas 66every pthread_exit() takes a millisecond or more, also totally 67destroying the CPU's L1 and L2 caches! 68 69This is very much noticeable even for normal process sys_exit_group() 70calls: the kernel has to do the vma scanning unconditionally! (this is 71because the kernel has no knowledge about how many robust futexes there 72are to be cleaned up, because a robust futex might have been registered 73in another task, and the futex variable might have been simply mmap()-ed 74into this process's address space). 75 76This huge overhead forced the creation of CONFIG_FUTEX_ROBUST so that 77normal kernels can turn it off, but worse than that: the overhead makes 78robust futexes impractical for any type of generic Linux distribution. 79 80So something had to be done. 81 82New approach to robust futexes 83------------------------------ 84 85At the heart of this new approach there is a per-thread private list of 86robust locks that userspace is holding (maintained by glibc) - which 87userspace list is registered with the kernel via a new syscall [this 88registration happens at most once per thread lifetime]. At do_exit() 89time, the kernel checks this user-space list: are there any robust futex 90locks to be cleaned up? 91 92In the common case, at do_exit() time, there is no list registered, so 93the cost of robust futexes is just a simple current->robust_list != NULL 94comparison. If the thread has registered a list, then normally the list 95is empty. If the thread/process crashed or terminated in some incorrect 96way then the list might be non-empty: in this case the kernel carefully 97walks the list [not trusting it], and marks all locks that are owned by 98this thread with the FUTEX_OWNER_DIED bit, and wakes up one waiter (if 99any). 100 101The list is guaranteed to be private and per-thread at do_exit() time, 102so it can be accessed by the kernel in a lockless way. 103 104There is one race possible though: since adding to and removing from the 105list is done after the futex is acquired by glibc, there is a few 106instructions window for the thread (or process) to die there, leaving 107the futex hung. To protect against this possibility, userspace (glibc) 108also maintains a simple per-thread 'list_op_pending' field, to allow the 109kernel to clean up if the thread dies after acquiring the lock, but just 110before it could have added itself to the list. Glibc sets this 111list_op_pending field before it tries to acquire the futex, and clears 112it after the list-add (or list-remove) has finished. 113 114That's all that is needed - all the rest of robust-futex cleanup is done 115in userspace [just like with the previous patches]. 116 117Ulrich Drepper has implemented the necessary glibc support for this new 118mechanism, which fully enables robust mutexes. 119 120Key differences of this userspace-list based approach, compared to the 121vma based method: 122 123 - it's much, much faster: at thread exit time, there's no need to loop 124 over every vma (!), which the VM-based method has to do. Only a very 125 simple 'is the list empty' op is done. 126 127 - no VM changes are needed - 'struct address_space' is left alone. 128 129 - no registration of individual locks is needed: robust mutexes dont 130 need any extra per-lock syscalls. Robust mutexes thus become a very 131 lightweight primitive - so they dont force the application designer 132 to do a hard choice between performance and robustness - robust 133 mutexes are just as fast. 134 135 - no per-lock kernel allocation happens. 136 137 - no resource limits are needed. 138 139 - no kernel-space recovery call (FUTEX_RECOVER) is needed. 140 141 - the implementation and the locking is "obvious", and there are no 142 interactions with the VM. 143 144Performance 145----------- 146 147I have benchmarked the time needed for the kernel to process a list of 1 148million (!) held locks, using the new method [on a 2GHz CPU]: 149 150 - with FUTEX_WAIT set [contended mutex]: 130 msecs 151 - without FUTEX_WAIT set [uncontended mutex]: 30 msecs 152 153I have also measured an approach where glibc does the lock notification 154[which it currently does for !pshared robust mutexes], and that took 256 155msecs - clearly slower, due to the 1 million FUTEX_WAKE syscalls 156userspace had to do. 157 158(1 million held locks are unheard of - we expect at most a handful of 159locks to be held at a time. Nevertheless it's nice to know that this 160approach scales nicely.) 161 162Implementation details 163---------------------- 164 165The patch adds two new syscalls: one to register the userspace list, and 166one to query the registered list pointer: 167 168 asmlinkage long 169 sys_set_robust_list(struct robust_list_head __user *head, 170 size_t len); 171 172 asmlinkage long 173 sys_get_robust_list(int pid, struct robust_list_head __user **head_ptr, 174 size_t __user *len_ptr); 175 176List registration is very fast: the pointer is simply stored in 177current->robust_list. [Note that in the future, if robust futexes become 178widespread, we could extend sys_clone() to register a robust-list head 179for new threads, without the need of another syscall.] 180 181So there is virtually zero overhead for tasks not using robust futexes, 182and even for robust futex users, there is only one extra syscall per 183thread lifetime, and the cleanup operation, if it happens, is fast and 184straightforward. The kernel doesn't have any internal distinction between 185robust and normal futexes. 186 187If a futex is found to be held at exit time, the kernel sets the 188following bit of the futex word: 189 190 #define FUTEX_OWNER_DIED 0x40000000 191 192and wakes up the next futex waiter (if any). User-space does the rest of 193the cleanup. 194 195Otherwise, robust futexes are acquired by glibc by putting the TID into 196the futex field atomically. Waiters set the FUTEX_WAITERS bit: 197 198 #define FUTEX_WAITERS 0x80000000 199 200and the remaining bits are for the TID. 201 202Testing, architecture support 203----------------------------- 204 205i've tested the new syscalls on x86 and x86_64, and have made sure the 206parsing of the userspace list is robust [ ;-) ] even if the list is 207deliberately corrupted. 208 209i386 and x86_64 syscalls are wired up at the moment, and Ulrich has 210tested the new glibc code (on x86_64 and i386), and it works for his 211robust-mutex testcases. 212 213All other architectures should build just fine too - but they wont have 214the new syscalls yet. 215 216Architectures need to implement the new futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic() 217inline function before writing up the syscalls (that function returns 218-ENOSYS right now). 219