Searched refs:capable (Results 1 – 15 of 15) sorted by relevance
/security/ |
D | min_addr.c | 37 if (write && !capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO)) in mmap_min_addr_handler()
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D | commoncap.c | 113 if (!capable(CAP_SYS_TIME)) in cap_settime() 1345 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, cap_capable),
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D | device_cgroup.c | 604 if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) in devcgroup_update_access()
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D | security.c | 729 return call_int_hook(capable, 0, cred, ns, cap, opts); in security_capable()
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/security/integrity/evm/ |
D | evm_secfs.c | 73 if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || (evm_initialized & EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE)) in evm_write_key() 183 if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || evm_xattrs_locked) in evm_write_xattrs()
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D | evm_main.c | 319 if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) in evm_protect_xattr()
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/security/safesetid/ |
D | lsm.c | 154 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, safesetid_security_capable)
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/security/keys/ |
D | keyctl.c | 434 if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) { in keyctl_invalidate_key() 479 if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) { in keyctl_keyring_clear() 914 if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) { in keyctl_chown_key() 1021 if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || uid_eq(key->uid, current_fsuid())) { in keyctl_setperm_key()
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D | trusted.c | 389 if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) in pcrlock()
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/security/apparmor/ |
D | policy.c | 665 bool capable = ns_capable(user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN); in policy_admin_capable() local 667 AA_DEBUG("cap_mac_admin? %d\n", capable); in policy_admin_capable() 670 return policy_view_capable(ns) && capable && !aa_g_lock_policy; in policy_admin_capable()
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D | lsm.c | 1158 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, apparmor_capable),
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/security/yama/ |
D | yama_lsm.c | 437 if (write && !capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE)) in yama_dointvec_minmax()
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/security/integrity/ima/ |
D | ima_fs.c | 392 if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) in ima_open_policy()
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D | ima_appraise.c | 486 if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) in ima_protect_xattr()
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/security/selinux/ |
D | hooks.c | 6873 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, selinux_capable),
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